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Abstract	
Title of Dissertation:  Oil spill preparedness in Sweden - Prevention, 
planning, and response for large accidents 
 
Degree:   PhD 
 
 
This dissertation has analysed the Swedish oil spill preparedness between 2010 and 
2015 by examining management, prevention, planning and response, and compared 
it to international practices. The study is based on analysis of available data, surveys 
administered to the coastal County Administrative Boards and municipalities, and 
interviews with the national oil spill experts. 
 
Oil spills can cause significant acute damage to the environment. Sweden has a long 
coastline with intense shipping traffic. This suggests a high risk of a large oil spill 
occurring, but no oil spill over 1,200 tonnes has affected the Swedish territorial 
waters or Exclusive Economic Zone. 
 
The findings show that the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency, the Oil Spill Depots, the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine 
Management, and the Oil Spill Advisory Service are central organisations to national 
oil spill preparedness. All relevant international conventions have been ratified and 
implemented, excepting the OPRC Convention requirement to have a National 
Contingency Plan for oil spills. Oil spill contingency plans exist in 79% of the 
coastal municipalities. However, only 60% of the coastal municipalities have 
conducted oil spill exercises within the last 5 years. Requirements to follow up 
evaluation recommendations were only present in 18% of the 11 real spill and 
exercises analysed. It is concluded, that in some respects, the structures of Swedish 
preparedness to handle the impact of a major oil spill somewhere on its coastline 
could prove to be inadequate. Despite this, Swedish oil spill preparedness is shown 
to be equivalent to most neighbouring countries. 
 
This dissertation establishes the strengths and weaknesses of the Swedish oil spill 
preparedness regime and calls for further development. The benefits of maintaining 
and improving the current level of preparedness far outweigh the effort, but will only 
be evident when a large oil spill occurs. 
 
Keywords:  
Oil spills, Preparedness, Management, Contingency planning, Sweden 
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ANOVA Analysis of Variance, a common statistical test comparing variable means. 
API American Petroleum Institute. 
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CLC Convention International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 
CleanSeaNet EMSA satellite surveillance system for marine pollution. 
CNDS Centre for Natural Disaster Science, a science platform in Sweden. 
Copenhagen 
Agreement 
Nordic Agreement on Cooperation regarding Pollution at Sea from Oil and Other Substances. 
CPA Crisis Preparedness Agency, a disused Swedish agency that merged with other agencies to 
become MSB. 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone. 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency, an EU agency. 
EnSaCo EU project aimed to reduce negative environmental and socio-economic impacts of an oil spill 
accident through rapid and efficient shoreline oil spill response. 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency, responsible for the Swedish environment through 
regulations, funding support, and raising environmental awareness and responsibility. 
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group of the Arctic Council. 
EU European Union. 
EUSBSR EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. 
FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, the Swedish Defence University. 
FOSC Federal On-Scene Commander, a command position in the ICS system. 
FRG Voluntary Resource Group. 
FSHex13 Fu Shan Hai Exercise 2013. 
FUND Convention International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage. 
GI Global Initiative, an umbrella programme for IMO and IPIECA, working to assist countries in 
developing national structures and capability for oil spill preparedness and response. 
GI WACAF Global Initiative for West, Central and Southern Africa. 
gt Gross tonnage, measurement of the internal volume of a ship. 
Haveriekommando Central Command for Maritime Emergencies, responsible for oil spill preparedness in 
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Germany. 
HELCOM Helsinki Commission, the Helsinki Convention secretariat. 
HELCOM RESPONSE The marine pollution response working group of HELCOM. 
HELCOM SHORE The shoreline pollution response working group of HELCOM. 
Helsinki Convention Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. 
HNS Hazardous and Noxious Substances. 
ICS Incident Command System, a standardised approach to command, control, and coordination to 
handle complex emergency responses, used primarily in the United States. 
IFOs Intermediate Fuel Oils, a type of fuel for ships. 
IMO The International Maritime Organization, the UN agency for maritime affairs, responsible for 
international maritime rules and conventions. 
IMS Incident Management System, a function-based management structure. 
Intervention 
Convention 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties. 
IOPC Fund International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. 
IOSC International Oil Spill Conference, the world’s largest oil spill conference. 
IPIECA The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, the global oil 
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ISO International Organization for Standardization. 
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assessment, contingency planning, training, and information. 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature, an environmental non-profit organisation. 
IVL IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, a non-profit research institute. 
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Kystverket Norwegian Coastal Administration, responsible for oil spill preparedness in Norway. 
LCD Lowest Common Denominator, meaning the least interested nations determine the 
progression pace. 
Likert item A statement that the respondent is asked to evaluate by giving it a quantitative value, often 
used in surveys. 
LOS Ledning och Samverkan, a MSB management and cooperation project. 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. 
MIMIC Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport by holistic safety strategies, an EU project. 
MSB Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 
responsible for civil protection and crisis management through coordination, and training. 
MSP Marine Spatial Planning. 
Municipalities Municipalities are the local representatives of the Swedish Government, responsible for local 
services, such as physical planning, schools, rescue services, and regulations. 
NCP National Contingency Plan, a national plan for responding to oil and chemical pollution. 
NSO Nationell Samverkansgrupp för Oljeskadeskydd, the National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating, consisting of representatives from SCG, MSB, OSAS, SwAM, SMA, STA, CABs, 
and SALAR and is tasked with coordinating oil spill preparedness in Sweden. 
OILRISK Applications of ecological knowledge in managing oil spill risk, an EU project. 
OPA90 United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 
OPRC Convention International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation. 
OSAS Oil Spill Advisory Service, a Swedish expert group previously funded by SwAM that gives 
advice during oil and chemical spills to private and public organisations and authorities. 
OSC On-Scene Commander, a command position in the ICS system. 
OSLTF United States Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 
OSPAR Convention Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic. 
OSPRI Caspian and Black Sea’s Oil Spill Preparedness Regional Initiative. 
OSRL Oil Spill Response Limited, an oil spill response company. 
PAHs Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons. 
PREP United States National Preparedness For Response Exercise Program. 
PSSA Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, a type of area protection assigned by IMO. 
RAC-REMPEITC-Caribe Regional Activity Center - Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training 
Center for the Wider Caribbean. 
RETOS™ A readiness evaluation tool for oil spills developed by ARPEL. 
RISKGOV Environmental Risk Governance of the Baltic Sea, an EU project. 
SafeSeaNet EMSA vessel traffic monitoring and information system. 
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SALAR Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions. 
SCG Swedish Coast Guard, the agency responsible for surveillance, enforcement of regulations, 
and environmental protection in the Swedish territorial sea and EEZ. 
Shell Royal Dutch Shell, a large international oil and gas company. 
SI Swedish Institute, an agency promoting Sweden through foreign policy, education, 
international aid, and development. 
SMA Swedish Maritime Administration, the agency responsible for maintaining sea-lanes, and 
maritime search and rescue. 
SMHI Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute. 
SOPEP Ship Oil Pollution Emergency Plan, required by MARPOL for tankers over 150 gt and other 
vessels over 400 gt. 
SRSA Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the agency predating MSB. 
SSRS Swedish Sea Rescue Society, a volunteer organisation. 
STA Swedish Transport Agency, regulates and inspects transportation systems. 
STD Standard Deviation. 
SwAM Swedish Agency for Water and Marine Management, the agency responsible for Marine 
Spatial Planning, sustainable governance, and environmental protection of the sea and 
waterways. 
Sweco Originally Swedish Consultants, the largest construction, architecture, and environmental 
engineering consultancy company in Europe. 
TOBOS Teknik for oljebekämpning till sjöss samt bekämpning och sanering av olja i strandzonen, a 
Swedish project on oil spill response. 
TWh Terawatt hours. 
UAE United Arab Emirates. 
UN United Nations. 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme. 
USCG United States Coast Guard. 
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
VRAKA Development of a protocol for risk assessment of potentially polluting shipwrecks in 
Scandinavian waters project. 
WMU World Maritime University, a postgraduate maritime university under the auspices of the IMO. 
X2 Chi-square, a type of statistical test comparing frequency distributions. 
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Key	Definitions	
Term Explanation 
Oil spill Any oil pollution from ships, pipelines, fixed installations, ports etc. 
Oil spill management The organisation of the preparedness, such as the structure, means of communication, and 
division of responsibility between the organisations. 
Oil spill planning Background knowledge and planning measures, such as risk assessments and contingency 
planning. 
Oil spill 
preparedness 
The ability to respond to oil spills and includes management, and prevention, planning, and 
response phases. 
Oil spill prevention National or international political mitigating measures, such as international conventions, industry 
standards, and legislation. 
Oil spill response The capacity to clean up oil through training and exercises on equipment and methods. 
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Chapter	1	-	Introduction	
The first chapter describes how oil enters the marine environment, the relevance of 
the Fu Shan Hai accident, and presents the research aims, questions, and dissertation 
structure. 
1.1	 Oil	in	the	environment	
Oil may enter the marine environment in different ways, for example chronic spills 
from leaking shipwrecks and operational spills from shipping, but also surface 
runoff, natural oil seeps, and catastrophic oil spills (Etkin et al., 1998; Farrington & 
McDowell, 2004; GESAMP, 2007). Approximately 3.2 million tonnes of oil enter 
the marine environment each year (Etkin et al., 1998), although estimations of this 
volume range from 0.4 to 4 million tonnes (Etkin et al., 1998; Kvenvolden & 
Cooper, 2003). A third to half of all oil entering the marine environment originates 
from natural seeps in the ocean, originating from oil-laden sediments pushed to the 
surface by natural geological processes (see Figure 1) (Farrington & McDowell, 
2004). Such seeps are usually very old and a specialised ecosystem has evolved 
around them, with organisms capable of living in an environment with a high 
concentration of oil in the surrounding water. 
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Figure 1: Global input of oil to the marine environment from different sources (Farrington & McDowell, 
2004). 
Smaller, continuous discharges of oil, for example from leaking wrecks, ships, and 
infrastructure, have sub-lethal effects at the ecosystem level (F. J. Lindgren, 
Hassellöv, & Dahllöf, 2012a; 2012b). However, oil spill impacts depend on the type 
of oil and where the oil pollution occurred (Kingston, 2002; NRC, 2003). Even larger 
organisms may suffer from continuous spills, for example thousands of seabirds are 
killed every year by smaller chronic spills in the Baltic Sea, attributed to originate 
from the shipping traffic (K. Larsson & Tydén, 2005; 2011). 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on accidental spills, which account for 10% of the oil 
entering the ocean (see Figure 1) (Farrington & McDowell, 2004). An oil spill is a 
form of pollution and is defined in this dissertation as the release of liquid petroleum 
hydrocarbons into the environment from human activities. Due to the catastrophic 
nature of the larger of these spills, the environmental (Crawford et al., 2000; 
Elmgren, Hansson, Larsson, Sundelin, & Boehm, 1983; Morales-Caselles et al., 
2008; NRC, 2003) and socioeconomic impacts (Forsman, 2007a; Rodriguez-Trigo et 
al., 2010) could be severe. However, these impacts are not directly related to the size 
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of the spill. A smaller spill at an unfortunate time and place could also result in 
severe consequences. For example, the Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska in the 
United States 1989, spilled 35,000 tonnes of oil and 35,000 seabirds died as a result. 
This stands in contrast to the Braer accident off the Shetland Islands in the United 
Kingdom 1993, when 85,000 tonnes of oil were spilled and “only” 1,500 seabirds 
died (Kingston, 2002). However, most oil spills are much smaller in volume (ITOPF, 
2015). 
1.2	 Fu	Shan	Hai		
At approximately 12:18 on Saturday 31 March 2003, the Cyprus-registered 5,200 
deadweight tonnes (dwt) container vessel Gdynia collided with China registered 
70,000 dwt bulk carrier Fu Shan Hai. This happened approximately 3 nautical miles 
north northwest of Hammer Odde on Bornholm, a Danish island off of the southern 
coast of Sweden (DMA, 2003). The weather was clear, but due to bad judgement and 
a lack of communication, Gdynia hit Fu Shan Hai amidships on her port side. 
Gdynia suffered only light damage to her prow and could later return to a shipyard in 
the Polish city Gdynia, while Fu Shan Hai immediately took in water. Swedish, 
Danish, and German authorities were alerted and responded by immediately sending 
response vessels to the area. The crew of Fu Shan Hai abandoned the sinking vessel 
at 13:50, after taking measures to minimise oil leakage. As the hours passed, the bow 
of Fu Shan Hai sank more and more and after an aborted towing attempt, the ship 
sank at 20:49 and came to rest at 65 m depth (DMA, 2003; Kustbevakningen, 
2013b). 
 
On Sunday 1 June, the Swedish Coast Guard reported that the wreck had leaked 
approximately 40 m3 of oil and that this oil was moving towards the Swedish coast 
(Kustbevakningen, 2013b). Fu Shan Hai had a cargo of 66,000 tonnes of pot ash, 
potassium chloride fertilizer, and carried 1,672 tonnes of fuel oil, 110 tonnes of 
diesel, and 35 tonnes of lubricating oils (DMA, 2003; Ljungkvist, 2003). At 19:00, 
the local Swedish rescue service, Southeast Skåne’s Fire and Rescue Service, was 
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alerted and was sent an oil spill drift projection from the Coast Guard. This was the 
first such oil spill response for the rescue service. An oil spill contingency plan did 
not exist and the organisation had no knowledge about oil spills at sea. There was 
even some confusion as to whether the rescue service was responsible at all. The 
response procedure followed the normal emergency response routines and the 
relevant organisations were alerted. Additionally, the closest of the Swedish Oil Spill 
Depots, which are the regional oil spill response equipment stockpiles, was called in 
(Ljungkvist, 2003). 
 
On Monday 2 June, the rescue service staff met and were briefed by the Coast Guard 
that oil was projected to reach the shoreline within 24 hours (Kustbevakningen, 
2013b; Ljungkvist, 2003). This was the starting point of the Emergency Response 
phase for the rescue service, which is legally defined as the initial response phase of 
any rescue operation (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). An oil spill response strategy was 
formed, response plans were drawn, communications were set up, and response 
priorities were made. 
 
During the following three weeks, there was intense activity around the oil spill. The 
originally planned 50 responders peaked at 500 persons, in addition to the staff that 
was handling management, documentation, logistics, and other roles. Simultaneously 
at sea, six Swedish Coast Guard vessels, four Danish, and two German response 
vessels were collecting oil (Kustbevakningen, 2013b). The Swedish Armed Forces, 
with its conscripts and volunteer organisations, turned out to be of great help during 
the response. 
 
On Saturday 7 June, the Emergency Response phase ended and the clean-up phase 
began. This meant that the responsibility (and therefore, cost) was shifted directly 
from the rescue service to the affected municipality, Ystad. In practice, much of the 
work and response organisation remained the same as before, with the military 
conscripts and rescue service personnel cleaning up the beach. By then, the event had 
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triggered massive media interest in Sweden and several ministers, including the 
Swedish Prime Minister at the time, visited the clean-up sites (Ljungkvist, 2003). 
 
The oil came ashore in several waves from the still leaking wreck along 60 km of the 
shore, and 36.3 km of oiled beach was cleaned in total. A total of 3,900 tonnes of 
oily sand was collected on land and 375 m3 of oil and water emulsion were collected 
by the rescue service (Ljungkvist, 2003). A further approximately 1,000 tonnes of oil 
emulsion was collected by the Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen, 2013b). The impacted 
beaches had no trace of oil when revisited four years later (Martinsson & Fejes, 
2007). The cost of the response operation for the Swedish Coast Guard amounted to 
10 million SEK (~1.3 million USD) and the cost for the municipalities amounted to 
15 million SEK (~2 million USD). The total cost, including clean-up and the cost of 
the loss of the cargo and vessel amounted to over 1 billion SEK (~130 million USD). 
 
The evaluations of the oil spill response reported that despite not having an oil spill 
contingency plan, the ad-hoc nature of the response worked well concerning 
management, response, cooperation, and volunteers (Fejes, Lindgren, & Mahlander, 
2004; Ljungkvist, 2003). What did not work as well were the oil spill drift 
projections, communication between the different parties involved, and the division 
of responsibilities. It was pointed out that the response was very lucky with the 
seasonal timing of the event when it came to environmental effects. An easily 
cleaned sandy beach dominated the impacted shore and the weather was clear with 
mild winds for most of the period. Moreover, plenty of staff was accessible in the 
form of the local Swedish Armed Forces and the rescue service had more than 24 
hours to prepare for the arrival of the oil. All of these factors added to the claimed 
success of the response, but these extremely fair conditions cannot and should not be 
counted on for future spills. 
 
The oil spill response to the Fu Shan Hai accident was unprecedented in Sweden at 
the time and laid the foundation for the Swedish national work on oil spill 
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preparedness during the late 2000s and early 2010s, especially for contingency 
planning. In this way, it laid the foundation for the work on Swedish oil spill 
preparedness that is analysed in this dissertation. 
1.3	 Aim	
The aim of this dissertation is to better understand the state of oil spill preparedness 
in Sweden today and use the findings to recommend improvements. Oil spills refer to 
any oil pollution from ships, pipelines, fixed installations, ports etc. Oil spill 
preparedness refers to the ability to respond to oil spills and includes overall 
management, prevention, planning, and response. This is done by analysing Swedish 
preparedness as a case study and explaining the causes of any deficiencies in national 
preparedness. Any oil spills affecting the Swedish territorial sea or Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) are considered. The study seeks to answer the overall 
research question: 
 
Is Sweden prepared to handle a large oil spill? 
 
This question is divided into five sub-questions about Swedish oil spill preparedness: 
 
1. Is the oil spill preparedness regime effectively managed? 
2. Is the political commitment for oil spill prevention sufficient? 
3. Are the existing contingency planning measures sufficient? 
4. Are the existing response measures sufficient? 
5. Is the oil spill preparedness regime equivalent to international practice? 
1.4	 Dissertation	structure	
The dissertation is divided into ten chapters. Chapters 1 to 4 describe the background 
of the dissertation and explain the methodology used. Chapters 5 to 9 present and 
discuss the results of the study. Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation with reflections 
and recommendations. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The first chapter describes how oil is entering the marine environment, the Fu Shan 
Hai accident and its significance, and presents the research aims, questions, and the 
dissertation structure. 
 
Chapter 2 - Background 
The second chapter analyses current trends in oil trade and transport, and current 
trends in oil spills globally and around Sweden specifically. It also describes the 
behaviour and impacts of oil spills. 
 
Chapter 3 - Literature Review 
The third chapter gives a critical review of oil spill preparedness by examining 
management, prevention, planning, and response discourse in Sweden and 
internationally. 
 
Chapter 4 - Methodology 
The fourth chapter explains the research context, scope, and rationale. It justifies the 
hypotheses, approach, and methods used. The Oil Spill Preparedness model used in 
this dissertation is explained and compared to other frameworks. The data collection 
is elaborated, the analyses explained, and quality control and research ethics are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 5 - Management 
The first of the five results chapters focuses on the management part of oil spill 
preparedness and specifically the Swedish management structure. The oil spill 
preparedness network in Sweden is mapped and compared to the formal roles of the 
organisations and the opinions of the survey respondents. 
Chapter 6 - Prevention 
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The second of the five results chapters focuses on the prevention part of oil spill 
preparedness and specifically the Swedish political commitment to and 
implementation of, international legislation related to oil spills. International 
cooperation agreements and the Swedish role in them are also analysed. 
 
Chapter 7 - Planning 
The third of the five results chapters focuses on the planning part of oil spill 
preparedness and specifically the Swedish system for oil spill contingency planning. 
Planning measures for the governmental agencies, County Administrative Boards, 
and the status of oil spill contingency planning in Sweden are analysed. 
 
Chapter 8 - Response 
The fourth of the five results chapters focuses on the oil spill preparedness part of 
response and specifically the Swedish training and exercise system. Training 
measures, exercises and equipment for Swedish governmental agencies, County 
Administrative Boards and municipalities are examined. 
 
Chapter 9 - International Practice 
The fifth and final of the results chapters compares international and Swedish oil 
spill preparedness practices. Selected measures are quantified and a standardised 
evaluation tool is used to compare Sweden to neighbouring countries. 
 
Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
The final chapter summarises findings of the dissertation and explains the 
implications of the causal relationships. Recommendations, limitations, and future 
research topics are also presented.  
1.5	 Conclusion	
This introductory chapter presents the extent of oil pollution from accidents and 
highlights the importance of the 2003 Fu Shan Hai accident for Sweden. The 
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experiences of the management and the response to the spill came to influence and 
invigorate the development of oil spill preparedness in Sweden afterwards. Thanks to 
fortunate circumstances, such as the availability of military personnel, a full day of 
preparation for the local rescue service, agreeable weather, oil impacting on a less 
sensitive shoreline type, and scarce wildlife at that time of the year, the response was 
considered a success. However, these circumstances cannot and should not be 
counted on for future oil spills. 
 
What is the state of oil spill preparedness in Sweden in 2015, twelve years after the 
Fu Shan Hai accident? There is a need to thoroughly examine the status of oil spill 
preparedness in Sweden, and if necessary, improve it. 
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Chapter	2	-	Background	
The second chapter analyses current trends in oil trade and transport, and current 
trends in oil spills globally and around Sweden specifically. Environmental and 
economic impacts of oil spills are also discussed in a global and Swedish context. 
2.1	 Oil	trade	and	transport	
Despite current initiatives to move to sustainable sources of energy and renewable 
fuels, global demand for crude oil and oil products is still increasing. Demand rose 
from 2.7 million tonnes per day (t/d) in 1960 to 12.3 million t/d in 2013 (OPEC, 
2014a). The industry anticipates an increase in demand from 12.3 million t/d to 13.1 
million t/d in 2019, related to the expected consumption increase in Asia (OPEC, 
2014b). 
 
Tanker vessels transport most of the oil from production regions all over the world to 
consumption markets in Asia, Europe, and North America. There are approximately 
47,500 ships of more than 1,000 gross tonnage (gt) in the world shipping fleet 
(UNCTAD, 2014), excluding fishing and naval vessels. Approximately 4,900 of 
these are oil tankers, with a combined capacity of 470 million deadweight tonnes 
(dwt) (OPEC, 2014a). Together, these tankers transported 1.8 billion tonnes of crude 
oil in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014). Industry reports shows a gradual shift in the consumer 
market, with a decreasing export of oil and gas from the Middle East to Europe and 
North America and an increasing export to Asia (OPEC, 2014b). Increased transport 
logically corresponds to an increased risk of oil spill accidents, but enhanced ship 
safety measures and crew training has developed in parallel and the number of oil 
spills greater than seven tonnes has declined since 1975 (see Figure 2) (ITOPF, 
2015). 
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Figure 2: Seaborne trade of crude oil and product vessels of 60,000 dwt and over from 1970 to 2013 and 
number of recorded oil spills greater than seven tonnes during the same period (ITOPF, 2015). Figure used 
with permission. 
However, it is not just tankers that pose a risk for oil spills. All types of ships carry 
various types of bunker fuel oil, diesels and lubricants for their engines and 
generators. The largest container vessels have more fuel in their tanks than small 
tankers carry as cargo. Even ships that follow all international safety standards and 
have the latest technology and safety measures installed, run the risk of causing oil 
spill accidents. Additionally, oil rigs and terminals report accidents resulting in oil 
spills, estimated to be 3% of the total oil input to the marine environment (Farrington 
& McDowell, 2004). Most of these are smaller leaks, but large blowouts 
occasionally occur, for example Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
2.1.1	 Oil	trade	and	transport	around	Sweden	
The Baltic Sea is one of the busiest shipping areas in the world, with approximately 
2,000 vessels in the area at any given moment (HELCOM, 2011b). Around 15% of 
global shipping trade is transported on the Baltic Sea, including 11% of the global oil 
transport. In 2012, there were a total of 407,425 crossings of Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) lines reported in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 2014a). This 
is an increase of 8.2% from 376,671 crossings in 2006, although Baltic Sea crossings 
have been fairly stable between 2006 and 2012 (see Figure 3) (HELCOM, 2014a). 
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Figure 3: Annual total crossings of HELCOM AIS lines in the Baltic Sea by ship type (HELCOM, 2014a). 
AIS lines are defined geographic lines and the number of crossings from one side of 
the line to the other is recorded. This is done by the AIS transponder that all ships 
above 300 gt are required to have by the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 
1974). 
 
These data include AIS lines from the inner Baltic Sea up to the Skaw on the west 
coast of Sweden. This includes the large Swedish west coast ports of Gothenburg and 
Brofjorden, and gives an accurate estimation of the shipping activity in all waters 
around Sweden, not exclusively the Baltic Sea. What is missing from these data are 
vessel movements in Swedish inland waters. 
 
The volume of oil transported in the Baltic Sea has also increased during the 2000s, 
as data from the 16 largest Baltic Sea ports show (see Figure 4) (MSB, 2013b). 
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Figure 4: Oil transportation from the 16 largest ports in the Baltic Sea in million tonnes (MSB, 2013b). 
The increase is largely due to the expansion of Russian oil ports in the Gulf of 
Finland: Primorsk, Vysotsk, and Ust-Luga (Brunila & Storgård, 2012; Yurchenko, 
2014). The 2001 completion of the Baltic Pipeline System expansion to the existing 
Druzhba system connected the Russian oil fields in the West Siberia and Urals-Volga 
regions to the Baltic Sea through the Primorsk oil terminal outside of Saint 
Petersburg (see Figure 5) (Brunila & Storgård, 2012; EIA, 2015; Franklin, 2010; 
Petersen et al., 2011). The 2012 completion of the Baltic Pipeline System II rerouted 
all oil previously destined for Europe to the new port of Ust-Luga in the Baltic Sea, 
following Russian disagreements with Belarus over payments.  
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Figure 5: The Druzhba pipeline system and the connections to the Baltic Pipeline System 1 and 2 
(Franklin, 2010). 
In total, oil turnover from these Russian Baltic Sea ports increased from 10 million 
tonnes in 2001 to 129 million tonnes in 2014 (see Figure 6) (PASP, 2015). 
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Figure 6: Turnover of million tonnes of oil exported from the largest Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland 
(PASP, 2015). 
Future plans are to increase the Russian crude oil exports from the current 224 
million tonnes in 2014 to 280 million tonnes by 2035 with a 3 million tonnes 
increase in 2015, according to Russia’s Energy Minister (Soldatkin, Golubkova, 
Korsunskaya, Lyrchikova, & Astakhova, 2015). This includes export from the large 
ports in Novorossiysk in the Black Sea (exporting 66 million tonnes in 2014) and 
Kozmino outside Vladivostok in the Pacific Ocean (exporting 24 million tonnes in 
2014), and will take place in spite of low market prices for crude oil (EIA, 2015). 
Russia has been diverting crude oil to its refineries in the wake of sanctions over the 
conflict in Ukraine and falling crude oil prices, but aims to increase exports again 
following a modernisation programme of its refineries (Soldatkin et al., 2015). Oil 
export from Russia to China is also increasing, with plans to export 31 million tonnes 
in 2015, compared to 3 million tonnes in 2014. 
 
Tanker traffic is expected to keep increasing in the Baltic Sea and larger ships are 
expected to replace smaller vessels, as these are more cost-effective (Brunila & 
Storgård, 2012; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 2012). However, the 17 m draught 
restriction in the Danish Store Bælt strait, the 7.7 m restriction in the Sound between 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
16 
Denmark and Sweden, and the relatively shallow ports in the Baltic Sea limit ship 
size (Antoniewicz et al., 2007; NGA, 2014) to the B-Max or Baltimax class with an 
upper limit of 200,000 dwt (Stena Bulk, 2012). Larger oil tankers cannot enter the 
Baltic Sea and are often found off northeastern Denmark, lightering from smaller 
feeder tankers that can enter the Baltic Sea. 
2.2	 Oil	spills	
The first oil tanker accident that led to a large oil spill was Torrey Canyon, which ran 
aground on the Seven Stones reef off of the southwestern tip of the United Kingdom 
on 18 March 1967. Torrey Canyon released its full cargo of 119,000 tonnes of crude 
oil during the following 12 days, polluting large parts of the coast of the southern 
United Kingdom and northwestern France (ITOPF, 2014b; Smith, 1968). The 
incident led to the development of important international conventions, in the 1969 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC 
Convention), the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND Convention), 
and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) (IMO, 1978; IOPC Funds, 2011), discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Since then, the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) have 
collected information on over 1,800 oil spills of more than seven tonnes (ITOPF, 
2014a). However, there are far more spills that remain unreported or are below seven 
tonnes, as indicated for example by aerial surveillance in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 
2014c). The distribution of the number of oil spills and average number of spills per 
decade indicates a clear decreasing trend since the 1970s (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Number of oil spills between 1970 and 2013 and average number of spills per decade (ITOPF, 
2014a). Figure used with permission. 
Indeed, in 2014 only five spills of seven tonnes or over were recorded (MarEx, 
2015). The decreasing number of spills between 1970 and 2013 (see Figure 7) have 
naturally led to a decrease in volume of oil spilled (see Figure 8) (ITOPF, 2014a). 
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Figure 8: Recorded volume of oil spilled of more than seven tonnes per accident between 1970 and 2013, 
with selected larger oil spills marked (ITOPF, 2014a). Figure used with permission. 
The impact of a selected few dominant and named oil spills is evident in the annual 
quantity for the respective years. 
2.2.1	 Oil	spills	around	Sweden	
No large oil spills have occurred around Sweden on the same scale as highly 
publicised international accidents, such as Prestige in Spain in 2002 or Exxon Valdez 
in the United States in 1989 (see Table 1) (Anders Jahres Rederi, 2012; 
“Environmental Implications of Oil Spills from Shipping Accidents,” 2010; 
GESAMP, 2007; HELCOM, 1998; 2001; Rambøll Barents, 2010; Rylander, 2005; 
SST, 1983; 1985; Sveriges Riksdag, 1973; Veiga & Wonham, 2002). 
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Table 1: Largest oil spills around Sweden (Anders Jahres Rederi, 2012; “Environmental Implications of 
Oil Spills from Shipping Accidents,” 2010; GESAMP, 2007; HELCOM, 1998; 2001; Rambøll Barents, 
2010; Rylander, 2005; SST, 1983; 1985; Sveriges Riksdag, 1973; Veiga & Wonham, 2002). 
Name Year Location Spill size 
(tonnes) 
Globe Asimi 1981 Klaipėda, Soviet Union (Lithuania) 16,000 
Antonio Gramsci 1979 Ventspils, Soviet Union (Latvia) 5,500 
Ludwig Svoboda 1985 Ventspils, Soviet Union (Latvia) 5,000 
North Pacific 2001 Klaipėda, Lithuania 3,427 
Baltic Carrier 2001 Kadetrenden, Denmark 2,700 
Fu Shan Hai 2003 Ystad, Sweden 1,200 
Jawachta 1973 Trelleborg, Sweden 1,000 
Volgoneft 263 1990 Karlskrona, Sweden 1,000 
Tsesis 1977 Stockholm, Sweden 1,000 
José Martin 1981 Dalarö, Sweden 1,000 
Irini 1970 Nynäshamn, Sweden 1,000 
Golden Star 1976 Baltic Sea, Sweden 996 
Sivona 1982 The Sound, Sweden/Denmark 800 
Full City 2009 Langesund, Norway 700 
Antonio Gramsci 1987 Vaarlshti, Finland 650 
Esso Nordica 1970 Pellinki, Finland 600 
Golden Trader 2011 Impact on Tjörn, Sweden 500 
Pensa 1970 Hailuoto, Finland 500 
San Nikitas 1983 East of Söderhamn, Sweden 500 
Irenes Sincerity 1976 Baltic Sea, Sweden 500 
Sefir 1981 Öland, Sweden 498 
 
Many of these ships were not tankers spilling cargo oil, but rather ships spilling 
bunker fuel. The two most recent accidents were Golden Trader, which spilled oil 
off the north coast of Denmark in September 2011 and impacted the Swedish west 
coast island Tjörn several days later, and a pine-oil spill from a product tank on land 
in the port of Söderhamn in December 2011. The largest oil spill on record in the 
Baltic Sea is Globe Asimi outside Klaipėda in Lithuania 1981 (then part of the Soviet 
Union), which spilled approximately 16,000 tonnes of oil. In Swedish waters, the 
largest confirmed spill is Fu Shan Hai, described in the introduction, off the Swedish 
south coast in 2003, which spilled 1,200 tonnes of oil. 
 
In addition to these larger oil spill accidents, there are many smaller accidental or 
deliberate discharges which may not be reported. These small, chronic oil spills have 
a different impact compared to the larger catastrophic oil spills (K. Larsson & Tydén, 
2011; F. J. Lindgren, 2012), which will be elaborated on later in this chapter. Small 
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operational discharges of up to 15 ppm concentration, for example from propeller 
lubricants and bilge water, are allowed from ships under the MARPOL Convention, 
with some restrictions depending on the location of the ship (IMO, 1978). Oil spills 
in the Baltic Sea observed via aerial surveillance have declined by 77% between 
1988 and 2014 (HELCOM, 2015). The decline in reported spills is evident despite 
increased surveillance time, meaning that the number of spills observed per flight 
hour has decreased substantially (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Number of confirmed oil spills and number of aerial surveillance flight hours between 1988 and 
2014 in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 2015). 
There were between 105 and 149 shipping accidents annually between 2004 and 
2012, with 4 to 13 of these leading to pollution (see Figure 10) (HELCOM, 2014a). 
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Figure 10: Number of shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea between 2004 and 2012 (HELCOM, 2014a). 
This trend is fairly stable, with an average of 131 accidents per year, despite 
increasing traffic (HELCOM, 2012). This likely reflects the improved safety 
measures taken in the Baltic Sea, as well as better training of the crew, and improved 
equipment on board (COWI, 2012c). 
2.3	 Oil	spill	impacts	
Even a single oil spill can have significant consequences, both for the environment 
and the economy in the affected area. Well known accidents such as Exxon Valdez in 
Alaska in the United States 1989, Erika off Bretagne in France 1999, and Prestige 
off Galicia in Spain 2002, have all led to much research on the effects of oil spills, 
examining different aspects of environmental and socioeconomic impacts. 
2.3.1	 Oil	
Oil consist primarily of hydrogen and carbon molecules collectively called 
hydrocarbons (NRC, 2003). Hydrocarbons can be further subdivided into non-
petroleum based oils, such as animal fats and vegetable oil, and petroleum based oils, 
such as crude and refined oil. Petroleum hydrocarbons are thus naturally occurring 
hydrocarbon substances and can occur in gas, liquid, or solid form, depending on the 
length of the carbon chain (Kingston, 2002). Hydrocarbons are formed by the decay 
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of organic substances trapped within sedimentary rocks. High temperature and 
pressure convert the trapped matter into hydrocarbons over millions of years.  
2.3.1.1	 Crude	oil	
Liquid hydrocarbons found in nature are referred to as crude oil. Crude oil is the raw 
version of oil and the substance that is extracted from oil wells. This oil is the most 
complex one, containing hundreds of different hydrocarbon molecules and other 
organic and inorganic substances, such as sulphur, nitrogen, and oxygen, as well as 
metals such as iron, vanadium, nickel, and chromium. Crude oil is considered to be 
sweet if it has a sulphur content less than 1% weight and sour if it is more than 1% 
weight. Crude oil contains lighter hydrocarbon fractions that are refined into 
kerosene (airplane fuel), petroleum (gasoline) and diesel (fuel for cars and trucks), 
medium fractions that are refined into different grades of Intermediate Fuel Oils 
(IFOs, ship bunker fuel), and heavy fractions such as asphalt (used in road 
construction). Oil density is measured as American Petroleum Institute (API) 
specific gravity at 20° C. It is considered to be heavy if it consists of longer 
hydrocarbon chains and has an API gravity of 22° or less, medium if the API gravity 
is between 22 and 38°, and light if it consists of shorter chains and has an API 
gravity above 38° (UBS, 2004). The composition of crude oil varies with its 
geographical source (Wang et al., 2003), and this is why the industry often refers to 
different crude oils by their place of origin. For example, some market benchmarks 
are West Texas Intermediate Crude, Brent Crude, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Dubai crude. There are also blended crudes, which mixes oil from different places of 
origin, for example Russia’s main export Urals Blend, consisting of heavy sour 
crudes from the Urals-Volga region and light sweet crudes from West Siberia (EIA, 
2015). 
 
Crude oil can be categorised into saturates (alkanes and cycloparaffins), aromatics 
(mono- and polycyclic), resins (aggregates of pyridines, quinolones, carbazoles, 
thiophenes, sulfoxides, and amides), and asphaltenes (aggregates of polyaromatics, 
naphtenic acids, sulphides, polyhydric phenols, fatty acids, and metalporphyrins) 
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(Sugiura, Ishihara, Shimauchi, & Harayama, 1996). Alkanes and cycloalkanes 
normally constitute about 80% of the oil and have similar properties. The remaining 
hydrocarbons are mostly aromatic, meaning the molecules are unsaturated and made 
up of benzene rings. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) belong to this 
group. One additional group of hydrocarbons that occurs in varying amounts up to 
10% in crude oil is the asphaltenes, which are the heaviest crude oil molecules. Oil 
with a high proportion of asphaltenes tends to be thick and similar to asphalt. 
2.3.1.2	 Polycyclic	Aromatic	Hydrocarbons	(PAHs)	
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs), also known as Polyaromatic 
Hydrocarbons or Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons, can be found in nature as a 
component of crude oil. PAHs are created when coal or carbohydrates are heated 
without sufficient oxygen to cause complete combustion (Wang et al., 1999). This 
can happen in industrial processes or in car engines. The simplest form is called 
benzene and consists of six carbon atoms in a ring with attached hydrogen atoms. 
PAHs are generally fat-soluble and in some cases bioaccumulating (Gehle, 2009; 
Jenssen, 1996). Under certain conditions, PAHs adhere to sedimenting particles in 
aquatic environments, where they can persist for a long time with little degradation 
(Jewett, Dean, Woodin, Hoberg, & Stegeman, 2002; Peterson et al., 2003; Wang, 
Fingas, Owens, Sigouin, & Brown, 2001). Some PAHs are slightly toxic or non-
toxic, while others are strong carcinogens and mutagens in animals and humans (for 
example benzene) (Bowyer et al., 2003; Gehle, 2009; Jenssen, 1996; Lerda, 2010; 
Nielsen, Jørgensen, Larsen, & Poulsen, 1996; Peterson et al., 2003). The toxicity of 
PAHs depends on the composition of the different molecules in the compound. The 
standard method for reporting PAHs is the individual concentration of 16 common 
and well studied PAHs (Naphthalene, Acenaphthene, Acenaphthylene, Anthracene, 
Phenanthrene, Fluorene, Fluoranthene, Benzo(a)anthracene, Chrysene, Pyrene, 
Benzo(a)pyrene, Benzo(b)fluoranthene, Benzo(k)fluoranthene, 
Dibenz(a,h)anthracene, Benzo(g,h,i)perylene, and Indeno[1,2,3-cd]pyrene), and the 
total concentration of these is often called the 16 USEPA PAHs, after the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (Bojes & Pope, 2007; NRC, 2003). 
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2.3.2	 Oil	behaviour	
Once oil gets into the water, several different processes start to affect the behaviour 
of the oil (see Figure 11). These processes are collectively called weathering and 
their relative importance varies with time and the characteristics of the oil 
(“Environmental Implications of Oil Spills from Shipping Accidents,” 2010; ITOPF, 
2011e; Kingston, 2002; Singsaas & Lewis, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 11: Oil spill weathering processes in water (ITOPF, 2011e). Figure used with permission. 
2.3.2.1	 Spreading	
As soon as oil is spilled, it will start to spread out over the sea surface (Kingston, 
2002). The speed of the spreading depends on the viscosity and the volume of the oil, 
and waves, turbulence, tides, and currents. Light and fluid oil will generally spread 
faster than heavy and thick oils, but spreading is far from uniform. As the oil spreads, 
it changes colour from black or dark brown to iridescent and silver, and fragments 
into patches. In open water, wind tends to cause oil spills to form bands parallel to 
the wind direction. 
2.3.2.2	 Evaporation	
The lightest and most volatile components of the oil will evaporate within a few 
minutes (Kingston, 2002). The rate of evaporation depends primarily on temperature, 
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but sea state and wind also contribute. The greater the proportion of compounds with 
low boiling points, for example carbon molecules with only a few carbon atoms, the 
greater the evaporation. The spreading rate of the oil also affects evaporation, as the 
rate of evaporation is proportional to the surface area. Spills of refined products, such 
as diesel and kerosene, may evaporate completely within a few hours. This 
evaporation of light components may cause human health hazards (Janjua et al., 
2006) and increase risk of fire and explosion in confined areas (ITOPF, 2011e). 
2.3.2.3	 Dispersion	
The rate of dispersion depends on the properties of the oil and the sea state (API, 
2013e; Kingston, 2002; Wang et al., 2003). Low viscosity oil in the presence of 
breaking waves will disperse fast. Wave action at the surface will break up the oil 
slick into droplets of varying sizes and mix them into the water column. Smaller 
droplets tend to remain in the water and larger drops may rise back to the surface, 
where they could reaggregate into larger slicks or spread into a thin film. The 
dispersed oil mixes into increasing volumes of water, resulting in rapid reduction of 
oil concentration. The increased surface area presented by the oil droplets enhances 
the effect of other processes, such as biodegradation, dissolution, and sedimentation.  
 
Applying dispersants may speed up this process, if applied within a narrow window 
of opportunity, before the oil becomes emulsified. However, viscous oils tend to not 
disperse at all, even with dispersants. In Sweden, the Coast Guard vessels have 
equipment to apply dispersants. However, as this practice is discouraged by the 
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM, 2013a), dispersants are in practice not used in the 
Baltic Sea or on the west coast. 
2.3.2.4	 Emulsification	
Oil in water tends to absorb water and form what is called water-in-oil emulsion, 
sometimes referred to as mousse or chocolate mousse because of its colour and 
consistency (Daling, Moldestad, Johansen, Lewis, & Rødal, 2003; Kingston, 2002). 
Mousse can increase the volume of oil by up to five times. Thick, viscous oils tend to 
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take up water more slowly. The asphaltene compounds can coat the water droplets in 
the emulsion and increase stability. Stable emulsions may contain as much as 70% 
water and are often semi-solid, have a brown orange or yellow colour, and are highly 
persistent (Daling et al., 2003). Less stable emulsions can separate into oil and water 
under calm conditions or when heated by sunlight. Formation of emulsions reduces 
the rate of other weathering processes and is the main reason for the persistence of 
light and medium crude oils on the surface or on shore. 
2.3.2.5	 Dissolution	
The rate and extent of dissolution of hydrocarbon molecules in water depends on the 
composition of the oil, dispersion, water temperature, wave action, and spreading. 
Heavy oil molecules are virtually insoluble in seawater, while lighter molecules may 
dissolve (Kingston, 2002). However, lighter compounds are also volatile and 
evaporate 10 to 1,000 times faster than they dissolve. Thus, dissolved hydrocarbons 
in seawater rarely exceed 1 ppm and dissolution is not an important factor for oil 
spill mass balance calculations. 
2.3.2.6	 Photo-oxidation	
Hydrocarbons can react with oxygen under the influence of sunlight, either leading 
to the formation of persistent tars or soluble products (“Environmental Implications 
of Oil Spills from Shipping Accidents,” 2010; ITOPF, 2011e; Kingston, 2002). 
However, the effect of photo-oxidation is minor compared to other weathering 
processes. Thick layers of viscous oil or emulsions tend to oxidise and form 
persistent residues instead of degrading. This can be observed in tar balls that wash 
up on shore after an oil spill, which consist of a solid outer crust of oxidised oil and 
sediment, and a softer and less weathered core. 
2.3.2.7	 Sedimentation	
Dispersed oil droplets can interact with organic matter and sediment particles in the 
water column, until the droplets become heavy enough to sink to the sea floor 
(Kingston, 2002). Water columns rich in suspended particles, such as river mouths 
and estuaries, provide favourable conditions for sedimentation of oil droplets. 
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Microorganisms may also ingest oil, which will then sink to the seafloor as excreted 
faecal pellets. Most oils are lighter than water and will remain afloat, but will sink if 
sediment is attached. Some oils will sink if burned, since the fire will consume the 
lighter components and create heavier pyrogenic products. In rough seas, denser oil 
can be found just below the sea surface, masking its presence from observations by 
ship or aircraft. Sedimentation is one of the long-term processes that lead to 
accumulation of spilled oil in the marine environment. 
2.3.2.8	 Shore	interaction	
Oil interaction with the shore depends primarily on the substrate and the wave 
exposure (Kingston, 2002). Sinking is often the result on sandy beaches, where the 
sand and oil are mixed together by wave action (API, 2009). Seasonal cycles of 
sediment build up can result in oil layers to be buried and uncovered. Often, the 
heavy sand and oil mixture is washed off the beach into the near-shore water, where 
this mix separates in the water column. The sand sinks to the bottom and the oil 
washes up on the shore again, to be mixed with new sand. Oil can also be trampled 
into the ground, for example by workers during a clean-up. 
 
Muddy shores and marshes are common on shores with low wave energy (API, 
2013f; NRT, 2010; Zhu, Venosa, Suidan, & Lee, 2004). Oil does not usually 
penetrate into these fine sediments, but remains on the surface. However, burrowing 
animals may dig holes, which may cause less viscous oils to penetrate deeper into the 
ground (Jewett et al., 2002). Oil can also be incorporated into fine grain sediments 
during storms, where fine mud particles are suspended in water and mixed with the 
oil droplets, before settling into the sediment as the storm abates. In sheltered areas 
contaminated sediments may remain for long periods of time without any 
degradation taking place (Wang et al., 2001). 
 
On sheltered pebble and shingle shores and on rocky shores with cliffs and 
plattforms, high viscosity oils can form dense asphalt pavements when the surface 
layer of the oil oxidises. These asphalt pavements may persist for decades if left 
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undisturbed (Wang et al., 2001). Floating oil can penetrate readily between the 
shingles, under rocks, and into crevices and is then protected from sea action and 
weather. This makes oil spills in this environment difficult and time consuming to 
clean up. 
2.3.2.9	 Biodegradation	
Seawater contains a wide range of micro-organisms that are capable of metabolising 
oil compounds, such as bacteria, moulds, yeasts, fungi, algae, and protozoa (Brakstad 
& Bonaunet, 2006; Kingston, 2002; Pritchard, 1991; Sugiura et al., 1996). These 
organisms are present in seawater everywhere, but are more common in areas with 
natural seeps or chronically polluted waters, for example near urban centres or 
industry discharges. The main factors affecting the rate and extent of biodegradation 
are the microorganism composition and numbers, temperature, access to nitrogen, 
phosphorous and oxygen, and the characteristics of the oil, which vary tremendously. 
The end products of biodegradation are carbon dioxide and water. Once the 
biodegradation process begins, the organism community will develop and expand 
rapidly until it is limited by nutrients or oxygen deficiency. The smaller molecules 
are generally consumed faster and some of the largest molecules are broken down 
very slowly. 
2.3.3	 Environmental	impacts	
Environmental impacts of oil spills are well documented in the literature (Elmgren et 
al., 1983; Gehle, 2009; Kingston, 2002; Lerda, 2010; Lindén, Elmgren, & Boehm, 
1979; F. J. Lindgren, 2012; NRC, 2003; Peterson et al., 2003; Smith, 1968). In 
general, the marine environment has a strong capacity to recover naturally from 
single events of environmental damage, such as that caused by occasional oil spills 
(Lindén et al., 1979; Martinsson & Fejes, 2007; NRC, 2003). The primary cause of 
damage to the environment is through acute toxicity and through smothering (NRC, 
2003). The damage itself is dependent on the type of oil spilled (Lindén, 1976) and 
how quickly it disperses from the sensitive areas and organisms (Bowyer et al., 2003; 
Moreira, Moreira-Santos, Ribeiro, & Guilhermino, 2004; Peteiro, Labarta, & 
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Fernández-Reiriz, 2007). The most vulnerable organisms are sessile and therefore 
cannot move out of the way of an oil spill (F. J. Lindgren, Hassellöv, & Dahllöf, 
2012a). Saltmarshes and mangrove areas are considered the most sensitive habitats 
(Baker, 1982; Chan & Baba, 2009; Lindén & Pålsson, 2013; Wang et al., 2001; Zhu, 
Venosa, Suidan, & Lee, 2001). Seabirds are also particularly at risk, since they may 
be drawn to the calm areas that oil slicks can generate on the sea surface 
(Camphuysen & Heubeck, 2001; Heubeck et al., 2003; Kingston, 2002; Wolfaardt, 
Underhill, Altwegg, Visagie, & Williams, 2008). This could have a lesser or greater 
impact on the bird population as a whole, depending on factors such as how many 
birds are impacted and species vulnerability. Some oiled birds may not survive for 
long when released back into the wild after cleaning or may have difficulty breeding 
successfully, depending on the species. Short-term environmental impacts can be 
severe, but long-term damage is uncommon, unless specific factors allow the oil to 
remain (Herkül & Kotta, 2012; Jewett et al., 2002; Singsaas & Lewis, 2011; Wang et 
al., 2001). Oil spill contamination can persist for several years after an oil spill in 
cold areas or encased in ice (Jewett et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2001), and areas of salt 
marshes or mangrove swamps even for decades (Kingston, 2002). In warmer 
climates, natural degradation of the oil is relatively fast and the environment may be 
restored within a few years and even faster if the worst of the oil has been cleaned 
up. 
 
However, an oil spill at a unfavourable time of the year could potentially affect the 
majority of a population of a vulnerable or endangered species (Kingston, 2002; K. 
Larsson & Tydén, 2005). For example, the Treasure oil spill in South Africa in June 
2000, impacted the endemic population of African penguins, Spheniscus demersus, 
categorised as vulnerable on the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species (Crawford et al., 2000; Wolfaardt et al., 
2008). The spill oiled over 19,000 birds when it occurred between Dassen and 
Robben islands, which supported the largest and third largest colony of African 
penguins at the time, and accounted for about 40% of the total population. In this 
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case, approximately 90% of the penguins survived rehabilitation (Wolfaardt et al., 
2008), but for non-penguin bird species, the survival rate may be much lower 
(IPIECA, 2004a; WWF, 2006). Proper planning, training, equipment, and timely 
response will increase this survival rate dramatically. The birds are primarily affected 
through poisoning or choking when ingesting oil during preening, or freezing or 
starvation as the oil disrupts the insulating effect of the feathers and the birds need to 
invest a substantial amount of time to preen themselves, instead of foraging for food 
(Heubeck et al., 2003; K. Larsson & Tydén, 2011). 
 
The Baltic Sea has some 4.4 million wintering birds according to an estimation from 
2007-2009 (Skov et al., 2011). Of these, the Long-tailed Duck (Clangula hyemalis) 
stands out, as more than 90% of the European population spend the winters 
congregating around the Natura 2000 area Hoburgs Bank (area 28 in Figure 12) and 
the Middle Banks (areas 29 and 30), south of the largest Swedish island Gotland 
(Skov et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of wintering Long-tailed Duck (Clangula hyemalis) in the Baltic Sea, congregating 
around Hoburgs Bank (28) and the Middle Banks (29 and 30) (Skov et al., 2011). 
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These banks are also busy shipping areas and a large oil spill impacting the wintering 
seabirds could have a devastating effect on this vulnerable population. There is no 
correlation between the amount of oiled birds and the number of reported oil spills in 
Swedish waters, nor with the number of oil spills observed with aerial surveillance in 
the Baltic Sea (K. Larsson & Tydén, 2005; 2011). The authors concluded that these 
data are insufficient to estimate the impact of oil spills on the wintering birds. 
2.3.4	 Economic	impacts	
In addition to the clean-up costs, the economic impact on sectors that rely on a clean 
ocean and beach may be substantial. Commonly, the most impacted sectors are 
fisheries and tourism, although other interests, such as aquaculture, power plants, 
shipping, and various industries are also affected. Several studies have been carried 
out to investigate different factors associated with the cost of oil spills (Etkin, 2000; 
2003; Forsman, 2007b; Montewka, Weckström, & Kujala, 2013; Tegeback & 
Hasselström, 2012; Yamada, 2009). The type of oil, volume of spill, and location of 
the spill are the most influencing factors for oil spill cost and only a relatively 
scattered linear correlation exists with the volume spilled (Yamada, 2009). 
 
Two examples of economic impacts of oil spills are the Prestige accident in Spain 
2002 and the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Prestige 
has so far generated 120.6 million EUR in compensation costs, with final admissible 
claims estimated to be 573 million EUR (IOPC Funds, 2014). Although not 
originating from shipping, oil spills from oil rigs may also impact Sweden, as Polish 
oil extraction from its three Baltic Sea oil rigs is planned to double during 2015 
(PAP, 2014). BP paid a total of 20.8 billion USD for civil claims for the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in the United States in 2010 (DOJ, 2015). This is in addition to 4 
billion USD in criminal fines, penalties, and restitution paid before. Additionally, BP 
has entered into separate agreements to pay $4.9 billion to the five Gulf States and up 
to a total of $1 billion to hundreds of local governmental bodies to settle claims for 
oil spill related economic damage. This illustrates the astronomical sums clean-up 
and compensation claims can reach for oil spills. However, these claims most often 
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become highly political when the oil spill gets covered by the media, as in the case of 
both Prestige and Deepwater Horizon, and are often not directly tied to any scientific 
assessments. 
2.4	 Physiographic	characteristics	
Sweden is surrounded by the Baltic Sea to the east and the North Sea to the west. 
The Baltic Sea covers around 415,000 km2 and is one of the largest brackish water 
bodies in the world (Saundry, 2013). It connects to the northeast Atlantic Ocean 
through the North Sea and via the Skaw (Skagerrak), Kattegat, the Danish Belt 
straits, and the Sound between Denmark and Sweden. It is divided into the Gulf of 
Bothnia in the north, the Gulf of Finland in the east, and the Baltic Proper in the 
center (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Baltic Sea physiography, showing bathymetry and currents (EEA, 2009). 
The Baltic Sea is very shallow. The average depth is 56 meters and the deepest point, 
Landsortsdjupet, reaches 459 meters, which can be compared to the average depth of 
the world’s oceans at 3,500 m (Saundry, 2013). 
 
There are no noticeable permanent currents in the Baltic Sea, but the Skagerrak and 
Kattegat currents on the Swedish west coast are more permanent (see Figure 13). An 
outstanding feature of the Baltic Sea is the very large influx of fresh water into the 
basin. The lighter, less saline water from the Baltic Sea is transported as a surface 
current out through the Danish Belt Straits and the Sound (EEA, 2009). Heavier, 
saline water flows in the opposite direction close to the bottom into the Baltic Sea 
from the North Sea. Major in-flows only happen when persistent strong westerly 
winds prevail, historically once every 10 to 20 years. This creates a permanent 
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halocline in the Baltic Sea, which prevents horizontal mixing. Salinity ranges from 3-
4‰ in the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia to 6-9‰ in the Baltic Proper and 15-
30‰ on the west coast (SMHI, 2009). 
 
The tidal range around Sweden is very narrow. On the west coast, Skagerrak has 
around 10 cm and Kattegat 5 cm (up to 40 cm and 20 cm respectively during spring 
tides) (SMHI, 2013). On the east coast, the Baltic Sea can experience local elevations 
of low amplitude, caused by very weak tidal forces reinforced by strong winds etc. 
 
Sea ice in the Baltic Sea varies between the north and the south. The ice cover 
usually starts in the north of the Gulf of Bothnia in November and covers between 10 
and 100% of the Baltic Sea (Jevrejeva et al., 2004). The length of the ice season is 
between 4 to 7 months and the landfast ice thickness is between 50 and 120 cm. The 
ice remains longest in the gulfs of Bothnia, Riga, and Finland. 
 
The Swedish mainland coastline is around 11,500 km and the shorelines of the 
islands measure 31,900 km (SCB, 2002). There is no definition of the coastline in 
Swedish law. The coastline is instead defined and revised in the detailed municipal 
planning process for property purposes (LantmäterietSKL, 2015). However, there is 
continuous work on a national coastline definition (LantmäterietSjöfartsverket, 
2003). The Swedish coastline is emerging isostatically by about 1 cm per year in the 
north down to 0 cm in the south, after the latest ice age receded 10,000 years ago 
(SMHI, 2009). The coastline varies tremendously around Sweden, with rocky cliffs, 
wetlands, archipelagos, and sandy beaches on both the saline west coast and brackish 
east coast (HELCOM, 2007b). 
2.5	 Anthropogenic	vulnerability	
The Baltic Sea borders nine countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. All of these countries, except Russia, are 
part of the EU. Around 85 million people live in the catchment area of the Baltic Sea, 
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most of them in the southern half. Besides these nine countries, another five 
(Belarus, Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, and Ukraine) contribute to the river 
runoff into the Baltic Sea. On the west coast, Sweden borders Norway and connects 
to the Atlantic Ocean through the North Sea and Kattegat. Kattegat is included in the 
HELCOM definition of the Baltic Sea, although it is usually not considered to be 
part of the Baltic Sea, which is generally considered to end around the Danish Belt 
straits and the Sound. 
 
The large input of nutrients and organic matter from the Baltic Sea drainage area, 
enhanced by the limited influx of oxygenated saline water and the lack of mixing 
across the halocline, has led to eutrophication and severe oxygen depletion over 
significant portions of the bottom (HELCOM, 2011a). The lack of oxygen prevents 
any form of higher life, resulting in lifeless deep-water areas of, at times, up to 40% 
of the Baltic Sea (Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2014; Jutterström, Andersson, Omstedt, & 
Malmaeus, 2014). The brackish conditions and intense eutrophication mean that 
there are few species living in the Baltic Sea. Each species has a special ecosystem 
importance and the disappearance of a single key species could permanently change 
the whole system (HELCOM, 2003). There is a significant variation in the habitats 
and ecology along the Swedish coast, from hard susbstrate to eelgrass meadows, 
especially between the east and west coast (Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2014). 
 
The Baltic Sea is becoming increasingly crowded with non-shipping related interests, 
for example marine protected areas, offshore wind farms, and aquaculture. It is 
estimated that the wind farms capacity will increase by from 4.2 Terawatt hours 
(TWh) to 29.3 TWh by 2030 (698%) using a central scenario, possibly up to 49.8 
TWh (1,186%) using the highest scenario (EWEA, 2015). The Baltic Sea states are 
also much behind schedule in designating Baltic Sea Protected Areas (BSPA) 
(WWF, 2013). These new wind farms and marine protected areas could potentially 
change shipping patterns, depending on where these activities take place. 
Increasingly crowded shipping routes will slightly increase the risk of shipping 
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accidents with potential oil spills, depending on location (DNV, 2007; MARIN, 
2006). 
 
The shallow, narrow Danish and Swedish straits connecting the Baltic with the North 
Sea and Atlantic Ocean are known from accident reports to be difficult and 
congested passages (HELCOM, 2014a). Most of the groundings occur in this area, 
while collisions are spread along the trade routes in the Baltic, in the high-risk areas 
(see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14: Risk of exceptional spills of more than 5,000 tonnes in the Baltic Sea (COWI, 2012c). 
However, the steady number of accidents in recent years (see Figure 10) shows that 
severe oil spills are a real possibility, despite modern safety measures. The EU-
funded project Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic 
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Sea (BRISK) estimated that an oil spill between 300 and 5,000 tonnes will occur 
every four years and an exceptionally large spill (5,000 tonnes and above) will occur 
once every 26 years (see Table 2) (BRISK, 2011; COWI, 2012c). 
 
Table 2: Expected intervals between oil spill accidents in the Baltic Sea (BRISK, 2011). 
 
These expectations agree with the historic data in Table 1. However, there is a 
decreasing trend in the number of large oil spills during the last decade, but no 
decrease in the number of accidents (see Figure 10). 
 
Sweden is not a large importer or exporter of oil compared to most Baltic Sea 
countries (see Table 3) (Eurostat, 2015a; 2015b; IEA, 2013). 
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The
biggest	
    risk	
    areas	
    are	
    the	
    south-­western	
    Baltic	
    and	
    the	
    Kattegat.
	
    	
    	
    Sub-­region Large	
    accidents:
300-­5.000	
    tonnes
spilt
Exceptional
accidents:
5,000	
    tonnes	
    and
above	
    spilt
1.	
    Gulf	
    of	
    Bothnia 	
    	
    	
    36	
    years 	
    	
    600	
    years	
    
2.	
    Gulf	
    of	
    Finland 	
    	
    	
    39	
    years 	
    	
    255	
    years
3.	
    Northern	
    Baltic	
    Proper 	
    	
    	
    30	
    years 	
    	
    175	
    years
4.	
    South-­eastern	
    Baltic	
    Proper 	
    	
    	
    140	
    years 	
    	
    1,060	
    years
5.	
    South-­western	
    Baltic	
    Proper 	
    	
    	
    17	
    years 	
    	
    97	
    years
7.	
    Sound	
    and	
    Kattegat 	
    	
    	
    11	
    years 	
    	
    65	
    years
Entire	
    Baltic	
    Sea 	
    	
    	
    4	
    years 	
    	
    26	
    years
	
     	
    
Part-­financed	
    by	
    the	
    European	
    Union	
    (European	
    Regional	
    Development	
    Fund)
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Table 3: Oil import and export in the Baltic Sea Region and Norway 2013 (Russian export equivalent to oil 
turnover in the Gulf of Finland area) (Eurostat, 2015a; 2015b; PASP, 2015). 
Oil import 2013 
(million tonnes) 
 Oil export 2013 
(million tonnes) 
 
Germany 127.9 Russia 128,7 
Poland 27.9 Norway 75.8 
Sweden 23.1 Germany 20.1 
Finland 18.0 Denmark 13.3 
Denmark 12.0 Sweden 10.1 
Lithuania 10.1 Finland 9.2 
Norway 6.1 Lithuania 8.5 
Latvia 2.0 Poland 6.9 
Estonia 1.1 Latvia 0.7 
Russia 0.0 Estonia 0.8 
 
However, the long coastline and extensive shipping around the Swedish coasts make 
them vulnerable to oil spills. Indeed, many countries that are not large oil importers 
(in the Baltic Sea, this applies to Finland and Estonia in addition to Sweden) may 
still be at risk from tankers and shipping traffic in transit to other destinations 
(Moller, Molloy, & Thomas, 2003). 
2.6	 Conclusion	
This background chapter explained the current trade of oil, oil spill behaviour, and 
environmental and socioeconomic impacts. 
 
Sweden has large archipelagos close to the major oil ports and many busy shipping 
lanes. However, the ships of today are much safer than 35 years ago, when the first 
large tanker oil spill occurred. International conventions are in place, vessel 
standards have improved, and crews are better trained. However, shipping has 
simultaneously increased, leading to congestion in narrow passages, such as those in 
the Baltic Sea. This makes it difficult to determine if the total risk has changed. 
 
Few oil spills have occurred around Sweden, but this means that there is scant 
national experience in how to deal with oil spills. The low temperature and slow 
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turnover of water in the Baltic Sea mean that the degradation of the oil will likely 
take a long time. A catastrophic oil spill could for example affect the large 
populations of wintering seabirds that are present in the Baltic Sea. A spill at an 
unfortunate time and place could potentially decimate entire populations and persist 
in the environment for years. 
 
This dissertation analyses Swedish oil spill preparedness and examine trends existing 
in the current national capacity to handle large oil spills. 
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Chapter	3	-	Literature	Review	
This chapter discusses oil spill preparedness in the literature. There are few academic 
references to general preparedness for oil spills, as most are focused on specific 
aspects of oil spill preparedness and response (Depellegrin, Blažauskas, & de Groot, 
2010; Kuchin, 1999; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 2012; Taylor, Steen, Meza, 
Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a), tied to evaluations of 
specific oil spills (Cortez & Rowe, 2012; Kostka et al., 2011; Kurtz, 2008; National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2010), or 
to geographic areas (Bonsdorff, 1981; Ivanova, 2011; Pålsson, Olsson, & Lindén, 
2012). Experts agree that greater effectiveness of oil spill response can be achieved 
with sufficient preparation (IPIECA, 2004a; 2007; ITOPF, 2011b; Kirby & Law, 
2010). 
3.1	 Swedish	literature	
In the Swedish context, most of the research on oil spills was conducted in the 1970s 
and 1980s after the 1977 Tsesis oil spill outside Nynäshamn, south of Stockholm 
(Elmgren et al., 1983; S. Johansson, Larsson, & Boehm, 1980; Lindén et al., 1979; 
Norrby et al., 1979). Much of this research was focussed on ecotoxicology and 
environmental effects, and not oil spill preparedness management. The studies were 
opportunistic, since it was one of the first major oil spills in Sweden and occurred 
about 4 km from the Stockholm University field station Askö Laboratory. 
Established in 1961, Askö Laboratory had a good baseline dataset of the surrounding 
area to compare effects to, which is not usually the case after oil spill accidents. 
Because few large oil spill accidents have taken place in Sweden, limited research 
has been conducted on this topic. In the wake of the Tsesis accident, a governmental 
investigation reviewed Swedish oil spill preparedness (Norrby et al., 1979) and 
found it in need of improvement. However, this report focussed on organisational 
issues and not on contingency planning and response. The report recommended, 
among other things, that the Swedish Coast Guard (SCG) should merge with the 
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Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) and create a new agency, which should be 
responsible for oil spills, and the County Administrative Boards (CABs) should be 
responsible for regional contingency planning. Many recommendations in this report 
are still valid, for example the need for coordinated monitoring after oil spills and the 
creation of an oil spill fund. The recommendations led to the formation of an inter-
agency oil spill task force (today called the National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating, NSO) and regional equipment depots. This illustrates how oil spill 
preparedness became prioritised after the Tsesis oil spill. However, not all 
recommendations were implemented, despite the formation of a comprehensive 
funding programme for oil spill projects named TOBOS (Teknik for oljebekämpning 
till sjöss samt bekämpning och sanering av olja i strandzonen), which funded the 
research for several years (TOBOS, 1990). 
 
Södertörn University in Huddinge published three papers related to the EU project 
Environmental Risk Governance of the Baltic Sea (RISKGOV), examining risk 
governance in the late 2000s. These papers examined the Swedish role as a pro-
active country in making regional agreements (Hassler, 2008; 2010; 2011). They 
particularly examined how these agreements improved the implementation of 
international conventions and the mechanisms used to increase marine environmental 
protection in the Baltic Sea Region. However, these papers do not specifically 
discuss oil spill contingency planning or response, and merely highlight the benefits 
of being part of regional and multilateral agreements. A missing discussion in these 
papers concern whether there can be too many agreements, which could potentially 
create unnecessary administration and confusion. 
 
Current research at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg in relation to 
the project Development of a protocol for risk assessment of potentially polluting 
shipwrecks in Scandinavian waters (VRAKA), analyses chronic oil leaks from 
wrecks and their ecologic impact. The risk management is tied to removing oil from 
submerged vessels to prevent further environmental damage (Landquist, Hassellöv, 
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Rosén, Lindgren, & Dahllöf, 2013; Landquist et al., 2014). Part of this research has 
analysed the environmental impact of chronic oil spills and found it to lower the 
activity and alter the composition of the meiofauna community (F. J. Lindgren, 2012; 
F. J. Lindgren, Hassellöv, & Dahllöf, 2012a; 2012b). There are fewer literature 
sources analysing ecological effects, in contrast to the physical and toxicological 
effects. 
 
Current research at Kalmar Maritime Academy at Linnaeus University is focused on 
operational spills and seafarer motivation, but is not yet published in any papers 
(Hammander, 2015). 
3.2	 Oil	spill	management	
Oil spill management in this dissertation primarily discusses organisation of the 
preparedness: the structure, means of communication, and division of responsibility 
between the organisations. These are measures to harmonise workflows, ensure 
cooperation, and ensure that prevention, planning, and response work as smoothly as 
possible. These factors are analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
Several studies have been made on network theory and its inherent characteristics 
(Goldsborough et al., 2011; Newman, 2003; Sandström, 2008). However, studies on 
the coordination of human networks usually present models built on stable working 
relationships. These stable relationships are of less use for emergency response 
management (Hossain & Kuti, 2010), for example during an oil spill response 
operations. 
 
In the Swedish context, Ödlund (2007) argues that attitudes towards cooperation in 
crisis management are in flux and changing towards a more collective approach. 
Many studies have been performed in recent years, for example through the project 
Ledning och Samverkan (LOS), meaning Management and Cooperation, which was 
conducted between 2012 and 2014. These studies identified a number of issues 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
43 
related to general crisis management (Danielsson & Larsson, 2011; Danielsson, 
Johansson, & Eliasson, 2011; Danielsson, Johansson, & Kvarnlof, 2013; Danielsson 
et al., 2012; MSB, 2013a; 2014). The authors found that there is a knowledge gap in 
how to organise and manage larger response operations, how to accommodate the 
expanded organisation, and how to manage volunteer organisations (Danielsson et 
al., 2013). This critique is also highlighted in the evaluation of the forest fire 
response in Sweden during 2014, criticising the management system for not being 
able to cope with a large response (Sjökvist, 2015). The advantages and 
disadvantages of improvisation were also discussed, as was the need for a common 
situational awareness and the difficulty in communicating situational awareness to 
everyone involved. In a large study comparing twenty different exercise evaluations, 
results show that each organisation performed its dedicated task and communicated 
well with the public (MSB, 2013a). However, there were deficiencies in knowledge, 
contact, dialogue, structure, clearness, analysis, and crisis communication within and 
between organisations. The analysis is difficult, because the different evaluations 
have different criteria for describing deficiencies. However, these deficiencies should 
be addressed to enhance the cooperation among the involved organisations. 
 
Oil spills involve a lot of different organisations and bring together many 
stakeholders that have very little regular interaction, which makes oil spill response 
even more challenging. 
3.3	 Oil	spill	prevention	
Oil spill prevention in this dissertation refers to political preparatory and mitigating 
measures at the national or international level, such as international conventions, 
industry standards, and national legislation. These factors are analysed at national, 
regional, and local scales in Chapter 6. The measures are set in place before an 
accident occurs, to minimise the risk of an oil spill occurring. It does not include 
prevention measures, such as oil spill contingency plans and local sensitivity atlases, 
which are analysed under planning measures in Chapter 7. 
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The role of the central government is critical in encouraging preparedness at various 
levels, by coordinating efforts and providing financial support (Tierney, 1993). 
Governmental engagement will impact the priorities of the national agencies, 
specifically through budgets and instructions to the agencies. This will often reflect 
the media coverage and public opinion, for example the massive media engagement 
and subsequent political engagement in oil spill response and offshore drilling 
following the Deepwater Horizon and the intense public and political pressure on the 
agencies to act (Allen, 2010). Communicating risk and effect to the public and 
thereby also to the politicians and authorities is extremely difficult (Allen, 2010; 
Alvinius, Danielsson, & Larsson, 2010). 
 
For oil spill prevention, this political commitment can for example be ratification of 
international conventions or signing of international agreements concerning oil spill 
preparedness. Sweden is an active member of the United Nations (UN) and its 
maritime agency, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and has signed 
most of the IMO Conventions. Concerning oil spills, the most important conventions 
for oil spill preparedness are: 
 
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), is widely 
recognised as the constitution of the oceans (UN, 2001). UNCLOS has been 
ratified by a majority of the UN Member States. The convention deals with a 
multitude of issues in maritime and marine affairs, including accidents resulting 
in discharges of hazardous substances into the oceans. Sweden ratified the 
convention on 25 June 1996.  
 
• The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973/1978, or MARPOL, is the international convention covering the prevention 
of operational or accidental pollution of the marine environment by ships (IMO, 
1978). It is a combination of two conventions and has been updated by 
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amendments through the years. Sweden signed MARPOL on 9 June 1980 and 
ratified it on 2 October 1983. 
 
• The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties, or Intervention Convention regulates if, and which, 
measures Coastal States can take on the High Seas to be able to prevent, mitigate 
or eliminate any danger from oil pollution to the coastline or other interests after 
a maritime accident (UN, 1969). It was adopted on 29 November 1969 and 
entered into force on 6 May 1975. The Intervention Convention applies to all 
seagoing vessels, except warships or non-commercial State owned vessels. 
 
• The original convention concerning compensation for oil spill damage was the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC 
Convention) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (FUND 
Convention). Both the 1969 and 1971 Conventions were revised in 1992 by 
adopting two Protocols and these revisions are known as the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention (IOPC Funds, 2011; Jacobsson, 
2007). They were adopted on 27 November 1992 and entered into force on 30 
May 1996 and have been an incentive for several oil spill preparedness initiatives 
(Jacobsson, 2012). 
 
However, the ratification of a convention does not necessarily equal enforcement of 
it. Knudsen and Hassler (2011) showed that even if IMO sets international 
regulations for its Member States, it is the national administrations’ task to 
implement them. These national administrations may interpret the regulations 
differently and may have varying resources and working practices that influence the 
ratification. This creates differences in the level of implementation between different 
countries. Knapp and Franses (2009) presented a method to measure the effect of the 
various IMO Conventions on casualty rates by using an econometric model. 
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However, the analysis correlates significant effects only with a few of the 
conventions and amendments and the model fit is far from perfect in many cases, as 
pointed out by Knudsen (2011). 
 
Sweden has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1 January 1995 and is 
active within several of its policy areas. In October 2009, the EU approved the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) (EC, 2010). This 
strategy is the first plan in Europe covering a macro-region, and aims at reinforcing 
cooperation within the Baltic Sea. The EUSBSR contributes to major EU policies 
and reinforces integration within the area, which includes preparedness measures for 
oil spills. 
 
Regionally, the oldest environmental organisation working exclusively with all the 
Baltic Sea countries is the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). It is the governing 
body of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area (Helsinki Convention), the first regional convention to address the Baltic 
Sea (HELCOM, 2007a). The convention has its own Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), 
also detailing measures for oil spill preparedness. A major difference between EU 
and HELCOM is that the Russian Federation is a member of HELCOM, the only 
Baltic Sea Region state that is not part of the EU. Additionally, whereas EU 
Regulations and Directives are binding law, HELCOM decisions are 
recommendations and it is up to each member state to decide to what extent, if at all, 
these recommendations will be adopted (Mitroussi, 2004). 
 
Hassler (2008) argues that international conventions tend to suffer from the Lowest 
Common Denominator (LCD) effect. This means that the progression pace is 
determined by the least dedicated nations. Hassler argues that regional agreements 
may serve to complement international conventions, thereby reducing the negative 
LCD effects. He uses Sweden as an example of a pro-active country when it comes 
to mitigating oil spills and that regional initiatives help to negate LCD effects. The 
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paper does not address the efficiency of the international conventions, nor the 
regional initiatives and does not offer any empirical measurements, which makes the 
claims reasonable, but hard to quantify. The effect of increased preparedness that is 
perceived could partially also be contributed to national and internal organisational 
development. In another paper, Hassler (2010) argues that bilateral and sub-regional 
initiatives may increase maritime safety, compared to exclusive reliance on 
international conventions. Sweden is active both in the international arena and 
regionally regarding oil spill preparedness, which was strongly encouraged in the 
governmental inquiry (Norrby et al., 1979) following the Tsesis oil spill in 1977. 
3.4	 Oil	spill	planning	
Oil spill planning in this dissertation refers to the background knowledge and 
organisational measures, such as risk assessments, contingency planning, and 
increasing awareness. These are measures to minimise the negative impacts of oil 
spills. These factors are analysed in Chapter 7. It does not include training, which is 
analysed under response in Chapter 8. 
 
There is a tendency to equate contingency planning with a written plan and believe 
that such a plan is evidence of preparedness (Perry & Lindell, 2003). In reality, 
planning is a continuous process and the contingency plan represents a specific point 
in time. A written plan in itself does not equate to being prepared. Preparedness is a 
dynamic and on-going process of which a written plan is an important part, but not a 
condition. 
 
Oil spill contingency planning means to plan ahead for a future accident. An 
effective response to an oil spill depends on the preparedness of the organisations 
and individuals involved. The process of producing a contingency plan will provide 
opportunities to define division of responsibility, response strategies and operational 
procedures, as well as to identify necessary roles and responsibilities. By establishing 
a workflow and assigning tasks in advance, an organisation can test different 
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scenarios and foresee bottlenecks and issues that will be problematic in a real 
incident. All the questions that will arise during the planning process should be 
addressed before a real incident. Most importantly, there is a need to exercise the 
plan, to see how it works and revise it accordingly. 
 
In a review of disaster preparedness, Tierney (1993) stresses that preparedness 
activities must be based on correct assumptions about the post-disaster need and 
human behaviour. Quarantelli’s general principles for good disaster planning, 
regardless of organisation (Quarantelli, 1982) is summarised by Tierney as: 
 
• “Planning is a continuous process. Planning does not consist of developing 
written plans, which are then considered "finished" rather, it is an ongoing 
process that involves a continuing effort to assess vulnerability and improve 
response capability. 
 
• Planning involves attempting to reduce the unknowns in the anticipated 
disaster situation. No planning effort can anticipate everything that will 
occur when disaster strikes, but good plans can at least identify major 
problems that are expected and attempt to devise solutions. Because 
everything about a future disaster situation cannot possibly be known, it is 
impossible to pre-plan every aspect of the response, and flexibility is an 
absolute necessity. 
 
• Planning aims at evoking appropriate actions. Rather than aiming at a rapid 
response, planning should emphasize acting correctly, even if that means 
doing nothing until adequate information is available. "It is far more 
important in a disaster to obtain valid information as to what is happening 
than it is to take immediate actions ... Planning, in fact, should help delay 
impulsive reactions". 
 
• Planning should be based on what is likely to happen. While catastrophic and 
worst-case disasters do occur, preparedness efforts should focus first on 
disaster scenarios that are typical and probable. Plans should be based on 
empirically grounded assumptions about how members of the public will 
respond in emergency situations, rather than on “common sense" ideas or 
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myths about disaster behavior. There is considerable continuity between how 
people behave during non-disaster times and how they behave in disasters. 
Rather than developing plans that require people to do things differently, 
planners should take this continuity into account.  
 
• Planning must be based on valid knowledge. Three kinds of knowledge are 
critical: knowledge of how people are likely to respond in emergency 
situations; knowledge of the hazard itself and of associated vulnerabilities; 
and knowledge concerning the resources needed to respond to the hazard. 
 
• Planning should focus on general principles. One reason for keeping plans 
focused on principles is that “a complex and detailed plan is generally 
forbidding to most potential users and tends to be ignored.”. A second reason 
is that, since disaster situations shift and evolve rapidly, no plan can ever 
hope to cover all contingencies. Responding in a disaster situation always 
involves unexpected and unanticipated challenges, so plans must allow for 
flexibility. 
 
• Planning is partly an educational activity. Good preparedness involves not 
only the development of plans but also efforts to ensure that all relevant 
community or societal sectors are brought into the planning process. The 
parties involved in the process must be educated on what the hazards are, 
how the plans will address the problems that are expected, and what their 
disaster roles will be. 
 
• Planning always has to overcome resistance. The benefits that can be derived 
from preparedness activities are not self-evident. Disaster planning always 
requires some form of change in behavior, and change is often difficult to 
bring about. Government officials, business officials, and community 
residents have many priorities other than disaster planning, and societal and 
community needs are invariably greater than the resources that are 
available. Thus, getting preparedness measures developed, adopted, and 
accepted involves overcoming barriers that are often quite formidable. 
 
• Planning must be tested. It is virtually a foregone conclusion that disaster 
plans that are not rehearsed and exercised will either not be used at all or 
will fail in an actual disaster situation. All types of coordinated action 
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require rehearsal; this is especially true for the coordination that is needed 
following a disaster. 
 
• Planning is not management. Disaster planning develops general principles 
and strategies for action during emergencies; emergency management 
attempts to apply those principles and strategies in the disaster setting. 
Because disasters always contain elements that are not anticipated in plans, 
the actions that are ultimately taken by managers may not be covered in any 
plan.” 
 
These principles are very relevant to oil spill contingency planning and other authors 
have since elaborated and expanded on the work of Quarantelli. Perry and Lindell 
(2003) give an excellent and insightful discussion of the general principles. Tierney 
(1993) highlights that although types of disasters (floods, earthquakes, landslides) 
differ, planning should be generic and that the same general tasks will be needed in 
all of these disasters. Planning should be integrated, rather than fragmented; a 
holistic plan involving different organisations and governments is far more effective 
than each entity producing a disaster plan of their own. This corresponds to the idea 
and practice of the post-incident management tool used in the United States, called 
the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS has a general management structure for all 
emergencies, regardless of type, which all authorities and the industry should be 
familiar with. This system is used regularly in exercises where the authorities and 
industry train their personnel in their respective and compatible contingency plans 
(Cashman, Stephens, & Boyles, 2003). 
 
The oil industry (IPIECA, 2007; ITOPF, 2011b; Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, 
Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008b) and various governments have 
published several guidelines (ACS, 2012; Kulander, Ericsson, Tegeback, Fejes, & 
Evans, 2010; Nuka Research and Planning Group LLCPearson Consulting LLC, 
2010; Sjöfartsverket, 2005) and oil spill contingency plans (Länsstyrelsen Hallands 
Län, 2011; Maritime Safety Queensland, 2014). There are no official rules for how to 
write an oil spill contingency plan. Different areas, organisations, and countries have 
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different regulations and practices that must be taken into account. Hence, the 
general principles described by Tierney (1993) above are good guidelines and are, by 
design or coincidence, followed to a great extent by most practitioners. Several 
international preparedness organisations, both industry and governmental, have made 
efforts to harmonise all oil spill contingency plans through common guidelines and 
recommendations (API, 2013c; HELCOM, 2013b; Owens, Solsberg, West, & 
McGrath, 1998; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014; Taylor, Moyano, & Steen, 2014; Taylor, 
Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a; 2008b). 
However, the primary use of an oil spill contingency plan is the planning process 
itself, not the finished document. This can be illustrated by the Swedish case of 
Tjörn, which is an island on the west coast that was impacted by the oil spill from the 
Golden Trader accident off the Danish coast in 2011 (Dimming, 2012; Ghirxi, 2014; 
MSBHaV, 2014). The Tjörn municipality had an oil spill in 1987 and had an oil spill 
contingency plan updated in 2005 (Pålsson, Ericsson, & Olsson, 2011). However, as 
the plan had never been exercised, it was not even considered to be used during the 
oil spill response (MSBHaV, 2014). 
 
In order to have sufficient knowledge to be able to develop a good contingency plan 
for an area, there is a need to carry out a risk assessment for oil spills and gather 
information about environmental sensitivity to oil spills. Much research has been 
done on risk assessments, mostly tied to specific areas (Arctic Council, 2009; Aseev 
et al., 2014; Hassler, 2011; Kirby & Law, 2010; Moller et al., 2003; Nuka Research 
and Planning Group LLCPearson Consulting LLC, 2010; Veiga, 2004). Sensitivity 
mapping is also a topic that has received a lot of attention, often in connection to risk 
assessments for other projects, for example establishment of wind farms (API, 2013f; 
IPIECA, 1994b; IPIECA, IMO, OGP, 2012; SL Ross Environmental Research Ltd., 
DF Dickins Associates LLC, Envision Planning Solutions Inc., 2010). This planning 
and risk assessment process raises the awareness of the people involved and creates 
an understanding of the issues, regardless of what the finished plan may look like. 
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In the Baltic Sea region, much work has been done by HELCOM (HELCOM, 2013a; 
2013b) and in the last years primarily through several EU projects, for example 
BRISK, EnSaCo, and Baltic Master II. These projects have developed guidelines 
(Emmelin & Haglund, 2012; MSB, 2011; Pålsson, 2011; Pålsson & Nilsson, 2011), 
risk assessments (BRISK, 2011; Brunila & Storgård, 2012; COWI, 2012c; J. 
Johansson & Molitor, 2011; MSB, 2013b; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 2012; 
Staskiewicz, 2011; Viertola, 2013), and sensitivity maps (COWI, 2012a; Depellegrin 
et al., 2010; Forsman, 2012a; Lundius, 2011; Staskiewicz, 2011) to help the 
contingency planning process. In addition, the projects have worked with testing the 
plans during exercises (Forsman, 2012b; Ljungkvist, 2011; MSB, 2012). Much of the 
work within these projects has taken place in Sweden. 
 
Pålsson and Wåhlander (2013) showed that 80 of the coastal municipalities in 
Sweden (61%) had an oil spill contingency plan, 14 did not have a plan (11%) and 
38 did not respond (29%). Additionally, 66 municipalities (50%) responded that the 
plan had been revised during the last five years and 42 municipalities (32%) 
responded that the plan had been used during an exercise within the last five years. 
This is an improvement from a similar study in 2011 (Pålsson et al., 2011). However, 
this is still far below an ideal situation, where all municipalities have an oil spill 
contingency plan in place, and exercise and revise it regularly. However, as no 
regulations exist for the municipalities to have an oil spill contingency plan, no 
requirements exist for the municipalities for what needs to be included.  
3.5	 Oil	spill	response	
Oil spill response in this dissertation refers to the training, equipment and methods 
used to clean up oil, and exercises. These are measures to make the response as 
effective as possible. These factors are analysed in Chapter 8. Much research has 
been done on oil spill response, and similar to the environmental and economic 
impacts, the focus has been on individual spills (Fagö, 1991; Jernelöv & Lindén, 
1981; Kurtz, 2008; Maritime Safety Queensland, 2014; NOAA, 1992). 
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Like disaster preparedness, much research has been done in social science on disaster 
response, and more is known about this phase than others (Tierney, 1993). A key 
feature in disasters is that they generate extremely high demands for emergency 
equipment and personnel. In the case of oil spills, these could for example be booms, 
boats, storage sites, waste management, and response professionals. This demand is 
usually far above the normal capacity of the impacted area and affected organisations 
must adapt to this situation. 
 
Good overviews of different response strategies (API, 2013g; 2013e; de Susanne & 
Peytavi, 2011; IPIECA, 2004b; 2004a; IPIECAOGP, 2012b; 2013b; ITOPF, 2011a; 
2011c; 2011f), use of equipment (Cortez & Rowe, 2012; IPIECAOGP, 2012a; 
2013a; ITOPF, 2011g; 2011h; 2012c; 2012d), and exercises (IPIECA, 1994a; NRT, 
2014) can be found among industry and authorities. The several advantages of 
exercising plans and personnel is highlighted and discussed by several authors (e.g. 
(de Susanne & Peytavi, 2011; Forsman, 2012b; Køpenhavnsavtalet, 2015a; 
Ljungkvist, 2011; MSB, 2011; 2012; NRT, 2014; Pålsson et al., 2011; Perry, 2004). 
 
Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea Region countries is in various stages of 
development (Pålsson et al., 2012; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). There are several 
conventions and agreements, for example HELCOM, BRISK, and the Copenhagen 
Agreement, that regulate cooperation across borders and between organisations. Past 
experiences from oil spills show that almost all oil spills at sea will affect land 
(Rylander, 2005). A weakness of existing plans, conventions, and agreements is that 
they are focused on oil spills at sea. Limited attention is directed at oil once it has 
come ashore. Furthermore, the development of onshore clean up technology has been 
very limited in the last decades (API, 2013a; 2013b; 2013d; Pålsson & Lindén, 
2014a). HELCOM has recently expanded its focus from open sea response to include 
shoreline response to oil spills (HELCOM, 2013b). Shore response was made an 
integral part of the annual BALEX DELTA exercise for the first time in 2010 
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(HELCOM, 2014b). Oiled wildlife response has also been developed and was added 
to the HELCOM Response Manual in 2010 (HELCOM, 2011b). 
 
In Sweden, oil spill response has been evaluated in a number of reports. After the 
Tsesis oil spill outside Nynäshamn in 1977, a detailed governmental investigation 
reviewed the contingency planning and response (Norrby et al., 1979) and reported 
that the response had been unnecessarily delayed because of communication and 
organisational issues, such as unclear division of responsibility and lack of liaison 
officers and communication radios. More recently, the Swedish Audit Agency 
conducted an audit in 2006 and came to the conclusion that preparedness in 
municipalities was inadequate, with few municipalities having sufficient response 
capacity, the national response resources and efforts had not been received by the 
municipalities, and there were still issues regarding the division of responsibilities 
(Riksrevisionen, 2006). Evaluations are conducted on the various exercises and spills 
in Sweden, for example after Fu Shan Hai in 2003 (Fejes et al., 2004; Ljungkvist, 
2003), the international BOILEX exercise in 2011 (MSB, 2012), and the FSHex13 
exercise in 2013 (Ljungkvist et al., 2013). The Swedish Civil Contingency Agency 
(MSB) and the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine Management (SwAM) 
initiated a comprehensive evaluation of the most recent large oil spill response in 
Sweden, i.e. Golden Trader, which impacted Tjörn 2011 (MSBHaV, 2014). Many 
deficiencies were identified and recommendations made, and are discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
3.6	 Conclusion	
The literature review shows that there is a knowledge gap specific to oil spills and oil 
spill preparedness in Sweden since the Tsesis oil spill in 1977. This is true in all 
chosen topics: prevention, planning, response, and management. However, work has 
been done on disaster and crisis management related to natural disasters. A large 
body of grey literature exists on the topic of oil spill contingency planning and risk 
assessments. Qualitative research has primarily been examining management and 
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assessing risk. The reasons for this may be because the involved authorities have 
limited interaction with the scientific community or that the topic has not been 
interesting enough for the academic world, with the few exceptions noted earlier. 
The distinct Swedish management structure with strong municipalities and national 
coordination, rather than national control, has not been analysed in the oil spill 
context. 
 
Consequently, there is an academic need to fill the knowledge gaps in oil spill 
preparedness concerning the Swedish context. This dissertation responds to this need 
and gives insights into the current Swedish situation. 
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Chapter	4	-	Methodology	
This chapter presents the research context, scope, and rationale of this dissertation. 
The research approach, hypotheses, methods for data collection, methods for analysis 
explained are explained and justified, together with quality control and research 
ethics. 
4.1	 Research	approach	
The research questions were conceived through inductive reasoning and observation 
of the status of oil spill preparedness in Sweden. These questions were formulated 
during the initial data collection phase and continuously refined. This dissertation has 
been developed using an action research approach with Sweden as a case study. This 
was achieved by working concretely with oil spill preparedness through several 
projects, primarily the EU Baltic Sea Region project Baltic Master II, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) project Environmental Assessment of 
Ogoniland, and the Swedish Institute (SI) and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
(MSB) funded Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil Spill Forum (BMSP Oil Spill 
Forum). 
4.1.1	 Epistemology	
The philosophy that has been adhered to in this dissertation is the post-positivist 
theory originally developed by Thomas Kuhn (1962) and expanded by Karl Popper 
(1994). This theory uses deductive reasoning, empirical evidence, and hypothesis 
testing to gather information (Trochim, 2006). This dissertation follows the critical 
realist philosophy in that it assumes that all observations have error and all theories 
can be revised. The assumption is that everyone is biased by culture, education, and 
general life experiences. The critical realist philosophy gave rise to the constructivist 
philosophy, where our view of the world is constructed based on our imperfect and 
biased perceptions. Consequently, a post-positivist constructivist believes that the 
best method to achieve objectivity is to triangulate data using multiple imperfect 
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perspectives, which has been the methodological approach in this dissertation. This 
means that true objectivity and reality can never be achieved, but it can be 
approached. This pursuit of objectivity uses a community of scientific philosophers 
to critically scrutinise each theory and offer multiple perspectives. This is partly the 
philosophical basis for the article peer-review system used today. 
 
This dissertation has strived for more credible findings by using multiple methods, 
investigative approaches, and other types of triangulation when collecting data. The 
research has drawn on the scientific disciplines of social science, disaster 
management, and network theory. This constructivist philosophy of emphasising the 
importance of multiple measures and observations using triangulation has been 
followed. The triangular approach is defined as the use of different research methods 
to study a single research problem (Olsen, 2004). Using this approach, the findings 
can show convergent results, despite an apparent lack of statistical certainty. 
4.1.2	 Action	research	
Action research refers to processes that involve intervention in organisations and 
procedures (Gummesson, 2000). It is a combination of research and management 
consultancy that involves intervention into processes of decision-making, 
implementation, and change. It has the dual purpose of advancing knowledge and 
improving or enhancing a practice in some way. Action research has a wide scope 
and varies in emphasis between practical transformation and advancement of general 
knowledge. Its origin goes back to the 1940s and it is also termed action science, 
action inquiry, and action learning (Perry & Lindell, 2003). It has been argued that 
to truly understand managerial processes and changes, it is beneficial to be part of 
the process, to be a “change agent” (Gummesson, 2006). Huxham (2003) states that: 
 
”Action research is particularly appropriate for developing theory that relates 
closely to practice and is concerned with the process of managing.” 
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With the action research approach, it is much easier for a researcher to intrude on on-
going management processes. Assuming the role of an expert or consultant, the 
researcher has a legitimate reason for being involved in the process. 
 
The advantage of this approach is that it provides the researcher with substantially 
improved access to individuals and to non-public material (Gummesson, 2000; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2003). 
 
The disadvantage of this approach lies in balancing the roles of researcher and 
consultant (Gummesson, 2000). The researcher may become too involved in the 
process, to the point of being detrimental to the process itself. In contrast, a 
researcher can also end up personally driving the process, meaning that the process 
will stop as soon as the researcher leaves. Participation may also require too much 
attention, and the researcher will not have time to take adequate notes or consider 
different perspectives. The researcher must be aware of this bias and introduce 
mechanisms to control or quantify them. 
 
Since this dissertation revolves around oil spill preparedness and its management, 
action research was the most logical approach. The author’s dual role as a 
researching PhD candidate and a research assistant working practically with projects, 
also made the action research approach the most logical to pursue. The main 
differences between this dissertation work and that described by Gummesson (2000), 
is that he describes situations where he was a consultant in one organisation and had 
more or less direct influence over organisation decisions. This dissertation examined 
oil spill preparedness in Sweden with no direct influence by the researcher on the 
organisations involved. Contrary to a company that spends time and money to hire a 
consultant to evaluate or facilitate a change, the organisations involved in Swedish 
oil spill preparedness may not want to or be able to change because of different 
reasons. 
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4.1.3	 Case	study	
Case study research is one of several methods of social science research. It is the 
preferred method to use when the main research questions are “How?” and “Why?”, 
when a researcher has little control over behavioural events, and where the focus of 
the study is a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2014). A case study represents a 
whole experiment, rather than merely a sample. This means that it is not trying to 
make any statistical generalisations of probabilities, but will analytically expand and 
generalise theories. Case study research in this dissertation is considered a research 
approach rather than a research method. This is because case study research is 
interpreted as a method covering the research topic as a whole, not just data 
collection techniques. Case study research shares similarities with the historian’s 
approach to research in that it relies on existing documentation of events. But in 
contrast, the case study researcher may have access to direct observations of the 
phenomenon and is able to interview persons involved in the events. 
 
Yin (2014) defines the scope of the case study as: 
 
“…an empirical inquiry that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its 
real-world context, especially when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident.” 
 
Yin goes on to define the features of the case study as: 
 
“A case study inquiry 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis.” 
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The definition and extent of a case study depends on the specific research questions 
and how they are formulated. This makes defining the units of analysis a problem 
and is closely related to identifying case study boundaries (Yin, 2014). It is therefore 
critical to identify spatial, temporal, and other case boundaries in the research design. 
This is true even if researching abstract arguments or hypotheses, which need to be 
concretely manifested and defined in a real case in order to be analysed. 
 
What makes case study research more than just a form of qualitative research is the 
use of both quantitative and qualitative evidence (Yin, 2014), which has been 
adopted in this dissertation. This makes the research versatile and gives a strong 
incentive for the researcher to use different methods for triangulation, thus avoiding 
mono-method bias. Case study research is also well suited for describing common, 
critical, revelatory, or unique cases (Yin, 2014). The common case might try to 
capture the everyday situation to analyse theories on specific processes. The critical 
case might be used when a theory has a clear setup that will allow it to be tested 
using a single decisive case to prove or disprove the theory. The revelatory case 
might be observations of a situation previously inaccessible to science. A unique 
case might be a rare injury or disorder that can reveal insights about normal 
processes, or as in this dissertation, the specific situation in a country. 
 
Criticism specifically regarding single case studies, such as used in this dissertation, 
concerns fears that the uniqueness of the case will make it difficult or impossible to 
generalise from and that there may be unique artifactual conditions surrounding each 
case (Yin, 2014). The concern on generalizability is eloquently addressed by Norman 
(1970): 
 
“The possibilities to generalise from a single case study are founded in the 
comprehensiveness of the measurements which makes it possible to reach a 
fundamental understanding of the structure, process and driving forces rather than a 
superficial establishment of correlation and cause-effect relationships”. 
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Generalisation can therefore be obtained if the measurements are well structured, 
which has been the aim of the research design in this dissertation. The artifactual 
conditions of a single case are inherent in the validity of the case study research, and 
should be controlled by the same measures that control the research validity. Another 
issue is that a case may not turn out to be the case originally thought because there 
are other influencing factors of which the researcher was unaware (Yin, 2014). 
Establishing a comprehensive understanding of the topic during the initial 
knowledge-gathering phase has controlled this issue. 
 
The case study approach was the logical choice for this dissertation, since oil spill 
preparedness is a phenomenon outside of the control of the researcher and the focus 
is contemporary and aimed at a single country: Sweden. The case is unique because 
no studies have been found that have analysed oil spill preparedness in Sweden or its 
organisational network. 
4.1.4	 Dissertation	approach	
The work for this dissertation started using the action research approach with 
Sweden as the case study. However, this approach changed after the initial phase of 
the research ended with the Baltic Master II project. The relatively long knowledge-
gathering phase meant that there was ample time to immerse in the oil spill 
preparedness topic, obtain access to data, and establish a comprehensive network of 
contacts. Gummesson (2000) argues that this immersion in a topic is necessary for 
what he calls the “pre-understanding” of a topic. The researcher is often able to list 
a great number of factors and relationships on a certain topic, while only having 
superficial knowledge them. The difficult part is to attach proper weight to these 
factors and relationships. The researcher may be unaware of the consequences of 
inadequate access and understanding. This may result in a focus on statistical 
analyses of weak data based on incorrect assumptions about the importance of 
various factors and relationships (Gummesson, 2000). Thus, an insufficient amount 
of time spent on gathering knowledge means that the work of the researcher becomes 
liable to serious shortcomings and may be misleading. For example, the researcher 
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risks choosing an access method that fails to provide an opportunity for the 
informants to give relevant answers or erroneously believes that a popular method 
within management research is the correct method to use for the study. The best 
opportunity for researchers to develop sufficient understanding is to operate as active 
participants in a process, rather than as interviewers or detached observers. 
Gummesson’s (2000) reasoning has been a guide for the research approach in this 
dissertation. 
 
The practical work during the Baltic Master II project ranged from preparing and 
writing draft contingency plans (Pålsson, 2011; Pålsson & Nilsson, 2011), to 
observing, planning, and conducting exercises for various organisations in Sweden 
and Denmark. Reports on the level of preparedness for oil spills in the Baltic Sea 
region were also written (Pålsson et al., 2011; 2012). This provided an opportunity to 
be involved practically in the oil spill preparedness community in the Baltic Sea 
Region, and establish a network of contacts that was of great help during the data 
collection phase. Much information relevant to this dissertation and to theory 
formation was gathered during informal conversations with experts, observations 
during exercises, and interaction during conferences. 
 
In an investigation of the oil contamination in the Niger Delta, field sampling of 
water and sediment was made in Ogoniland in Nigeria. The purpose of this was to 
assess the level of pollution that has arisen from oil spills (Lindén & Pålsson, 2013; 
Pålsson & Lindén, 2014b; UNEP, 2011). This was an opportunity to study a 
fundamentally different setting in depth and provide a perspective on the Swedish oil 
spill preparedness. Although not concerning Sweden directly, the situation in Nigeria 
highlighted the problems many countries have with oil spill preparedness and the 
implications of a failure to be prepared. 
 
The data collection phase mainly coincided with the BMSP Oil Spill Forum project, 
during which the researcher’s role changed from active participation to more of an 
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observer. In this way, access and network contacts gained from the knowledge-
gathering phase were maintained, but time was reallocated to dissertation data 
collection and writing. Further analysis of the state of oil spill preparedness in the 
Baltic Sea was made during the BMSP Oil Spill Forum project through project 
reports (Pålsson & Lindén, 2014a; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). Analysis was 
possible after data collection through interviews, organising and participating in oil 
spill workshops in the Baltic Sea region, and continuous data collection as new 
sources were discovered. Much knowledge can be gathered through informal 
discussions during themed events such as workshops and conferences (Gummesson, 
2000) and this was true during both Baltic Master II and BMSP Oil Spill Forum. 
 
The social research approach is found to be similar to a criminal investigation in that 
evidence is collected from different sources, such as interrogations (interviews) of 
witnesses (informants), documentation (written information), and crime scene 
investigation (observations). With an increasing body of collected facts, theories 
evolve around suspects (involved organisations), motive (the “Why?”), and means 
(the “How?”). Each of these theories are then in turn falsified by evidence until the 
one true (or constructivist close to true) theory has been substantiated enough to hold 
up in a criminal court (peer-review), with overwhelming evidence triangulated from 
different perspectives. 
4.2	 Research	design	
The methodological approach was based on action research and the case study 
method following a post-positivist constructivist perspective. This approach was 
operationalised through a research design that first chose specific units of analysis 
and variables, and then appropriate methods of analysis in order to draw correct 
conclusions. 
4.2.1	 Aim	
The aim of this dissertation is to better understand the state of oil spill preparedness 
in Sweden today and use the findings to recommend improvements. Oil spill 
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preparedness refers to the ability to respond to oil spills and includes overall 
management, and the prevention, planning, and response parts. This is done by: 
 
• Describing the Swedish oil spill preparedness regime. 
• Analysing the current state of oil spill preparedness in Sweden. 
• Analysing the cause of any deficiencies found. 
• Use the findings to suggest improvements. 
4.2.2	 Scope	
This Swedish oil spill preparedness case study focuses on overall management, and 
the prevention, planning, and response parts of oil spill preparedness. Oil spills refer 
to oil pollution from ships, pipelines, fixed installations, ports etc. Due to budget 
limitations, and laboratory and equipment access, the dissertation does not cover 
efficiency of practical operational response or evaluation of different oil spill clean-
up techniques and strategies, except the operational management and organisation of 
response and exercises. Neither does the study evaluate individual oil spill 
contingency plans or liability issues. The organisations reviewed primarily represent 
the governmental agencies tied to the National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating (NSO). NSO consists of representatives from the Swedish Coast Guard 
(SCG), the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Swedish Agency for 
Marine and Water Management (SwAM), the Oil Spill Advisory Service (OSAS) at 
Sweco AB, the Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA), the Swedish Transport 
Agency (STA), the Swedish County Administrative Boards (CABs), and the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). 
 
The geographical scope is Swedish territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ), including the nation’s three largest lakes: Vänern, Vättern, and Mälaren, 
defined as state waters in national legislation (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). The 
dissertation does not extend to spills on land, unless the spills end up in or originate 
from state waters. However, the Swedish role in international oil spill preparedness is 
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included, for example through EU projects and work under international conventions 
and agreements through organisations such as the Arctic Council, the Helsinki 
Commission (HELCOM), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
 
The temporal limitations are developments made during the course of the research, 
i.e. between 2009 and 2015. 
4.2.3	 Oil	Spill	Preparedness	model	
Oil spill preparedness is a broad topic that is divided into many sub-topics in 
different ways by different authors. In order to structure the research and manage the 
topics, a framework concept model for oil spill preparedness was developed. This 
framework is an adaptation of work from the Baltic Master II project (Pålsson, 2011; 
Pålsson et al., 2012) which in turn is based on a comprehensive paper by Taylor et al. 
(2008b). The model was developed to conceptualise oil spill preparedness in order to 
subsequently operationalise the concepts and develop suitable units of analysis and 
variables. 
4.2.3.1	 Concept	model	
The Oil Spill Preparedness concept model was founded on three main pillars: 
Prevention, Planning, and Response (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Oil Spill Preparedness concept model with three distinct pillars: Prevention, Planning, and 
Response, standing on a foundation of: Management, Research and Funding. 
Foundational topics for all three pillars are: Management, Research, and Funding. 
These pillars and their management are the oil spill preparedness topics that have 
been analysed in the Swedish context. Analyses of research and funding are not 
substantial enough to have their own sections, as these are deeply linked to the 
different topics and have thus been embedded in the examination of the specific 
topics. 
 
The three foundational topics are: 
 
1. Management 
Management supports the three pillars. In this dissertation, management is 
defined as governance of the organisations involved in the preparedness, 
organisational structure, means of communication, and division of 
responsibility among these organisations. Effective management will 
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streamline workflows, ensure cooperation and make certain that the different 
actors function as smoothly as possible. 
 
2. Research 
Research is an underlying foundation for making the correct choices during 
oil spill planning and response. It involves knowledge of the fate and effect of 
oil spills, the behaviour of oil in the environment, and the effect this 
knowledge has on the decision-making and preparedness management. This 
topic is deeply embedded in all pillars and does not warrant its own section. 
 
3. Funding 
Funding is one of the foundation topics. There is basic funding for oil spill 
preparedness in Sweden, but the issue is how funding is directed, channelled, 
and utilised. As soon as an oil spill occurs, funding issues will have to be 
discussed and solved. Different countries and organisations have different 
strategic goals, with funds being earmarked for a specific task and some 
funds used at the discretion of the organisation. This topic is also deeply 
embedded in all pillars and does not warrant its own section. 
	
The three pillars are: 
	
1. Prevention 
Prevention in this dissertation is defined as keeping an oil spill from 
happening by taking precautionary action, including setting up mitigating 
measures should an oil spill occur. This involves preventive measures on a 
national or international level, such as international conventions, industry 
standards, and national legislation. These are set in place before an accident 
occurs, in order to minimise the risk of an oil spill occurring and the negative 
impacts of an oil spill. Prevention also includes local prevention measures, 
such as local regulations, protocols, and voluntary procedures. 
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2. Planning 
Planning in this dissertation is defined as knowledge of oil spills and its 
impacts and organisational measures, such as risk assessments, contingency 
planning, and awareness. Good planning will minimise the negative impacts 
of an oil spill, should it occur. These measures will involve several different 
organisations, which will approach the planning and the need for planning 
from different perspectives and with varying interest. 
 
3. Response 
Response in this dissertation is defined as cleaning up the oil with trained 
personnel, which equipment and methods should be used, and actually 
cleaning up the oil. These are prerequisites needed to make the response 
efficient. Response involves actions both before and after an oil spill occurs, 
such as training, health and safety, exercises, equipment depots, waste 
disposal, and logistics. 
4.2.3.2	 Model	refinement	
Different oil spill preparedness models were found in the literature and compared to 
the concept model. 
 
1. Key Success Factors 
Weber et al. (2001) designates Key Success Factors for preparedness and 
how to use them for a preparedness assessment system. The Key Success 
Factors are: 
 
a) Stakeholder outreach and engagement. 
b) Policy and doctrine. 
c) Area Contingency Plan. 
d) United States Coast Guard (USCG) capability. 
e) Non-USCG capability.  
f) Team training and exercises. 
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g) Evaluations (of exercises and response). 
 
These factors are practically driven and are defined from the viewpoint of the 
USCG and the Federal On-Scene Commander (FOSC) role in the United 
States system for emergency response, the Incident Command System (ICS). 
ICS is a function-based management system used in the United States and 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 - Management. 
 
The Key Success Factors compares well with the Oil Spill Preparedness 
concept model in Figure 15. In this case b) would sort under the Prevention 
pillar, c) under the Planning pillar, d), e), f), and g) as Response pillar, and a) 
would correspond to the Management foundation. 
 
2. UNEP Regional Seas 
Moller et al. (2003) discuss preparedness in light of work done by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 13 Regional Seas around the 
world. The factors impacting preparedness in this paper are: 
 
a) The designation of a competent national authority to deal with marine 
emergencies. 
b) The preparation and adoption of national contingency plans. 
c) Participation in regional or multilateral spill response arrangements. 
d) The provision of spill response equipment and materials. 
e) The ratification of certain relevant international conventions. 
 
These factors can all be compared with the Oil Spill Preparedness concept 
model, with a) corresponding to the Management foundation, b) to the 
Planning pillar, c) and e) to the Prevention pillar, and d) to the Response 
pillar. 
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3. Atlantic approach 
Veiga (2004) divides her model for oil spill preparedness into four 
parameters, 
 
a)  Emergency towing arrangements. 
b)  Contingency planning practices. 
c)  Response performance in selected past spills. 
d)  Oil pollution legislation. 
 
Each parameter is then qualitatively assessed and scored from a range of 
different indicators. These scores then sort the countries (United States, 
United Kingdom, France, and Spain) into three different categories. The 
categories are low, corresponding to initial application of standards; medium, 
corresponding to improving standards; and high, corresponding to desired 
standards for each country assessed. 
 
These parameters also roughly compare to the concept model, in that b) 
would correspond to the Planning pillar, c) to the Response pillar, and d) to 
the Prevention pillar. In the model, a) is not considered part of the on shore 
response, as it takes place at sea, and thus is left out of the assessment. 
 
In addition to work done specifically on oil spills, much research has been done on 
generic crisis and disaster management (Danielsson et al., 2012; Danielsson & 
Larsson, 2011; Hossain & Kuti, 2010; Ödlund, 2007; 2010; Perry, 2004; Perry & 
Lindell, 2003; Quarantelli, 1982; Tierney, 1993). Similarly to oil spill preparedness, 
research on crisis management started in the 1950s in the United States and focused 
on social behaviour (Tierney, 1993). However, the types of disasters in this context 
are primarily related to natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes as well 
as technological disasters, such as nuclear disasters. The social science related to 
disaster management is focused on human behaviour in crisis situations, as discussed 
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in Chapter 3. The terminology related to disaster management would therefore fit 
better with the dissertation definition of preparedness as a whole, rather than 
management. 
 
In a comprehensive review paper on disaster management, Tierney (1993) described 
four distinct phases of disaster management. These phases are mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. Mitigation is defined as policies and actions 
taken before an event takes place and which are meant to minimise the damage of a 
disaster event, for example land use planning, design and engineering principles, and 
governmental policies. This mitigation corresponds well with the Prevention pillar 
and is defined similarly. Preparedness is defined as the “second line of defence”, for 
example with emergency plans, risk assessments, and training. As preparedness aims 
to enhance the ability to respond in case of a disaster, it corresponds to the Planning 
pillar. The exception is that training and exercises are considered part of the 
Response pillar and not the Planning pillar, due to the effects of training in 
enhancing response capacity. Only the planning of training and exercises is 
considered part of the Planning pillar in the model. Tierney’s response actions are 
taken at the time of the disaster (or before if the disaster is predicted) and are 
intended to reduce the impacts, for example by evacuations, building emergency 
shelters, and communication with the public. This Response corresponds to the 
Response pillar, with the exception of training and exercises discussed above. 
Finally, Tierney defines recovery as long-term efforts to reconstruct and restore the 
impacted area, dealing with the disruption that the disaster has caused community 
life, and mitigating future hazards. The recovery phase is left out of the concept 
model because recovery is not considered part of the Response pillar in the concept 
model, but rather as the consequences of response and impact. The exception is the 
mitigation of future hazards, which is considered to belong to the Prevention pillar. 
Admittedly, oil spills may require years or even decades of recovery time, often in 
terms of environmental impacts, and legal implications and settlements (IOPC 
Funds, 2011; 2014). Additionally, disaster management generally discusses disasters 
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with a much greater infrastructural impact, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, which 
require extensive human rebuilding. As such, recovery does not warrant an 
additional pillar in the concept model. 
4.2.3.3	 Refined	model	
Evaluating the Oil Spill Preparedness concept model in light of the frameworks 
mentioned above, the concept was further refined. As the integrated nature of these 
pillars became apparent during the model refinement, the model was reimagined with 
the pillars as overlapping circles representing different phases of oil spill 
preparedness (see Figure 16). 
  
 
Figure 16: Refined Oil Spill Preparedness model. 
An important observation is that the three central topics (Prevention, Planning, and 
Response) are reflected in most of the models reviewed, indicating that they are 
considered essential for the preparedness system to work. These central topics 
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overlap and interact to a large degree. Many conventions, agreement, legislation, and 
policies regulate planning or response requirements. Much planning is based on 
requirements or recommendations from agreements or legislation and influences the 
response strategies and equipment need. Exercises and real spills in turn influence 
policy changes and contingency planning. 
 
The additional topics from this refined Oil Spill Preparedness model are used in 
selection of units of analysis and variables. However, the foundational research and 
funding are not addressed in separate chapters, as they are embedded in the central 
prevention, planning, and response topics and analysed as part of them. 
4.2.4	 Hypotheses	
One main hypothesis and five embedded hypotheses have been established to cover 
the research questions. 
4.2.4.1	 Main	hypothesis	
The overall research question for this dissertation on Swedish oil spill preparedness 
has been formulated in the main hypothesis: 
 
 Hmain – Sweden is prepared for an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 Hmain0 – Sweden is not prepared for an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes 
 
The main hypothesis is subdivided into five embedded hypotheses based on the 
refined Oil Spill Preparedness model in Figure 16. The Management foundation, 
Prevention, Planning, and Response topics, have their own hypotheses and 
subsequent units of analysis (see Figure 17). Additionally, in order to compare 
Swedish oil spill preparedness to other countries, the topic of International Practice 
has been added. The variables of the units of analysis for Hmain correspond to 
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Chapters 5 to 9 in this dissertation. In turn, Chapters 5 to 9 have their own variables, 
discussed in the respective section below. 
 
 
Figure 17: Main hypothesis chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
A large oil spill is defined to be 10,000 tonnes of oil in this dissertation. This specific 
oil spill weight is mentioned in the oil spill manual from the Swedish Civil 
Contingency Agency (MSB) to the municipalities (Kulander et al., 2004). This 
manual states that the goal of Swedish onshore oil spill preparedness is to be 
prepared for oil spills where a single spill would be up to 10,000 tonnes by the year 
2010. As this was the strategic aim between 2004 and 2010, 10,000 tonnes is a 
suitable definition. These 10,000 tonnes are tied to the responsibilities of the Swedish 
Coast Guard (SCG), who has an operational goal of being prepared to handle oil 
spills at sea, where a single spill would be up to 10,000 tonnes (Regeringen, 2007c). 
This goal was increased from 5,000 tonnes in 2005 (Regeringen, 2004b). However, 
the goal of 10,000 tonnes is absent from the updated Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill 
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Preparedness (NSO, 2014b), which replaced the MSB manual in 2014. No definition 
of time limits for the response is mentioned in either document, but is assumed to be 
within a reasonable amount of time, interpreted in this dissertation as a few years 
rather than decades. An oil spill of 10,000 tonnes would be classified as an 
exceptional spill according to the classes outlined by the BRISK project for the 
Baltic Sea (BRISK, 2011), as discussed in Chapter 2. However, compared to global 
data on previous oil spill accidents reaching well over 100,000 tonnes (ITOPF, 
2014a), 10,000 tonnes would not be considered an exceptionally large spill on a 
global scale. 
 
However, responding to oil spills is extremely weather dependent. During a storm, 
no vessels can operate and most of the equipment cannot be deployed or function, for 
example beach cloth and booms. Oil will also spread and emulsify faster and may 
become partially submerged, making detection difficult (Kingston, 2002). Other 
factors, such as daylight hours during winter and oil spill accessibility in remote 
areas will also play a role (Kingston, 2002; Singsaas & Lewis, 2011). In contrast, if 
the weather is calm, it is much easier to deploy the booms and skim oil, and 
evaporation will be much faster. Consequently, setting a figure such as 10,000 tonnes 
is indicative at best. It will be impossible to respond to 10,000 tonnes, or even 1,000 
tonnes, in a storm, whereas the response capability in calm weather for the same 
resources is vastly improved. A realistic number is thus impossible to correctly 
determine, and is the main reason the number has disappeared from the Swedish 
Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness (NSO, personal communication, September 
2015). Therefore, 10,000 tonnes is used as an approximation by the response 
organisations and in this dissertation. 
 
The term sufficient used in the hypotheses is defined as sufficient to accomplish the 
intended function of the hypotheses. Examining the variables can yield different 
results and three ranks of achievement were used: Preferable, Sufficient, and 
Insufficient (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Achievement ranks for the variables. 
Rank Definition Criteria 
Preferable The unit of analysis is at the best 
practice level. 
Proof of function at the highest level. 
Score of 95% or more. 
Sufficient The unit of analysis is present and 
working, but should be further 
developed. 
Proof of function as intended. Score 
from 50% up to 95%. 
Insufficient The unit of analysis is absent or not 
functioning. 
Proof of not functioning. Score below 
50%. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is wholly present and/or functioning 
(Preferable), partially present and/or functioning (Sufficient), or not present and/or 
functioning at all (Insufficient). Variables that do not work or exist in even 50% of 
the cases are not considered to be functioning and ranked Insufficient. Variables that 
work roughly as intended or exist in 50% up to (but not including) 95% of the cases 
are considered to function and ranked Sufficient. Variables that work or exist in 95% 
up to 100% of the cases are considered to function at the best practice level and are 
ranked Preferable, corresponding to the ideal situation. The rationale is that some 
variation can be accepted, as long as the majority is functioning at the highest level. 
Although statistical mathematics would not be suitable in analysis of most of these 
variables, 5% is chosen as an acceptable level of deviation from a full score. These 
5% corresponds to the two standard deviations covering 95% of the values in a 
normal distribution. This 95% limit is the basis for measuring significance in 
statistical tests and is thus judged to be a suitable approximation for the analyses. 
 
These three levels have been used to rank all of the variables in the embedded 
hypotheses. However, slight variation from the percentages have sometimes been 
utilised for individual variables and explained in the respective chapter. Following 
the reasoning above, all of the variables are interlinked and must perform 
sufficiently. Thus, no variable can be ranked Insufficient for the hypotheses to be 
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accepted. Consequently, all of their variables must be ranked Sufficient or Preferable 
for any of the embedded hypotheses to be accepted. 
 
The results in Chapters 5 to 9 have their own embedded hypotheses, H1 to H5, to 
relate to. These are combined to assess the main hypothesis, Hmain. Logically, 
rejecting all of the embedded null hypotheses, H10 to H50, means that the main null 
hypothesis, Hmain0, is also rejected. Correspondingly, accepting H1 to H5 means 
that Hmain is also accepted. But what about other combinations of acceptances and 
rejections for H1 to H5 and H10 to H50? Looking back at the refined Oil Spill 
Preparedness model (see Figure 16), the argumentation supports the notion that the 
prevention, planning, and response topics must function for oil spill preparedness to 
work sufficiently. Management must also function and is thus considered separately 
in Chapter 5, while the research and funding are examined embedded in Chapters 6 
to 8. Sweden should also have oil spill preparedness equivalent to international 
practice, as discussed in Chapter 9. Thus, H10 to H50 must all be rejected for Hmain 
to be accepted. 
 
Similarly, H1 to H5 face the same problem as Hmain. Using the same reasoning as 
above, all of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate that they are sufficient for 
any of H1 to H5 to be accepted. This means that the requirements to fulfil Hmain are 
high, because if even one of the variables is ranked Inadequate in any of H1 to H5, 
Hmain will be rejected. This sensitivity to specific variables may not fully reflect the 
nuanced status of oil spill preparedness in Sweden. As such, the hypothesis testing 
should be viewed as comparing to a utopia, where all parts of the preparedness exist 
and function flawlessly. This situation is what accepting Hmain represents. This 
utopia is unachievable, but something to strive for and the real response will be 
highly dependent on the conditions during the oil spill itself. It is also interesting to 
analyse how close Sweden is to this utopia and examining the units of analysis and 
corresponding variables will achieve this. 
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4.2.4.2	 Hypothesis	1	
The first embedded hypothesis relates to how Swedish oil spill preparedness is 
organised and managed and is formulated as: 
 
 H1 – Preparedness regime is sufficiently managed 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H10 – Preparedness regime is not sufficiently managed 
 
Hypothesis 1 is chosen to analyse issues related to the organisation of Swedish oil 
spill preparedness: its structure and its division of responsibilities. This reflects how 
logical the management structure and the division of responsibility are, which will 
have an impact on how the command structure is understood by the organisations 
involved. Connections between the involved organisations, clear roles, and structures 
for interaction and communication need to be established and exercised before an oil 
spill. 
 
This is operationalised into: if the expected structure follows the organisational 
responsibilities, how the organisations are connected, if the structure is understood 
by those involved, if the organisations are valued, and if the structure follows the 
expectations of the organisations (see Figure 18). Hypothesis 1 is tested in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 18: Hypothesis 1 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
As has been identified in some of the exercise evaluations (Ljungkvist et al., 2013; 
MSB, 2012) and project reports (Baltic Master, 2006), the division of responsibility 
among the involved organisations is not always clear and this was reflected in the 
chosen units of analysis. 
 
If Swedish oil spill preparedness is effectively managed, the organisational structure 
follows a path tied to the organisational responsibilities. The two main agencies on 
land and sea, MSB and SCG, should have connections to all coastal municipalities 
and County Administrative Boards (CABs). Municipalities should be connected to 
their neighbours and their respective CABs. The involved organisations should be 
well aware of the other organisations’ mandates and responsibilities and these 
responsibilities should follow the expectations. In short, all organisations involved 
should have a clear understanding of their own and other organisations’ place and 
responsibilities in the system. 
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This structure is partly a communication and exercise problem, as structure and 
responsibilities may be unknown outside the organisation. However, no organisation 
can or will act alone if a large oil spill occurs. Knowledge of other involved 
organisations is essential for any complex operation, such as an oil spill. Therefore, it 
is the responsibility of all organisations that have a role in oil spill response to have 
established such connections and gathered the necessary knowledge. 
4.2.4.3	 Hypothesis	2	
The second embedded hypothesis relates to the Swedish political commitment to, 
and implementation of, the international legislation related to oil spills, and is 
formulated as: 
 
 H2 – Political commitment is sufficient 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H20 – Political commitment is insufficient 
 
Hypothesis 2 is chosen to analyse a major indictor of whether oil spill prevention is 
sufficient: political commitment. This is reflected by how international legislation is 
implemented by the Swedish government. Firstly, the government has a role in 
signing the conventions and agreements; secondly, it needs to designate a responsible 
organisation to oversee the convention and agreement implementation; thirdly, it 
needs to budget sufficient funds for the responsible organisations to be able to 
perform their assigned responsibilities. 
 
This is operationalised into: which international conventions are ratified and how 
they are implemented, which international agreements are signed and how they are 
implemented, and what the organisational budgets are for enforcing these 
conventions and agreements (see Figure 19). H2 is tested in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 19: Hypothesis 2 chosen indicator, units of analysis, and variables. 
As the literature review revealed criticism against the level of implementation and 
enforcement of some of these conventions (Hassler, 2008; 2010; Knudsen & Hassler, 
2011), the ratification of international conventions relating to oil spill preparedness 
and their implementation were chosen as the units of analysis. 
 
There are several international conventions and agreements relating to oil spill 
preparedness and response. The political commitment can be measured by how many 
conventions have been ratified or agreements signed. Ratifying a convention or 
signing an agreement signals intent, but do not involve as much effort as 
implementation. It is therefore reasonable to assume that all relevant international 
conventions and agreements should be signed, if any political support exists. 
Implementation is analysed by examining if Sweden has fulfilled the obligations 
described in the convention and agreement texts. This is harder to evaluate, as the 
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texts are often open to interpretation or does not specify to which extent a measure 
should be implemented. Implementation analysis consequently becomes more 
subjective, but is guided by the specifications and intentions of the texts as much as 
possible. Finally, annual budgets and budget instructions correspond to the political 
priorities for the fiscal year. The agencies should ideally receive sufficient budget to 
perform their assigned responsibilities. However, priorities within organisations will 
make the real effect of the budget hard to analyse. A comparison will therefore have 
to be made with previous budgets, to see the general trend. 
 
For oil spill preparedness to be considered to have political commitment, the relevant 
international conventions should be ratified and agreements signed, should be 
implemented, and the responsible organisations sufficiently budgeted. H2 excludes 
the inherent values of the different conventions, as this topic would be better suited 
for a complementary PhD. 
4.2.4.4	 Hypothesis	3	
The third embedded hypothesis relates to the Swedish system for, and status of, oil 
spill contingency planning, and is formulated as: 
 
 H3 – Contingency planning measures are sufficient 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
H30 – Contingency planning measures are insufficient 
 
Hypothesis 3 is chosen in order to analyse several major issues indicating if oil spill 
planning measures are sufficient: the priority of oil spill contingency planning in 
organisations, risk awareness, available resources, and participation in external 
projects. In order to write a good contingency plan, there is a need to have a risk 
assessment for oil spills, know the coastal environmental sensitivity, as well as 
prioritising areas for protection. The commitment of an organisation is reflected in 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
83 
the resources designated for a task. Being open to external advice and taking part in 
collaboration projects also reflects the organisations’ commitments to oil spill 
planning. 
 
This is operationalised into: the existence of risk assessments, sensitivity maps and 
contingency plans, available staff resources and budget, and participation in external 
projects (see Figure 20). H3 is tested in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Figure 20: Hypothesis 3 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
Since the planning process itself consists of many different aspects, the units of 
analysis focussed on evidence concerning different parts of the planning process by 
the organisations. The analysis of the content of the plan itself has been excluded, as 
supported by Perry and Lindell (2003) regarding the importance of the planning 
process itself, rather than the finished document. 
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To make the best priorities during oil spill contingency planning, a risk assessment 
must exist, either a local one or a regional one detailing the oil spill risk in the area 
(API, 2013c; IPIECAOGP, 2015; ITOPF, 2011b). Additionally, good knowledge 
about the sensitivity of the coast should exist in the form of a sensitivity map. This 
map should be easily distributed and used to get an overview for both planning and 
response purposes. How useful a plan is depends on what the plan covers and 
whether the affected organisations have exercised the plan accordingly. However, 
having a recently revised plan is the end result of the first step of the planning cycle, 
which will continue by exercising the plan and revising it. Having a plan or not is an 
indicator as to whether an organisation is working with oil spill preparedness. 
Similarly, the resources dedicated to oil spill preparedness also indicates how 
prioritised the issue is. However, resources spent may be periodical, with a higher 
workload surrounding the planning, execution, and reporting of a larger exercise, for 
example. This makes the role of the resources harder to interpret if taken out of 
context. If resources are increased, but no risk assessment, sensitivity map or plan is 
produced, the question of how the resources are spent will arise. Reversed, a 
reduction of available resources coupled with increased productivity suggests that the 
issue has been successfully internalised into the organisation, but may also warn that 
the issue is not being prioritised. External participation in projects has many 
advantages, for example extra resources available, an externally driven time plan to 
follow, and external help. Therefore, project participation is also a good indicator of 
commitment. 
 
For Sweden to have sufficient oil spill contingency planning measures, relevant 
organisations should have an updated oil spill contingency plan, based on a risk 
assessment and taking into account the sensitive areas, and continuously exercise and 
revise the plan. However, it could also be argued that measures are sufficient if a 
positive trend can be shown and an increasing number of organisations are writing 
and revising their contingency plans. 
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4.2.4.5	 Hypothesis	4	
The fourth embedded hypothesis relates to the Swedish system for oil spill response 
and exercises and is formulated as: 
 
 H4 – Response measures are sufficient 
  
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H40 – Response measures are insufficient 
 
Hypothesis 4 is chosen in order to analyse factors indicating whether oil spill 
response measures have sufficient equipment, training, exercises, and works 
systematically with known issues discovered during real spills and exercises. This 
reflects organisational and system knowledge, and learning among the organisations 
responsible for the oil spill response. The response itself needs management and 
plans to be effective, but the responder needs two basic things to be effective: 
training and equipment. Sweden has regional depots of oil spill equipment located 
around the country. Annual national training courses are organised by the Swedish 
Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The responsibility to conduct exercises is left to 
the regional and local authorities, meaning the County Administrative Boards 
(CABs) and the municipalities. Exercises serve two primary functions; they raise 
awareness among the participants and evaluations show topics in need of 
improvement. 
 
This is operationalised into: participation in and quality of training, equipment 
location and amount, exercises participated in, lessons learned from exercises and 
real spills, and external project participation (see Figure 21). H4 is tested in Chapter 
8. 
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Figure 21: Hypothesis 4 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
While there are regular exercises at sea in Sweden, the few exercises onshore and the 
few real spills have shown that there are issues to be addressed in the Swedish oil 
spill response (MSB, 2012; MSBHaV, 2014). These are the focus of the chosen units 
of analysis. 
 
Training courses are excellent indicators as they can determine the number of trained 
personnel. At least one person in each organisation should be specialised in oil spill 
by having participated in one of the courses. However, no analysis of the course 
quality is included in the analysis, only factors related to quality control. The 
regional Oil Spill Depots should be strategically located to minimise deployment 
time to high risk and/or especially vulnerable areas and have sufficient equipment to 
handle the designated amount of oil. Exercises are vital to testing the planned 
response and should be conducted frequently (Cashman et al., 2003; Perry & Lindell, 
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2003). In order to improve, exercises need to be evaluated and the recommendations 
followed up. 
 
Sweden would be considered to have sufficient response measures if there is 
evidence that personnel is properly trained, sufficient equipment exist, and there is a 
structured approach to working with identified oil spill response issues. 
4.2.4.6	 Hypothesis	5	
The fifth hypothesis relates to how Swedish oil spill preparedness compares to other 
nations and is formulated as: 
 
 H5 – Preparedness in Sweden is equivalent to international practice 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
H50 – Preparedness in Sweden is not equivalent to international practice 
 
Hypothesis 5 is chosen in order to compare the level of Swedish oil spill 
preparedness to neighbouring countries. The number of international conventions 
ratified is one suitable indicator. However, it does not reveal any information on the 
implementation of these conventions, which is likely to differ significantly (Knudsen 
& Hassler, 2011). The strategic target values for responding to oil spills differs 
between countries and reflects the ambition of the oil spill response, as this target 
should be supported with the corresponding resources. It is also interesting to 
examine as an indicator of international practice, as no standard exists. There is no 
international guide for contingency planning and exercises, but the oil and gas 
industry have developed several measures, for example contingency planning 
templates and guides (API, 2013c; IPIECAOGP, 2015; ITOPF, 2011b). These 
standards could be considered to be the industry best practice, as most companies use 
them. A useful tool that has been developed is the RETOS™ standardised 
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preparedness evaluation (Taylor et al., 2014; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014), which is 
used to compare Sweden to neighbouring countries. 
 
This is operationalised into: the number of international agreements and targets, use 
of National Contingency Plans and the Tiered Preparedness and Response concepts, 
and the score of the RETOS™ evaluation tool (see Figure 22). H5 is tested in 
Chapter 9. 
  
 
Figure 22: Hypothesis 5 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
A large oil spill could potentially impact several nations. With Sweden’s exposed 
location and long coastline, the nation would greatly benefit from being proactive 
when it comes to oil spill preparedness in an international context, as pointed out by 
several authors (Hassler, 2008; Pålsson et al., 2012). This includes taking part in 
international cooperation and adhering to international best practices. This reasoning 
prompted the choice of the units of analysis for H5. 
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For Sweden to be considered to have oil spill preparedness equal to international 
practice, Sweden should follow the international practices and have strategic targets 
and a RETOS™ evaluation score equal to the neighbouring countries. It is outside 
the scope of this thesis to go into depth on oil spill preparedness in all of the 
countries of the world, so the focus is on the neighbouring countries. 
4.2.5	 Validity	
Validity concerns the accuracy of the results and can be further subdivided. 
Important types of validity for this study are discussed below. 
4.2.5.1	 Construct	validity	
Construct validity concerns identifying and operationalising the correct measures for 
the concepts of the study. This is increased by using triangulation, suggested by Yin 
(2014) and Trochim (2006) and discussed previously. By choosing the specific 
concepts elaborated in the Oil Spill Preparedness model and operationalising them, a 
robust and triangulated chain of evidence has been provided. This approach 
examines the issue of oil spill preparedness using several different approaches to 
analyse a broader spectrum of influencing factors. Since no publications could be 
found that matched the operational measures to concepts, deductive reasoning was 
used for the conversion of indicators to units of analysis. For example, if possible, 
the information from the questionnaire was corroborated with document sources and 
vice versa, in order to increase construct validity. 
4.2.5.2	 Internal	validity	
Internal validity addresses the causal relationship between two events, and if and 
how one event caused the other (Trochim, 2006; Yin, 2014). This is controlled by 
using pattern matching for similar events and using deductive reasoning to establish 
rival explanations to be falsified. These rival explanations are represented in the 
indicators in the hypotheses section. 
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4.2.5.3	 External	validity	
External validity concerns how and to what extent the findings of the study can be 
generalised to other locations or settings (Trochim, 2006; Yin, 2014). This is 
primarily discussed in Chapters 9 and 10, which examines the dissertation results in 
comparison to oil spill preparedness in other countries. 
4.2.6	 Reliability	
Reliability concerns the consistency of measurements and the need for the findings to 
be repeatable by other scientists (Trochim, 2006; Yin, 2014). This is primarily 
addressed through maintaining a rigorous case study protocol and database. The 
problem with case studies is that they are often based on a contemporary case where 
the scientist will not have complete control over all surrounding factors. It may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to replicate the exact context at another time. The most 
important factor for reliability in this situation is to properly document the research 
procedures and raw data (Yin, 2014), which has been done in this study. This will 
make it possible for other researchers to be able to use the same data and analyse it 
themselves using different methods, ideally agreeing with the conclusions of this 
dissertation. 
4.3	 Research	ethics	
The World Maritime University (WMU) Research Ethics panel approved this study 
as seen in the Compliance with Guidelines on Good Research Practice section in the 
Preface. 
 
The survey used in this dissertation for the questionnaire and the interviews was 
submitted in Swedish and English to the WMU Ethics Committee 3 December 2014 
(see Appendix A - Questionnaire and Appendix B - Interview). It was approved 15 
December 2014, before distributing the questionnaire part of the survey to the 
respondents and using the full survey during interviews. 
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The respondents to the questionnaire were contacted in their role as public 
employees working at government authorities (see Appendix C - Sendlist). Since 
they are civil servants with listed professional email addresses, no intrusions into the 
respondents’ privacy were made. Each respondent additionally approved the terms 
and conditions of the survey, which was set out on the first page of the questionnaire 
(see Appendix A - Questionnaire). 
 
The informants from the interviews, like the respondents to the questionnaire, were 
assured that their responses would be made anonymous before use in this dissertation 
and in publications. Before the interview started, the informants accepted the same 
terms and conditions as the questionnaire respondents and all informants signed a 
Letter of Consent (see Appendix D - Letters of Consent). 
4.4	 Limitations	
There are several limitations to and assumptions about the research approach that 
need to be stressed. 
4.4.1	 Surveys	
When dealing with surveys using a questionnaire, there are issues with reaching the 
target audience, having them read through, consider, and interpret the questions 
correctly, and not fatiguing the respondents by creating a lengthy survey (de Vaus, 
2014). These factors were considered during the process of designing and refining 
the questions, and during the pilot study discussed in section 4.5.2.1 Pilot. The online 
survey tool used, SurveyGizmo, automatically logs various respondent statistics, for 
example the time it took to go through the questions and if any of the open-ended 
responses seem false based on automated word analysis. This gives an indication of 
the quality of the responses. However, the survey does not reveal any information on 
the level of oil spill preparedness for those that did not respond. A logical 
assumption would be that respondents that chose not to answer the questionnaire 
have a lower than average preparedness as they evidently do not prioritise the issue. 
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This was exemplified by the fact that some potential respondents opted out of the 
survey and one person sent an email declaring that participation was not a priority. 
 
Likewise, there are inherent issues in performing interviews related to how questions 
are asked, how they are interpreted, and how truthful the informants are (de Vaus, 
2014; Gummesson, 2000; Trochim, 2006). Having only a single interviewer perform 
all of the interviews with mostly familiar contacts was intended to control these 
effects. This familiarity was intended to create an environment of trust, where the 
respondents felt secure enough to answer truthfully and without bias towards what 
they thought the interviewer would like to hear. 
4.4.2	 Data	access	
Data that are unpublished or inaccessible to the public could be very informative, but 
difficult to access. Organisations may have collected data that is hidden away, for 
example in an internal report, memo, or repository. Most probably, the researcher is 
not even aware of the existence of such data. This is especially true of older printed 
sources that may only exist in a few physical locations. This is mitigated during the 
knowledge-gathering phase, which reduces the likelihood of missing valuable 
datasets with increased subject knowledge and simultaneously increases data access 
through network contacts. 
4.4.3	 Language	access	
Language access is similar to data access and a language barrier restricts the access 
to both finding texts and to understanding them. This could be a data collection 
weakness, since an unknown amount of research has been done on oil spill 
preparedness in the former member states of the Soviet Union. However, using 
modern translation tools and translators mitigates this effect. Additional effort has 
been made to find relevant references through the Russian librarian at WMU, and 
through the oil spill preparedness network in the Baltic Sea Region. Thus, it is 
unlikely that any major source of data have been missed. 
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4.4.4	 Time	constraint	
As always, time constraints must be considered. The cut-off point for data collection 
should ideally be when additional data do not change the evidence or covers the topic 
completely. In reality, there is a subjective point where the researcher judges that no 
more relevant data will be found. Considering the access issues above, this may or 
may not be the right decision to make. This issue has been controlled by proper pre-
understanding of the topic, as recommended by Gummesson (2000). 
4.4.5	 Organisational	changes	
During the course of the survey, the contract for the Oil Spill Advisory Service 
(OSAS) at the consultancy company Sweco expired, and many of the contact persons 
in the municipalities and CABs switched position within and between organisations 
or retired. This was controlled for as much as possible by administering the 
questionnaire before the change. However, a few municipalities did not respond to 
the questionnaire because they did not, at the time, have anyone responsible for oil 
spill preparedness. 
4.5	 Methods	
Different research methods have been used in this dissertation, almost exclusively 
from the field of social science. 
4.5.1	 Literature	analysis	
The principal research method that was used was literature analysis by examining 
available discourse. 
4.5.2	 Survey	
The semi-structured survey questions were formulated in English according to 
established guidelines (de Vaus, 2014) and translated to Swedish. The survey was 
divided into two parts: a questionnaire with a majority of Likert item multiple-choice 
questions (see Appendix A - Questionnaire) and a shorter interview with statements 
and Likert item multiple-choice, and open ended questions (see Appendix B - 
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Interview). The Likert item options followed established standard formulations (RP 
Group, 2003). Both questionnaire and interview questions were asked during the 
interviews. 
 
The “no opinion” option was omitted from many questions of the survey because it 
targeted professionals with a working knowledge on the subject. The neutral option 
of the Likert items was left intact for those that did not have strong opinions either 
way. 
4.5.2.1	 Pilot	study	
Following literature recommendations (de Vaus, 2014; van Teijlingen & Hundley, 
2001), a pilot study was conducted during November 2014, after building the survey 
and refining it following tests on colleagues and professional contacts. The pilot 
study was performed on contacts that had until recently been working with oil spill 
preparedness issues in the survey target organisations (municipalities, CABs, and 
agencies), but did not currently hold such a position. In order to be able to maximise 
the number of responses, this was judged to be as close as possible to the real 
respondents, without diminishing the pool of actual respondents. The pilot study 
helped to develop the lines of reasoning, to refine the questions, subtract some 
questions, and add new questions that reinforced the evidence for specific 
hypotheses. 
4.5.2.2	 Questionnaire	
All of the regional and local governments with a coastline towards Swedish state 
water, defined in Swedish law as the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the three largest 
lakes: Vänern, Vättern, and Mälaren (de Vaus, 2014; van Teijlingen & Hundley, 
2001), were selected for the questionnaire respondent groups. This corresponds to 
126 coastal municipalities and 18 coastal CABs (see Appendix C - Sendlist) and 
represented two populations; municipalities and CABs. The foundation for the 
contact points was a mailing list used for a previous survey (Pålsson & Wåhlander, 
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2013), combined with multiple participation lists acquired from numerous oil spill 
conferences and events during the course of the research. 
4.5.2.3	 Interview	
Swedish national oil spill experts were selected to be the interview informants. These 
were defined as the members of the National Cooperation Group for Oil Combating 
(NSO). NSO consists of representatives from the Swedish Coast Guard (SCG), the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Swedish Agency for Marine and 
Water Management (SwAM), the Oil Spill Advisory Service (OSAS) at Sweco, the 
Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA), the Swedish Transport Agency (STA), the 
County Administrative Boards (CABs) and the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR). Representation from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was replaced by SwAM after this agency’s creation in 
2011, but EPA is again part of the NSO since fall 2015. The interviews excluded the 
representatives of the municipalities (SALAR) and the CABs, because these 
provided more detailed input through the questionnaire from each individual 
municipality and CAB. NSO meets twice a year to discuss recent oil spill events and 
continuously works on oil spill related projects, either together or through its 
respective organisations. During 2014, NSO finalised the Swedish Strategy for Oil 
Spill Preparedness (NSO, 2014b) and during 2015, an associated Action Plan has 
been developed and circulated for comments. Close collaboration was established 
with most of the members of this group during the oil spill projects worked on during 
the study. Thus, it was easy to approach NSO and convince them to be informants 
for the interviews. This was also a deliberate strategy to minimise bias in the form of 
withheld opinions, as the informants were counted on to trust the confidentiality and 
answer truthfully. 
4.6	 Data	collection	
There are different sources available on the topic of oil spill preparedness, but much 
of this has not been published in academic journals. Data from the survey 
questionnaire and interviews complemented data from literature sources. 
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4.6.1	 Literature	sources	
Literature has been gathered from a wide variety of publicly available sources. 
Scientific papers have been gathered through the library at WMU and open access 
journals and conference proceedings online. Official documents such as conventions, 
strategies, and statements have been collected from government agencies, authorities, 
and organisation webpages. Project reports have been gathered from the project 
pages of the Baltic Sea oil spill projects Baltic Master, Baltic Master II, BRISK, 
EnSaCo, MIMIC, and OILRISK. 
4.6.2	 Questionnaire	
Respondents were approached through their official email addresses in November 
and December 2014, and in January 2015, and asked whether they or someone else 
in their organisation were responsible for coordination of oil spill preparedness. 
Representatives from each of the 18 CABs confirmed that they were the contact 
points, as did 124 of the 126 municipalities contacted. The potential bias for only 
reaching respondents with access to Internet and a computer when using an online 
survey was dismissed, since all of the respondents have publicly listed emails and 
computers with Internet access through their employers. As civil servants, they have 
an obligation to answer public inquiries. However, in reality, there is no requirement 
for them to do so, and they may feel that answering a questionnaire is not a priority. 
Voluntary participation in the survey was explicit in the instructions. 
 
In total, there were 75 unique responses to the questionnaire. Of these, CABs 
represented 16 responses, corresponding to 89% of the selected group of 18 coastal 
CABs. From the municipalities, there were 59 responses, corresponding to 77% of 
the selected group of municipalities. Since many of the municipalities have joined 
their rescue services into various formations of rescue associations covering 2 to 10 
municipalities, the questionnaire was sent to 77 unique email addresses, representing 
the 126 municipalities selected. The responses were completed to varying degrees 
from 0% to 100%, which is reflected in the survey results. 
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4.6.3	 Interviews	
Six separate interviews were conducted in the offices of the different organisations in 
January 2015 by the same interviewer. One member of NSO was on leave of absence 
without stable Internet access or telephone connection. It was decided to send the 
survey questions via email to this informant. These seven interviews correspond to 
all of the chosen informants. Following suggestions from Trochim (2006), none of 
the interviews were recorded, in order to ensure confidentiality and thus increase 
honesty. The equipment used was a pen, a notebook and a tablet computer, which 
had the survey questions online. Following the recommendations by Trochim (2006) 
and de Vaus (2014), the informants were allowed to talk uninterrupted between 
questions in each interview. When different answer options were available, the 
alternatives were shown to the informant after the question was asked, to facilitate 
memory of the alternatives and phrasing of the question. If anything was unclear, the 
notes were read back to the informant to confirm or deny the statements, and 
appropriate changes were made to the responses. The interviews lasted between one 
and two hours and were completed without interruptions. The informants gave an 
honest impression and took the questions seriously, evidenced by the observation 
that they often thought for some time before giving an answer. It may also have 
helped that the aim of the interview was research, and not to produce information for 
any specific government agency or evaluation. In this way, possible territorial bias 
and agency competition were controlled. Following each interview, the notes were 
revisited in the evening of the same day and rewritten into clearer sentences. This 
was a precaution to make sure that the notes would be understood later and 
information would be sensible, with the interview fresh in memory. 
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4.7	 Analysis	
Several analytical methods were used and are explained in the following section. 
4.7.1	 Coding	
Coding means converting answers to numbers and then classifying them (de Vaus, 
2014). This was done for the scaled survey responses in order to use them in 
statistical software. “Yes” and “No” answers were simply coded as dummy variables 
of 1 and 0 respectively and Likert item answers were coded from 1 to 5, with 5 being 
the most positive or affirming answer. Coding was done using the software search-
and-replace function, in order to eliminate transcription errors. 
4.7.2	 Statistics	
Survey data analysis was made using standard statistical approaches described by 
Trochim (2006), de Vaus (2014), and Yin (2014). These statistics describe the 
predominant answers and the variance and distribution, and tests dependencies 
between factors mathematically. 
 
The statistical analysis and graphs were made using the GraphPad Prism version 6.0f 
statistical software. GraphPad Prism is a commercial programme by GraphPad 
Software. It is an intuitive programme with helpful documentation, which produces 
easily customisable graphs. This made it the most suitable software to use among the 
available competitors. 
4.7.2.1	 ANOVA	
A two way Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) is used when there is one measurement 
variable and two nominal variables (Fisher, 1925; McDonald, 2014). Each nominal 
variable must also be found in combination with each of the other nominal variables, 
which was satisfied in the dataset. ANOVA tests three hypotheses: if the means of 
the measurement variable are equal for different values of the first nominal variable, 
if the means are equal for different values of the second nominal variable, and that 
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there is no interaction, meaning effects of one nominal variable do not depend on the 
value of the other nominal variable (McDonald, 2014). 
4.7.2.2	 Berger’s	test	
For correlation tests between two binomial variables from the questionnaire, 
Berger’s test has been used (Berger, 1996). Berger’s test is an exact, unconditional 
test of homogeneity, meaning that it exactly calculates the probability of getting the 
observed data. It is more powerful than the originally intended Fisher’s exact test for 
2 x 2 tables (Fisher, 1925), which has a number of conditions limiting its power 
(Mehta & Senchaudhuri, 2003). 
4.7.2.3	 Dunn’s	post	test	
Dunn's post test is performed after Friedman’s test. It calculates the expected average 
difference in the rank sum between two columns and compares it with the real value 
(GraphPad Software, 2015). The p value then takes into account the number of 
comparisons and is calculated for each pair of columns, identifying which pairs of 
columns are different form the rest. 
4.7.2.4	 Friedman’s	test	
Friedman’s test is a non-parametric statistical test that compares three or more 
matched or paired groups by ranking each row separately (GraphPad Software, 
2015). The ranks in each column are then summed. The value of the Friedman 
statistic is then calculated from the sums of ranks and the sample sizes. If the p value 
is small, the differences between columns are not random, and at least one of the 
columns differs from the rest. A post test (usually Dunn’s post test) is needed to see 
which columns differ from which other columns. 
4.7.2.5	 X2	
The X2, or chi-square, test is used when there are two nominal variables and it is 
required to see whether the proportions of one variable are different for different 
values of the other variable. This is done by calculating the expected frequencies 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
100 
between the variables and comparing them to the observed frequencies (de Vaus, 
2014; McDonald, 2014). 
4.7.3	 Evaluation	analysis	
Evaluation theory and aims have been discussed by several authors, although with a 
focus on a single organisation or programme (Hanberger, 2011; Saunders, 2012; 
Weiss, 1998). Different uses of evaluations exist, categorised by Saunders (2012) as 
instrumental, conceptual, enlightenment, process use, and persuasive or symbolic. 
The evaluation analysis identifies the intended use and the aims of the exercises and 
real responses, according to the framework criteria of usability practices in 
evaluation design, outlined in Saunders (2012). Additionally, how the 
recommendations will be followed up was analysed. This analysis described the use 
of the evaluations and real spills, and examines how the lessons learned have been 
utilised. 
4.7.4	 Network	analysis	
The novel methodological approach of this dissertation concerns the methods applied 
to assessing the organisational network for oil spill preparedness. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, this approach has not been found for oil spill preparedness in Sweden. 
Network theory has some unique characteristics, which means that the analysis must 
be handled differently from normal statistics (Newman, 2003). For example, real 
world networks are not random when it comes to the number of contacts, called 
degrees in network theory. Degrees do not have a traditional normal distribution, but 
are often highly skewed, meaning that they have a long tail of values that are far 
above the mean (Newman, 2003; 2008). These high-degree nodes or hubs 
represented by the tail can have a substantial effect on the behaviour of a networked 
system. The goal of studying networks is to understand and explain the workings of 
systems built on these networks, in this case Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
 
Analysis related to network theory has been performed using the Gephi programme 
version 0.8.2 beta (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009). Gephi is open-source 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
101 
software for graph and network analysis by the Gephi Consortium. It uses a 3D 
render engine to display large networks in real time and can perform a variety of 
spatialising, filtering, and manipulating tasks. It is an intuitive programme with 
helpful documentation that produces graphs that are easy to customise, making it the 
most suitable software to use among the available competitors at the time. 
4.7.4.1	 Centrality	measures	
These types of statistics describe the basic attributes of a network and are most often 
the average network density, degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. 
 
• Average network density is the ratio of the number of connections (called 
edges in network theory) per node (called vertexes) to the number of possible 
connections. This represents to what extent all organisations are connected to 
the others. 
 
• Degree centrality, or degree of a node, is simply the number of connections. 
This represents to what extent an organisation is connected to others. 
 
• Eigenvector centrality takes into account the quality of the nodes by examining 
how many connections each connected node has. Thus, an organisation with a 
smaller number of high quality contacts may outrank an organisation with a 
larger number of mediocre contacts. This assumes that influence is correlated 
with connections (Newman, 2008). 
 
This analyses the attributes of the oil spill preparedness network in Sweden, based on 
connections and describes the links mathematically. It is used to improve the validity 
of the analysis, by correlating the survey information to the network structure. 
4.7.5	 Preparedness	analysis	
The preparedness analysis uses a standardised evaluation framework to compare 
Swedish oil spill preparedness to other countries. Such a framework consists of a 
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checklist of measures in various configurations depending on the organisational level 
(national, regional, local, or industry), with multiple-choice answers and an inbuilt 
analysis tool. 
4.7.5.1	 RETOS™	
RETOS™ version 2.0 is an Excel tool based on original work developed for the 
ARPEL Governance Project (Taylor et al., 2014; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014; Taylor, 
Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a; 2008b). It 
provides a general guide for industry and governments to assess their level of oil spill 
response, planning, and readiness management in relation to pre-established criteria, 
and international best management practices. This is the only such tool that was 
found and is backed by regional and international experts from industry and 
government, such as Clean Caribbean and Americas (CCA), the Regional Activity 
Center - Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Center for 
the Wider Caribbean (RAC-REMPEITC-Caribe), IMO, Oil Spill Response Limited 
(OSRL), the Caspian and Black Sea’s Oil Spill Preparedness Regional Initiative 
(OSPRI), the Global Initiative for West, Central and Southern Africa (GI WACAF), 
and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA). 
4.8	 Conclusions	
Working from the underlying philosophy, through research design and methods, and 
finishing in explanations of the analyses performed, this chapter explains the 
reasoning from research approach through design, methods, data collection, and 
analysis. The epistemological and methodological background for conducting the 
research is justified, and builds on the background and literature review presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Hypotheses testing in the forthcoming results chapters are justified. 
Research quality is discussed in the form of potential and real threats to validity and 
reliability, and how these are managed. Finally, research methods and tools are 
described technically and justified. 
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The research process in this dissertation follows a deductive progression from 
describing the current state of Swedish oil spill preparedness, to identifying patterns, 
testing causative theories, and generalising findings. 
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Chapter	5	-	Management	
The first of the five results chapters focuses on the oil spill preparedness topic of 
management and specifically the Swedish management structure. The roles of the 
different institutions are introduced and analysed, and the oil spill preparedness 
network is mapped and compared to the survey responses. This is the only 
foundation component with its own chapter, as the research and funding are 
discussed in relation to the prevention, planning, and response topics in Chapters 6 to 
8. 
5.1	 Introduction	
An effective preparedness is not necessarily dependent on large amounts of oil spill 
materials and equipment (ITOPF, 2012b). Most importantly, infrastructure, logistical 
support, and leadership are needed to effectively respond to an oil spill. 
5.1.1	 Organisational	structure	
Experience has shown that an oil spill response can be effective even with basic 
equipment and resources, on the conditions that the organisational structure is clearly 
defined and understood by those involved and the response work itself is well 
managed (ITOPF, 2012b). Thus, an organisational structure is required that provides 
informed leadership for difficult decisions under time pressure and accommodates 
compromises during both planning and response. This structure will also be 
responsible for managing the diverse expectations and demands from the media and 
different governmental, private, and public organisations involved (ITOPF, 2012b). 
 
Overcoming the issues of coordination and management of the various organisations 
involved in oil spill preparedness is preferably done before an actual spill. All 
affected parties should be part of the oil spill contingency planning process. 
Negotiating priorities and decisions during an ongoing response will impede the 
successful outcome of an operation. An effective organisational structure includes 
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the involved organisations and makes them work together as a unit toward the 
common goal of minimising the oil spill impact. This requires a clear command 
structure with unambiguous roles and responsibilities, and effective leadership 
(ITOPF, 2012b). A clearly defined and established command and management 
structure will significantly reduce confusion and misinformation during an oil spill 
response (Purnell & Zhang, 2014). 
 
Different management systems are used in different parts of the world. These have 
often been developed from local preferences and previous oil spill experience. 
Regardless of the organisational system, four functions are essential to include in a 
response organisation (ITOPF, 2012b): 
 
1. Management 
Leading overall response and individual operations, for example at sea and on 
land. 
 
2. Planning 
Structuring future operations based on current and forecasted situations, 
including the availability of resources and local sensitivities. 
 
3. Logistics 
Operations support with equipment and qualified personnel. 
 
4. Administration 
Record keeping, financial control, and other administrative tasks, for example 
compilation of claims. 
 
There are two general organisational models for oil spill response, the Team-based 
structure and the Function-based organisational structure (ITOPF, 2012b). 
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5.1.1.1	 Team-based	structure	
The Team-based structure (see Figure 23) has been used successfully in various parts 
of the world (ITOPF, 2012b). 
 
 
Figure 23: Team-based structure for oil spill response (ITOPF, 2012b). Information refers to state of the 
casualty, the location of spilt oil, shoreline impact, the weather etc. Figure used with permission. 
Its main principles are shared with the Function-based structure, but the Team-based 
approach is more focussed on individual organisations and teams are not assigned 
based on function. Instead, positions are based on the different mandates of the 
organisations, commonly at sea and onshore, with accompanying support. This 
structure makes the teams independent, but also less coordinated with the overall 
response organisation. Only a few overarching tasks (for example public health, 
media, and legal issues) are shared with other organisations, necessitating 
establishment of liaison officers and to some extent, duplicating management and 
administration work. 
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5.1.1.2	 Function-based	structure	
The Function-based structure (see Figure 24), also known as the Incident 
Management System (IMS), is best exemplified by the Incident Command System 
(ICS) used primarily in the United States (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006; ITOPF, 
2012b; Jamieson, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 24: Function-based structure for oil spill response (ITOPF, 2012b). Information refers to state of 
the casualty, the location of spilt oil, shoreline impact, the weather etc. Figure used with permission. 
The Function-based structure focuses on the roles and functions that are needed for 
an effective response. It is designed specifically for disaster responses that require 
personnel from different organisations and agencies to work together in a single 
structure with predetermined roles and responsibilities. All relevant organisations 
should be familiar with the ICS structure, which enables a response organisation to 
be built quickly. For example, it is the United States Coast Guard (USCG) that will 
be appointed as the Incident Command and lead the response for any oil spill 
accidents in territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United 
States, with the other functions being filled by qualified individuals from other 
agencies, the industry, and volunteer organisations. The ICS structure has been 
adopted by the Philippines, Brunei, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, and Canada (Curd, 2013), 
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and has been endorsed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (IMO, 
2012) and industry, for example Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) and Shell 
(Curd, 2013; OSR, 2013). 
5.1.2	 Organisational	theory	
There are predominantly two perspectives on organisational theory: the rationalist 
perspective and the social-psychological perspective. From a rationalist perspective, 
organisations can be described as systematically established structures, invented to 
accomplish specific goals (Abrahamsson, 1992). The important structures in this 
perspective are the formal structure and authority, responsibility, competence, and 
coordination (Ödlund, 2007; 2010). The social-psychological perspective targets 
personal interactions and interaction with the environment. This perspective focuses 
on social psychology in the form of identity and culture, and socio-biology in the 
form of trust. The mainly top-led and politically derived framework and conditions 
in an organisation (the rationalist perspective) interact with the mechanisms that 
govern human behaviour and interaction (the social-psychological perspective). 
 
The Function-based structure (IMS) is built around a hierarchical chain of command 
and the unity of command concept (IPIECAOGP, 2014a). This concept means that 
every individual has only one designated superior officer, giving a clear point of 
contact and minimising the possibility of contradictory and confusing orders. The 
Function-based structure also uses a common terminology, to minimise 
misunderstandings between organisations during a response. 
 
Much of the research on the Function-based structure has naturally been done in the 
United States. The United States’ management organisation, before implementation 
of ICS in 2004 (Moynihan, 2009), was similar to the current management structure 
in Sweden. The United States federal government did not require any specific 
management structure to be used by emergency response organisations on state and 
local level (Lindell, Perry, & Prater, 2005). This resulted in several different 
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organisational structures, position titles, and operational procedures that impeded 
cooperation, even among the same response agencies (e.g. fire departments) in 
neighbouring areas. A criticism against non-Function-based structure systems is that 
in case of an event requiring cooperation with unknown organisations, valuable time 
is lost trying to overcome differences in organisational training, design, procedures, 
and titles (Lindell et al., 2005). 
 
Crisis management in Sweden is mainly decentralised and the responsibility is 
delegated by the government to individual municipalities and their rescue services 
(Ödlund, 2010). The organisational structure follows the responsibility principle, in 
that the organisation responsible for an activity during normal conditions retains that 
responsibility during a crisis situation. Additionally, the structure follows the 
subsidiarity principle, which states that crises should be managed close to the 
citizens. This means that the local authorities should handle the crisis, reinforced by 
national resources, rather than being taken over by a national agency. 
 
The traditional method for managing cross-sector activities is cooperation with other 
organisations towards a common goal. The Swedish system of institutional structures 
makes the agencies legally equal and no organisation is above another. Cooperation 
is the only management option (Norberg, Ryghammar, and Hedberg, 2005, cited by 
Ödlund (2007; 2010) and Swedish agencies are obliged legally to cooperate during 
crises (Regeringen, 2006b), making cooperation a central issue in preparedness. 
5.1.3	 Network	theory		
The definition of network follows Kupucu (2005): 
 
“A network is a group of individuals or organizations who, on a voluntary basis, 
exchange information and undertake joint activities and who organize themselves in 
such a way that their individual autonomy remains intact. In this definition important 
points are that the relationship must be voluntary, that these are mutual or 
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reciprocal activities, and that belonging to the network does not affect autonomy and 
independence of the members.” 
 
Network theory is used to map relationships between individuals, organisation or 
other entities and is used for analysis of interacting groups, in this case the Swedish 
oil spill preparedness network. 
5.1.4	 Swedish	formal	organisation	
The Swedish oil spill response organisation, the operational part of oil spill 
preparedness, follows the Team-based structure (see Figure 23) by having the sea 
response separate from the onshore response (see Figure 25).  
 
 
Figure 25: The formal oil spill response organisation in Sweden. 
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The onshore response is formally a municipal responsibility, but certain tasks are 
shared between the municipalities, the County Administrative Boards (CABs), and 
various governmental agencies. 
 
In practice, this arrangement is not followed strictly. The line between the Swedish 
Coast Guard’s (SCG) and the municipalities’ responsibilities are formally the 
division between land and sea (Regeringen, 2007c; Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). 
However, the practical situation is that both organisations work on oil spills on the 
shoreline (MSBHaV, 2014). Reports (Baltic Master, 2006; Danielsson et al., 2012; 
MSB, 2013a) and evaluations (MSBHaV, 2014; Riksrevisionen, 2006) have 
highlighted the need to clarify this division of responsibilities, as the practical 
situation has undermined the formal arrangement. 
 
The Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) and the Swedish Transport Agency 
(STA) also have responsibility at sea. However, this is more related to shipping and 
not directly to oil spill preparedness. They are consequently not directly part of the 
formal oil spill response organisation. 
 
Similarly, on land, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), and Police have more general responsibilities, but 
nothing dedicated to oil spill preparedness. Consequently, they are not part of the 
formal organisation either. 
5.2	 Methods	
Chapter 5 analyses how the Swedish oil spill preparedness regime is organised and 
managed, and examines if the management during the preparedness planning and 
response phases is sufficient. 
 
The analysis has followed the rationalist perspective and thus examines the 
effectiveness of the oil spill management structure. 
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5.2.1	 Study	design	
The issues above are covered in Hypothesis 1, H1: 
 
 H1 – The preparedness regime is sufficiently managed 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H10 – The preparedness regime is insufficiently managed 
 
Hypothesis 1 was chosen to analyse the organisation of Swedish oil spill 
preparedness, its structure, and division of responsibilities. The units of analysis have 
been chosen based on reasoning and practicality after consulting literature and expert 
opinions. 
 
The responsibilities of the organisations are determined by their mandates, regulated 
through law or governmental instructions. The number and shape of the network 
connections determine the structure of the organisational network. The impression of 
an organisation is determined by three factors: how other organisations understand 
the role and responsibilities of the organisation, how valuable the organisation is 
perceived to be to other organisations, and the expectations of the other 
organisations. The relationship between the units of analysis and their corresponding 
variables can be seen in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26: Hypothesis 3 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
If the Swedish oil spill preparedness system is effectively managed, the 
organisational structure follows a logical path tied to the organisational 
responsibilities, which everyone understands. Additionally, the organisations 
involved know their roles and responsibilities in this system. In order for such a 
structure to be effective, it has to be communicated and exercised, as structures and 
responsibilities may be unknown outside of the organisation. However, no 
organisation can act alone if a large oil spill occurs and knowledge of the other 
organisations involved is a requirement for effective oil spill preparedness. 
 
These criteria have been quantified in Table 5, following to the rationale for ranking 
the variables in Chapter 4. 
  
Responsibili9es	 Mandates	 Instruc9ons	
Structure	 Organisa9onal	network	
Network	
density	
Organisa9ons	
Understanding	 Survey	responses	
Value	 Survey	responses	
Expecta9on	 Survey	responses	
H1	–	The	preparedness	regime	is	sufficiently	managed	
Indicators	 Units	of	analysis	 Variables	
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Table 5: Evaluation criteria for H1. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient 
Mandates 95% or more of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities in 
their mandate. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities in 
their mandate. 
Less than 50% of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities in 
their mandate. 
Planning network 
density 
95% or more of the maximum 
possible planning connections 
between the agencies, CABs, 
and municipalities. 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum possible planning 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
Less than 50% of the maximum 
possible planning connections 
between the agencies, CABs, 
and municipalities. 
Response network 
density 
95% or more of the maximum 
possible response connections 
between the agencies, CABs, 
and municipalities. 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum possible response 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
Less than 50% of the maximum 
possible response connections 
between the agencies, CABs, 
and municipalities. 
Responses for 
understanding 
Respondents consider 
organisational roles well 
understood, 95% or more of 
the maximum score. 
Respondents consider 
organisational roles 
understandable, from 50% up 
to 95% of the maximum score. 
Respondents do not consider 
organisational roles 
understandable, less than 50% 
of the maximum score. 
Responses for 
planning values 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations valuable 
for planning, 95% or more of 
the maximum score. 
Respondents consider existing 
organisations valuable for 
planning, from 50% up to 95% 
of the maximum score. 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations not 
valuable for planning, less than 
50% of the maximum score. 
Responses for 
response values 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations valuable 
for response, 95% or more of 
the maximum score. 
Respondents consider existing 
organisations valuable for 
response, from 50% up to 95% 
of the maximum score. 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations not 
valuable for response, less 
than 50% of the maximum 
score. 
Responses for 
planning 
expectations 
Respondents consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for planning to meet 
expectations, average score up 
to +/- 0.25. 
Respondents consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for planning to be close to 
expectations, average score 
from +/- 0.25 to 1.0. 
Respondents do not consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for planning to meet 
expectations, average score 
below -1.0 or over 1.0. 
Responses for 
response 
expectations 
Respondents consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for response to meet 
expectations, average score up 
to +/- 0.25. 
Respondents consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for response to be close to 
expectations, average score 
from +/- 0.25 to 1.0. 
Respondents do not consider 
organisational responsibilities 
for response to meet 
expectations, average score 
below -1.0 or over 1.0. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is wholly present and/or functioning 
(Preferable), partially present and/or functioning (Sufficient), or not present and/or 
functioning at all (Insufficient). All of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate 
that they at least reach the rank of Sufficient for H1 to be accepted, meaning that oil 
spill preparedness is sufficiently managed, but should be further developed. If all 
variables are ranked Preferable, oil spill preparedness is managed at the best practice 
level. If any of the variables are ranked Insufficient, the management is missing an 
important factor, negatively impacting Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
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5.2.2	 Sources	
Primary information has been collected from the questionnaire (see Appendix A - 
Questionnaire) distributed to all coastal municipalities and County Administrative 
Boards (CABs), and the interviews (see Appendix B - Interview) with the members 
of the National Cooperation Group for Oil Combating (NSO). NSO consists of 
representatives from the Swedish Coast Guard (SCG), the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water 
Management (SwAM), the Oil Spill Advisory Service (OSAS) at Sweco, the 
Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA), the Swedish Transport Agency (STA), the 
County Administrative Boards (CABs), and the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR). 
 
Data was also collected from publicly available sources online, primarily 
government websites. Response evaluations have been obtained directly from the 
organisers or evaluators, if not publicly available. Scientific papers have been 
acquired through the library at the World Maritime University (WMU) and open 
access journals online. 
5.2.3	 Analysis	
The connection data from the survey has been visualised as an organisational 
network in the Gephi programme version 0.8.2 beta (Bastian et al., 2009). The layout 
used is ForceAtlas2, with scaling value 100 and overlap avoidance (Jacomy, 
Venturini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014). This layout is used to separate and cluster 
the involved organisations depending on their connections to other organisations. 
The data was mapped by eigenvector centrality and analysed using statistical 
methods for network theory (Newman, 2003). Eigenvector centrality assigns each 
node a centrality based on both the number and the quality of its connections. The 
theory assumes that influence is proportional to connections (Newman, 2008). 
Having a large number of connections is important, but a node with a smaller 
number of high quality contacts may outrank one with a larger number of average 
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contacts. In this way, the influence of the organisations is reflected in their rank and 
is visualised by a difference in node size. The popular search engine Google uses an 
algorithm called Page Rank based on eigenvector centrality ranking. Network 
density measures the number of connections between nodes and divides that number 
by the maximum number of possible connections. All nodes connected to all other 
nodes would be 1.00. 
5.3	 Results	
Formal mandates and evaluations of oil spill exercises and real spills have been 
analysed to identify the formal and practical responsibilities of the various 
organisations. Data from the questionnaire have been compiled and analysed to map 
and examine the connections between the different organisations involved in oil spill 
preparedness. 
5.3.1	 Mandates	
Several organisations are involved in oil spill preparedness in Sweden. The main 
actors and their mandates are described below. 
5.3.1.1	 Swedish	Coast	Guard	(SCG)	
SCG is responsible for monitoring state waters, maritime security, and for rescue 
services (including environmental protection) at sea and in the largest Swedish lakes: 
Vänern, Vättern, and Mälaren (Regeringen, 2007c). The agency operates 25 coastal 
stations, 30 vessels, and 3 aircraft. SCG is responsible for several international 
conventions and agreements on border control, maritime security, and marine 
environmental protection. This includes oil spill response, such as the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC 
Convention), and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). SCG also represents Sweden in international 
forums, such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) and Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention) for oil spill related issues. The Governmental instructions explicitly 
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state that SCG should be able to respond to an oil spill of up to 10,000 tonnes 
(Regeringen, 2007c). 
5.3.1.2	 Swedish	Civil	Contingencies	Agency	(MSB)	
MSB is responsible for civil protection, crisis management, and disaster 
preparedness in Sweden. It is mandated to encourage and coordinate efforts, and 
oversee training, exercises, and evaluations to improve national disaster 
preparedness. However, the agency does not have specific instructions to lead any 
response, following the subsidiarity principle. MSB is required to provide expert 
advice and logistics assistance in case of serious accidents, including oil spills. 
Furthermore, it has the mandate to supply international assistance and represent 
Sweden in international disaster management operations. For oil spills, this covers 
for example the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group 
(EPPR) of the Arctic Council and the Response Working Group (HELCOM 
RESPONSE) of HELCOM. MSB is responsible for the development of national oil 
spill preparedness strategies (Kulander et al., 2004; NSO, 2014b) and handles 
damage claims related to oil spills. The agency is also responsible for equipping and 
maintaining the Oil Spill Depots, described below. In practice, MSB has been more 
involved than its mandate suggests, by participating actively as experts and advisors 
during past oil spill response operations (MSBHaV, 2014). 
5.3.1.3	 Oil	Spill	Depots	(Depots)	
MSB maintains five mobile oil spill equipment depots and a central supply depot. 
The equipment consists of personal protection, skimmers, pumps, All-Terrain 
Vehicles, small boats, booms, and sorbents (Forsman, 1997). The equipment is 
preloaded in containers for swift distribution. The central depot is located in 
Kristinehamn and the mobile Depots were stationed in local rescue services in 
Botkyrka, Karlskrona, Umeå, Visby, and Vänersborg until April 2015. They have 
now been relocated to the SCG stations in Djurö, Gothenburg, Härnösand, 
Oskarshamn, and Slite (Söder, 2015). The intent was to be able to transport 
equipment 250 km within 10 hours to reinforce local rescue services in case of oil 
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spills, effectively covering all Swedish coasts (Forsman, 1997). The response 
capacity of the Depots is discussed in Chapter 8. 
5.3.1.4	 Swedish	Agency	for	Marine	and	Water	Management	(SwAM)	
SwAM is a young agency, founded in July 2011. The agency has general 
responsibility for marine issues, but does not have any explicit responsibility for oil 
spill planning or response in its mandate (Regeringen, 2011b). The agency represents 
Sweden in international marine environmental forums, such as the environmental 
protection working groups of the Arctic Council, HELCOM and OSPAR. SwAM is 
responsible for Swedish Environmental Objective 10: A Balanced Marine 
Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos, which include 
discharges of oil and chemicals (Environmental Objectives Council, 2006). 
However, the Swedish Environmental Objectives do not prescribe any specific way 
to reach the targets, and do not prescribe any particular means to achieve them and is 
basically a reporting task. In practice, SwAM has been more involved than its 
mandate suggests in giving advice to oil spill response organisations (MSBHaV, 
2014). This has probably contributed to confusion regarding SwAM’s role, as 
discussed later in this chapter. SwAM was responsible for the Oil Spill Advisory 
Service (OSAS) until the end of 2014, described below. 
5.3.1.5	 Oil	Spill	Advisory	Service	(OSAS)	
OSAS is a service under contract from SwAM to the consultancy company Sweco 
and previously IVL, another consultancy company. The contract expired at the end 
of 2014 and was not renewed by SwAM (NSO interviews, January 2015). The 
specialists attached to OSAS acted on SwAM’s behalf as experts on oil and chemical 
accidents at sea and in inland waters. These specialists possess a broad knowledge of 
oil spill risks, preparedness, response, chemistry, toxicology, and monitoring. OSAS 
gave expert advice and information to public administration and agencies regarding 
oil spills. With larger oil spills, it could assist on site. 
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5.3.1.6	 Swedish	Maritime	Administration	(SMA)	
SMA has responsibility for the shipping routes in Sweden, including minimising 
environmental impacts (Regeringen, 2007d). The Administration has no direct 
mandate for oil spill response, but is obliged to secure shipping routes and to warn 
ships approaching a maritime casualty, for example a ship leaking oil. 
5.3.1.7	 Swedish	Transport	Agency	(STA)	
STA is responsible for regulations, enforcement, and permits in the transport sector 
(Regeringen, 2008c). This includes ratification of international rules, such as 
international conventions, into Swedish legislation. It has no explicit instructions for 
oil spill response, but is responsible for a number of international agreements and 
represents Sweden in international transport forums, such as IMO for shipping 
issues. These rules are enforced using shipping inspectors, which assess shipping 
accidents, with potential oil spills. 
5.3.1.8	 Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	
EPA has general responsibility for environmental issues concerning climate, 
biodiversity, waste, and waste water management, but has no explicit responsibility 
for oil spill preparedness (Regeringen, 2012b). OSAS was originally under contract 
by EPA, but this responsibility was carried over to SwAM, when the new agency 
was created in 2011. EPA has explicit instructions to cooperate with SwAM on 
marine issues, but it is not specified to what extent and in which areas this 
collaboration should take place. However, it was decided during 2015 that the EPA 
would be responsible for oiled wildlife response. 
5.3.1.9	 Swedish	Armed	Forces	(SAF)	
SAF is responsible for the military defence of Sweden (Regeringen, 2007b). It does 
not have any civil responsibility, but is explicitly instructed to support civil agencies 
in cases of emergencies as far as it is able. In practice, the Armed Forces was 
involved in both the Fu Shan Hai accident (Ljungkvist, 2003) and the Tjörn oil spill 
by contributing with manpower, management, and logistics (MSBHaV, 2014). In 
particular, SAF’s experience in setting up robust long-term command staff 
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organisations, and the contribution of enlisted personnel as a work force have been 
appreciated during these responses. 
5.3.1.10	Swedish	Police	
The police is responsible for enforcing national laws and investigating criminal 
offences (Regeringen, 2014c). It has no explicit mandate for oil spill preparedness 
and response, but helps to maintain security around oil spill accidents. This service 
was needed during the Fu Shan Hai response, where the police helped to maintain 
control of the traffic to and from the affected areas (Ljungkvist, 2003). 
5.3.1.11	County	Administrative	Boards	(CABs)	
CABs represent the Swedish Government at the regional level and are responsible 
for coordination of all national goals, including environmental protection and 
disaster management in their respective counties (Regeringen, 2007e). A Governor 
appointed by the Government leads each CAB. The smallest counties represent 5 
municipalities and the largest 49 municipalities. As such, they are not a specialised 
authority, but have the responsibility to coordinate emergencies covering more than 
one municipality. CABs can, if needed, designate an officer to lead emergency 
response across several municipalities (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). However, this is 
usually a suitable rescue service officer from one of the municipality, rather than a 
CAB employee. CABs are required to have an officer on call to respond to any crisis 
affecting the county, by initiating alarm procedures and disseminating information. 
Another requirement is to prepare a risk assessment of potential risks in the county, 
which includes oil spills. 
5.3.1.12	Municipalities	
The municipalities are the local governments and are fairly autonomous authorities 
in Sweden. They are led by elected officials and responsible for local services such 
as schools, emergency services, and physical planning. They are organised into 
several offices, for example the rescue service, the technical office, and the 
environmental office. The rescue service and the municipality offices can in some 
circumstances be considered to be separate organisations, especially when dealing 
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with Rescue Service Associations consisting of several municipalities, but are still 
part of the same municipality. Municipalities are required by law to have an action 
plan for rescue services, which should include a risk assessment of possible threats 
and the municipal capacity to handle emergencies (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). They 
are also required to have a rescue service dealing with these emergencies, but the 
types of emergencies are not listed. The emergencies are defined as (unofficial 
translation): 
 
“… rescue services that the State or Municipalities are responsible for after an 
accident or impending risk of an accident to prevent or limit damage to people, 
property or environment.” 
 
However, municipalities are not required to have an oil spill contingency plans or oil 
spill response equipment (MSBHaV, 2014; Sveriges Riksdag, 2003), but are 
recommended to have them by MSB (Kulander et al., 2004). Oil spills are only 
specifically mentioned once in the legal act regulating protection from accidents, 
clarifying that municipalities could be reimbursed by the state if undertaking oil spill 
clean-up (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). 
5.3.1.13	Volunteers	
There are several different volunteer organisations, for example the Swedish Sea 
Rescue Service (SSRS), that deal with lifesaving at sea and work closely with SCG, 
and the Swedish Wildlife Rehabilitators Association (Katastrofhjälp Fåglar och Vilt, 
KFV), who care for injured animals, including animals that have been oiled. Some of 
these organisations have cooperation agreements with a municipality, CAB, or an 
agency. These organisations do not have any formal responsibility in oil spill 
preparedness, but are of great value as they are often trained and organised 
professionals, and have unique knowledge and equipment in their specific areas of 
expertise. However, the exclusion of the volunteer organisations from the formal 
organisation has made notification and inclusion of them sporadic (Ljungkvist, 2003; 
MSBHaV, 2014). 
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5.3.1.14	Industry	
There are a number of industry actors involved, for example ports, shipping 
companies, and oil companies. Industries only have responsibilities for oil spill 
planning and response for spills inside their own geographic area, for example a port 
or a refinery (Regeringen, 1998). However, especially the larger ports are involved in 
municipal contingency planning and response to some degree, as some ports and 
municipalities have agreements to assist each other with personnel and equipment in 
case of oil spills. These ports have no formal part in oil spill contingency planning 
and their equipment is not usable by the municipalities, unless some kind of 
agreement exists. Clean-up companies are another industry will likely become 
involved during a large oil spill response. In Sweden, the clean-up companies are 
hired as temporary contractors by the municipalities if there is an oil spill and do not 
have a dedicated role. Few contracts have been setup in advance. No companies are 
currently drilling for oil in Swedish territorial waters or EEZ. Few shipping or oil 
companies have direct contact with the municipalities, except if they own any land-
based infrastructure. Shipping and oil companies are not part of the formal oil spill 
response management, contrary to the common situation abroad, for example in the 
United States. 
5.3.1.15	Others	
Other stakeholders involved are various authorities abroad, for example in Norway 
and Finland. These represent the governmental authorities and agencies, which are 
responsible for oil spill planning and response. They do not have any formal 
responsibilities in Sweden, but are obliged to give assistance to Swedish 
municipalities and agencies through the international conventions and regional 
agreements described in Chapter 6, such as HELCOM (HELCOM, 2008) or the 
Copenhagen Agreement (Copenhagen Agreement, 1993). This group also includes 
individual fishermen, who may become involved during an oil spill response. 
Fishermen have no formal place in the response network and have not been found to 
have ever been utilised during any oil spill response (Ericsson, M., email 
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communication, 11 November 2015). They could potentially be used during the 
clean up phase, contracted by the municipality. 
5.3.1.16	Conclusion	
The survey responses showed that 70% of the agency representatives agreed that 
they had a mandate for either contingency planning or response (see Table 6). 
However, there is room for interpretation of this mandate, as oil spills are only 
explicitly mentioned as a task in the instructions to SCG (Regeringen, 2007c). For 
the other organisations, wording concerns disasters and crises or are expressed in 
general terms of assisting other organisations. 
 
Table 6: Summary of organisational mandates and the survey responses. 
Organisation Planning Response 
Respondent Mandate Respondent Mandate 
Swedish Coast Guard (SCG) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) No Yes Yes Yes 
Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
(SwAM) 
No No No No 
Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) Yes Yes Yes No 
Swedish Transport Agency (STA)  No Yes Yes 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  No  No 
Swedish Armed Forces (SAF)  No  Yes 
Police  No  No 
CABs  Yes  Yes 
Municipalities  Yes  Yes 
 
The discrepancy is even larger among the municipality and the CAB respondents 
(see Table 7). For planning, 25% of the CAB respondents did not consider 
themselves to have any responsibility, which this chapter showed to be mandated. 
For response, 50% of the CAB respondents did not consider themselves to have any 
responsibility. For the municipality respondents, 17.5% did not consider themselves 
to have any planning responsibility, which this chapter showed to be mandated. For 
response, 98% of the municipality respondents recognised that they have a 
responsibility. 
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Table 7: Summary of survey mandate responses. 
Organisation Planning Response 
Yes No Yes No 
CABs 9 3 5 5 
Municipalities 47 10 49 1 
- Coastal 38 5 39  
- Lake 9 5 10 1 
Total 56 13 54 6 
 
No larger oil spills have been recorded in the Swedish lakes. Therefore, an analysis 
of whether lakeside municipalities are less aware of their oil spill preparedness 
responsibilities than their coastal counterparts was conducted. However, no 
significant difference was found for planning, Berger’s test (N = 57), p = .0744, or 
for response, Berger’s test (N = 50), p = .1573. 
5.3.2	 Network	
The respondents were asked which organisations they work with during contingency 
planning and response. 
5.3.2.1	 Theoretical	network	
A theoretical network (see Figure 27) could be built on the assumption that: 
 
• All agencies work with all other agencies, all CABs, and all municipalities. 
• All CABs work with all agencies, the neighbouring CABs, and their own 
municipalities. 
• All municipalities work with all agencies, their respective CAB, and all 
neighbouring municipalities. 
 
The size of a node corresponds to eigenvector centrality, assumed to be a proxy for 
network influence. Pink colour denotes agencies, green CABs, and yellow 
municipalities. 
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Figure 27: Theoretical oil spill preparedness network. 
This network is valid for both planning and response, as these organisations would 
need information and help from all neighbours and agencies during a large oil spill 
accident. This network consists of 98 nodes (organisations) and 1,348 edges 
(connections) with an undirected density of 0.235. This network only reflects the 
authorities and any connections to industry, volunteers, and others are excluded, as 
they are not part of the formal response. 
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5.3.2.2	 Planning	network	
The Swedish oil spill planning network is arranged by relative importance (see 
Figure 28). The size of a node corresponds to eigenvector centrality, assumed to be a 
proxy for network influence. Pink colour denotes agencies, green CABs, yellow 
municipalities, red industries, magenta volunteers, and cyan others.  
 
 
Figure 28: Swedish oil spill contingency planning network. 
The central organisations are SCG, MSB, SwAM, and OSAS, surrounded by the 
municipalities, CABs, and other agencies, with the industry and volunteers in the 
periphery. The planning network made up by the municipalities, CABs, and agencies 
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consists of 136 nodes (organisations) and 893 edges (connections) with an undirected 
density of 0.076. 
5.3.2.3	 Response	network	
The Swedish oil spill response network is arranged by relative importance (see 
Figure 29). Size of node corresponds to eigenvector centrality, assumed to be a proxy 
for network influence. Pink colour denotes agencies, green CABs, yellow 
municipalities, red industries, orange volunteers, and aqua others.  
 
 
Figure 29: Swedish oil spill response network. 
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The central organisations are SCG, MSB, SwAM, OSAS, and the Depots, 
surrounded by the municipalities, CABs, and other agencies. The industry and 
volunteers are located in the periphery of the network. The response network made 
up by the municipalities, CABs, and agencies consists of 129 nodes (organisations) 
and 831 edges (connections) with a density of 0.080. 
5.3.2.4	 Conclusion	
The network densities were recalculated with only the agencies, CABs, and the 
municipalities, to be able to compare to the theoretical maximum model. The 
recalculated densities were divided by the number of responses, in order to normalise 
the results to density per response. The normalised densities for the planning and 
response networks were then compared to the normalised density for the theoretical 
maximum to assess similarity (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Network densities and normalised values. 
 Density Agency 
responders 
CAB 
responders 
Municipality 
responders 
Sum 
responses 
Normalised 
density 
% 
Theoretical 
max 
0.235 10 18 70 98 0.002398 100.0 % 
Planning 0.133 6 10 51 67 0.001985 82.8 % 
Response 0.127 6 9 45 60 0.002117 88.3 % 
 
The results show that the planning network is 82.8% and the response network is 
88.3% of the theoretical maximum. As the links to the agencies and from the 
municipalities to their respective CABs are present in all networks, the missing links 
are primarily between neighbouring municipalities and between neighbouring CABs. 
5.3.3	 Understanding	
Understanding in this dissertation means the respondents’ perceptions of how well 
the organisations involved in oil spill preparedness understand the intended roles of 
the other organisations. These data correspond to the agreement from the 
questionnaire to the statement "The role of this organisation in oil spill preparedness 
is well understood by the others.”. The agreement scale ranges from Strongly 
disagree (-2), Disagree (-1), No opinion (0), Agree (+1), and Strongly agree (+2). 
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The values of the organisations were compiled and graphed with standard deviations 
(see Figure 30). 
 
 
Figure 30: Understanding of the roles of the organisation involved in oil spill preparedness. Error bars 
signify standard deviations. 
In general, the respondents consider the practical organisations, such as SCG, MSB, 
the Depots and the municipalities to be well understood (see Figure 30 A, B, and D). 
The roles of SwAM, EPA, and STA are not well understood (see Figure 30 A, B, C, 
and D). It is interesting to note that the agency responders do not believe that the 
roles of most agencies are well understood, excepting SCG (see Figure 30 C). 
5.3.4	 Values	
The planning and response values in this context are defined as the worth of an 
organisation to another for contingency planning and response respectively. 
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5.3.4.1	 Planning	value	
The data corresponds to survey responses, when asked to identify how valuable the 
respondents consider these organisations to be in assisting the respondents’ 
organisation with oil spill contingency planning (NOT for oil spill response). The 
response scale ranges from Not valuable (-2), Limited value (-1), Average value (0), 
Valuable (+1), and Very valuable (+2), while the No opinion responses have been 
left out. The values of the organisations were compiled and graphed with standard 
deviations (see Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31: Organisational values for oil spill planning. Error bars signify standard deviations. 
The pattern reinforces the results of the network map, with SCG, MSB, the Depots, 
CABs, and the municipalities as the most valuable organisations to the responders 
(see Figure 31 D). It is also evident that the municipality and CAB responders 
generally value only SCG, MSB, the Depots and themselves, and consider the 
remaining agencies to be of little value (see Figure 31 A and B). In contrast, the 
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agency responders value the agencies as much as they do CABs and municipalities 
(see Figure 31 C). 
5.3.4.2	 Response	value	
The data is based on responses when asked to identify how valuable the respondents 
consider these organisations to be in assisting the respondents’ organisation with oil 
spill response (NOT for oil spill contingency planning). The response scale ranges 
from Not valuable (-2), Limited value (-1), Average value (0), Valuable (+1), and 
Very valuable (+2), while No opinion responses have been left out. The values of the 
organisations were compiled and graphed with standard deviations (see Figure 32). 
 
 
Figure 32: Organisational values for oil spill response. Error bars signify standard deviations. 
Similar to the planning pattern, the response pattern reinforces the results of the 
network map, with SCG, MSB, the Depots, OSAS, CABs, and the municipalities as 
the most valuable organisations for the respondents (see Figure 32 D). The 
municipality respondents consider SCG, MSB, the Depots, OSAS, and CABs to be 
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of great value for response (see Figure 32 A). The CAB respondents are less in 
agreement, but generally value SCG, MSB, the Depots, and OSAS (B). The agency 
respondents generally value the agencies as much as they do CABs and the 
municipalities (see Figure 32 C). 
5.3.5	 Expectations	
Expectations in this context means the respondents’ opinions regarding what level of 
responsibility the involved organisations should have, compared to the current 
responsibilities. The data correspond to the survey responses. 
5.3.5.1	 Planning	expectations	
Planning expectations correspond to responses to the question ”What level of 
responsibility do you think these organisations should have in oil spill contingency 
planning, compared to today?“. The response scale ranges from Greatly decreased 
(-2), Slightly decreased (-1), Same as now (0), Slightly increased (+1), and Greatly 
increased (+2), while the No opinion responses have been left out. The values of the 
organisations were compiled and graphed with standard deviations (see Figure 33). 
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Figure 33: Opinions on the level of responsibility organisations should have for planning. Error bars 
signify standard deviations. 
The pattern and thus the opinions of the respondents vary (see Figure 33 A, B, and 
C), with the combined opinions showing that CABs should have more responsibility 
for planning (see Figure 33 D). The agency representatives consider that SwAM and 
EPA should have more responsibility than they currently have (see Figure 33 C). 
5.3.5.2	 Response	expectations	
Opinions on the level of responsibility the organisations should have for response, 
correspond to responses to the question “What level of responsibility do you think 
these organisations should have in oil spill response, compared to today?“. The 
response scale ranges from Greatly decreased (-2), Slightly decreased (-1), Same as 
now (0), Slightly increased (+1), and Greatly increased (+2), while the No opinion 
responses have been left out. The values of the organisations were compiled and 
graphed with standard deviations (see Figure 34). 
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Figure 34: Opinions on what level of responsibility organisations should have for response. Error bars 
signify standard deviations. 
The pattern and thus the opinions of the respondents vary (see Figure 34 A, B and 
C), with the combined opinions showing that the CABs should have more 
responsibilities than they have (see Figure 34 D). The opinion of the municipality 
respondents is that the Depots and CABs should have more responsibility for oil spill 
response (see Figure 34 A). The CAB respondents are content with the status quo 
(see Figure 34 B). The agency responders think that SwAM and EPA should have 
more responsibilities (see Figure 34 C). 
5.3.6	 Opinion	summary	
The detailed opinion values for understanding, values, and expectations from the 
survey can be found in Appendix E - Management Results. The average values can 
be found below in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Organisation opinion values from the survey. 
Organisation SCG MSB Depots SwAM OSAS EPA SMA STA SAF 
Understanding 1.17 0.52 0.82 −0.30 0.31 −0.31 −0.05 −0.39 0.19 
Planning values 1.51 1.38 1.30 0.63 0.88 0.37 0.53 0.19 0.05 
Response values 1.79 1.35 1.64 0.88 1.45 0.46 0.60 0.28 0.71 
Planning 
expectations 
0.74 0.75 0.69 0.55 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.31 0.16 
Response 
expectations 
0.66 0.80 0.76 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.41 0.32 0.27 
          
Organisation Police CABs Municipalities Volunteers Industry Others Average %  
Understanding 0.06 0.56 0.97 0.17 −0.10 0.00 0.24 56.0  
Planning values −0.29 1.46 1.69 0.25 0.07 −0.06 0.66 66.6  
Response values 0.22 1.47 1.78 0.73 0.47 0.65 0.96 74.1  
Planning 
expectations 
0.00 0.91 0.55 0.02 0.55 0.10 0.45   
Response 
expectations 
0.08 0.84 0.48 0.17 0.52 0.19 0.46   
 
5.4	 Discussion	
The result of this study has several implications for management and organisation of 
Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
5.4.1	 Mandates	
Considering that not all of the agencies, CABs, and municipalities agreed that they 
have responsibilities for oil spill planning and response, there is a need to clarify and 
communicate their responsibilities. The Tjörn oil spill demonstrated the established 
practice that SCG and municipalities cooperate in the shallow shoreline areas, even 
though this is formally a SCG responsibility (MSBHaV, 2014). This is related to the 
limited draft some of the SCG vessels have, meaning that only the smallest vessels 
can come all the way up to shore. 
5.4.2	 Network	
The network of connections between the organisations involved in oil spill 
preparedness is important for cooperation. 
5.4.2.1	 Planning	network	
The structure of the planning network reflects the theoretical organisation (see Figure 
27), with the main agencies taking a central role (see Figure 28). However, the 
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coordinating “middle management” role of CABs is not evident in the structure. 
Many municipalities work directly with the agencies as well as with the CABs, rather 
than exclusively working through the CABs. Few of the municipalities indicated that 
they work together with their neighbouring municipalities, especially not with 
municipalities belonging to a separate county. This makes the CABs the most 
relevant regional link, as is intended. 
 
SwAM occupies an unexpected central role in the networks, considering that the 
agency does not have a direct mandate for either oil spill planning or response, and 
its role is unclear to most organisations. OSAS also has a central role in planning, but 
the decision by SwAM not to renew OSAS’s contract, will likely diminish OSAS’s 
importance in the network. The oil spill expertise is retained in Sweco for now (NSO 
interviews, January 2015). However, if the service is not useful (i.e. generates 
income), it will likely be disbanded. NSO recognises OSAS as a valuable asset that 
should be retained and is developing a new structure for supporting oil spill response 
systems, such as OSAS and the Digital Environmental Atlas (NSO, 2015). The 
central role of the Depots suggests that municipalities are dependent on them to have 
oil spill response equipment available. The new locations for the Depots may change 
the network, depending on how the management of them will develop. 
5.4.2.2	 Response	network	
The results show a slightly smaller and denser response network (see Figure 29) 
compared to the planning network (see Figure 28). This is reasonable, as input from 
several organisations is needed in order to develop a contingency plan, but all the 
organisations may not be required during a real oil spill or an exercise. For example, 
situations may occur when an oil spill does not have an identified polluter. In such 
situations, SMA and STA are not involved. Similarly, if the spill is small enough that 
no outside resources are needed for the response, several of the organisations will not 
be involved at all. The same agencies central for planning are also central to 
response. However, the influence of SCG, OSAS, and the Depots are higher in the 
response network than the planning network. The central role of SCG during 
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response was not anticipated, as it does not have any mandate onshore. However, 
SCG works closely with the municipalities on land, which was evident during the Fu 
Shan Hai (Kustbevakningen, 2013b; Ljungkvist, 2003) and Tjörn oil spills 
(MSBHaV, 2014). OSAS is a more valued organisation in the response network (see 
Figure 32), than in the planning network (see Figure 31). Similar to OSAS, the 
Depots are, and rightly so, a more valuable organisation during the response, 
particularly for the municipalities (see Figure 32). This reinforces the suggestion that 
the municipalities rely heavily on the equipment in the Depots to reinforce the 
municipal response capacity. SwAM remains a central organisation, even if its role is 
considered to be unclear (see Figure 30). Survey responses show that many 
municipalities work directly with the agencies. These direct connections speed up 
communication, but will make the coordinating role of CABs more difficult, if they 
are not informed of all decisions taken. This suggests that CABs may be better suited 
to coordinate between the municipalities and neighbouring counties, which is their 
intended role. 
 
It is notable that the industry is only peripherally involved in these networks. 
Globally, it is common for a vessel or shipping company to have requirements for an 
oil spill clean-up company to be on standby. It is also common for the oil companies 
to have a contingency plan in place, in collaboration with the national resources and 
the companies’ response contractors (IPIECAOGP, 2015; ITOPF, 2012a). 
5.4.3	 Understanding	
It is interesting to note that SCG has a role that the respondents think is much better 
understood than the other agencies (see Figure 30). However, it is reasonable that the 
role of the organisations that are directly responsible for oil spill preparedness (SCG, 
MSB, the Depots, CABs, and the municipalities) are the best understood. This is 
because they are the primary involved organisations and are working with most of 
the other organisations on oil spill preparedness (and possibly other issues). Out of 
the interviewed agencies, SwAM and EPA seem to be particularly unclear to CABs 
and the agency respondents. SwAM is a relatively new agency in Sweden, having 
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only existed since 2011. The goal of creating SwAM was to create a government 
agency responsible for coordination and encouragement of aquatic environmental 
issues and could be tasked with handling national Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) 
(Hafström, Nilsson, Askman, & Larsson, 2010). The Swedish Board of Fisheries was 
decommissioned and the largest part of the old agency was combined with the 
aquatic departments of EPA to create SwAM. From the present research, it is 
apparent that a number of the respondents believe that some agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities are unclear about the role and mandate of SwAM concerning oil spill 
preparedness, even four years after it was created. This lack of familiarity with 
SwAM is shared with EPA. It is unclear to the respondents what, if any, role the 
EPA retains in terms of the marine environment in general and oil spills in particular 
after SwAM was created. However, oiled wildlife was decided to be an EPA 
responsibility during 2015 (Ericsson, M., telephone communication, January 2016). 
 
OSAS was originally a service contracted by the EPA and tasked with providing 
expert advice on oil spill issues. However, the responsibility for contracting was 
transferred to SwAM after its creation and OSAS expanded to include advice on 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS). The survey responses indicate that 
understanding of the role of OSAS is considered low among agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities (see Figure 30). However, OSAS’ expertise has proven to be of great 
help during real spills (Holmström, Gyllenhammar, Håstad, Fogelberg, & Törneman, 
2014; Ljungkvist, 2003; MSBHaV, 2014) and it is mostly present through a 
representative or consulted via telephone during exercises (Ljungkvist et al., 2013; 
MSB, 2012; Sjödin, 2011). The low understanding of OSAS’ expertise suggests that 
the service could have been advertised better. However, this is contradicted by the 
result of the organisational value, which ranks OSAS high for planning (see Figure 
31) and even higher for response (see Figure 32). The future of OSAS is uncertain, 
as its contract was not renewed for 2015 (NSO interviews, 2015). As OSAS have 
also been assisting several smaller oil spills on land, there is a discussion that the cost 
should be shared with the EPA or MSB. 
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5.4.4	 Value	
The network analysis is reinforced by the value of the different organisations for 
planning. The same agencies (SCG, MSB, OSAS, and the Depots) stand out as 
valuable to the respondents (see Figure 31). The municipality and CAB respondents 
value the same organisations (see Figure 31 A and B), whereas in contrast, the 
agency respondents value other agencies as highly as CABs and the municipalities 
(see Figure 31 C). 
 
The same pattern can be seen with the response value, as SCG, OSAS, and the 
Depots are valued more (see Figure 32). SwAM is, similarly to the network, valued 
higher for the response than for the planning. In light of the unclear role of SwAM, 
this was not anticipated and would be interesting to explore further. 
 
The respondents do not consider the industry to be valuable for planning (see Figure 
31), but have a role to play during response (see Figure 32). This is often tied to 
cooperation agreements between some of the industries and the local rescue services. 
5.4.5	 Expectations	
Expectations in this dissertation relates to if the organisations should have greater, 
lesser, or the same level of responsibilities for oil spill planning and response. The 
municipality respondents expect CABs to take a greater responsibility in oil spill 
planning (see Figure 33 A). This opinion is reflected in the draft NSO action plan 
(NSO, 2015), where CABs are given greater responsibilities by requirements to 
update their regional oil spill response plans and assess contingency planning at the 
municipal and regional levels. Since CABs have coordinating responsibility during a 
response, it is reasonable that they should also have a coordinating responsibility for 
planning, based on the responsibility and closeness principles. CAB and agency 
respondents expect more from SwAM and EPA (see Figure 33 B and C). This is also 
reasonable, as SwAM and EPA are the environmental agencies in Sweden and 
SwAM is explicitly responsible for following up on environmental issues concerning 
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oil spill planning and response, specifically Swedish Environmental Objective 10: A 
Balanced Marine Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos 
(Environmental Objectives Council, 2006). 
 
The situation is similar in oil spill response, with municipality respondents expecting 
more help from CABs and the lead agencies (see Figure 34 A). The CAB 
respondents are content with the response, including the efforts of SwAM and EPA 
(see Figure 34 B). This might be tied together with low expectations of these 
agencies, as their role in oil spill preparedness is unclear to many respondents. 
5.4.6	 Implications	
In all of the analyses, SCG stands out as a key organisation. The role of SCG is well 
understood by the respondents, follows the expectations of the other organisations, is 
central in the planning and response network, and is highly valuable for both 
planning and response. This was not anticipated, as the SCG mandate formally does 
not extend to land and the ability to respond to oil spills once the oil has reached the 
shore is limited. This central role might be attributed to the fact that SCG is the sole 
responsible agency for oil spill response at sea and it is the contact point for all such 
issues. This stands in contrast to the situation on land, where responsibilities are 
divided between several organisations (see Figure 25). The effectiveness of SCG is 
attributed to its organisation, resources, and exercises (Kustbevakningen, 2015). 
Furthermore, SCG has a long history of close collaboration with many of the 
agencies and organisations on land and has established cooperation channels with 
other agencies and municipalities. 
 
From the results of the survey, it is evident that SwAM needs to clarify its role in oil 
spill preparedness and communicate this to the other organisations. The central role 
of SwAM during planning (see Figure 28) and response (see Figure 29) was not 
anticipated, in light of the unclear role of the agency. 
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The industry adoption of the Function-based structure (Curd, 2013; IPIECAOGP, 
2014a; OSR, 2013) gives an incentive to move towards this structure for oil spill 
preparedness. SCG has already established positions harmonised with international 
coast guard management models, for example the On-Scene Commander (OSC) 
function. The IMO guidelines (IMO, 1995) specifically mention that (emphasis 
added): 
 
“It is likely that different agencies or organizations will be responsible for different 
aspects of the counter-pollution plan, at sea and on shore, but overall co-ordination 
by a designated authority or lead agency is essential for success.” 
 
Suggesting that the non-hierarchical Team-based structure is not the preferred 
structure for response according to IMO. Thus, it seems that the maritime sector and 
industry are moving from the historical Team-based system to the Function-based 
system, such as IMS.  
 
There are several advantages to standardising IMS: training materials can be shared 
between organisations; IMS can lower the risk of overlooking important functions 
during an emergency response, and it replaces the ad-hoc emergency networks with a 
standardised format that all of the organisations are familiar with (Lindell et al., 
2005). A strength of hierarchical structures like IMS is that they are efficient and 
responsive (Ödlund, 2010). Moynihan (2009) argues that voluntary acceptance and 
implementation of IMS is the best. A top-down implementation does not work as 
well and will generate much distrust. However, top-down coordination is hardly 
possible in a crisis management system (Moynihan, 2009; Ödlund, 2010). Factors 
such as established routines, clear responsibilities and boundaries, are important for 
cooperation, while a lack of these factors causes confusion. 
 
Critique against IMS and specifically the Incident Command System (ICS) used in 
the United States exists, primarily from academics. Waugh Jr. and Streib (2006) 
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argued that centralisation is unrelated or even destructive to the response capacity. 
Specifically, the criticism has been that ICS ignores the importance of inter-
organisational relationships, the spontaneous nature of the response, the role of 
unorganised volunteers, and the competition between organisations. However, the 
response community in the United States does not recognise the academic critique 
and “has been almost universal in its praise of ICS” (Buck et al., 2006). Moynihan 
(2009) gives evidence for three propositions: 
 
• “Even with centralized network governance, network diversity makes crisis 
response coordination more difficult.” 
 
• “Even with centralized network governance, authority is shared among 
members and subject to contention, weakening crisis response coordination.” 
 
• “Even with centralized network governance, positive working relationships 
and trust is a critical factor in fostering crisis response coordination.” 
 
Moynihan (2009) further argues that a consistent group of responders during crisis 
planning and exercises are crucial to building relationships and trust among them. 
These relationships are impossible, or at least take time, to build in the middle of a 
crisis, but are critical for a functioning coordination. Traits, such as mandates, 
objectives, and forms, influence the culture, identity, and trust of an organisation and 
vice versa (Ödlund, 2010). Buck et al. (2006) presents evidence that the most 
important factor for successful use of ICS is pre-established inter-organisational 
connections. The authors conclude that ICS is just a convenient template to organise 
around. 
 
Personal contacts and continuity are important factors for successful cooperation and 
trust needs to be developed over time (Buck et al., 2006; Moynihan, 2009; MSB, 
2013a; Ödlund, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006). At the same time, there is an inherent 
trust in specific functions and organisations, in that whoever is there is a capable 
professional. For these personal connections to emerge, there is a need for more 
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cross-organisational meetings, such as exercises. This may explain the close 
relationship between the municipalities and SCG, as the SCG have 25 coastal 
stations and can utilise an extensive network of personal relationships with local 
organisations and individuals. This focus on interpersonal relationships also extends 
to the Depots and their surrounding area. Since the Depots have been removed from 
the local municipality, they may both loose local expertise in handling the equipment 
and local interpersonal relationships. The other agencies lack these close ties to the 
municipalities, as they are more centralised. 
 
IMS is considered a good structure for handling multi-organisational operations 
(IMO, 2012; IPIECAOGP, 2014a). The need for revision of the Swedish model for 
crisis management during a large response operation has been highlighted by Ödlund 
(2007), Danielsson et al. (2012), and most recently by Sjökvist (2015). Sjökvist was 
especially assigned by the Swedish Government to evaluate the large forest fire that 
occurred in Sweden during summer 2014, and argued that (unofficial translation): 
 
“The management model that works for more mundane emergency response does not 
work during larger incidents. During the fire it became clear that in these extreme 
cases, a management model that all key stakeholders are aware of, and able to work 
through, is required.” 
 
Indeed, ICS originated in the problems with complex multi-agency emergency 
management from forest fires in California in the 1970s and was only later adopted 
for oil spill response, formally in 2004 (Buck et al., 2006; Jamieson, 2005; Lindell et 
al., 2005). 
 
The weaker link between the different counties, compared to the municipalities 
within the counties, suggests that the existing Team-based structure works up to the 
county level. When the response involves more than one county, there is likely a 
need for a Function-based structure, such as IMS. However, a Function-based 
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structure may be needed even at the municipal level in certain areas. If the 
interpersonal relationships do not exist between two municipalities, as indicated in 
the networks, there is likely a need for a Function-based structure even at this level. 
Consequently, cross-organisational exercises are needed in order to build these 
personal relationships and understanding for other organisations. These exercises are 
essential in order to properly evaluate the need for a Function-based structure. 
 
The scores of the variables for the management of oil spill preparedness analysed in 
this chapter have been summarised in Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10: Scores for the units of analysis. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient Score 
Mandates 95% or more of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities 
in their mandate. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities 
in their mandate. 
Less than 50% of the 
governmental organisations 
have oil spill responsibilities 
in their mandate. 
70% 
Planning network 
density 
95% or more of the 
maximum possible planning 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum possible planning 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
Less than 50% of the 
maximum possible planning 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
82.8% 
Response network 
density 
95% or more of the 
maximum possible 
response connections 
between the agencies, 
CABs, and municipalities. 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum possible 
response connections 
between the agencies, 
CABs, and municipalities. 
Less than 50% of the 
maximum possible response 
connections between the 
agencies, CABs, and 
municipalities. 
88.3% 
Responses for 
understanding 
Respondents consider 
organisational roles well 
understood, 95% or more of 
the maximum score. 
Respondents consider 
organisational roles 
understandable, from 50% 
up to 95% of the maximum 
score. 
Respondents do not 
consider organisational 
roles understandable, less 
than 50% of the maximum 
score. 
56.0 % 
Responses for 
planning values 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations 
valuable for planning, 95% 
or more of the maximum 
score. 
Respondents consider 
existing organisations 
valuable for planning, from 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum score. 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations not 
valuable for planning, less 
than 50% of the maximum 
score. 
66.6 % 
Responses for 
response values 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations 
valuable for response, 95% 
or more of the maximum 
score. 
Respondents consider 
existing organisations 
valuable for response, from 
50% up to 95% of the 
maximum score. 
Respondents consider most 
existing organisations not 
valuable for response, less 
than 50% of the maximum 
score. 
74.1 % 
Responses for 
planning 
expectations 
Respondents consider 
organisational 
responsibilities for planning 
to meet expectations, 
average score up to +/- 
0.25. 
Respondents consider 
organisational 
responsibilities for planning 
to be close to expectations, 
average score from +/- 0.25 
to 1.0. 
Respondents do not 
consider organisational 
responsibilities for planning 
to meet expectations, 
average score below -1.0 or 
over 1.0. 
0.45 
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Responses for 
response 
expectations 
Respondents consider 
organisational 
responsibilities for response 
to meet expectations, 
average score up to +/- 
0.25. 
Respondents consider 
organisational 
responsibilities for response 
to be close to expectations, 
average score from +/- 0.25 
to 1.0. 
Respondents do not 
consider organisational 
responsibilities for response 
to meet expectations, 
average score below -1.0 or 
over 1.0. 
0.46 
 
As shown by the analysis of the variables in Table 10 and the overall Sufficient 
ranking, indicating that the Swedish oil spill preparedness management structure is 
generally understood by the involved organisations, follows a logical division of 
responsibilities, and has an established network, the hypothesis: 
 
H1 – The preparedness regime is effectively managed 
 
is accepted and the null hypothesis H10 is rejected. Even though there are several 
deficiencies in the network, the system seems to be functioning. However, this does 
not mean that it will work during a larger oil spill and the structure still needs to be 
exercised more frequently (as discussed in Chapter 8), in order to function according 
to expectations. 
5.4.7	 Limitations	
The focus of the hypothesis is directed towards the rationalist perspective and omits 
the social psychological perspective due to time constraint. 
 
Not all agencies that have been commented on have had a chance to respond. The 
reason for this is that they were not part of the National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating (NSO), or do not have any formal responsibilities for oil spill 
preparedness. This negative bias is negated by the duality of a relationship, in that 
both connections can claim to be connected to the other. Thus, a connection exists if 
one of the organisations claims to be connected to another, even if only one of them 
responds. Similarly, additional responses from municipalities and CABs might have 
impacted the responses further, although the high response rate suggests that the 
effect would be minor. 
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5.5	 Conclusion	
The most efficient strategy to handle an oil spill at sea is always to prevent the spill 
from reaching the coastline and respond to it before it comes ashore. However, as 
this is might not be effective enough, the onshore organisations need to cooperate 
with each other and with the organisations at sea. 
 
The Swedish oil spill management system follows an established structure and is 
generally understood by those involved. The most trusted and valued organisation is 
the Swedish Coast Guard, even though it has no response operations or mandates 
onshore. The Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management also stands out, as 
most survey respondents consider the role of the agency to be unclear. This may be 
because other organisations are still unsure of the separation between the 
responsibilities of this relatively new agency and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. Before the Tjörn oil spill and subsequent evaluation, the representatives 
from the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management were not familiar with 
the role of the agency in the oil spill management network or the expectations of 
other organisations. It is surprising that this agency occupies such a central role in 
the planning and response networks, considering that it has no direct mandate for 
either and the role of the agency is viewed as unclear. The network analysis 
additionally shows that both the Oil Spill Depots and the Oil Spill Advisory Service 
are important, which makes their future existence and relocation a critical issue for 
Swedish oil spill preparedness. This is recognised by the National Cooperation 
Group for Oil Combating in its current draft action plan, but no agency is so far 
willing to take responsibility for the Oil Spill Advisory Service. 
 
The Swedish Team-based structure for response could benefit from harmonising 
some of the common positions in the organisations. The management system itself 
has not been tested during a response to an accident larger than 1,200 tonnes. The 
few connections between the counties, and in some cases between neighbouring 
municipalities, in the oil spill preparedness network suggests a need to implement a 
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Function-based system for large cross-organisational operations on a national level, 
for example large oil spills. Thus, there is a need to conduct more cross-
organisational exercises in order to build the interpersonal relationships and 
understanding of other organisation involved in oil spill preparedness and to evaluate 
the need for a Function-based structure in Sweden. 
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Chapter	6	-	Prevention	
The second of the five results chapters focuses on the oil spill preparedness topic of 
prevention and specifically the Swedish political commitment to, and the 
Government’s implementation of, international conventions related to oil spill 
prevention and response. It also examines Swedish involvement in existing 
international cooperation agreements. 
6.1	 Introduction	
Oil spill prevention is defined to mean mitigating measures on a national or 
international level. These are preparedness measures set in place before an accident 
occurs, to minimise the accident risk and negative impacts of a spill. These measures 
are collectively called international regulations and consist of international 
conventions and agreements, industry standards, and European Union (EU) 
legislation. It can be argued that preparedness, rather than prevention, is a better term 
for the examination of the aforementioned regulations, as many of these specifically 
govern either response or prevention measures. However, this chapter focuses on the 
Swedish Government’s work on implementation of international regulations into the 
national context. Implementation of international regulations is considered a 
proactive prevention measure, affecting Swedish oil spill preparedness. Improved oil 
spill preparedness in the form of these preventive measures, means that impacts are 
mitigated and consequently costs are lowered for oil spills (Knapp & Franses, 2009; 
Knudsen & Hassler, 2011). Contingency plans, training, and equipment are discussed 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Governmental support is critical to the process of encouraging or discouraging 
prevention activities (Tierney, 1993; Veiga & Wonham, 2002). The government who 
ratifies international conventions and signs agreements should institute laws that see 
them incorporated into national legislation, designate responsible agencies, and 
provide these agencies with sufficient budget to implement the assigned tasks. 
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However, the ratification of international conventions relate to a number of different 
obstacles, usually tied to the implementation of the convention. For example, 
conventions by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) usually have a 
significant effect on the flag and consequently fleet of the Parties to these 
conventions. Holt (1993) maintained that IMO suffers from the Lowest Common 
Denominator (LCD) effect through the consensus process, where one or a few States 
can stall the work of a majority consensus. Hassler (2008) identified deficiencies in 
implementation of both IMO Conventions and the Helsinki Convention in the Baltic 
Sea. Knudsen and Hassler (2011) disagree with Holt and instead highlight IMO’s 
openness to change and readiness to respond to public pressure, but is critical of the 
weak link between IMO and national administrations. They argue that the effect of 
interpretation and available resources makes the implementation differ. One problem 
relating to international shipping is that Flag States are often developing countries 
with weaker regulations and enforcement than developed countries, including on 
environmental regulations (Knudsen & Hassler, 2011). 
 
Sweden has a long history of working proactively with environmental issues. For 
example, Sweden initiated the first United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human 
Environment, that convened in Stockholm 1972 (Johnson, 2012; UN, 1968) and was 
deeply engaged in the formulation of the 1974 Helsinki Convention, the 
establishment of HELCOM in 1974, in the 1992 revision of the Helsinki Convention, 
its Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme, and its Baltic 
Sea Action plan (Hassler, 2003; HELCOM, 2007a; 2008). The Swedish Government 
stated in October 2005 (Regeringen, 2005b): 
 
“[The Swedish] government will endeavour to make all Nordic EU members strive 
for the EU Marine Strategy to become as potent as possible”. 
 
The Swedish Government has assigned the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine 
Management (SwAM) to be responsible for the environmental quality objective “A 
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Balanced Marine Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos”, 
which originally includes the specific Interim target 7: Discharges of oil and 
chemicals (Environmental Objectives Council, 2006). This target stated that: 
 
“By 2010 discharges of oil and chemicals from ships will be minimized and reduced 
to a negligible level by stricter legislation and increased monitoring.” 
 
Interim Target 7 was reported to have been achieved by 2010 (Naturvårdsverket, 
2011), when all Interim Targets where removed and incorporated into the general 
Environmental Objectives. However, the justification for the removal was not 
elaborated. Curiously, oil spills are still mentioned to be a problem in the most recent 
evaluation of the Environmental Objectives (Naturvårdsverket, 2015). 
  
Concerning IMO regulations, Sweden led the suggestion to classify the Baltic Sea as 
a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) in January 2004 (Hassler, 2008; Knudsen 
& Hassler, 2011). PSSA is a type of area protection assigned by IMO. Subsequently, 
all Baltic Sea region countries except Russia endorsed this proposal, and PSSA status 
for the Baltic Sea was obtained in April 2004 (Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; Lindén, 
Chircop, Pourzanjani, Schröder-Hinrichs, & Raaymakers, 2006; Pålsson, 2008). 
Russia chose to not sign the agreement, which means that the Russian Baltic Sea 
waters are exempted from the PSSA status. In contrast, Sweden wanted even stricter 
limitations on the shipping in the Baltic Sea (Regeringen, 2005b). Sweden is also 
active in the Expert Working Groups HELCOM RESPONSE (concerning oil spill 
response), and the HELCOM SHORE (concerning onshore oil spill response), by 
chairing the first and coordinating the latter (NSO interviews, January 2015). 
Sweden is also active in the North Sea through OSPAR and the Bonn Agreement 
(Kustbevakningen, 2015). 
 
Taking these examples into account, it is clear that Sweden has historically expressed 
a considerable ambition to improve the environment globally and regionally, both 
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concerning environmental issues in general and oil spill preparedness specifically. 
This chapter shows that the Swedish political commitment to oil spill preparedness is 
in good standing, but has some shortcomings. However, it is of course possible to 
want to protect the marine environment while simultaneously scaling down oil spill 
preparedness. But maintaining existing preparedness is considered to be cheaper and 
more effective than rebuilding it (ITOPF, 2011b; Veiga & Wonham, 2002). 
6.2	 Methods	
Chapter 6 includes an analysis of the Swedish Government’s commitment to oil spill 
prevention. The analysis examined ratification and implementation of international 
conventions as a way of estimating the political commitment to oil spill prevention. 
6.2.1	 Study	design	
The research question is formulated as Hypothesis 2, H2. 
 
 H2 – Political commitment is sufficient 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H20 – Political commitment is insufficient 
 
Hypothesis 2 was chosen to analyse whether the political commitment to oil spill 
prevention is sufficient. The units of analysis have been chosen based on reasoning 
and practicality after consulting literature and expert opinions. 
 
Which international conventions are ratified and implemented, and which 
international agreements are signed and implemented determine the political 
commitment. Additionally, the budget to the responsible agencies and authorities 
determine if the government has allocated sufficient funds for the implementation. 
The relationship between the units of analysis and their corresponding variables can 
be seen in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35: Hypothesis 2 chosen indicator, units of analysis, and variables. 
For oil spill preparedness to be considered to have political commitment, the relevant 
international conventions and agreements should be ratified or signed, and 
demonstrate that they have been implemented and budgeted for. Only international 
conventions and agreements relating specifically to pollution by oil from ships or 
offshore activities have been considered. The focus of this study is on impacts 
exclusive to Sweden. Requirements relating to the ships themselves have therefore 
been excluded, although it is recognised that provisions for increased safety onboard 
has an impact on the ship as a whole and the risk of having an accident. H2 excludes 
the inherent value and impact of the different international conventions and 
agreements, as a discussion on a single convention and its implementation is by itself 
substantial enough to be the topic of a PhD. 
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These criteria have been quantified in Table 11, following to the reasoning for 
ranking the variables in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 11: Evaluation criteria for H2. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient 
Number of 
conventions 
95% or more of the 11 relevant 
international conventions 
ratified. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions ratified. 
Less than 50% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions ratified. 
Conventions 
implemented 
95% or more of the 11 relevant 
international conventions 
implemented. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions implemented. 
Less than 50% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions implemented. 
Number of 
agreements 
95% or more of the 4 relevant 
international agreements 
signed. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 4 
relevant international 
agreements signed. 
Less than 50% of the 4 relevant 
international agreements 
signed. 
Agreements 
implemented 
95% or more of the relevant 
international agreements 
implemented. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
relevant international 
agreements implemented. 
Less than 50% of the relevant 
international agreements 
implemented. 
Preparedness 
funding 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
increased by more than 5% 
from 2010 to 2015. 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
stable and does not deviate 
more than +/- 5% from 2010 to 
2015. 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
decreased by more than 5% 
from 2010 to 2015. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is wholly present and/or functioning 
(Preferable), partially present and/or functioning (Sufficient), or not present and/or 
functioning at all (Insufficient). All of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate 
that they at least reach the rank of Sufficient for H2 to be accepted, meaning that the 
oil spill prevention measures are sufficient, but should be further developed. If all 
variables are ranked Preferable, oil spill prevention measures are at the best practice 
level. If any of the variables are ranked Insufficient, important oil spill prevention 
measures are missing, negatively impacting Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
6.2.2	 Sources	
Convention data and texts were collected from publicly available sources, primarily 
government and convention websites. Scientific papers have been gathered through 
the library at the World Maritime University (WMU) and open access journals 
online. Project reports have been gathered from the project pages of various oil spill 
projects. 
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Additional information and comments have been gathered from the questionnaire 
(see Appendix A - Questionnaire) distributed to all Swedish coastal municipalities 
and County Administrative Boards (CABs), and the interviews (see Appendix B - 
Interview) with the members of the National Cooperation Group for Oil Combating 
(NSO), described in Chapter 4. 
6.2.3	 Analysis	
The provisions of the relevant international conventions and agreements have been 
analysed systematically and the implementation has been evaluated. Additionally, 
the national budgets for the principal agencies responsible for oil spill preparedness 
have been examined. 
6.3	 Results	
Sweden is party to two main types of international regulations: international 
conventions and international agreements. As Sweden is a member of the EU, the 
relevant EU Directives are also addressed. The funding available for preparedness is 
reflected in the budget for the responsible agencies. 
6.3.1	 International	conventions	
International conventions relating to pollution of oil from ships are primarily 
governed by IMO, with the exception of United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) that is governed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. 
6.3.1.1	UNCLOS	
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted 10 
December 1982. UNCLOS is the most important legal instrument for the oceans 
(UN, 2001). It entered into force 16 November 1994 and as of 10 October 2014, 166 
states have ratified this convention (UN, 2014). Sweden ratified it 25 June 1996 (UN, 
2014). UNCLOS establishes extensive guidelines for businesses, environment, and 
management of marine natural resources. However, only a few of the provisions in 
UNCLOS refer to pollution by discharges of oil and other substances. These issues 
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requires Parties to the convention to establish national regulations to prevent, reduce, 
and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels (Article 211), regulate 
enforcement by Flag States (Article 217), inspections and enforcement by Port States 
(Article 218 and 219); enforcement by Coastal States (Article 220 and 221), and 
pursue offenders (Article 111). None of the articles relate specifically to oil spill 
preparedness. 
6.3.2	 IMO	Conventions	
The many IMO Conventions are key to the international prevention measures for oil 
pollution by ships. IMO establishes common regulations for oil spills from ships, and 
installing prevention measures in the form of design requirements and risk reduction 
measures (Schröder-Hinrichs & Hebbar, 2006). The conventions specifically relating 
to oil pollution from ships or offshore activities are listed in Table 12. Denounced 
signifies that a state has withdrawn its ratification, in this case because the updated 
replacement conventions have made the original conventions obsolete. 
 
Table 12: IMO Conventions relating to pollution by oil from ships or offshore activities ratified and 
denounced by Sweden (ECOLEX, 2015a; 2015b; FAO, IUCN, UNEP, n.d.; IMO, 2015a; 2015c). 
Convention IMO 
Adoption 
Swedish ratification/accession Entry into 
Force 
Status 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II) 1973-11-02 1980-06-09 1983-10-02 Ratified 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III) 1973-11-02 1980-06-09 1992-07-01 Ratified 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV) 1973-11-02 1980-06-09 2003-09-27 Ratified 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V) 1973-11-02 1980-06-09 1988-12-31 Ratified 
MARPOL Protocol 97 (Annex VI) 1997-09-26 1998-05-18 2005-05-19 Ratified 
INTERVENTION Convention 69 1969-11-29 1973-02-08 1975-05-06 Ratified 
INTERVENTION Protocol 73 1973-11-02 1976-06-28 1983-03-30 Ratified 
CLC Convention 69 1969-11-29 1975-03-17 1975-06-19 Denounced 
CLC Protocol 76 1976-11-19 1978-07-07 1981-04-08 Ratified 
CLC Protocol 92 1992-11-27 1995-05-25 1996-05-30 Ratified 
FUND Convention 71 1971-12-18  1978-09-16 Denounced 
FUND Protocol 76 1976-11-19 1978-07-07 1994-11-22 Ratified 
FUND Protocol 92 1992-11-27 1995-05-25 1996-05-30 Ratified 
FUND Protocol 2003 2003-05-16 2005-05-05 2005-08-05 Ratified 
OPRC Convention 90 1990-11-30 1992-03-30 1995-05-13 Ratified 
BUNKER Convention 01 2001-03-23 2013-06-03 2008-11-21 Ratified 
 
Table 12 shows that Sweden has ratified the relevant IMO Conventions (ECOLEX, 
2015a; 2015b; FAO et al., n.d.; IMO, 2015a; 2015c). However, the OPRC 
Convention is of particular interest as a prevention measure to national oil spill 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
156 
preparedness, since it has provisions that are not exclusive to ships. Additionally, the 
CLC Convention and the FUND Convention are indirectly important for prevention. 
But as these liability conventions are primarily handled by an international 
secretariat, they do not require much implementation and have not been considered 
for further analysis. 
6.3.2.1	 MARPOL	
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) was originally adopted on 2 November 1973 and modified by the 1978 
Protocol (IMO, 1978; 2015b). The 1978 Protocol came about after a series of tanker 
accidents between 1976 and 1977, but since the 1973 Convention had not yet entered 
into force, the 1978 Protocol absorbed the 1973 Convention and both entered into 
force on 2 October 1983. MARPOL has been updated by several amendments and 
additions since entering into force. It is the main international convention that 
regulates the prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships. MARPOL 
includes six technical Annexes relating to different kinds of pollution (IMO, 2015b): 
 
• Annex I Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil entered into force 
2 October 1983. 
• Annex II Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid 
Substances in Bulk entered into force 2 October 1983. 
• Annex III Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances 
Carried by Sea in Packaged Form entered into force 1 July 1992. 
• Annex IV Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships 
entered into force 27 September 2003. 
• Annex V Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships 
entered into force 31 December 1988. 
• Annex VI Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships entered 
into force 19 May 2005.  
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Since this study is limited to oil spills, only Annex I is of relevance. 
 
Annex I 
Annexes I and II have been ratified by 152 states (EMSA, 2012), which represents 
99.2% of the world’s shipping tonnage. This makes MARPOL one of the most 
successfully implemented conventions. It requires all ships to be fitted with oil 
pollution prevention equipment. It has clear rules of how and under which 
circumstances oil and oily mixture may be discharged from the ship via bilge water 
and from tanks, for example maximum concentration and distance to land. 
Regulation 37 further requires tankers of more than 150 gross tonnage (gt) and 
vessels of more than 400 gt, to have a Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan 
(SOPEP) onboard, which is approved by the Flag State. If any pollution in or around 
the vessel is observed, the ship’s master should be made aware immediately and 
respond appropriately, as detailed in the SOPEP. However, simultaneous threats 
against the life or safety of the crew have priority. MARPOL Annex I does not 
contain any other requirements for national oil spill prevention measures. 
6.3.2.2	 Intervention	Convention	
The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention) was adopted on 29 November 
1969 and entered into force on 6 May 1975 (UN, 1969). It regulates if, and what, 
measures Coastal States may take on the High Seas (meaning the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction) to prevent, mitigate or eliminate any danger from oil pollution 
to the coastline or other interests, after a maritime accident. However, the Coastal 
State is only allowed to take necessary actions and must consult with the Flag State 
or States of the ships involved, the owners of ship and cargo, and possibly 
independent experts. If a Coastal State takes action beyond allowed limits, it is liable 
to pay compensation for any damage caused by its actions. None of these actions 
involve measures on the shore, with the possible exception of emergency towing 
procedures to a place of refuge. 
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6.3.2.3	 OPRC	Convention	
Sweden signed the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention) on 30 March 1992 and it entered 
into force on 13 May 1995 (ECOLEX, 2015b). It is the largest international 
agreement on oil spill response cooperation, with 109 signatory states as of 27 
February 2015 (ECOLEX, 2015b). The individual articles in the OPRC Convention 
were analysed and indicators for their implementation were investigated (see Table 
13). In summary, only Articles 4 to 10 are relevant for implementation by the 
Swedish Government, as the other articles concern convention explanation and 
procedures. 
 
Table 13: Analysis of the OPRC Convention articles. 
Articles Description Explanation Implemented 
Article 1 
General provisions 
Sets out rules and limitations of the 
convention. 
Explanatory text. Not applicable 
Article 2 
Definitions 
Defines keywords used in the 
convention. 
Explanatory text. Not applicable 
Article 3 
Oil pollution 
emergency plans 
Requirements for ships, offshore 
units and seaports to have an 
onboard oil pollution emergency 
plan. 
Only relates to ships. Not applicable 
Article 4 
Oil pollution reporting 
procedures 
Requirements for ships, offshore 
units, seaports and aviation to 
without delay report any oil spill 
pollution observed to the relevant 
coastal State. 
Enforced by the relevant 
actors themselves, SCG 
aerial surveillance, and 
EMSA satellite 
surveillance. 
Yes 
Article 5 
Action on receiving a 
pollution report 
Requirements for Parties to assess 
the spill and inform other Parties at 
risk of any oil spills that has been 
reported. 
Responsibility of SCG as 
responsible authority for 
the convention. 
Yes 
Article 6 
National and 
regional systems for 
preparedness and 
response 
Requirements to designate a 
national responsible authority and 
contact point and a national 
contingency plan; establish a 
minimum level of oil spill combating 
equipment, an exercise programme, 
and communication capabilities. 
All points established at 
sea. No points completely 
established on land. Varies 
between municipalities and 
no clear responsible 
authority. No national 
contingency plan. 
Partially 
Article 7 
International 
cooperation in 
pollution response 
Requirements to cooperate 
between Parties if needed and 
establish measures to facilitate this 
cooperation. 
Cooperation exercises and 
project participation. 
Yes 
Article 8 
Research and 
development 
Requirements to cooperate 
between Parties to promote and 
exchange results of research and 
development. 
Cooperation exercises and 
project participation. 
Yes 
Article 9 
Technical cooperation 
Requirements to cooperate 
between Parties to train personnel, 
ensure availability of resources, and 
initiate joint research and 
development programmes. 
Cooperation exercises and 
project participation. 
Yes 
Article 10 
Promotion of bilateral 
and multilateral 
Requirement to promote 
cooperation agreements. 
Cooperation exercises and 
projects. 
Yes 
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cooperation in 
preparedness and 
response 
Article 11 
Relation to other 
conventions and 
international 
agreements 
Establishes that this convention 
should not work against other 
conventions. 
Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 12 
Institutional 
arrangements 
Designation of coordinator to 
handle information services, 
education and training, and 
technical services. 
IMO designated as 
coordinator. 
Not applicable 
Article 13 
Evaluation of the 
convention 
Requirement to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the convention 
IMO designated as 
evaluator. 
Not applicable 
Article 14 
Amendments 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 15 
Signatures, 
ratification, 
acceptance, approval 
and accession 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 16 
Entry into force 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 17 
Denunciation 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 18 
Depository 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Article 19 
Languages 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
Annex 
Reimbursement of 
costs of assistance 
Procedure explanation. Explanatory text Not applicable 
 
Articles 4 to 5 
Article 4 establishes requirements for ships, offshore units, seaports, and aviation to 
report any oil spill pollution observed to the relevant Coastal State without delay. 
Article 5 establishes requirements for Parties to assess the oil spill and inform other 
Parties at risk of any reported oil spills. 
 
The Swedish Coast Guard (SCG) has addressed issues relating to the oil pollution 
reporting procedures, as they receive and respond to reports of oil spills (Regeringen, 
2007c). 
 
For aerial observations of oil spills, in addition to publically reported observations, 
SCG employs their own fleet of three surveillance aircraft that run daily patrols 
along the entire Swedish coastline (HELCOM, 2014c; Kustbevakningen, 2014). SCG 
reported 2,283 flight hours to HELCOM in 2013, corresponding to more than half of 
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the total reported hours (HELCOM, 2014c). Additional visual observations are 
supplied from EMSA satellite images (EMSA, 2013a; 2013b). 
 
Article 6 
Article 6 establishes requirements to designate a national responsible authority and 
contact point and a National Contingency Plan (NCP), establish a minimum level of 
oil spill response equipment, an exercise programme, and communication 
capabilities. 
 
At sea, oil spill preparedness has a clear structure, with SCG the designated 
responsible authority and contact point, as discussed in Chapter 5. This is explicitly 
mentioned in the SCG instructions from the Swedish Government (Regeringen, 
2007c; 2014d). SCG has established oil spill combatting equipment on their vessels 
and in ports, conduct frequent exercises, and have interorganisational communication 
capabilities. On land, this is not as clear. Since SCG is only responsible for oil spills 
at sea and in the great lakes, Vänern, Vättern, and Mälaren (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003), 
the role of the agency as the sole responsible authority is only partly true. No 
document titled National Contingency Plan has existed for Sweden according to the 
senior experts (Evans, S., telephone communication, October 2014 and NSO 
interviews, January 2015). 
 
Article 7 to 9 
Articles 7 to 9 requires Parties to cooperate if needed and establish measures to 
facilitate this cooperation: to promote and exchange results of research and 
development, to train personnel, ensure availability of resources, and initiate joint 
research and development programmes. 
 
These are all addressed in the instructions to SCG (Regeringen, 2007c) and to the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the agency responsible for disaster 
preparedness and management (Regeringen, 2008b). Additionally, Articles 7 to 9 
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have been implemented through a number of EU projects, for example measures to 
facilitate cooperation (Forsman, 2012b) and training (Sjöfartsverket, 2005). 
However, the convention text does not mentioned to what extent this facilitation is 
required, and it could be debated if any country has done enough to facilitate 
cooperation, and promote and exchange results. 
 
Article 10 
Article 10 establishes the requirement to promote cooperation agreements. 
 
This has been addressed through the regular cooperation exercises that SCG takes 
part in or organise (Kustbevakningen, 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2014), and through 
working in EU projects, for example agreement development in the BRISK project 
(BRISK, 2012). 
6.3.2.4	 CLC	Convention	
The 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC Convention), was adopted on 29 November 1969 and entered into force on 19 
June 1975 (IOPC Funds, 2011). It was replaced by the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention, which was adopted on 27 November 1992 and entered into force on 30 
May 1996. The CLC Convention gives shipowners a strict liability for pollution 
damage caused by oil leaks or discharges from their ships into any territories 
belonging to a Party of the convention. Strict liability means that the shipowner is 
liable even if not at fault for the oil pollution, with a few exceptions. The CLC 
Convention applies to ships carrying oil as cargo and does not include spills of fuel 
oil from other ships. It was adopted to make sure that adequate compensation is 
available to countries and individuals who suffer oil pollution damage from oil 
tankers. The CLC Convention relates to oil spill prevention through establishing a 
system for claims for response costs and damage. The convention does not require 
much in terms of implementation by the national governments, as it is run by an 
international secretariat. 
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6.3.2.5	 FUND	Convention	
The 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND Convention), was adopted on 18 
December 1971 and entered into force 16 October 1982 (IOPC Funds, 2011). It was 
replaced by the 1992 Protocol, which was adopted on 27 November 1992 and 
entered into force on 30 May 1996, at the same time as the CLC Convention. The 
FUND Convention was established to create an international fund to relieve the 
shipowners of the financial burden of the CLC Convention, and to provide additional 
compensation to the victims in cases where the CLC Convention was inadequate or 
unobtainable. Victims of oil spill pollution damage can thus be compensated beyond 
the shipowner’s liability, and in situations where there is no shipowner liable. To this 
end, the FUND Convention established the separate 1992 International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund, known as the IOPC Fund (IOPC Funds, 2011). The IOPC Fund 
is not a UN agency, but is an intergovernmental organisation following procedures 
similar to those of the UN. Only States can become members of the IOPC Fund. The 
FUND Convention relates to oil spill prevention through establishing a system for 
claims for response costs and damage claims. The convention does not require much 
in terms of implementation by the national governments, as it is run by an 
international secretariat. 
6.3.2.6	 Bunker	Convention	
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 
(Bunker Convention) was adopted on 23 March 2001 and entered into force on 21 
November 2008 (IMO, 2001; Jacobsson, 2009). The convention was adopted to fill 
the gap from the CLC Convention and the FUND Convention, by providing 
compensation for oil spill pollution damage when oil is carried as bunker fuel, and 
not cargo. The Bunker Convention only covers pollution damage in the territorial 
seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Parties, and is modelled on the 
CLC Convention. Similar to the CLC Convention, a key requirement of the Bunker 
Convention is the need for the shipowners to maintain compulsory insurance. 
Another key provision is the requirement for direct action, which would allow a 
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compensation claim to be brought directly against an insurer. However, contrary to 
the CLC Convention, it is not supported by any fund. 
6.3.3	 International	agreements	
Sweden is active in many international and regional agreements. For example, SCG 
regularly represents Sweden at meetings and in the various exercises, thus 
performing relevant commitments to these agreements (Kustbevakningen, 2011; 
2012; 2013a; 2014). Of the examined agreements, only HELCOM contains a 
measure comparable to the OPRC Convention, in mentioning a National 
Contingency Plan for oil spills. 
6.3.3.1	 Arctic	Agreement	
The Arctic Council Member States: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States, signed the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic on 15 May 2013 
(Arctic Council, 2013). As of February 2014, Norway, Finland, Russia, and Canada 
have completed internal procedures for entry into force (Arctic Council, 2014). 
Sweden and Finland are unique in that they do not have a coast towards the Arctic 
sea directly. However, the northern parts of the Baltic Sea are well within any 
definition of the Arctic and share many of the issues with the Arctic areas outside of 
the Baltic Sea. The aim of the Arctic Agreement is to protect the Arctic marine 
environment from pollution by oil, through strengthening cooperation, coordination, 
and mutual assistance among the Parties. The content of the agreement is similar to 
the OPRC Convention. Additionally, the agreement describes the development of 
Operational Guidelines, yet to be written, which will include notification procedures, 
requests for assistance, coordination and cooperation procedures, transboundary 
movement of resources, joint exercises, and reimbursement procedures. 
 
The Arctic agreement is worded similarly to the OPRC Convention, but a notable 
exception is that Article 4:1 (emphasis added) requires that: 
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“Each Party shall maintain a national system for responding promptly and 
effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall take into account particular 
activities and locales most likely to give rise to or suffer an oil pollution incident and 
anticipated risks to areas of special ecological significance, and shall include at a 
minimum a National Contingency Plan or plans for preparedness and response to 
oil pollution incidents.” 
 
Unlike the OPRC Convention, there is no requirement to have a National 
Contingency Plan, if other plans for preparedness and response exist. 
6.3.3.2	 Bonn	Agreement	
The Agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea by oil and 
other harmful substances is known as the Bonn Agreement (Bonn Agreement, 1983). 
It was agreed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom in 1969, in the wake of the Torrey Canyon oil spill 
(Bonn Agreement, 2015). The EU joined the agreement in 1983 and Ireland in 2007, 
and it now covers a large geographic area around the Bonn Agreement Member 
States. The aim of this agreement is to cooperate on oil spill response and oil spill 
surveillance. To accomplish this, several documents have been produced, for 
example the Counter-Pollution Manual (Bonn Agreement, 2014) and Aerial 
Operations Handbook (Bonn Agreement, 2009), and annual exercises called 
BONNEX are held. The Bonn Agreement does not include any provisions for 
National Contingency Planning or other measures onshore. 
6.3.3.3	 Copenhagen	Agreement	
The Nordic Agreement on Cooperation regarding Pollution at Sea from Oil and 
Other Substances is known as the Copenhagen Agreement (Køpenhavnsavtalet, 
2004). It was agreed by Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden in 1971 
and amended in 1993. The aim of the Copenhagen Agreement is to cooperate in 
protecting the marine environment through monitoring, investigation, reporting, 
evidence collection, pollution control, assistance, and information exchange. Parties 
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also cooperate in preparation guidelines and through regular exercises 
(Køpenhavnsavtalet, 2015b). The Copenhagen Agreement does not make any 
provisions for contingency planning, but has a guide (Køpenhavnsavtalet, 2015b) 
that is otherwise detailed regarding response cooperation and exercises at sea. 
Onshore activities have been included in the Copenhagen Agreement exercises a few 
times, for example in Gothenburg 2010 (Køpenhavnsavtalet, 2010). 
6.3.3.4	 HELCOM	
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 
known as the Helsinki Convention 1974, was signed by Denmark, Finland, West 
Germany, East Germany, Poland, USSR, and Sweden in 1974 and entered into force 
on 3 May 1980. It was replaced by the Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, known as the Helsinki Convention 1992, which 
was signed by Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, 
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden in 1992 and 
entered into force on 17 January 2000 (HELCOM, 2008). The aim of this convention 
is to prevent and eliminate pollution of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area caused by harmful substances. The Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission, known as the Helsinki Commission or HELCOM, governs the Helsinki 
Convention. The commission name, HELCOM, is more often referred to when 
discussing the Helsinki Convention, than the convention itself. HELCOM has 
developed a Baltic Sea Action Plan (HELCOM, 2007a), which includes measures for 
oil spill preparedness. Several supporting documents have been produced, for 
example the HELCOM Manual on Co-operation in Response to Marine Pollution 
(HELCOM, 2013a) and annual exercises called BALEX DELTA are organised. This 
manual is intended to be the practical implementation of the OPRC Convention for 
the Contracting parties and includes oil spill response at sea (Volume I) (HELCOM, 
2013a), spills of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) (Volume II), and oil spill 
response onshore (Volume III) (HELCOM, 2013b). The focus of this manual is 
international cooperation, rather than being a manual on oil spill response equipment 
and strategies. An advantage of HELCOM is that it includes Russia, but unlike the 
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EU Directives and similar to the IMO Conventions, the recommendations are not 
legally binding in sense that they have no sanctions in case of non-compliance. It is 
up to each Member State to decide how and when these recommendations will be 
adopted, although they are obliged to do so as signatories to the convention. 
HELCOM practical provisions are collected in the convention annexes. Annex IV 
Prevention of pollution from ships Regulation 4, calls upon Parties to apply 
MARPOL Annex I to V. HELCOM Annex VII Response to Pollution Incidents is 
the most relevant of the annexes for oil spill preparedness. The original 1992 
HELCOM Annex VII Regulation 2: Contingency Planning that entered into force on 
17 January 2000 (HELCOM, 2008) requests that (emphasis added): 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall draw up a National Contingency Plan and in co-
operation with other Contracting Parties, as appropriate, bilateral or multilateral 
plans for a joint response to pollution incidents.” 
 
HELCOM Recommendation 28E/12 from 15 November 2007 (emphasis added) 
states that: 
 
“RECOMMENDS FINALLY that the Contracting States integrate shoreline 
response into National Contingency Plans, and cooperate by conducting trainings 
and organising exchange programmes to ensure swift and adequate response 
capacity and to develop best practices.” 
 
Thus, assuming that Contracting States have National Contingency Plans. 
 
HELCOM Recommendation 33/2 from 6 March 2012 (emphasis added) goes on to 
state: 
 
“RECALLING ALSO HELCOM Recommendation 28E/13 “Strengthening of sub-
regional co-operation in response field”, requiring the Contracting Parties to 
integrate shoreline response into National Contingency Plans, and cooperate by 
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conducting trainings and organizing exchange programmes to ensure swift and 
adequate response capacity and to develop best practices, as well as HELCOM 
Recommendation 31E/6 “Integrated wildlife response planning in the Baltic Sea 
area”.” 
 
However, HELCOM Recommendation 34E/3 from 3 October 2013 states in the 
“Amendments to Annex VII “Response to pollution incidents” of the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention, concerning response on the shore”, that the text for Regulation 2: 
Contingency Planning (emphasis and underlines added) should be amended to: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall have a National Contingency Plan for response to 
pollution incidents at sea. Each Contracting Party shall also, as appropriate, have 
contingency plans for response on the shore. Such plans may be combined.” 
 
Recommendation 34E/3 thus removes the obligation of HELCOM Member States to 
have a National Contingency Plan for the shoreline and implies that the National 
Contingency Plan was intended exclusively for pollution response the sea in previous 
versions of the text. This change was made to facilitate Germany, where the state is 
responsible for the response at sea and the federal states are responsible for their own 
plans (Bernt, S., email communication 4 November 2015). However, it also makes 
Sweden fully compliant on the issue of National Contingency Plans. 
6.3.4	 EU	Directives	
Sweden has been a member of the EU since 1 January 1995. This membership means 
it must incorporate EU legislation in the form of Directives and Regulations into 
Swedish law and will face sanctions if they do not comply. In contrast to 
international conventions, there is no ratification process, and the implementation 
and enforcement of the Directives are the only interesting processes to examine. 
Similar to UNCLOS, none of the Directives concerning oil spill prevention 
(Directives 2005/35/EC, 2009/123/EC, 2002/59/EC and 2009/16/EC) are directly 
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relevant for oil spill preparedness onshore. There is no requirement from the EU to 
have a National Contingency Plan. 
 
However, the EU has introduced mechanisms to increase oil spill preparedness. This 
is primarily done through the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). EMSA 
has developed the SafeSeaNet (EMSA, 2012), a vessel traffic monitoring and 
information system and the CleanSeaNet (EMSA, 2013a), a satellite surveillance 
system for marine pollution. SafeSeaNet can warn for unwanted ships in the area and 
CleanSeaNet sends satellite images of suspected oil spills on a daily basis to EU 
Member States. In addition, EMSA has several vessels on standby, to assist in oil 
spill response (EMSA, 2011). 
6.3.5	 Budget	
There is no specific budget for oil spill preparedness in Sweden. The funds for oil 
spill preparedness are embedded in the budgets of several different organisations and 
budget posts, primarily related to the environment and civil protection. Specifically, 
oil spill preparedness is embedded in the budgets of SwAM, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), SCG, MSB and its predecessors the Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency (SRSA) and the Crisis Preparedness Agency (CPA), as well as the 
funds for Crisis preparedness, the marine environment, and the general budgets for 
the municipalities. The most important of these organisations are shown in Chapter 5 
to be: SCG, MSB, SwAM, and the municipalities. Their budgets are analysed 
together with the fund for crisis preparedness. The crisis preparedness fund can and 
is used for oil spill preparedness projects, but also for various other crisis and 
disaster management and preparedness projects, such as flooding and forest fires. 
 
Between 2010 and 2015, the budgets increased slightly for SCG, MSB, and SwAM, 
and substantially for the municipalities, while decreasing for crisis preparedness (see 
Table 14) (Ek, Berg, Oscarsson, & Malm, 2014; Regeringen, 2011a). As SwAM did 
not exist in 2010, the budget from 2012, the first full year of operation, is used 
(Regeringen, 2013). 
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Table 14: Funding development between 2010 and 2015 in million SEK, except SwAM that is measured 
from 2012 (Regeringen, 2011a; 2013; 2015c). 
Budget line 2010/2012 2015 Change 
SwAM 192.6 208.0 108.0 % 
SCG 989.5 1,040.2 105.1 % 
MSB 961.0 1,043.6 108.6 % 
Crisis preparedness 1,171.4 1,014.4 86.6 % 
Municipalities 72,749.3 90,772.5 124.8 % 
Total 76,063.7 94,078.7 123.7 % 
 
Sweden had a unique political situation during December 2014, with government 
negotiations resulting in the opposition coalition budget being agreed to by the sitting 
government. This led to a reduction of more than 1.5 billion SEK (~180 million 
USD), from 6.9 billion SEK (~825 million USD) to 5.3 billion SEK (~641 million 
USD) for the environment compared to the government’s budget proposal and more 
specifically 145 million (~17.4 million USD) less to the marine environment, from 
1.3 billion SEK (~158.8 million USD) to 1.2 billion (~141.5 million USD) (Ek et al., 
2014). However, despite these drastic changes, the budgets were still mostly similar 
to preceding years. The expenditures from 2000 to 2014 and the 2015 budget and 
opposition budget bill for the priorities and different agencies can be seen in Figure 
36 (Regeringen, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004a; 2005a; 2006a; 2007a; 2008a; 2009; 2010; 
2011a; 2012a; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015b; 2015a). SRSA and CPA merged to form 
MSB in 2009 and SwAM was created in 2011, weighing them with expenses tied to 
the agency creation and closing of the old agencies. 
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Figure 36: Expenditures change in million SEK from 2000 to 2014 and the 2015 budget and opposition 
budget bill for environment and crisis preparedness related agencies and municipalities (Regeringen, 2001; 
2002; 2003; 2004a; 2005a; 2006a; 2007a; 2008a; 2009; 2010; 2011a; 2012a; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 
2015b). 
6.4	 Discussion	
One of the key issues in discussing oil spill prevention is the international nature of 
shipping. Coastal municipalities have in reality no direct influence on the potential 
risks from ships passing their coasts and rely on the government to represent them in 
the international forums (Baltic Master, 2007). 
 
As shown in the results, Sweden has ratified all of the relevant IMO Conventions. 
However, only a few of these include provisions for oil spill preparedness directly, as 
most detail responsibilities and rights of the Flag and Port State. There are also issues 
related to both ratification and implementation of the OPRC Convention and the 
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Bunker Convention that warrant closer examination. This is especially related to the 
requirement to have a National Contingency Plan. 
6.4.1	 Ratification	
The Bunker Convention was ratified comparably late, on 3 September 2013, several 
years after entry into force on 21 November 2008 (Berndtsson, 2013; Jacobsson, 
2009). The timing of the ratification can be compared to the other examined 
conventions (see Table 12), where Sweden has ratified well in advance of entry into 
force. It is also surprising considering that the last oil spills in the area, for example 
Fu Shan Hai 2003, Full City 2009, Godafoss 2011, and Golden Trader 2011, were 
not from tankers, but bunker fuel from cargo vessels. The delay in ratification has 
been despite pressure from MSB to expediate the process (Ericsson, M., personal 
communication, October 2011). MSB is responsible for the oil pollution 
compensation claims in Sweden from the municipalities to the insurers. No particular 
reason for the delay has been given, despite multiple inquiries from MSB, which can 
be interpreted as a lack of priority and therefore commitment by the government. 
6.4.2	 Implementation	
The most relevant of the international conventions for implementation proved to be 
the OPRC Convention. One of the goals of this convention was to have means to 
encourage countries, particularly developing countries, to establish national response 
systems (Holt, 1993). With that perspective, the provisions concerning the national 
obligations are the most important part of the convention. Sweden was one of the 
first states to ratify the OPRC Convention and remained active by helping to fund 
IMO’s training programme of OPRC seminars and workshops (Edwards, 1993). 
 
Sweden fulfils its obligations to the OPRC Convention for articles requiring 
implementation, except one. Article 6 states that (emphasis added): 
 
1) “Each Party shall establish a national system for responding promptly and 
effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall include as a minimum: 
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a) the designation of: 
 
i) the competent national authority or authorities with responsibility for oil 
pollution preparedness and response; 
ii) the national operational contact point or points, which shall be 
responsible for the receipt and transmission of oil pollution reports as 
referred to in article 4; and 
iii) an authority which is entitled to act on behalf of the State to request 
assistance or to decide to render the assistance requested;  
 
b) A National Contingency Plan for preparedness and response which 
includes the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved, 
whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed by the 
Organization.” 
 
SCG is the designated Swedish contact point for the OPRC Convention, explicitly 
stated in §12:3 in the government’s instructions (Regeringen, 2007c). Since the 
jurisdiction of SCG is limited to the state waters including the great lakes, the 
responsibility for planning once the oil reaches land is outside of its jurisdiction. Oil 
spill preparedness on land is nationally coordinated by MSB, but the responsibilities 
of the coastal municipalities, as discussed in Chapter 5 (Kulander et al., 2004; 
MSBHaV, 2014; NSO, 2014b). Contrary to the instructions to SCG, the 
government’s instructions to MSB do not explicitly mention the OPRC Convention 
(Regeringen, 2008b). Swedish municipalities are autonomous authorities and MSB 
has no mandate to order the municipalities to develop oil spill contingency plans. 
Thus, MSB may only encourage and recommend the municipalities to develop such 
plans. Although a coordinating agency, MSB is not required to have a National 
Contingency Plan and indeed does not (NSO interview, January 2015). This makes 
the role of SCG as a national contact point for the OPRC Convention puzzling, as its 
responsibility is only oil at sea and becomes a municipal issue once the oil comes 
ashore (MSBHaV, 2014; Regeringen, 2007c). It seems a little odd that the 
coordinating agency, namely SCG, does not have any authority over the other 
responisible authorities, namely the municipalities regarding oil spill issues. 
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On land, the municipalities have the responsibility for (unofficial translation) 
(Sveriges Riksdag, 2003): 
 
“… rescue services that the State or Municipalities are responsible for after an 
accident or impending risk of an accident to prevent or limit damage to people, 
property or environment.” 
 
However, there is no explicit law in Sweden that requires a municipality to clean up 
an oil spill once the emergency phase has ended (MSBHaV, 2014). The closest 
requirement is the obligation of a municipality to keep the municipality tidy, but this 
law was intended for garbage and litter, not for oil spills (MSBHaV, 2014). The 
municipalities are independent and little to no coordination regarding oil spill clean-
up exists, excepting through Rescue Service Associations and cooperation with 
neighbouring municipalities, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
In Sweden, there is no and has never existed a National Contingency Plan, according 
to senior experts (NSO interviews, January 2015 and Lindén, O., Fejes, J., and 
Evans, S., separate telephone communications, October 2014). The closest 
documents that exists are strategic documents (Kulander et al., 2004; NSO, 2014b), 
guidelines (Kulander et al., 2010; Rylander et al., 2006), and the Emergency 
Response Plan of SCG. The SCG plan could be considered a national plan, as it 
covers the national jurisdiction at sea (NSO interviews, January 2015). Most likely, 
this plan has been interpreted internationally in IMO to be the Swedish National 
Contingency Plan (O’Hagan, C., email communication, 16 March 2015 and 
McKendrick, D., email communication 17 March 2015). However, the SCG 
emergency response plan should not be counted as a National Contingency Plan 
because: a) it only covers one organisation: SCG, and b) it does not apply to oil spills 
once they have come ashore, as that is the responsibility of the municipalities. In 
theory, the response capability of SCG is only as shallow as the draught of their 
response vessels, as they cannot go all the way onto shore. In practice, SCG 
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cooperates with the municipal rescue services on oil spill response in the shallow 
areas (MSBHaV, 2014). 
  
A key requirement from the OPRC Convention Article 6§1b is: 
 
“… which includes the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved, 
whether public or private …” 
 
Both the SCG Emergency Response Plan and the MSB document Oil Combating 
along the Swedish Coastline and in the Major Lakes up to 2010, lists the 
organisations involved in oil spill preparedness and outlines their responsibilities 
(Kulander et al., 2004). However, the MSB document explicitly states that: 
 
“The document Oil Combating along the Swedish Coastline and in the Major Lakes 
up to 2010 is intended as a strategy and policy document.” 
 
Thus, the MSB strategy document was never intended to be a National Contingency 
Plan, although the document includes the general planning content recommended in 
industry guidelines (IPIECA, 2007; ITOPF, 2011b). 
 
Since the OPRC Convention is a specific convention set by IMO, it is reasonable to 
assume that issues onshore were never considered during its development. However, 
considering the damage to the shore that Torrey Canyon and other accidents caused 
(Smith, 1968) and the IMO reference to the plan as a written document in its Manual 
on Oil Pollution Section II - Contingency planning (IMO, 1995), this assumption is 
invalid. A fair point is that many countries in Europe have a more centralised 
organisation for oil spills, with one authority taking responsibility for both sea and 
land, for example the German Central Command for Maritime Emergencies 
(Haveriekommando) and Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket) (ITOPF, 
2012a; Ly, 2012; VPS, 2014). 
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Results from the NSO interviews (January 2015) responding to the statement 
“Sweden needs a national oil spill contingency plan” show a difference of opinion, 
with three against and four in favour (see Figure 37). 
 
 
Figure 37: Expert opinion on the statement “Sweden needs a national oil spill contingency plan”. 
Informants argue that: 
 
• A National Contingency Plan might not be possible to have because of the 
wide variety of different organisation, funds, coastline, and resources that the 
Swedish municipalities have. 
• Such a plan could be used to plan and prioritise resources better regionally 
and nationally, clarify responsibilities, and disseminate knowledge. 
• It could be a standard or guide to measure the work on oil spill preparedness 
for municipalities, SCG, MSB, and other parties. 
• Regardless, better coordination between municipalities, counties, and 
agencies is needed. 
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The responses indicate why Sweden does not have a National Contingency Plan for 
oil spills. Logically, all of the interviewed agencies need to agree that a plan is 
needed, before such a plan will be written. All of the agencies are responsible for a 
part of such a plan. The current draft action plan (NSO, 2015) developed by NSO 
and tied to the revised Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness (NSO, 2014b) 
could not be interpreted as a National Contingency Plan, as it primarily outlines 
priority areas for the strategy to work on. The NSO interviews also reveal differing 
opinions concerning the exact content of a National Contingency Plan, which 
naturally impacted the responses on the necessity of having a plan or not. The OPRC 
Convention refers to IMO manuals on oil spill contingency planning and these 
guides are updated regularly (IMO, 1995; 2005; 2009; 2011). There are other guides 
from the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA, 2007) and the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF, 
2011b) that are also used internationally. However, none of these guides give a 
complete plan that can cover different countries and situations. Instead, they provide 
useful advice for content and reflection for countries to consider when developing 
their own plan. In the end, it is up to each country to decide what to include in their 
National Contingency Plan. 
6.4.3	 Funding	
The recent changes in budget shows a 13% drop in national funding for crisis 
preparedness, but a 25% increase in the general funding to the municipalities (see 
Table 14). However, this change does not address the allocation of funds to oil spill 
preparedness within the agencies and municipalities. Furthermore, the drop in funds 
for Crisis preparedness may partially have been reallocated to the newly created 
MSB, since the funds for the Crisis Preparedness Agency (CPA) (165 million SEK), 
the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) (669 million SEK), and the drop for 
the Crisis preparedness (106 million SEK) roughly adds up to the MSB budget for its 
first year (907 million SEK). The funding development between 2000 and 2015 in 
Figure 36 illustrate the trend of increased budget for environmental issues and 
marine issues overall, which has not transferred into oil spill preparedness. 
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There is a slight increase in funding for the major agencies and organisations 
involved in oil spill preparedness, except for Crisis preparedness, meaning that any 
change in the organisations’ activities regarding oil spill preparedness is due to 
changes in priorities within the respective organisations or their instructions from the 
government. This invalidates any arguments that oil spill preparedness has decreased 
because of a decrease in the governmental funding. 
 
Despite the budget being increased, two oil spill preparedness assets have been 
changed between 2010 and 2015. Firstly, the Oil Spill Advisory Service (OSAS) at 
Sweco has ceased to exist on a governmental contract (NSO interviews, January 
2015), as this contract was not renewed by SwAM at the end of 2014. However, the 
oil spill expertise remains in the organisation, and is hired as consultants for various 
smaller spills, such as ruptured oil tanks on trucks. Secondly, the Depots have been 
moved from five rescue services stations to five SCG coastal stations, elaborated in 
Chapter 8. 
6.4.4	 Implications	
No legal sanctions exist that can be used against a ratifying state that fails to comply 
with implementing any IMO Convention. There is no penalty for either failure to 
comply or for ineffectiveness to comply (Boisson, 1999). In comparison, not 
implementing an EU Directive within the prescribed time could potentially lead to 
fines (Bux, 2014). This would have an impact on the EU Member States if they have 
not implemented the MARPOL provisions laid out in EU Directive 2005/35/EC. 
However, the OPRC Convention is presently not included in any EU Directives. 
Sweden is not the only country that has ratified the OPRC Convention, without 
having a National Contingency Plan. For example, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Guyana, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, and Madagascar do not have any National Contingency 
Plans either (ITOPF, 2012a). 
 
The removal of the requirement to have a National Contingency Plan from the 
HELCOM Convention text after so many years seems like a strange formulation. In 
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order to solely satisfy the German requirements, the requirement could perhaps have 
been worded differently. 
 
The scores of the analysed variables for oil spill prevention in this chapter have been 
summarised in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Scores for the H2 variables. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient Score 
Number of 
conventions 
95% or more of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions ratified. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
11 relevant international 
conventions ratified. 
Less than 50% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions ratified. 
100% 
Conventions 
implemented 
95% or more of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions implemented. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
11 relevant international 
conventions implemented. 
Less than 50% of the 11 
relevant international 
conventions implemented. 
90.9% 
Number of 
agreements 
95% or more of the 4 
relevant international 
agreements signed. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
4 relevant international 
agreements signed. 
Less than 50% of the 4 
relevant international 
agreements signed. 
100% 
Agreements 
implemented 
95% or more of the relevant 
international agreements 
implemented. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
relevant international 
agreements implemented. 
Less than 50% of the 
relevant international 
agreements implemented. 
100% 
Preparedness 
funding 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
increased by more than 5% 
from 2010 to 2015. 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
stable and does not deviate 
more than +/- 5% from 2010 
to 2015. 
Funding for preparedness 
measures and agencies is 
decreased by more than 5% 
from 2010 to 2015. 
123.7% 
 
As shown by the analysis in Table 15, most of the variables were ranked Preferable. 
Even though Sweden does not fulfil the requirement to have a National Contingency 
Plan in OPRC Convention Article 6 §1b, all international conventions are ratified 
and implemented, all international agreements are signed and implemented, and 
sufficient budget for the relevant government agencies and municipalities to maintain 
oil spill preparedness is provided, and the hypothesis: 
 
 H2 – Political commitment is sufficient 
 
is accepted and the null hypothesis H20 is rejected. 
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6.4.5	 Limitations	
Since no budget is specifically earmarked for oil spill preparedness, only a crude 
estimate can be made for the budget, both nationally and for the agencies. However, 
this is still indicative of the political commitment. If no changes exists in the budget 
or instructions assigned by the government, any changes to oil spill preparedness 
would be due to priorities within the organisation. 
6.5	 Conclusion	
Sweden follows the political commitment for safety and environmental protection by 
having all international conventions related to oil spill preparedness ratified and 
taking an active part in implementing and enforcing international agreements. 
 
Sweden does not fulfil the OPRC Convention requirement to have a National 
Contingency Plan. However, IMO has no legal sanctions for States that do not 
comply with its Conventions. It is remarkable that a National Contingency Plan has 
not yet been developed in Sweden, especially when all of the other conventions have 
been implemented and the nation is active in all regional agreements. The 
Emergency Response Plan of the Swedish Coast Guard have been interpreted 
internationally to be the National Contingency Plan, but neither this nor the strategy 
document developed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency fulfils the criteria 
for National Contingency Plans as defined in the OPRC Convention. However, the 
response system in Sweden exists despite the lack of a documented National 
Contingency Plan, so a plan does not seem necessary in either practical or legal 
sense. Half of the interview informants did not acknowledge a need for a National 
Contingency Plan. However, developing a National Contingency Plan could be a 
good opportunity to address problems that are consistently identified in exercise and 
real spill evaluations. If done correctly developing a National Contingency Plan 
could be an opportunity to harmonise requirements for the oil spill organisations, 
clarify division of responsibilities, and regulate training and exercise requirements.  
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Chapter	7	-	Planning	
The third of the five results chapters focuses on the oil spill preparedness topic of 
planning and specifically the Swedish system for oil spill contingency planning. It 
examines planning measures for governmental agencies, County Administrative 
Boards (CABs), and the status of oil spill contingency planning in Sweden. 
7.1	 Introduction	
A key issue for controlling the impacts of an oil spill is preparedness to manage a 
response and to clean up the oil. This is ideally accomplished through planning and 
exercises to continuously improve the plan and proficiency of the managers and 
responders. A well prepared response may save time and money, and decrease the 
impact of an oil spill on the environment (IPIECA, 1994a; ITOPF, 2011b). Oil spill 
planning is defined in this dissertation as background knowledge and planning 
measures, such as risk assessments, contingency planning, and increasing awareness 
of oil spill impacts. The content of an oil spill contingency plan varies significantly 
due to differing policies and regulations (ITOPF, 2011b). It usually includes strategic 
policy (e.g. division of responsibilities, preferred response techniques, and training 
requirements), operational procedures (e.g. notification routes, waste management 
routines, and logistics), and an information directory (e.g. contact information, 
documentation support, and legislation). 
 
There is a tendency to equate contingency planning with a written plan, and a belief 
that this plan is evidence of preparedness (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Planning is in fact 
a continuous process, and the contingency plan represents a specific point in time. 
Preparedness is a dynamic and on-going process of which a written plan is an 
important part, but not a condition for, emergency preparedness. However, the 
process of developing a contingency plan provides opportunities to clarify 
responsibilities, response strategies, operational procedures, and identify problems. 
Most importantly, there is a need to exercise the plan, to see how it works and how it 
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can be improved. In many cases, the importance of contingency planning is not 
appreciated until an accident actually happens (Purnell & Zhang, 2014). Several 
plans have been developed or first updated in the wake of an accident, not least after 
Fu Shan Hai in Sweden 2003. 
 
Acknowledging that an effective response to an oil spill depends on the level of 
preparedness of the organisations and individuals involved, the oil spill industry 
(IPIECA, 2007; IPIECAOGP, 2015; ITOPF, 2011b; Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, 
Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008b) and various governments have 
published numerous guides on contingency planning (ACS, 2012; Kulander et al., 
2010; Nuka Research and Planning Group LLCPearson Consulting LLC, 2010; 
Sjöfartsverket, 2005). 
 
Around the Baltic Sea, much oil spill contingency planning has been done by 
HELCOM (HELCOM, 2013a; 2013b) and in the last years primarily through EU 
projects, for example BRISK, EnSaCo, and Baltic Master II. These projects have 
developed guides (Emmelin & Haglund, 2012; MSB, 2011; Pålsson, 2011; Pålsson 
& Nilsson, 2011), risk assessments (BRISK, 2011; Brunila & Storgård, 2012; COWI, 
2012c; J. Johansson & Molitor, 2011; MSB, 2013b; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 
2012; Staskiewicz, 2011; Viertola, 2013), and sensitivity mapping (COWI, 2012a; 
Depellegrin et al., 2010; Emmelin & Haglund, 2012; Forsman, 2012a; Lundius, 
2011; Staskiewicz, 2011) to help the contingency planning process in the project 
partner countries. In addition, the plans have been extensively tested during exercises 
(Forsman, 2012b; Ljungkvist, 2011; MSB, 2012). Much of the work within these 
projects has taken place in Sweden. 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, Sweden does not have a National Contingency Plan for 
oil spill preparedness. At sea, the Swedish Coast Guard (SCG) follows its 
Emergency Response Plan. On land, emergency preparedness is the responsibility of 
each individual municipality (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003). The Swedish Civil 
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Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible for national coordination of oil spill 
preparedness (Regeringen, 2008b). Regional oversight is the responsibility of the 
County Administrative Boards (CABs) (Regeringen, 2007e), meaning coordination 
and audit. However, this does not give any agency the authority to require a 
municipality to have an oil spill contingency plan. Previous evaluations (MSBHaV, 
2014; Riksrevisionen, 2006) point out that there is no requirement for the coastal 
municipalities to have an oil spill contingency plan. However, §8 of the Civil 
Protection Act (2003:778) (Sveriges Riksdag, 2003) requires municipalities to have 
an action programme for civil protection. This act requires the municipalities to 
specify the aim of the programme and include a risk assessment of possible 
emergency situations that can occur in the municipality. This programme must also 
include an assessment of the municipal capability, including resources, to handle 
such situations and any plans to acquire such capability. The capability is required to 
be specified both for times of peace and during times of heightened alert. The oil 
spill response strategy and guide produced by MSB in 2004 encourages the 
municipalities to develop an oil spill contingency plan (Kulander et al., 2004). This 
document has been the guiding document for oil spill preparedness in Sweden, until 
the publication of a new strategy in 2014 (NSO, 2014b). However, MSB does not 
have the authority to order the municipalities to develop an oil spill contingency 
plan. This can only be recommended and encouraged, limiting the management 
options. 
 
In order to have sufficient background knowledge to develop a good oil spill 
contingency plan for an area, there is a need to carry out risk assessments for oil 
spills, and obtain information about environmental, economic, and cultural 
sensitivities that could be impacted in case of an oil spill. Information regarding 
these sensitivities is often collected in a database with a map interface (Forsman, 
2012a; IPIECA et al., 2012; ITOPF, 2011b). It is important to know the scale, 
content, and age of the data, in order to make correct assumptions regarding its 
reliability. The primary information needed during an oil spill response is to know 
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the coastline characteristics and its environmental sensitivity, followed by an oil spill 
trajectory forecast. This is vital information to be able to prioritise the response 
(Depellegrin et al., 2010; Forsman, 2012a; Staskiewicz, 2011). 
 
The national system of environmental sensitivity mapping in Sweden is called the 
Digital Environmental Atlas (Liljeberg & Martinsson, 2008). This atlas can be 
regarded as a tool to help municipalities and CABs prioritise sensitive coastal areas 
during contingency planning and during oil spill response (Forsman, 2012a; 
Liljeberg & Martinsson, 2008; Lundius, 2011). The majority of the Swedish 
municipalities use this Digital Environmental Atlas, although some still use their 
own system (Pålsson et al., 2011; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). The Swedish oil spill 
trajectory forecast model is called SeaTrack Web and available by request from the 
Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI) (U. Johansson & Olsson, 
2013). 
7.2	 Methods	
Chapter 7 has analysed the state of contingency planning in Sweden in order to 
evaluate if existing measures are sufficient. The number of contingency plans among 
the municipalities has been analysed along with resources and sharing of information 
and best practices through external projects. The content of these contingency plans 
has not been evaluated, as the process of developing a plan is more important than 
the document itself. 
7.2.1	 Study	design	
The issues described above are formulated as Hypothesis 3, H3: 
 
 H3 – Contingency planning measures are sufficient 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H30 – Contingency planning measures are insufficient 
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Hypothesis 3 was chosen to analyse measures affecting oil spill contingency 
planning. The units of analysis have been chosen based on reasoning and practicality 
after consulting literature and expert opinions. 
 
The background of oil spill contingency planning is determined by risk assessments 
for oil spills and knowledge about the environmental sensitivity to oil. The number 
of oil spill contingency plans determines the state of planning in Sweden. The 
organisations themselves need to prioritise oil spill contingency planning, determined 
by the allocated staff resources and budget. Outreach in order to learn and share 
information is determined by participation in external oil spill projects. The 
relationship between the units of analysis and their corresponding variables can be 
seen in Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38: Hypothesis 3 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
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For Sweden to have sufficient oil spill contingency planning measures, the 
municipalities and CABs should have an updated oil spill contingency plan, based on 
a risk assessment and taking into account sensitive areas, and continuously exercise 
and revise the plan. However, it could also be argued that measures are sufficient if a 
positive trend can be shown and an increasing number of organisations are 
developing and revising their contingency plans.  
 
These criteria have been quantified in Table 16, following the reasoning for ranking 
the variables in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 16: Evaluation criteria for H3. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient 
Municipal risk 
assessments 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
CAB risk 
assessments 
95% or more of the CABs have 
a risk assessment. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have a risk assessment. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have a risk assessment. 
Sensitivity maps 95% or more of the 
municipalities use a sensitivity 
map. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities use a sensitivity 
map. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities use a sensitivity 
map. 
Municipal 
contingency plans 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
Municipal plan 
revision 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised within 
the last 5 years. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised within 
the last 5 years. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised within 
the last 5 years. 
CAB plan revision 95% or more of the CABs have 
a contingency plan revised 
within the last 5 years. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have a contingency plan 
revised within the last 5 years. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have a contingency plan 
revised within the last 5 years. 
Municipal staff 
resources 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have increased, 
average score of 1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to remain the same, 
average score from 0.0 up to 
1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have decreased, 
average score below 0.0. 
CAB staff resources Respondents consider staff 
resources to have increased, 
average score of 1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to remain the same, 
average score from 0.0 up to 
1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have decreased, 
average score below 0.0. 
Municipal budget Respondents consider budget 
to have increased, average 
score of 1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider budget 
to remain the same, average 
score from 0.0 up to 1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have decreased, 
average score below 0.0. 
CAB budget Respondents consider budget 
to have increased, average 
score of 1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider budget 
to remain the same, average 
score from 0.0 up to 1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have decreased, 
average score below 0.0. 
Municipality 
external projects 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have been 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have been 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have been 
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partners in one or more 
external project. 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
partners in one or more external 
projects. 
CAB external 
projects 
95% or more of the CABs have 
been partners in one or more 
external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have been partners in 
one or more external project. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have been partners in one or 
more external projects. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is wholly present and/or functioning 
(Preferable), partially present and/or functioning (Sufficient), or not present and/or 
functioning at all (Insufficient). All of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate 
that they at least reach the rank of Sufficient for H3 to be accepted, meaning that the 
oil spill planning measures are sufficient, but should be further developed. If all 
variables are ranked Preferable, oil spill planning measures are at the best practice 
level. If any of the variables are ranked Insufficient, important oil spill planning 
measures are missing, negatively impacting Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
7.2.2	 Sources	
Primary information and comments have been collected from the questionnaire (see 
Appendix A - Questionnaire) sent out to all 126 coastal municipalities and 18 coastal 
CABs in Sweden), and the interviews (see Appendix B - Interview) with the 
members of the National Cooperation Group for Oil Combating (NSO), described in 
Chapter 4. Additional material examined are scientific papers gathered through the 
library at the World Maritime University (WMU), open access journals online, and 
project reports have been gathered from the project pages of various oil spill projects. 
7.2.3	 Analysis	
The statistical analysis and graphs have been performed using the GraphPad Prism 
statistical software. Three statistical methods described in Chapter 4 have been used: 
ANOVA, Berger´s test, and Χ2. 
 
There is an ongoing debate on what statistical methods are most appropriate to use 
for Likert items (McDonald, 2014). The data in this study are treated as a 
measurement variable to use the more powerful parametric tests for the analyses. The 
Likert items used in the questionnaire were consolidated from a five-level Likert 
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scale into a three-level (see Appendix G - Planning Results). This was done in order 
to decrease the degrees of freedom, to enable the use of a stronger statistical analysis. 
ANOVA assumes a normal distribution and an equal variance between the groups, 
which may not be the case in these data. However, this method is not very sensitive 
to moderate deviations from the normal distribution (McDonald, 2014). Another 
option would be the unpaired non-parametric Mann-Whitney test, which does not 
assume a normal distribution or a similar variance (GraphPad Software, 2015; 
McDonald, 2014). Unfortunately, the Mann-Whitney test cannot calculate a p value 
lower than .05 for sample sizes of seven or less (GraphPad Software, 2015), as in this 
case. Thus, even though the Mann-Whitney test is the most accurate, this test cannot 
be used on the dataset. 
7.3	 Results	
Descriptive statistics and correlation testing have been used on the responses from 
the questionnaire. Two groups have been compared: the municipalities and CABs. 
7.3.1	 Risk	assessments	
Concerning risk assessment, 16 of the 60 responding coastal municipality 
representatives (26.7%) responded that they have a risk assessment specifically for 
oil spills, 41 responded that they do not have a risk assessment (68.3%) and 3 gave 
no comment (5.0%). All except two of the risk assessments have been carried out 
within the last five years. 
 
For the CABs, 4 of the 12 respondents (33.3%) acknowledged that they have a risk 
assessment and 8 responded that they did not (66.3%). 
7.3.2	 Sensitivity	mapping	
Data regarding the use of sensitivity index and mapping tools were collected from 
older reports and are showed in Figure 39 (Pålsson et al., 2011; Pålsson & 
Wåhlander, 2013). 
 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
188 
 
Figure 39: Use of sensitivity index systems in the Swedish municipalities. 
Combining data from these reports showed that 58 of the 102 responding 
municipalities (56.9%) reported that they used the Swedish Digital Environmental 
Atlas, 21 used their own sensitivity mapping system (20.6%), 23 did not use any 
system at all (22.5%). Another 24 municipalities did not respond. 
 
There is a significant difference between 2011 and 2013 (excluding the “No reply” 
option, since it contains no information), Χ2 (2, N = 126) = 9.37, p = .0014. 
7.3.3	 Contingency	planning	
Extrapolating the municipality representatives to the 126 coastal municipalities they 
represent, 71 municipalities responded that they have an oil spill contingency plan 
(56%), 25 that they did not have a plan (20%) and 30 did not answer the 2015 
questionnaire (24%). Data from 2011 (Pålsson et al., 2011) and 2013 (Pålsson & 
Wåhlander, 2013) interpreted oil spill contingency plans that were being developed 
as existing. Comparing with the 2013 and 2015 questionnaire data, this has been 
proved incorrect in a number of cases. Consequently, the raw data from the earlier 
reports (Pålsson et al., 2011; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013) have been reinterpreted 
and a combined dataset has been produced, showing the last available data from any 
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of the questionnaires. This combined data reveals that the total number of Swedish 
coastal municipalities that have an oil spill contingency plan is 95 (79.2% of the 
responding municipalities) as of March 2015 and the number of contingency plans 
having been written or revised within 5 years is 83 (69.2%) (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Compiled and combined municipal data (Pålsson et al., 2011; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). 
Question Answer 2011 2013 2015 Combined 
When was the 
plan revised? 
0-5 years ago 32 46 65 83 
>5 years ago 16 16 6 12 
No plan 46 16 25 25 
No reply 32 48 30 6 
 Total 126 126 126 126 
 
The data show that the municipalities that wrote or revised their plans within the last 
five years doubled between 2011 and 2015, and the number of municipalities without 
a plan decreased (see Figure 40). 
 
 
Figure 40: Time since last revision of the municipal oil spill contingency plans. 
There is a significant difference between the years (excluding the “No reply” option, 
since it contains no information), Χ2 (4, N = 126) = 30.25, p < .0001. 
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Of the 12 responding CABs, 6 responded that they have an oil spill contingency plan 
written or revised within the last 5 years (50%). 
7.3.4	 Organisational	resources	
The questionnaire responses for change in workload and staff during the last five 
years for the 50 responding coastal municipalities and the 10 responding CABs were 
compiled (see Table 18). 
 
Table 18: Respondent organisational changes between 2010 and 2015. 
 Municipalities CABs 
Budget Staff Budget Staff 
Greatly decreased 1 1 0 0 
Slightly decreased 1 2 0 1 
Remains the same 38 39 7 7 
Slightly increased 9 7 2 2 
Greatly increased 1 1 1 0 
Total 50 50 10 10 
Average 0,16 0,10 0,40 0,10 
 
The agreement scale ranges from Greatly decreased (-2), Slightly decreased (-1), 
Remains the same (0), Slightly increased (+1), and Greatly increased (+2).  
 
No significant difference was observed when comparing the consolidated responses 
from organisations with and without a plan concerning budget change in 
municipalities (see Figure 41 A), ANOVA (2, N = 50) = 7.24, p = .1213, budget 
change in CABs (see Figure 41 B), ANOVA (2, N = 10) = 2.85, p = .2600, and 
change in staff resources in municipalities (see Figure 41 C), ANOVA (2, N = 50) = 
7.00, p = .1250, except for change in staff resources for CABs (see Figure 41 D), 
ANOVA (2, N = 10) = 31.00, p = .0313. There is a significant difference between the 
CABs with and without a plan when examining the reported changes in staff 
resources. 
 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
191 
 
Figure 41: Changes in the organisational budgets and staff resources among municipalities and County 
Administrative Boards (CABs) between 2010 and 2015. 
7.3.5	 External	projects	
Out of the 50 responding coastal municipalities, 13 responded that they had been part 
of an external oil spill project (26%). Out of the 10 responding CABs, 4 responded 
that they had been part of a project (40%). 
 
Comparing the responding coastal municipalities (see Figure 42 A) and responding 
CABs (see Figure 42 C), that developed or revised a plan between 2010 and 2015 
with participation in external oil spill projects during the same time, no significant 
difference in proportions of the variables was found, Berger’s test (N = 50), p = 
.2282 for A and (N = 10) p = .5303 for C. Combining data on the 39 of the 
municipalities listed as partners in EU oil spill projects (ARCHOIL, Baltic Master II, 
and EnSaCo), no significant difference was found (see Figure 42 B), Berger’s test (N 
= 120), p = .0814. 
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Figure 42: Project participation and contingency planning among municipalities and County 
Administrative Boards (CABs) between 2010 and 2015. 
7.4	 Discussion	
The principal organisation impacted by an oil spill that reaches the shore will be the 
local municipality. Thus, they will have the most to gain from having an oil spill 
contingency plan. The CABs are responsible for county coordination and obliged to 
have a risk assessment (Regeringen, 2007e), which should make them an integral 
part of the municipalities’ planning. This chapter has examined several indicators for 
planning measures in Sweden among municipalities and CABs. 
7.4.1	 Risk	assessments	
The risk assessments were not widely used as over two thirds of the responding 
municipalities did not have a risk assessment for oil spills. It was particularly 
surprising that not more of CABs have risk assessments. Only 4 of 18 CABs 
confirmed that they have a risk assessment for oil spills. In the instructions to the 
CABs from the Government (Regeringen, 2007e), §54:4 explicitly requires CABs to 
maintain regional risk- and vulnerability analysis for use by themselves and other 
stakeholders’ emergency preparedness. All CABs have a risk- and vulnerability 
analysis, but the content varies between the counties. The intent of the risk- and 
vulnerability analysis requirement is that there is no need for individual 
municipalities in the area to develop their own risk assessments. The municipalities 
should be able to rely on the regional risk- and vulnerability analysis developed by 
the CABs. Many of the municipalities are small or do not have a long coast line, 
which makes pooling resources to produce regional risk- and vulnerability analyses 
pragmatic. The low number of risk analyses may reflect a reliance on national oil 
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spill risk assessments (MSB, 2013b; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 2012), or 
assessments funded through projects such as Baltic Master II (J. Johansson & 
Molitor, 2011) and BRISK (BRISK, 2011; COWI, 2012c). 
7.4.2	 Sensitivity	mapping	
The Digital Environmental Atlas was commissioned from the consultancy IVL 
Swedish Environmental Research Institute (IVL) working with the CAB of Västra 
Götaland by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from 2003 to 2007 
(Forsman, 2012a). The finished web-based application has been available for free 
online since 2008. The Digital Environmental Atlas was then delivered from EPA to 
the CABs, who debated for several years which of them would be responsible. In 
2010, a decision was made that it would be located at the CAB of Västra Götaland in 
Gothenburg. A management group was created in 2011, and goals and tasks were 
decided and distributed (Georgieva Lagell, A., email communication, 7 July 2013). 
The system was planned to transfer to a newer platform, which would increase the 
user friendliness and therefore the practical use. Unfortunately, the work stalled 
again because of a lack of funds and interest (Georgieva Lagell, A., telephone 
communication, October 2013). The system has now been transferred, but is in need 
of an update, as some transcription errors have occurred with the data. 
 
The NSO interviews (January 2015) regarding a national coastal sensitivity map 
show a strong unanimous support for such a tool and more specifically the Digital 
Environmental Atlas. All seven respondents strongly agreed with the statement 
“Sweden needs a coastal environmental sensitivity map”. The respondents argued 
that the Digital Environmental Atlas is the only tool to make environmental 
assessments and classify sensitive areas. All respondents agree that there is a need to 
assess the habitats of the coastline, in order to make the correct priorities to protect 
sensitive areas during an oil spill. Additionally, such information could be used in 
risk assessment and preparedness, for example to designate suitable places of refuge, 
or suitable areas for anchoring and lightering of distressed ships. One respondent was 
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more specific, explaining that a sensitivity map tool is necessary, but its usefulness is 
tied to its user friendliness. 
 
Other tools besides the Digital Environmental Atlas exists, shown by the Baltic 
Master II (Pålsson et al., 2012) and the Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil Spill Forum 
questionnaires (Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). For example, CABs have other GIS 
tools they use for other purposes. Development of the user interface and move from 
an obsolete platform to a modern GIS platform has been discussed for years (A. 
Georgieva Lagell, telephone communication, October 2013), and has recently come 
to pass. However, optimisation and evaluation is needed, as there are still data 
translation errors (Länsstyrelsen Västra Götaland, 2007). 
 
Environmental priorities need to be agreed between the municipalities and by the 
CABs in advance, before the Digital Environmental Atlas will be a useful decision 
tool. However, some municipalities are not aware of the uses of the Digital 
Environmental Atlas or even of its existence. 
 
Additionally, update of the basic data in the Digital Environmental Atlas is needed. 
Most of the existing data is digitised information from a 1969 survey (Liljeberg & 
Martinsson, 2008). The EU projects, specifically ARCHOIL (NSO interviews, 
January 2015), Baltic Master II (Lundius, 2011) and, EnSaCo (Forsman, 2012a) have 
updated this data in many of their project partners’ municipalities. 
 
The need for further development as well as funding is acknowledged by the 
government in the draft NSO Action plan, but no concrete plans for how to do this is 
mentioned (NSO, 2015). No agency is still willing to accept responsibility and costs 
for the Atlas. This reflects the continued reluctance of any agency to take 
responsibility for a tool that all agree is valuable. 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
195 
7.4.3	 Contingency	planning	
Sweden does not have a National Contingency Plan for oil spills and planning 
requirements are not bound in Swedish law (MSBHaV, 2014), as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. However, the coordinating agency, MSB, has for several years 
encouraged the municipalities to develop their contingency plan through guides 
(Forsman, 1997) and projects (for example the EU projects ARCHOIL, Baltic 
Master, and EnSaCo). It is obvious from the data that oil spill contingency planning 
measures have not been sufficient, as all municipalities do not have a plan. The ideal 
situation would be if all municipalities have a plan and were revising and exercising 
it frequently. Despite few but common smaller oil spills along the coast, oil spill 
contingency planning has historically had a low priority among the municipalities, 
indicated in the comments to the questionnaire. However, this situation is improving 
with a current historic peak of the number of municipalities with oil spill 
contingency plans. Looking at the data, 79.2% (corresponding to 95 of the 
responding 120 municipalities) have recently updated plans (see Table 17). The trend 
in development of municipal oil spill contingency plans between 2011 and 2015 is 
encouraging, with a doubling of the number of municipalities that have developed or 
revised their plan during the last five years (see Figure 40). However, these data do 
not reveal how many municipalities that have actually developed a new plan or 
revised an old one. In general, the questionnaire comments show that a greater 
proportion of municipalities developed their plans in 2011 compared to 2013 and 
2015. However, the date a plan is developed is hard to establish. Many municipalities 
that formally had plans had not been using them for several years (or even decades) 
and admitted that revising the old plan in practice meant to replace it. Would these be 
considered to update an old plan or develop a new plan? The responses could not 
reflect this difference adequately. This issue is reflected in a few conflicting 
responses from the same municipality, where one respondent did not know that an 
old plan existed and another did. The data also reflect an increasing number of 
revisions of the plans, which helps to keep the plan and oil spill awareness up to date 
and not be forgotten. 
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CABs do not have any requirements to have an oil spill contingency plan. They are 
instructed by the government to have a regional overview and coordination, and 
support organisations responsible for emergency preparedness in the county 
concerning planning, risk assessments, training, and exercises (Regeringen, 2007e). 
However, at least 6 out of the 18 CABs the questionnaire was distributed to have 
developed such a plan anyway for their own organisation. These plans are in most 
cases developed in close collaboration with the county municipalities in regions 
where there is a close collaboration between the municipalities and the CABs, for 
example Halland on the Swedish west coast (Länsstyrelsen Hallands Län, 2011) and 
Blekinge on the southeast coast (Länsstyrelsen Blekinge Län, 2011). However, the 
draft NSO action plan (NSO, 2015) shifts the responsibility for oil spill planning 
from the municipalities to the CABs, in line with recommendations made already in 
the 1970s (Norrby et al., 1979). 
 
Responses from the expert interviews (January 2015), to the statement “The existing 
system for contingency planning in Sweden is sufficient for national preparedness”, 
show a divided opinion, with three against and four in favour (see Figure 43). 
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Figure 43: Expert opinion on the statement “The existing system for contingency planning in Sweden is 
sufficient for national preparedness”. 
Informants argue that: 
 
• Oil spills are such a rare event and the municipalities are ill prepared to 
handle a spill. 
• Many municipalities do not have updated plans or exercise frequently 
enough. 
• The system in itself is sufficient, because the municipalities and CABs have 
the local knowledge and resources. 
• What is lacking is the expert knowledge on oil, which is supplied by the 
national authorities. 
• There is no requirement in the Swedish law to have an oil spill contingency 
plan or to clean up after an oil spill. 
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• One single national authority is responsible for oil spills at sea, which is 
good, but on land the issue becomes fragmented and confusing with multiple 
agencies and authorities sharing the responsibility. 
• Multiple responsibility gaps exist, for example financial and ownership issues 
for oil spills from leaking wrecks. 
• The main problem on land is the lack of knowledge about roles and 
responsibilities among the involved organisations, which is not a problem 
with the system itself. 
 
The comments of the informants mirror the general opinions from the questionnaire 
and conclusions from the EU projects (MSB, 2012; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). 
The complex system with multiple agencies on land responsible for different aspects 
of an oil spill logically leads to confusion about roles and responsibilities as was 
discussed in Chapter 5. Any system with a high complexity will have a lower 
understanding of the whole system by the individual users. 
 
The fact that a municipality has an oil spill contingency plan does not necessarily 
mean that they are well prepared for an oil spill (Perry & Lindell, 2003; Tierney, 
1993). This is exemplified by the Golden Trader oil spill that impacted the island of 
Tjörn in 2011. The Tjörn municipality had an oil spill contingency plan, revised in 
2005 (Pålsson et al., 2011), that had never been used. Consequently, the municipality 
and local rescue service had to start from scratch during the initial response and 
subsequent clean-up (MSBHaV, 2014), even though the national Oil Spill Depots, 
and both international and national experts assisted them. An interesting note is that 
the Baltic Master II questionnaire was distributed during 2011 (Pålsson et al., 2011) 
and a response by the head of the rescue service on Tjörn, that would lead the oil 
spill response two months later, stated that Tjörn had a plan, but nobody had ever 
used it and it was likely not of any practical use. So the municipality was aware of 
the plan and that it was insufficient because it had never been used during an 
exercise. 
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7.4.4	 Organisational	resources	
The results of the impact of the organisational resources are surprising. There are no 
significant differences between the changes and having a plan or not in any of the 
examined variables. The only significance is the CAB staff resources, but this change 
may be impacted by the weaker power of the ANOVA test for data with a low 
number of participating CABs (see Figure 41 D). The expected pattern was to see the 
organisations with a plan to have more budget and staff resources in order to develop 
the plan. In contrast, most municipalities and CABs reported no change in either of 
these parameters (see Figure 41 A to D), regardless of whether they had a plan or 
not. This suggests that a change in budget or staff might not lead to more plans being 
developed or revised and suggests the theory that this process is driven by other 
factors. 
 
There is a significant difference in CAB staff resources in Figure 41 D between the 
“Decreased”, “No change” and “Increased” categories, which does not give much 
further information. No significant difference was found between those with a plan 
and those without. It is possible that a gradual change during this time has not been 
perceived as an overall change by the employees, thus leading to an overestimation 
of the “No change” category. The data are difficult to interpret because of the low 
number (10 out of 18) of CABs that responded to these questions. Although this is 
taken into account by the statistical analysis, the small number of datapoints makes 
the analysis weaker. 
7.4.5	 External	projects	
Since 2003, several EU projects have worked to increase the preparedness level 
(BRISK, 2011; Ljungkvist, 2011; Pålsson & Nilsson, 2011), exercise the 
contingency plans (MSB, 2012), and update Digital Environmental Atlas data in 
Sweden (Lundius, 2011) and the Baltic Sea Region (Forsman, 2012a). As many of 
these EU oil spill preparedness projects were finalised in 2013, few new oil spill 
projects have started up in the Baltic Sea Region until 2015. Despite waning interest 
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in oil spill preparedness, the processes initiated during these EU projects have made 
several municipalities develop their own oil spill contingency plans and use them in 
exercises during the last five years. The municipalities who answered the 2011 and 
2013 questionnaires have largely been involved in the aforementioned EU projects 
(Pålsson et al., 2011; Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013). Thus, the projects have 
concretely helped some of the Swedish municipalities involved in external projects 
to improve their oil spill preparedness. 
 
Surprisingly, no significant positive impact of participating in external oil spill 
preparedness project is revealed in the data, when comparing plan and project (see 
Figure 42). There are more than twice as many municipalities that had not been part 
of an external project that had a plan, than municipalities that had been part of a 
project. However, the number of municipalities that have been part of an external 
project, but did not have a plan was low. This indication is true for both data 
exclusively from the questionnaire and from municipalities that were partners in the 
EU projects. It is thus concluded that being part of a project is not a requirement for 
developing an oil spill contingency plan. Of course, there are municipalities that have 
been part of an oil spill project and through the project have received additional 
funds, for example Karlskrona, Karlshamn, Ronneby, and Sölvesborg for the Baltic 
Master II project (Länsstyrelsen Blekinge Län, 2011). The funds covered the costs of 
additional employees or allocation of staff tasked with developing an oil spill 
contingency plan, and exercising it by the end of the project. These municipalities 
have obviously gained from being part of the external projects. A more detailed 
analysis is needed on the municipal involvement in recent projects and what they 
gained, in order to make a better analysis of the full impact of these projects. As 
before, CAB data for participation in external projects is difficult to analyse because 
of the low number of responses, but no significance was revealed (see Figure 42). 
7.4.6	 Implications	
It is evident that the risk awareness among both municipalities and CABs is lower 
than expected. However, a good number of municipalities currently have a 
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contingency plan in place. An analysis of the quality of the oil spill contingency 
plans has not been done, as literature and experience suggests that the planning 
process itself is more important (ITOPF, 2011b; Pålsson & Nilsson, 2011; Perry & 
Lindell, 2003; Purnell & Zhang, 2014). Currently, there is no national quality 
assurance in place for these plans and no regulations regarding content. The quality 
of the plans can thus vary and the plans are not harmonised nationally. However, 
existing plans belonging to other municipalities have generally been reviewed during 
preparation of the municipal contingency plans (Pålsson, 2011). 
 
The scores of the analysed variables for oil spill planning in this chapter have been 
summarised in Table 19. 
 
Table 19: Scores for the H3 variables. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient Score 
Municipal risk 
assessments 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a risk 
assessment. 
26.7% 
CAB risk 
assessments 
95% or more of the CABs 
have a risk assessment. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have a risk 
assessment. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have a risk assessment. 
33.3% 
Sensitivity maps 95% or more of the 
municipalities use a 
sensitivity map. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities use a 
sensitivity map. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities use a 
sensitivity map. 
77.5% 
Municipal 
contingency plans 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan. 
79.2% 
Municipal plan 
revision 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised 
within the last 5 years. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised 
within the last 5 years 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have a 
contingency plan revised 
within the last 5 years 
69.2% 
CAB plan revision 95% or more of the CABs 
have a contingency plan 
revised within the last 5 
years. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have a contingency 
plan revised within the last 5 
years 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have a contingency plan 
revised within the last 5 
years 
50.0% 
Municipal staff 
resources 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
increased, average score of 
1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to remain the 
same, average score from 
0.0 up to 1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
decreased, average score 
below 0.0. 
0.10 
CAB staff 
resources 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
increased, average score of 
1.0 or above. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to remain the 
same, average score from 
0.0 up to 1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
decreased, average score 
below 0.0. 
0.10 
Municipal budget Respondents consider 
budget to have increased, 
average score of 1.0 or 
Respondents consider 
budget to remain the same, 
average score from 0.0 up to 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
decreased, average score 
0.16 
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above. 1.0. below 0.0. 
CAB budget Respondents consider 
budget to have increased, 
average score of 1.0 or 
above. 
Respondents consider 
budget to remain the same, 
average score from 0.0 up to 
1.0. 
Respondents consider staff 
resources to have 
decreased, average score 
below 0.0. 
0.40 
Municipality 
external projects 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external projects. 
26.0% 
CAB external 
projects 
95% or more of the CABs 
have been partners in one or 
more external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have been partners in 
one or more external project. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have been partners in one or 
more external projects. 
60.0% 
 
As shown by analysis of the variables in Table 19 and the occurrence of Insufficient 
ranking, indicating that only a few of the municipalities and CABs have risk 
assessments, not all have updated oil spill contingency plans or use environmental 
sensitivity maps, the organisational resources are sufficient, and that few 
municipalities have been partners in external projects, the hypothesis: 
 
 H3 – Contingency planning measures are sufficient 
 
is rejected and the null hypothesis H30 is accepted. This situation is interesting, since 
the recommendation to develop oil spill contingency plans was emphasised by the 
authorities already in 2004 (Kulander et al., 2004). However, as shown by the data 
(see Figure 40), there has been much development in Swedish municipal oil spill 
contingency planning between 2010 and 2015. If this development trend continues, 
all Swedish municipalities may have an oil spill contingency plan within a few years. 
7.4.7	 Limitations	
The questionnaire responses are supported by the literature and the interviews. The 
limitations of the study primarily concern the statistical analyses. The low power of 
the examined statistical tests has made the analysis of the changes in organisation 
relating to budget and staff resources difficult to interpret. 
 
Likert items can be treated as a nominal variable, as a measurement variable, or as an 
ordinal variable (McDonald, 2014). If treated as a nominal variable, the data would 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
203 
be summarised by the proportion of people giving each answer and analysed with a 
X2 test. As the data would turn ranked data (from least agreement to most) into 
separate groups without any relative position, important information would be lost 
(McDonald, 2014). If treated as a measurement variable, the data can be summarised 
by a mean and standard deviation and analysed with established parametric tests, for 
example ANOVA, as used in this dissertation. A valid argument against this 
treatment is that Likert items cannot be considered to have a normal distribution. 
This is because it is usually constricted by the amount of response options and the 
answers are just crude divisions of an opinion, meaning that the scale differences 
may not be entirely correct. However, ANOVA is not very sensitive to deviations 
from a normal deviation and has been shown to work even with small numbers of 
values (McDonald, 2014). The most correct way is to treat the data as an ordinal 
variable. This assumes that the Likert items have an inherent ranking among them, 
but does not assign specific values to them (McDonald, 2014). The statistical tests 
for ordinal variables are called nonparametric tests and do not make assumptions of a 
normal distribution of the data (GraphPad Software, 2015; McDonald, 2014). This 
makes them very useful, but less powerful than parametric tests. Measurement 
variables that do not have a normal distribution are often converted to ordinal 
variables and analysed using a nonparametric test. Unfortunately, the Mann-Whitney 
test cannot calculate a p value lower than .05 for sample sizes of seven or less, as in 
this case, meaning that this test was completely powerless to detect any differences 
in the data (GraphPad Software, 2015). 
 
A possible error on the project participation data would be if the respondents 
misinterpreted the meaning of an external oil spill project, simply forgot that the 
municipality had been part of such a project, or did not know about the municipal 
participation in a project. 
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7.5	 Conclusion	
Sweden has historically been spared any larger oil spills, likely affecting the 
preparedness community to not focus on unlikely oil spills. The focus has instead 
been on more likely events, such as fires and car accidents. The awareness among 
organisations in areas that have a higher risk for oil spills, such as cities with large 
ports or heavy shipping traffic off of its coasts is higher. These municipalities are 
generally better prepared, as a greater proportion of them have oil spill contingency 
plans. The questionnaire responses show that development and revision of oil spill 
contingency plans are not uniform among municipalities or County Administrative 
Boards. 
 
Oil spill contingency planning on land is more complex than at sea. Since Sweden 
does not have a National Contingency Plan for oil spills, the planning responsibility 
lies on each individual municipality, but is not required by law. The degrees to which 
the municipalities have developed and revised their oil spill contingency plans differ, 
with 79% of the municipalities having a plan. In addition, many municipalities or 
County Administrative Boards do not have risk assessments or use environmental 
sensitivity maps for planning. However, there is a clear increase in the number of 
municipalities developing plans during the last five years. If this trend continues, all 
municipalities may soon have an oil spill contingency plan. However, in the draft 
action plan of the Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness, the responsibility for 
oil spill contingency planning is firmly lifted to the regional level. This means that it 
will now be the County Administrative Boards who are responsible for regional 
contingency plans and that these are linked to the municipal plans. 
 
But having a plan is not enough. The plan itself is just a document. The foundation 
work with consulting stakeholders, finding information, and prioritising sensitive 
areas is crucial when developing the plan, as it raises the awareness among the 
involved organisations more than just giving them a copy of the finished planning 
document. All stakeholders must be aware that the plan exists, it must contain the 
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relevant information to be usable, and it must be frequently updated to remain a 
usable and living document. 
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Chapter	8	-	Response	
The fourth of the five results chapters focuses on the oil spill preparedness topic of 
response and specifically the Swedish training and exercise system. It examines 
measures for training, exercises, and equipment for Swedish governmental agencies, 
County Administrative Boards (CABs), and municipalities. 
8.1	 Introduction	
Oil spill response in this context is defined as the physical work of cleaning up the 
oil. Clean-up should ideally be done by trained professionals, using established 
methods and equipment. Trained professionals are needed to maintain health and 
safety issues for the responders, as oil spill clean-up can have adverse health effects 
if conducted incorrectly (Barnea, 1999; IPIECAOGP, 2012b; Na, Sim, & Jo, 2012; 
OGPIPIECA, 2012). There is a variety of methods and equipment for oil spill clean-
up, for example skimmers, pumps, beach cloth, dispersants, and booms, but basic 
buckets and spades are also utilised (ACS, 2012; API, 2013a; Fejes, Zetterberg, 
Andersson, Palokangas, & Svenson, 1999; Pålsson & Lindén, 2014a). The strategies 
to make the response as effective as possible should be described or referenced in oil 
spill contingency plans. 
 
Sweden has five national Oil Spill Depots with equipment, managed by the Swedish 
Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) (Kulander et al., 2004; 2010; MSBHaV, 2014). 
These Depots were contracted to be stored at local rescue service stations in 
Vänersborg, Karlstad, Visby, Botkyrka, and Umeå until April 2015. As the contract 
ended, the depots were relocated to the Swedish Coast Guard (SCG) stations in 
Härnösand, Djurö, Slite, Oskarshamn, and Gothenburg (Söder, 2015), but are still the 
responsibility of MSB (see Figure 44). In addition, extra equipment to reinforce the 
Oil Spill Depots is stored centrally in Kristinehamn. 
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Figure 44: Oil Spill Depot locations and major oil ports in Sweden (Göteborgs Hamn, 2015; Söder, 2015). 
These Depots are designed to provide supplementary material in the form of boats, 
barges, containers, pumps, skimmers, booms, and personal protective equipment to 
reinforce the municipalities during an oil spill response (M. Olsson, 2012). In 
addition to the municipal equipment and the Depots, additional equipment is stored 
with SCG and a few volunteer organisations, such as the Swedish Sea Rescue 
Society (SSRS) and the Swedish Wildlife Rehabilitators (KFV), and the industry, 
such as ports and oil companies. 
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The low number of oil spills in Sweden suggests that the national organisations have 
had few, if any, opportunities to apply and test their contingency plans during a real 
oil spill response. Whereas SCG exercise frequently (Kustbevakningen, 2015), not 
all of the municipalities conduct oil spill exercises. Exercises are pointed out as 
critical to maintain the ability to respond to real spills (IPIECAOGP, 2014b; Perry, 
2004) and not conducting exercises will impact the ability to respond effectively to a 
real oil spill. This can be exemplified in the case of the Golden Trader oil spill that 
impacted the island of Tjörn. The local municipality did indeed have an oil spill 
contingency plan, but had not exercised it (MSBHaV, 2014). Consequently, the plan 
was not used and most of the response was setup in an ad-hoc fashion without a plan 
for an extended response operation, which subsequently requires several work shifts 
to mitigate fatigue among responders and managers. 
 
During a real spill, difficult decisions must be made quickly during challenging 
circumstances, usually with only partial information and under time constraint 
(MSB, 2010). These decisions may have long-term impacts on the environment, 
local economy, and people’s properties, health, or even lives. The choices may thus 
affect the reputation and the legitimacy of the organisation, in addition to its 
operational efficiency. Of course, it is impossible to predict everything that can 
happen during an oil spill. However, exercises can provide a structure and experience 
that can help to avoid mistakes during real spills, plug knowledge gaps, and work out 
bottlenecks. Good decision-making and information processes can be established in 
the organisations through contingency planning and functions, while inefficient or 
dangerous practices can be modified or eliminated. Exercises may also reveal what, 
and if, resources are needed and if they are put to the best use. To make the most of 
these exercises, there is a need for careful evaluations, communication of the 
evaluation results, and for the involved organisations to deal with any deficiencies 
identified in the evaluations. 
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Internationally, leading industry expert organisations like the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) and International 
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) advocate frequent exercises, but do not 
detail the exact frequency (IPIECAOGP, 2014b; ITOPF, 2011b). The United States 
has some of the strictest environmental regulations for oil spills globally. For 
exercises, the United States adopted the National Preparedness For Response 
Exercise Program (PREP) in 1994 (Cashman, 2005; Cashman et al., 2003; NRT, 
2014; Reiter, Jarvis, & Storey, 2005). This was done in order to meet the regulatory 
requirements for exercises set out in section 4202(a) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA90) (NRT, 1997). These exercises depend on the type of facility or vessel 
involved and the requirements have different levels of complexity, from more 
frequent tabletop exercises to complex events with participation from both the 
industry and the authorities. The requirements range from quarterly for simpler 
exercises, through annual regional worst-case discharge exercises, to area exercises 
involving multiple jurisdictions every third year. 
 
Sweden is Party to a number of international agreements, such as the Helsinki 
Commission (HELCOM), the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) and the Copenhagen 
Agreement, that require joint exercises (BRISK, 2012). However, these are aimed at 
open sea response between the various neighbouring countries. Only a few exercises 
have included activities onshore, for example the Copenhagen Agreement exercise 
Matteus in Gothenburg 2010 (Kustbevakningen, RTJ Storgöteborg, RTJ Öckerö, 
2010; Køpenhavnsavtalet, 2010) and the BOILEX exercise in Nynäshamn, 2011 
(MSB, 2012) by the EnSaCo project. In addition to these, some shoreline 
municipality and county-level exercises have taken place in Sweden (Ljungkvist et 
al., 2013; Skåne Nordväst, 2014). 
 
MSB has many responsibilities in crisis preparedness and management, but is tasked 
with systematically and transparently evaluating the implementation and effects of 
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measures to increase preparedness (MSB, 2010). The agency is active in promoting 
exercises, but do not themselves directly organise any oil spill exercises. However, it 
works closely and frequently with the municipalities and CABs who organise 
regional exercises, on oil spills and other issues. 
 
Unfortunately, few universally recognised frameworks for evaluating oil spill 
exercises exists. Several different frameworks have been developed, for example by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (2011), IPIECA (2014b), 
and PREP (NRT, 2014), and build on the same basic principles. As there is no 
universal framework, not all common reference values or requirement levels can be 
used for comparison. Thus, some exercises are inherently self-evaluated and not all 
quantifiable measures can be compared between evaluation frameworks. It should 
therefore be encouraged to use one of the existing frameworks when conducting 
exercises. The goal-based evaluation is a common type of evaluation, and is used by 
MSB (MSB, 2010). It measures to what degree certain pre-designated targets have 
been met. Goal-based evaluations focus on the intended use and result of an exercise. 
Such an evaluation is best started with defining the aims of the exercise and relating 
the implementation and results of the exercise to these goals. The evaluation should 
relate both to the efforts of the involved personnel and whether the structure of the 
exercise has affected the possibility of reaching the exercise aims. 
 
A successful exercise is an exercise and evaluation that manages to get the 
participants eager to want to learn more and improve their individual and 
organisational behaviour. After the exercise and evaluation, contingency plans have 
to be updated to reflect the lessons learned and subsequently tested in a new exercise 
cycle. 
8.2	 Methods	
This chapter analyses the status of Swedish oil spill response and examines if the 
established measures maintain a sufficient response level for the oil spill risk. 
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Several measures contribute to whether an oil spill response is sufficient or not. 
Primarily, these relate to equipment, training, and exercises, but also include the 
lessons learned from real oil spills. Examining these factors determines their value 
for Swedish oil spill response. 
8.2.1	 Study	design	
The issues above are formalised into Hypothesis 4, H4: 
 
 H4 – Response measures are sufficient 
  
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
 H40 – Response measures are insufficient 
 
Hypothesis 4 was chosen to analyse whether oil spill response have sufficient 
equipment, training, and exercises, and issues discovered during real spills and 
exercises are systematically addressed. The units of analysis have been chosen based 
on reasoning and practicality after consulting literature and expert opinions. 
 
Conducted training courses and participation determine the level of training among 
the organisations responsible for the oil spill response. The equipment location and 
inventory determine the available material resources. Conducted exercises, their 
frequency, methodology, and evaluations determine organisational and system 
learning. Outreach in order to learn and share information is determined by 
participation in external oil spill projects. The relationship between the units of 
analysis and their corresponding variables can be seen in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: Hypothesis 4 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
 
For Sweden to have sufficient oil spill response measures, the municipalities would 
have to be properly trained and frequently conduct oil spill exercises, using 
equipment located close to the risk areas. A structured approach to working with 
identified oil spill response issues and engagement in external projects should also be 
evident. 
 
These criteria have been quantified in Table 19 following to the reasoning for 
ranking the variables in Chapter 4. 
 
  
Training	 Courses	 Par9cipa9on	
Material	 Equipment	
Inventory	
Loca9on	
Exercises	and	
real	spills	
Exercises	 Exercise	frequency	
Evalua9ons	
Methodology	
Recommen-
da9ons	
Follow-up	
Outreach	 External	projects	
Project	
par9cipa9on	
H4	–	Response	measures	are	sufficient	
Indicators	 Units	of	analysis	 Variables	
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Table 19: Evaluation criteria for H4. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient 
Environmental impacts 
course 
Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% up 
to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Limitation and clean-up 
course 
Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% up 
to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Clean-up manager 
course 
Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% up 
to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Staff specialist course Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% up 
to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Land spills course Representatives from 95% or 
more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% up 
to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Equipment inventory Equipment quantified for 
regional and national use 
exist. 
Equipment quantified for local 
and regional use exists.  
Equipment quantified for local 
use does not exist.  
Equipment location 95% or more of the 
equipment depots are located 
closer to major oil ports than 
before. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
equipment depots are located 
closer to major oil ports than 
before. 
Less than 50% of the 
equipment depots are located 
closer to major oil ports than 
before. 
Exercise frequency 95% or more of the 
municipalities held an oil spill 
exercise within the last 5 
years. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities held an oil spill 
exercise within the last 5 
years. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities held an oil spill 
exercise within the last 5 
years. 
Evaluation methodology 95% or more of the examined 
evaluations use an 
established evaluation 
method. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
examined evaluations use an 
established evaluation 
method. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations use an 
mentioned evaluation method. 
Evaluation 
recommendations 
95% or more of the examined 
evaluations gives 
recommendations. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
examined evaluations gives 
recommendations. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations give 
recommendations. 
Evaluation follow-up 95% or more of the examined 
evaluations requires follow-up 
measures. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
examined evaluations 
requires follow-up measures. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations require 
follow-up measures. 
Municipality external 
projects 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external projects. 
CAB external projects 95% or more of the CABs 
have been partners in one or 
more external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of the 
CABs have been partners in 
one or more external project. 
Less than 50% of the CABs 
have been partners in one or 
more external projects. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is wholly present and/or functioning 
(Preferable), partially present and/or functioning (Sufficient), or not present and/or 
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functioning at all (Insufficient). All of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate 
that they at least reach the rank of Sufficient for H4 to be accepted, meaning that the 
oil spill response measures are sufficient, but should be further developed. If all 
variables are ranked Preferable, oil spill response measures are at the best practice 
level. If any of the variables are ranked Insufficient, important oil spill response 
measures are missing, negatively impacting Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
8.2.2	 Sources	
Data were collected from publicly available sources online, primarily government 
websites. Response evaluations have been collected directly from the organisers or 
evaluators, if not publicly available. Scientific papers have been gathered through the 
library at the World Maritime University (WMU) and online open access journals. 
Project reports have been gathered from the project pages of various oil spill 
projects. Data on the MSB training courses was collected directly from the training 
unit at MSB. 
 
Additional information and comments have been collected from the questionnaire 
(see Appendix A - Questionnaire) distributed to all coastal municipalities and CABs, 
and the interviews (see Appendix B - Interview) with the members of the National 
Cooperation Group for Oil Combating (NSO), described in Chapter 4. 
8.2.3	 Analysis	
Different methods for analyses have been used in this chapter. The statistical 
analyses and graphs were generated using the GraphPad Prism statistical software. 
The statistical analyses used are Berger’s test and X2. 
8.2.3.1	 Evaluation	analysis	
The evaluation analysis used in this chapter follows the guidelines of Saunders 
(2012), ISO (2011), and IPIECA (2014b), and is built on the framework used by the 
Swedish Institute for the Marine Environment (Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2013) and MSB 
(2010). Using the above references as a template, an evaluation framework was 
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constructed (see Appendix H - Response Results). The aim was to examine which 
analysis tools the Swedish oil spill evaluations have used, how the evaluations were 
done, what criteria were used for assessment, if and how the evaluations have been 
tied to plans or earlier evaluations, how the evaluations have been disseminated, and 
finally, how the recommendations have been followed up. 
8.3	 Results	
Descriptive statistics and correlation testing have been used on the responses from 
the questionnaire. Two groups in the questionnaire were compared: the 
municipalities that have exercised their contingency plan and those that have not. 
These groups were tested with various influencing factors. An evaluation analysis 
was performed on a number of oil spill exercises and real oil spill evaluations. 
8.3.1	 Training	
MSB have conducted 32 oil spill training courses up until the end of 2014 (see 
Figure 46). 
 
 
Figure 46: MSB oil spill preparedness courses. 
A system of four oil spill preparedness courses: Environmental impacts, Limitations 
and clean-up, Clean-up manager, and Staff specialist, were introduced during 2010. 
In 2012, an additional course covering Spills on land was introduced. These courses 
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replaced the old system of three courses that existed between 2004 and 2008: Marine 
oil spill preparedness - Basic level, Advanced level, and Command and cooperation. 
Both old and new courses have been arranged once a year in various cities around 
Sweden, with between 6 to 53 participants. However, 36% of the planned courses 
have been cancelled, with preregistration varying from 0 to 11, but in one instance 
reaching 20 participants. 
 
The original courses had a total of 104 participants. Most were from the MSB Oil 
Spill Depots and participated in more than one course (see Table 20). However, no 
data detailing which depot the participants represented could be obtained. The basic 
level course was the most popular. 
 
Table 20: MSB original course attendance. 
 Basic level Advanced level Command and 
cooperation 
Total 
Participants 50 38 16 104 
 
The modern courses have been attended by primarily municipality staff (84.4%), but 
also representatives from the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), Swedish Maritime 
Administration (SMA), County Administrative Boards (CABs), ports, clean-up and 
oil companies representing the industry, the Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS) 
representing volunteers, and other, for example academia an unaffiliated individuals 
(see Table 21). The Environmental impacts course is the most popular course. The 
course participants range from 147 on the Environmental impacts course, to 22 on 
the Staff specialist course. Only one individual has completed all the courses and 
another 10 individuals have completed four of the five courses. 
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Table 21: MSB course attendance by number of individuals. 
 Environmental 
Impacts 
Limitations and 
clean-up 
Clean-up 
manager 
Staff specialist Spills on land 
Agencies 6 5 2 1 5 
CABs 5 1 1 0 3 
Municipalities 124 80 53 21 60 
Industry 6 9 4 0 3 
Volunteers 2 1 0 0 0 
Others 4 1 0 0 1 
Total 147 97 60 22 72 
 
Extrapolating the organisational affiliation of the participants, there are 57 
municipalities represented among the participants for the Environmental Impacts 
course, down to 12 for the Staff specialist course (see Table 22). Only two of the 
CABs have participated in the courses. 
 
Table 22: MSB courses attendance by number of organisations. 
 Environmental 
Impacts 
Limitations and 
clean-up 
Clean-up 
manager 
Staff specialist Spills on land 
Agencies 2 2 1 1 2 
CABs 2 1 1 0 2 
Municipalities 57 39 36 12 41 
Industry 4 7 3 0 2 
Volunteers 2 2 0 0 0 
Others 3 1 0 0 1 
Total 70 52 41 13 48 
 
Extracting the affiliation of the participants and focusing on the 126 coastal 
municipalities, the participants represents at most two thirds of these municipalities 
or their Rescue Service Associations (see Table 23). Other landlocked municipalities 
are instead represented, particularly in the Spills on land course. 
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Table 23: Coastal municipality representation. 
 Environmental 
Impacts 
Limitations and 
clean-up 
Clean-up 
manager 
Staff specialist Spills on land 
Municipalities 88 65 61 29 56 
Percentages 69.8 % 51.6 % 48.4 % 23.0 % 44.4 % 
 
8.3.2	 Equipment	
No list of oil spill response equipment exists for all the Swedish municipalities. A 
summary of the resources available at the rescue services in the municipalities in 
northwestern Skåne, Blekinge, Gotland, and on the Danish island Bornholm was 
compiled for the Baltic Master II project (M. Olsson, 2012). The six involved 
Swedish municipalities had each between 175 and 750 m of boom, mostly around 
400 m. Only one municipality had their own boat (although boats can usually be 
procured on short notice). None of the municipalities had any skimmers or pumps. 
 
The CABs do not have any oil spill equipment, but most have access to boats or 
other vehicles. 
 
On land, equipment is primarily stored at the five Oil Spill Depots and the central 
depot located around Sweden (see Figure 44). Relating to the largest oil ports in 
Sweden, two of the depots have been moved closer to one of the largest oil ports in 
Sweden, while three have been moved further away. This equipment is intended to 
supplement the municipalities and contains skimmers, quad motorcycles, beach 
cloth, and personal protection equipment (Kulander et al., 2004). 
 
SCG has several kilometres of boom in their organisation and powerful skimmers 
and pumps onboard their vessels, as is the case with the other Baltic Sea Region 
countries (Pålsson et al., 2012). 
 
Internationally, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), has three vessels in 
the area that are equipped with boom arms and skimmers and equipment stockpiles 
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on land (EMSA, 2011). These vessels are on contract to be able to respond if needed, 
but otherwise fulfil other duties. 
8.3.3	 Exercise	frequency	
Extrapolating the municipality respondents to the 126 coastal municipalities they 
represent, 56 (44%) municipalities responded that they have used their oil spill 
contingency plan in an exercise and 35 (28%) that they had not used the plan in an 
exercise (see Table 24). Of the coastal municipalities, 35 (28%) did not respond. 
 
Table 24: Questionnaire response rate for when the oil spill contingency plan was exercised. 
Question Answer 2011 2013 2015 Combined 
When was the 
plan exercised? 
0-5 years ago 29 37 56 72 
>5 years ago 9 3 0 3 
No exercise 56 41 35 45 
No reply 32 45 35 6 
 
Combined with data from 2011 (Pålsson et al., 2011) and 2013 (Pålsson & 
Wåhlander, 2013), the total number of municipalities that have used their oil spill 
contingency plan in an exercise is 75 (60%) as of March 2015, with 72 (57%) having 
exercised within the last 5 years. 
 
Combining the results of the questionnaire with previous data (Pålsson et al., 2011; 
Pålsson & Wåhlander, 2013), the number of municipalities that exercised their oil 
spill contingency plan during the preceding five years has almost doubled between 
2011 and 2015 and the number of municipalities that have never used their plan 
decreased (see Figure 47). 
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Figure 47: Time since last exercise the municipalities used their oil spill contingency plans. 
There is a significant statistical difference between the years (excluding the “No 
reply” option, since it contains no information), Χ2 (4, N = 126) = 23.24, p = .0001. 
8.3.4	 Evaluations	
Two real oil spill evaluations (Fu Shan Hai 2003 and Golden Trader impacting 
Tjörn 2011) and nine oil spill exercises including at sea and onshore response to 
varying degrees (Matteus 2010, Skåne Nordväst 2010, Blekinge 2011, BOILEX 
2011, Gotland 2011, Olivia 2011, FSHex13 2013, Barbro 2014, and Hedvig 2014) 
were analysed. These exercises represent the majority of the larger oil spill exercises 
that have been conducted between 2010 and 2015. 
 
The analysis (see Appendix H - Response Results) showed that 77.8% of the 9 oil 
spill exercises follow the definition of functional exercises (ISO, 2011), but are 
mostly called tabletop exercises. Exercises were unique, one-off exercises, meaning 
that they were a first time occurrence, and not necessarily intended to be conducted 
regularly in 77.8% of the cases. Local municipalities have initiated most of the 
exercises and only the larger ones have been driven by state agencies. MSB 
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guidelines (MSB, 2010) recommending both an internal and external evaluator were 
followed in 55.6% of the exercises.  
 
Different methods, including no specific method, have been used for the 11 
evaluations (exercises and the real spills) and 44.4% of these used an established 
evaluation method, defined as a named or documented method. Of the evaluations, 
81.2% have evaluation criteria, but only 18.2% have measurable performance 
indicators. The data were mostly collected from documentation and evaluator notes, 
and 9.1% of the evaluations used questionnaires. Only 18.2% of the evaluations 
referred to older spills in the area and 27.3% to earlier evaluations, even though all of 
the locations have had one or several oil spills previously. The depth of the 
evaluations also differed substantially, with the shortest evaluation providing a 2-
page summary and the most substantial evaluation being a thorough 131-page report. 
All evaluations have been summarised in a document, but 45.5% have also arranged 
one or several evaluation seminars to help to communicate the experiences from the 
exercises and real spills. A specific dissemination plan is included in 36.4% of the 
evaluations. Explicit recommendations were present in 72.7% of the evaluations, but 
only 18.2% required any follow up of the recommended measures. 
8.3.5	 External	projects	
Out of the 50 responding coastal municipalities, 13 responded that they had been part 
of an external oil spill project (26%). Of the 10 responding CABs, 4 responded that 
they had been part of an external project (40%). 
 
There is no significant statistical difference for the responding coastal municipalities 
(see Figure 48 A) and responding CABs (see Figure 48 C), when correlating 
exercises and participation in external oil spill projects between 2010 and 2015, 
Berger’s test (N = 50), p = .076 for (A) and (N = 10), p = 1.000 for (C).  
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Figure 48: Project participation and exercises among municipalities responding to the questionnaire (A), 
taken from the project literature (B), and County Administrative Boards (CABs) responding to the 
questionnaire (C) between 2010 and 2015. 
However, there is a significant statistical difference between project participation 
when combining data on exercises for all of the coastal municipalities (see Figure 48 
B) who participated in the ARCHOIL, Baltic Master II, and EnSaCo oil spill 
projects, Berger’s test (N = 120), p = .001. 
8.4	 Discussion	
The evidence presented in the results is relevant for the future of Swedish oil spill 
response capability. 
8.4.1	 Training	
Only 64% of the planned courses arranged by MSB have been completed, as some 
have been cancelled due to lack of interest. This may be because of participant 
scheduling conflicts when the courses are only held once per year, commitment to be 
away on a course for several consecutive days, a lack of awareness of the existence 
of the courses, or at worst, that previous participants have not recommended the 
course to their colleagues. In total, 147 individuals have taken the environmental 
impacts course, 97 the limitations and clean-up course, 60 the clean-up manager 
course, 22 the staff specialist course, and 97 the land spill course (see Figure 46). 
This shows a lack of specialist oil spill response training within the municipalities. 
Considering the 126 coastal municipalities and 18 coastal CABs, there is a 69.8% 
chance that a person in a municipality has specialised training on oil spills, a 51.6% 
chance to have someone specialised in limitations and clean-up, a 48.4% chance to 
have a certified clean up manager, a 23.0% chance to have someone certified as a 
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command specialist, and a 44.4% chance to have someone specialised in oil spills on 
land. This assumes that the course participants have remained within their respective 
organisations. Of course, several individuals that have not taken any courses are still 
more than capable in these roles, for example because they are trained through other 
organisations than MSB or have experience with real spills. Many rescue service 
officers can utilise the general emergency protocols and adapt them to an oil spill, 
but they will lack critical knowledge of the unique characteristics of oil spills. 
Additionally, these few trained or experienced experts need work in shifts for the 
extended oil spill response operation during real spills. Therefore, several specialists 
are needed to be able to maintain the oil spill expertise during a response without 
fatigue setting in. 
 
There has previously not been a fee for participating in the MSB-courses, other than 
travel and accommodation. However, due to economic cutbacks discussed in Chapter 
6, the courses are subject to a fee from 2015 onwards. The fee ranges from 7,625 
SEK, excluding VAT (~ 900 USD), up to 20,250 SEK, excluding VAT (~ 2,350 
USD), and will likely mean that even fewer municipalities will consider sending 
their employees to these courses, as this is a substantial cost for most municipalities. 
 
The courses have been setup nationally by MSB, and are not evaluated by any 
outside organisations, for example any of the international oil spill organisations 
(Källström, H., email communication, 25 May 2015). 
8.4.2	 Equipment	
The five Oil Spill Depots managed by MSB were set up after a Swedish project 
programme called Teknik for oljebekämpning till sjöss samt bekämpning och 
sanering av olja i strandzonen (TOBOS) in the 1980s, aimed to increase the 
preparedness after the Tsesis oil spill. After the initial creation, the inventory has 
been replaced and items have been removed or added over time (Ericsson, M., email 
communication, 18 Sep 2015). 
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The Baltic Master II report (M. Olsson, 2012) highlights the lack of oil spill 
equipment at the municipal level, and emphasizes their dependence and reliance on 
the Oil Spill Depots for specialised oil spill response equipment, such as skimmers. 
However, exercise and real spill evaluations show that the amount of oil spill 
equipment has not been deemed a limiting factor for Swedish oil spill response 
(Dimming, 2012; Holmström et al., 2014; Kustbevakningen et al., 2010; Martinsson 
& Fejes, 2007; MSB, 2012; MSBHaV, 2014). Between SCG, the Depots, and 
procured equipment, there has never been any problem to acquire resources during a 
Swedish oil spill response (excepting that some sellers increases their prices). 
However, it should be noted that certain specialised equipment was missing during 
Fu Shan Hai and Tjörn, especially for the voluntary oiled wildlife responders 
(Edelius, M., personal communication, May 2014). But as the oiled wildlife is not an 
official part of the response, no resources were allocated to fill this gap. Today, oiled 
wildlife responders are better equipped with tents and cleaning facilities. 
 
Experience from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the United States in 2010 
showed that large amounts of equipment in the form of booms and protective gear 
could be swiftly procured and shipped to the location of the spill (Allen, 2010). 
However, with no prior agreements, prices skyrocketed. Additionally, procedures for 
accepting equipment and aid from abroad proved to be problematic during the 
Deepwater Horizon (Allen, 2010), which was also the Swedish experience from the 
BOILEX exercise, when procedures for accepting equipment from Finland, Russia, 
and Estonia were tested (MSB, 2012). 
 
The recent move of the Oil Spill Depots may both increase and decrease response 
times. On the west coast, the two largest oil ports, Gothenburg and Brofjorden 
Preemraff, annually handle around 20 million tonnes of oil each. This is far above 
the third largest port, Malmö, that handle 3 million tonnes (Göteborgs Hamn, 2015). 
Since the previous location of the west coast Depot was in Vänersborg, on the coast 
of lake Vänern, the move to the port of Gothenburg is a more strategic location due 
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to the intense traffic and large volumes of oil being transported on the west coast. As 
the central MSB depot remains in Kristinehamn, on the coast of Vänern, there is still 
equipment close by this lake. No larger oil spill has been recorded in the Swedish 
great lakes, but as these are major sources of drinking water for large cities in 
Sweden, they are of particular strategic importance. For example, a catastrophic spill 
in Mälaren would disrupt the drinking water supply to the Stockholm region, 
consisting of around 2 million people. However, the Depot move from Karlskrona in 
the southeast to Oskarshamn is surprising, given that an oil spill occurred in 
Karlskrona in 1990 and that the Blekinge archipelago is a protected area, highly 
vulnerable to oil spills because of the many small islands. As the Depots can easily 
be loaded onto trucks and carried by road to the spill sites, swift access to larger 
highways also has a significant impact on the deployment times. 
 
Additionally, this move excludes the rescue service personnel trained on the 
equipment at the previous locations. The personnel will instead be part of the 
established MSB resource pool. This pool lists suitably trained personnel that can, on 
short notice, be sent to an oil spill, to be in charge of the equipment and training of 
staff on the use of the equipment. However, it is unsure how many people will be 
listed in the pool, if the members of the resource pool are in fact available in 
sufficient numbers when called upon, and how maintenance and training on the 
equipment will work. 
8.4.3	 Exercises	
For a response to work as best as possible, a feeling of trust and respect among the 
involved organisations must exist (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; Ödlund, 
2010; Purnell & Zhang, 2014). However, these feelings may disappear quickly 
during a real response. Stress, fatigue, accident investigations, and potential litigation 
can cause individuals to become guarded and less trusting. It is often the case that 
once the immediate emergency has been dealt with, sides begin to emerge and blame 
for inevitable mistakes will be assigned. The Deepwater Horizon response is a good 
example of this, where the media immediately portrayed BP as the culprit in the 
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disaster, undermining much of the needed cooperation and trust that the responders 
needed to have with the industry (Allen, 2010). Media management is therefore of 
crucial importance. Real cooperation can only exist when everyone involved are 
working towards the same transparent goals, without any ulterior motive. One way to 
foster this desired cooperation is through exercises with fictional, but realistic, 
scenarios. Exercises also provide opportunities for the authorities responsible for oil 
spill preparedness to report the results, ideas, and work with the oil spill community 
to further improve the response capabilities. It is thus encouraging to see the increase 
in municipal exercises between 2010 and 2015 (see Figure 47). However, there are 
still geographic and topical gaps identified in the evaluations (see Appendix H - 
Response Results) that should be addressed. 
 
The most interesting result of this study is that exercises are closely associated with 
the EU oil spill projects examined (see Figure 48). This suggests that an important 
driving factor, involved in almost half of the exercises conducted during the last 5 
years, is participation in external oil spill projects. Project participation has 
functioned as incentives and helped municipalities to exercise their plans. However, 
exercises should ideally be an integral part of the organisations’ work. Exercises 
should only be supplemented by the EU projects, the projects should not constitute 
the only reason for conducting exercises. As the oil spill projects have ended, this 
may lead to a decrease in oil spill exercises. MSB has a role to play here, as the 
agency is responsible for coordinating disaster response and to train and exercise the 
civil defence (Regeringen, 2008b). It would be helpful for the national oil spill 
response if the government or MSB clearly establishes exercise requirements, similar 
to what the United States has established through the PREP programme (NRT, 
2014). This intention is acknowledged in the draft action plan (NSO, 2015) for the 
Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness (NSO, 2014b). 
 
The exercises examined in this chapter have been structured as completely new 
events in 7 out of 9 cases and rarely consider the context of the involved organisation 
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(MSB, 2010). This makes the evaluations a critical point to transfer the knowledge 
gained from one exercise or real spill to the next. Experienced individuals may quit 
or move to another position, and the organisation may thus loose unique knowledge 
from exercises or real spills. The experiences gained from an exercise must be 
addressed for organisational learning to come into effect, for example through 
documentation and follow-up. Evaluations can be done at different levels, but it is 
important that the evaluation is as honest as possible (Purnell & Zhang, 2014). Many 
incident evaluations are biased by fear of reprisal or for political reasons, for 
example in the form of getting bad press or to appear more successful to superiors or 
auditors, in order to avoid further investigations. Consequently, they are written in a 
positive tone and may make unsubstantiated conclusions about success of the 
exercise of real response, giving the false impression that there were no issues. Care 
must also be taken when developing scenarios for oil spill exercises. Making the 
scenario too easy can invoke a false sense of security, and making it too hard may 
lead to a chaotic exercise and diminished enthusiasm from the participants. 
 
A significant problem is the few evaluation structures for oil spill response. 
Evaluation tools for exercises exists, for example the mentioned PREP guidelines in 
the United States (NRT, 2014). However, these are usually tailored for national 
requirements or specific industries and are hard to adapt to regulations in another 
country. Few exercise structures mean that there are few indicators that are possible 
to compare between exercises. In some cases, there might be some objective 
performance data from the last exercise, for example time before notification of all 
stakeholders was done or time before a command centre was established. If the 
scenarios and evaluations were the same between exercises, numbers and 
performance objectives could be compared. Of course, this has both advantages and 
disadvantages, especially considering how different the coastal municipalities are. 
While some municipalities only have a few hundred meters of coast, others have 
several tens of kilometres and hundreds of islands, which make the priorities and 
consequently the resources spent on oil spill response quite diverse among 
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municipalities. More information can also be gathered from conducting exercises. 
Systematic inquiries, for example through administering questionnaires before and 
after the exercises, can estimate the exercise effects on the participants. However, it 
is apparent from the evaluations analysed that the participants generally think that the 
exercises were good and that they sincerely appreciated them. The evaluations 
especially reflect the positive effect that the exercises have for the onshore 
organisations by increasing knowledge about oil spills and other organisations and 
building the trust and connections discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The survey responses indicate that the municipalities (see Figure 49 A) and CABs 
(see Figure 49 B) would like to have a tabletop exercise every 2 to 5 years and the 
agencies (see Figure 49 C) would like to have an exercise every 1 to 3 years. 
 
 
Figure 49: Opinions from the municipalities (A), County Administrative Boards (CABs) (B), agencies (C), 
and combined (D) on the frequency of tabletop exercises. 
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The respondent consensus is that municipal, county, and national tabletop exercises 
should be conducted once every 1 to 3 years, with a greater proportion preferring a 
municipal exercise every 2 to 3 years. 
 
Results for deployment exercises, corresponding to the ISO definition of Full-scale 
exercises (ISO, 2011), indicate that municipalities prefer these once every 2 to 5 
years for most levels, while CABs and agencies prefer the exercises once every 4 to 
5 years (see Figure 50). 
 
 
Figure 50: Opinions from the municipalities (A), County Administrative Boards (CABs) (B), agencies (C), 
and combined (D) on the frequency of deployment exercises. 
The consensus is that international onshore deployment exercises should be held 
once every 4 to 5 years or longer, and national, county and municipal exercises 
should be held once every 2 to 5 years. 
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The recommended exercise frequency should be taken into account when next 
reviewing the national exercise system. At the time of writing, the Swedish exercises 
are very few onshore, while SCG regularly participate in both minor (for example 
municipal or port exercises) and major oil spill exercises at sea (for example BALEX 
DELTA or the Copenhagen Agreement exercises) during the year (Kustbevakningen, 
2013a; 2014; 2015). Taking the financial aspects into account, as the measures 
should be cost effective, a municipal tabletop exercise is the best option in some 
cases, while a full-scale exercise is needed in other cases, depending on risk and 
resources at disposal. Another point when discussing the frequency is how often you 
need to exercise to maintain the expertise compared to when you are building 
expertise. Reasonably, the learning curve is generally steep in the beginning, if going 
from no knowledge to some knowledge, and then levels out. When having exercised 
up to a certain level, the frequency of exercises could be decreased, without losing 
response quality. Additionally, appropriate staff should be sent abroad as participants 
or observers during international oil spills or exercises. Such transfer of knowledge 
could be very useful for maintaining the necessary response quality. 
 
However, a PREP-like system is of course not a panacea. The critique that has been 
discussed here for the evaluations, has been discussed within the PREP community 
as well (Cashman, 2005; Reiter et al., 2005). A major point has been the stagnation 
of the PREP exercises, which should optimally continuously build on lessons learned 
from the previous year and continuously test new issues, but are not as good in 
reality. This is an inherent problem of having a standardised scenario. However, 
looking at the Swedish situation, a standardised scenario would be a positive start in 
order to increase the preparedness. 
8.4.4	 Implications	
Response issues have primarily been found in the response organisations onshore, as 
SCG have demonstrated frequent training and exercises for the response at sea. 
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The discussion repeatedly comes back to the need for an authority to set 
requirements for training and exercises on land. There should also be an organisation 
able to assist the municipalities in preparing for and evaluate the exercises, develop a 
standard scenario with performance indicators, a standardised evaluation system, and 
a system for following up the recommendations and lessons learned from exercises 
and real spills. MSB would be the most logical authority for this, as they already 
have oil spill, training, exercise, and evaluation expertise. 
 
The response at sea is regulated in several international conventions and agreements, 
discussed in Chapter 6. However, few international agreements exist on oil spill 
response onshore. For Sweden, the most relevant agreement would be the HELCOM 
Manual on Co-operation in Response to Marine Pollution within the framework of 
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 
(Helsinki Convention) (HELCOM, 2013a). The 2013 addition of Volume III to this 
manual specifically addressed onshore response, but primarily regulated international 
cooperation, for example requests for international assistance, cross-border 
movement of personnel and equipment, customs procedures, and logistics 
(HELCOM, 2013b). However, an important section is the addition of a shoreline 
component to the annual HELCOM BALEX DELTA oil spill exercises, although 
this is not mandatory for every BALEX DELTA exercise. 
 
The scores of the analysed variables for oil spill planning in this chapter have been 
summarised in Table 25. 
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Table 25: Scores for the H4 variables. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient Score 
Environmental 
impacts course 
Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% 
up to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
69.8% 
Limitation and clean-
up course 
Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% 
up to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
51.6% 
Clean-up manager 
course 
Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% 
up to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
48.4% 
Staff specialist course Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% 
up to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
23.0% 
Land spills course Representatives from 95% 
or more of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from 50% 
up to 95% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
Representatives from less 
than 50% of the coastal 
municipalities have 
participated. 
44.4% 
Equipment inventory Equipment quantified for 
regional and national use 
exist, counted as 100%. 
Equipment quantified for 
local and regional use 
exists, counted as 50%. 
Equipment quantified for 
local use does not exist, 
counted as 0%. 
100.0% 
Equipment location 95% or more of the 
Depots are located closer 
to major oil ports than 
before. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the Depots are located 
closer to major oil ports 
than before. 
Less than 50% of the 
Depots are located closer 
to major oil ports than 
before. 
40.0% 
Exercise frequency 95% or more of the 
municipalities held an oil 
spill exercise within the 
last 5 years. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the municipalities held an 
oil spill exercise within the 
last 5 years. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities held an oil 
spill exercise within the 
last 5 years. 
60.0% 
Evaluation 
methodology 
95% or more of the 
examined evaluations use 
an established evaluation 
method. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the examined evaluations 
use an established 
evaluation method. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations use 
an established evaluation 
method. 
45.4% 
Evaluation 
recommendations 
95% or more of the 
examined evaluations give 
recommendations. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the examined evaluations 
give recommendations. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations give 
recommendations. 
72.7% 
Evaluation follow-up 95% or more of the 
examined evaluations 
require follow-up 
measures. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the examined evaluations 
require follow-up 
measures. 
Less than 50% of the 
examined evaluations 
require follow-up 
measures. 
18.2% 
Municipality external 
projects 
95% or more of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the municipalities have 
been partners in one or 
more external project. 
Less than 50% of the 
municipalities have been 
partners in one or more 
external projects. 
26.0% 
CAB external projects 95% or more of the CABs 
have been partners in one 
or more external project. 
From 50% up to 95% of 
the CABs have been 
partners in one or more 
external project. 
Less than 50% of the 
CABs have been partners 
in one or more external 
projects. 
60.0% 
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As shown by analysis of the variables in Table 25, several are ranked as Insufficient. 
This indicates that the municipal participation is low in the courses, regional 
equipment exists but has just been relocated further away from the larger oil ports, 
not all Swedish municipalities have exercised, no common exercise evaluation for oil 
spills is used or enforced, the recommendations and lessons learned are not followed 
up, and the conducted exercises are to a large extent opportunistic events funded by 
temporary EU projects. Therefore, the hypothesis: 
 
 H4 – Response measures are sufficient 
 
is rejected and the null hypothesis H40 is accepted. This situation does not seem to be 
as optimistic as the planning development, as the exercises are generally not 
conducted without additional push from external projects and are not systematically 
evaluated and followed-up. 
8.4.5	 Limitations	
The same statistical limitations as for the planning apply to the response and the 
exercise data. However, the correlation found between being part of EU projects and 
exercises is very strong (see Figure 48). The questionnaire data are in general 
supported by the literature and interview data. There are also oil spill exercises that 
have been mentioned in the questionnaire responses, but which were not part of the 
evaluation analysis. This is primarily because those exercise evaluations have not 
been possible to access. 
8.5	 Conclusions	
As shown in this chapter, most of the municipalities have little or no training and 
experience from real spills or exercises. The questionnaire responses show that 
regions that have been impacted by, and are more at risk from, oil spills are generally 
better prepared. Depending on where a municipality is located and its exposure to oil 
spill risk, it may be more cost-efficient to scale the preparedness accordingly. This 
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will develop needs for training, equipment, and exercises relevant to the local 
situation. 
 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency is responsible for the five regional Oil 
Spill Depots and for coordinating oil spill preparedness nationally. The 
municipalities are requested to have a basic supply of equipment and preparedness, 
but equipment has not been a limiting factor during the last larger oil spill responses, 
Fu Shan Hai and Tjörn. However, the municipalities rely to a large extent on the 
equipment in the Oil Spill Depots, some even exclusively. 
 
In contrast to the authorities at sea, it is difficult for many municipalities to regularly 
exercise their oil spill contingency plans. Results indicate that external projects have 
been an influential driver in conducting oil spill exercises in Sweden. Exercises 
should be conducted regularly at municipal, county, and national level, to safeguard 
that the gathered knowledge and expertise will not be forgotten. A simple tabletop 
exercise takes no more than a day to perform. Exercises also develop personal 
relationships, which are important during response. Complex operations are thus of 
relevance to exercise regularly, not exclusively oil spill exercises. The responsibility 
to oversee training requirement and implement exercises has been firmly lifted to the 
County Administrative Boards in the draft action plan tied to the new Swedish 
Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness. This is a welcome development, acknowledging 
the need to implement requirements regarding training, exercise frequency, and 
evaluation methodology, to improve the currently insufficient oil spill response 
measures in Sweden. 
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Chapter	9	-	International	Practice	
The fifth and final of the results chapters compares Swedish oil spill preparedness to 
international practice. It quantifies selected measures and uses a standardised 
evaluation tool to compare countries around Sweden. 
9.1	 Introduction	
Oil spill preparedness has developed significantly from the first oil spill up to the 
present day, but still varies between countries. For example, use of contingency plans 
for oil spill preparedness was rare until the 1950s (ITOPF, 2012a). As the awareness 
of the risks and the impacts of oil spills grew, more and more countries established 
legal requirements and developed contingency plans. This often happened in the 
wake of a well publicised oil spill, for example the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA90) in the United States after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska 1989 (USC, 
2000). The sophistication of the plans grew over time, as regulators and response 
planners gained experience. The value of exercises to test the preparedness has been 
increasingly recognised. As competency in a specific oil spill response topic grows, 
new topics could be explored and tested. A good example of this is waste 
management. In the early days of oil spill response, the first priority was more 
focused on the speed of the oil spill recovery (ITOPF, 2012a). This had the effect 
that the waste from the oil spill response accumulated faster than it could be taken 
care of. Raised awareness of this issue resulted in better preparation of waste 
segregation and disposal procedures in subsequent response operations. 
Development and maintenance of oil spill preparedness is closely regulated in many 
nations. The content of oil spill contingency plans, training standards, exercise types 
and frequency, are now usually well defined. However, in some nations, oil spill 
contingency plans and response capabilities may be missing completely. This might 
be due to lack of appropriate expertise or funding. In such circumstances, it is 
common for the local operators of oilrigs, pipelines or ports to look for the best 
international practices. In many nations, the responsibility to build oil spill 
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preparedness has been laid exclusively on the oil industry, and not on other sectors 
that handle or transport oil (Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, 
Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a), including some national governments. Consequently, the 
industries’ oil spill preparedness in a country does not necessarily reflect the national 
preparedness. 
 
There are few formal frameworks designed to assess the full range of oil spill 
preparedness activities, from plan development, implementation, response 
equipment, training, and preparedness sustainability, and to which assessments can 
be compared (Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 
2008b). 
 
As the interest in assessing performance of oil spill preparedness has grown, many 
expert organisations have published guidelines. For example, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) has published general guidelines for 
exercises and testing (ISO, 2011), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
has published manuals on oil pollution concerning prevention (IMO, 2011), 
contingency planning (IMO, 1995), oil combating (IMO, 2005), and administration 
(IMO, 2009), and the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) has published 
RETOS™, an international tool to assess oil spill response planning and readiness 
(Taylor et al., 2014; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014). From the industry side, 
organisations such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), the International 
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), and the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) have published 
numerous guides and reports on oil spill preparedness issues (API, 2013a; 2013c; 
2013e; IPIECA, 1994a; 2004a; 2004b; ITOPF, 2011d; 2011b; 2011c). Several 
projects have been setup to disseminate these guidelines and train national authorities 
and companies, for example the Global Initiative (GI), the Regional Maritime 
Pollution Emergency Information and Training Center for the Wider Caribbean 
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Region (RAC/REMPEITC-Caribe), and the Project on Oil Spill Preparedness and 
Response in the ASEAN Seas Area (ASEAN-OSPAR Project). 
 
A concept of categorising the different levels of oil spill preparedness and response, 
called the Tiered Preparedness and Response, is included in many of the guidelines 
used internationally (IPIECA, 2007). It was developed in the 1980s by the oil spill 
industry to facilitate the structuring of the response with an appropriate amount of 
resources, which can be mobilised rapidly and escalated if needed. The Tiered 
Preparedness and Response categorises oil spill incidents according to their severity 
and the needed response capabilities. The concept is a function of size and location 
and is most commonly divided into three tiers (see Figure 51). 
 
 
Figure 51: Concept of Tiered Preparedness and Response, depending on spill size and proximity, adapted 
from the IPIECA (2007) model. 
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• Tier 1 spills are small spills mostly in or near the operator’s own facilities and 
are often operational in nature (e.g. tank overflow when lightering or leaking 
hoses or valves). The operator is expected to maintain equipment and trained 
personnel to respond to these spills without involving the government. 
 
• Tier 2 spills are larger and extend outside of the operator’s facilities or 
jurisdiction. The resources of the operator are insufficient to handle a Tier 2 
spill and outside assistance is needed. 
 
• Tier 3 spills are major spills that require resources from the whole nation and 
may even require international assistance. 
 
However, in practice, there are many factors that will influence the needed response 
and the limits of the different tiers (IPIECA, 2007). Factors such as availability of 
personnel and equipment, infrastructure, spill site accessibility and logistics, can all 
move the definition of the tier levels around. This is also the reason no specific oil 
spill weight or volume is tied to the different Tiers.  
 
The “best international practice” for oil spill preparedness is not a single manual, 
but a compilation of guidelines and recommendations for certain aspects of the oil 
spill response management system or the system specific to a certain country 
(Cashman et al., 2003; Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & 
Moyano, 2008a). However, the IOSC Guidelines and RETOS™ propose the most 
comprehensive compilation of topics that has been found (Taylor, Steen, Meza, 
Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008b). These guidelines and tools 
try to create a consistent and broad international guide for spill response planning 
and readiness assessment. They have been developed and refined over several years, 
and tested in a number of different countries in the Americas (RAC-REMPEITC, 
2015; Taylor et al., 2014; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014). 
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9.2	 Methods	
Chapter 9 analyses international oil spill preparedness measures and compares them 
to those used in Sweden. Several indicators can be used to compare the level of oil 
spill preparedness among countries. However, these indicators must be standardised 
as much as possible, logically making those that can be objectively quantifiable 
preferable to use.  
9.2.1	 Study	design	
The issues described above have been formalised as Hypothesis 5, H5: 
 
 H5 – Preparedness in Sweden is equivalent to international practice 
 
Which gives the null hypothesis: 
 
H50 – Preparedness in Sweden is not equivalent to international practice 
 
Hypothesis 5 was chosen to analyse Sweden compared to international practices on 
ratification of conventions and oil spill preparedness measures. The units of analysis 
have been chosen based on reasoning and practicality after consulting literature and 
expert opinions. 
 
The number of oil spill conventions ratified determines the international political 
commitment. The oil spill preparedness target values determine the level of ambition 
of the different nations. The use of National Contingency Plans and the Tiered 
Preparedness and Response concept determine the international practice. The 
RETOS™ evaluation determines the oil spill preparedness level of different nations. 
The relationship between the units of analysis and their corresponding variables can 
be seen in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52: Hypothesis 5 chosen indicators, units of analysis, and variables. 
If Sweden has ratified the relevant international conventions, use Tiered 
Preparedness and Response, has an oil spill preparedness target value in line with 
international practice, has a National Contingency Plan, and has a comparable 
RETOS™ evaluation score with the neighbouring countries, the preparedness would 
be considered equivalent to international practice. 
 
These criteria have been quantified in Table 26, following the reasoning for ranking 
the variables in Chapter 4. 
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Table 26: Evaluation criteria for H5. 
 Preferable Sufficient Insufficient 
Number of 
conventions 
Sweden has ratified a number 
of conventions more than one 
standard deviation from the 
average, equal to more than 
87.0%. 
Sweden has ratified a number 
of conventions within +/- one 
standard deviation from the 
average, equal to between 
16.6% and 87.0%. 
Sweden has ratified a number 
of conventions less than one 
standard deviation from the 
average, equal to less than 
16.6%. 
Target value Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets higher 
than 95% or more of the 
neighbouring countries. 
Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets higher 
than 50% up to 95% of the 
neighbouring countries. 
Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets lower 
than 50% of the neighbouring 
countries. 
Use of NCP Sweden follows international 
practices by having a National 
Contingency Plan, counted as 
100%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices, but has 
a system equivalent to a 
National Contingency Plan, 
counted as 50%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices by 
having a National Contingency 
Plan, counted as 0%. 
Use of Tiered 
response 
Sweden follows international 
practices by using Tiered 
Preparedness and Response, 
counted as 100%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices, but uses 
a system equivalent to Tiered 
Preparedness and Response, 
counted as 50%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices by using 
Tiered Preparedness and 
Response, counted as 0%. 
Evaluation scores Sweden scores more than one 
standard deviation from the 
average score of the compared 
countries, equal to more than 
85%. 
Sweden scores within +/- one 
standard deviation from the 
average score of the compared 
countries, equal to between 
61% and 85%. 
Sweden scores less than one 
standard deviation from the 
average score of the compared 
countries, equal to less than 
61%. 
 
These levels correspond to if a variable is higher than average, average, or below 
average. All of the units of analysis will have to demonstrate that they at least reach 
the rank of Sufficient for H5 to be accepted, meaning that Swedish oil spill 
preparedness is equivalent to other countries, but should be further developed. If all 
variables are ranked Preferable, Swedish oil spill preparedness is at the best practice 
level. If any of the variables are ranked Insufficient, certain oil spill preparedness 
measures are missing, compared to other countries. 
9.2.2	 Sources	
Data was collected from publicly available sources online, primarily government 
websites. Project reports have been gathered from the project pages of various oil 
spill projects. Data from the RETOS programme has been gathered from country 
representatives, primarily the responsible oil spill agencies in the Baltic Sea area, the 
United States, and Norway. The Baltic Sea countries and Norway were chosen as 
they represent the neighbouring countries and the United States is used as a reference 
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country. Scientific papers have been gathered through the library at the World 
Maritime University (WMU) and online open access journals. 
 
Additional information and comments have been collected from the interviews (see 
Appendix B - Interview) with the Swedish National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating (NSO), described in Chapter 4. 
9.2.3	 Analysis	
Different methods for analyses have been used in this chapter. The statistical 
analyses and graphs were generated using the GraphPad Prism statistical software. 
The statistical analyses used are Berger’s test, Friedman’s test, and Dunn’s post test. 
9.2.3.1	 Convention	analysis	
The assessment of ratified IMO Conventions and Protocols assigned the value 1 to 
each and then added them to form a sum between 0 and 12. For this analysis, 
denounced Conventions and Protocols have been rated as 1, as they were once 
ratified. This analysis does not include any assessment of implementation or 
enforcement of these Conventions and Protocols. 
9.2.3.2	 RETOS™	programme	
The RETOS™ programme has been used for the standardised comparison. It is an 
Excel tool based on original work developed for the ARPEL Governance Project 
(AGP) and refined for the International Oil Spill Conference between 2008 and 2014 
(Taylor et al., 2014; Taylor & Lamarche, 2014; Taylor, Steen, Meza, Couzigou, 
Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a; 2008b). RETOS™ provides a general 
guide for industry and governments to assess their level of oil spill response, 
planning, and readiness management in relation to established criteria, and is 
intended for international best management practices. Many regional and 
international experts from industry and government support RETOS™, for example 
IMO, Clean Caribbean and Americas (CCA), the Regional Activity Center - 
Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Center for the 
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Wider Caribbean (RAC/REMPEITC-Caribe), Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL), 
Caspian and Black Sea’s Oil Spill Preparedness Regional Initiative (OSPRI), the 
Global Initiative West and Central Africa (GI WACAF), and IPIECA. The chosen 
countries have all been analysed using the National RETOS Level A part of the 
RETOS™ Programme, evaluating the basic and most important aspects of national 
preparedness. The B and C levels go further into details of the preparedness and 
assume that Level A is passed. Levels B and C have not been used for the 
comparison, as most countries did not pass the Level A evaluation. 
9.3	 Results	
The results compare international practice with Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
9.3.1	 International	conventions	
As described in Chapter 3, there are several international IMO Conventions and 
Protocols that concern oil spill preparedness. These are MARPOL 73/78 Annex I/II, 
Intervention Convention 69, Intervention Protocol 73, CLC Convention 69, CLC 
Protocol 76 and 92, FUND Convention 71, FUND Protocol 76, 92 and 03, OPRC 
Convention 90, and Bunker Convention 01. The sum of these ratified conventions 
and protocols (IMO, 2015c) was mapped in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53: Sum of the ratified IMO Conventions and Protocols on oil spill preparedness (IMO, 2015c). 
As seen, Sweden is among the countries with the most oil spill related conventions 
ratified, scoring 12 of 12 examined conventions. 
9.3.2	 National	Contingency	Plans	
The countries that have developed a National Contingency Plan (NCP) for oil spill 
preparedness have been mapped in Figure 54, using information from a variety of 
sources (AMSA, 2014; Bratfoss, 2012; EEAA, 1998; Essien, Eduok, & Olajire, 
2011; Ireland, 2013; ITOPF, 2012a; Japan, 2015; Jolma & Haapasaari, 2014; Ly, 
2012; Marinestaben, 2015; MSA, 2000; RAC-REMPEITC, 2015; REMPEC, 2015; 
Republic of Korea, 2015; Reszko, 2011; Russian Federation, 2003; Skrube, 2010; 
VPS, 2014). 
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Figure 54: Countries with National Contingency Plans for oil spill response (AMSA, 2014; Bratfoss, 2012; 
EEAA, 1998; Essien et al., 2011; Ireland, 2013; ITOPF, 2012a; Japan, 2015; Jolma & Haapasaari, 2014; 
Ly, 2012; Marinestaben, 2015; MSA, 2000; RAC-REMPEITC, 2015; REMPEC, 2015; Republic of Korea, 
2015; Reszko, 2011; Russian Federation, 2003; Skrube, 2010; VPS, 2014). 
Sweden is one of 15 countries that have been found to not have a National 
Contingency Plan (10.4%), while 110 have a finished plan (76.4%) and another 19 a 
draft plan (13.2%) of the 144 countries information was available on. 
 
The correlation between having a NCP and being party to the OPRC Convention was 
tested statistically (see Figure 55). 
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Figure 55: Ratification of the OPRC Convention correlated to the existence of an approved or draft 
National Contingency Plan. 
No difference between ratification of the OPRC Convention and the existence of an 
approved or draft NCP was found, Berger’s test (N = 144), p = .179. 
9.3.3	 Tiered	Preparedness	and	Response	
The use of the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept (IPIECA, 2007) has been 
mapped in Figure 56, using a variety of data sources (AMSA, 2014; Bratfoss, 2012; 
EEAA, 1998; Essien et al., 2011; Ireland, 2013; ITOPF, 2012a; Japan, 2015; Jolma 
& Haapasaari, 2014; Ly, 2012; Marinestaben, 2015; MSA, 2000; RAC-REMPEITC, 
2015; REMPEC, 2015; Republic of Korea, 2015; Reszko, 2011; Russian Federation, 
2003; Skrube, 2010; VPS, 2014). 
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Figure 56: Countries using the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept (AMSA, 2014; Bratfoss, 2012; 
EEAA, 1998; Essien et al., 2011; Ireland, 2013; ITOPF, 2012a; Japan, 2015; Jolma & Haapasaari, 2014; 
Ly, 2012; Marinestaben, 2015; MSA, 2000; RAC-REMPEITC, 2015; REMPEC, 2015; Republic of Korea, 
2015; Reszko, 2011; Russian Federation, 2003; Skrube, 2010; VPS, 2014). 
Sweden is one of 85 countries (59.4%) that have not been found to use the Tiered 
Preparedness and Response concept, against 58 countries (40.6%) that do of the 143 
countries information was available on. However, the Swedish response is 
nonetheless divided into the municipal responsibility, the SCG responsibility, and the 
national responsibility in the form of the Oil Spill Depots. 
 
The correlation between having a NCP and using the Tiered Preparedness and 
Response concept was tested statistically (see Figure 57). 
 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
248 
 
Figure 57: Correlation between having a National Contingency Plan (NCP) and using the Tiered 
Preparedness and Response concept. 
Having a NCP shows a significant effect on using the Tiered Preparedness and 
Response concept, Berger’s test (N = 143), p = .004. 
9.3.4	 International	targets	
Different countries have established target values to their national oil spill response 
capacity and response tiers or categorisation (see Table 27) (Bratfoss, 2012; 
HELCOM, 2013a; Jolma & Haapasaari, 2014; Ly, 2012; Marinestaben, 2015; 
Regeringen, 2014d; Reszko, 2011; Saar, 2010; Skrube, 2010; Transport Canada, 
2013; VPS, 2014). 
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Table 27: National oil spill response capacity targets and categorisation of response tiers in tonnes 
(Bratfoss, 2012; HELCOM, 2013a; Jolma & Haapasaari, 2014; Ly, 2012; Marinestaben, 2015; Regeringen, 
2014d; Reszko, 2011; Saar, 2010; Skrube, 2010; Transport Canada, 2013; VPS, 2014). 
Country National Tier 1/local Tier 2/regional Tier 3/national 
Canada  10,000   
Denmark 5,000    
Estonia  <10 <30 >30 
Finland 30,000    
Germany  <50 <50 >50 
Latvia  <10 >10  
Lithuania No information    
Norway No target    
Poland No target    
Russia  <500 500-5,000 >5,000 
Sweden 10,000    
 
9.3.5	 Standardised	comparison	
The neighbouring countries and the United States were evaluated using the 
RETOS™ Programme at the National Level A evaluation. The United States 
represents a country with much developed oil spill preparedness and has been 
included as a reference. No data could be obtained from Estonia. The total scores of 
the neighbouring countries ranged from 56% to 98% with an average of 73.1% (see 
Table 28 and Appendix I - International Practice Results). 
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Table 28: RETOS™ evaluation scores. 
Country RETOS™ score 
Denmark 73 
Finland 83 
Germany 56 
Latvia 66 
Lithuania 65 
Norway 98 
Poland 74 
Russia 74 
Sweden 69 
U.S. 99 
Average 73.1 
STD 12.0 
 
The examined scores of the RETOS™ evaluation were added together to analyse 
data trends (see Figure 58). 
 
 
 
Figure 58: Combined evaluations scores for the Baltic Sea Region countries, including the United States 
and Norway, but excluding Estonia. 
The scores the examined countries are best at are Legislation, Regulations, 
Agreements, Response Coordination, and Tracking, Assessment & Information 
Management. The scores of the individual countries were mapped out on a radar 
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chart in Figure 59, and can be observed in detail in Appendix I - International 
Practice Results. 
 
 
Figure 59: Results of the country evaluations using the RETOS™ programme.  
A statistically significant difference was found between the examined countries, 
Friedman’s test (N = 10), p < .001. Comparing Sweden to the other countries, 
Sweden was significantly different from the United States and Norway, Dunn’s post 
test (N = 7), p < .05. 
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9.4	 Discussion	
Setting Swedish oil spill preparedness into a global context helps to both understand 
the Swedish position in relation to the global oil spill community and explore 
methods to compare oil spill preparedness between countries. 
9.4.1	 International	commitment	
The international political commitment to oil spill preparedness is reflected in the 
ratification of IMO Conventions related to oil spills. However, the number of ratified 
agreements varies a great deal between countries (see Figure 53), with Europe and 
Australia having ratified most of the conventions relating to oil spill preparedness. 
The landlocked countries with a small or no fleet have ratified few, if any, of these 
international conventions. To be able to interpret the results correctly, there is a need 
to understand the global shipping industry. Some countries have adopted national 
legislation to regulate oil spill risk and impacts from international shipping (for 
example OPA90 in the United States). This domestic legislation may cover the 
regulations and requirements of the international conventions, and sometimes surpass 
them, as is the case of OPA90. Critique and issues relating specifically to the 
implementation of the international conventions are also abundant, and many 
countries are accused of only adhering to these conventions on paper (Edwards, 
1993; Holt, 1993; Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; Mitroussi, 2004). The main accusation 
is that IMO aims for the Lowest Common Denominator (LCD), meaning that the 
ambition is set by the least interested country, in order to get universal acceptance of 
its conventions through a consensus process (Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; Mitroussi, 
2004). In the end, it is the responsibility of the signatory Parties’ national 
governments to sufficiently and correctly implement the international conventions. 
 
Sweden places well in comparison with the international community, by having 
ratified all of the oil spill conventions and protocols (IMO, 2015c). Much work has 
been done proactively with international environmental issues and the country can be 
considered to have implemented the IMO Conventions well, excepting the 
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requirement for a National Contingency Plan and that more resources could be 
allocated to enforce the implementation, as was discussed in Chapter 6. 
9.4.2	 Strategic	ambition	
Similarly to the ratification of the conventions, the international targets for oil spill 
response vary greatly between countries (see Table 27). It is difficult if not 
impossible to correctly judge if the response capacity targets are correctly set. 
However, for the Baltic Sea Region, the Swedish target (10,000 tonnes) is set lower 
than Finland (30,000 tonnes), despite having a significantly longer coastline, but 
larger than Denmark (5,000 tonnes), who has a far longer coastline if Greenland is 
included. For the risk of spills, it is suggested that the elevated risk and distance to 
shore in the Gulf of Finland may warrant an increased preparedness there (BRISK, 
2011; COWI, 2012c; Viertola, 2013). Logically, the target values should be based on 
comprehensive risk assessments, taking into consideration the traffic situation, the 
risk of spills, and the coastal sensitivity. It is also noteworthy that these targets are 
set far below a worst-case scenario. 
 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), the secretariat of the Helsinki Convention 
(HELCOM, 2008), has outlined a regional target value for the Baltic Sea in the 
Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) (HELCOM, 2007a). 
 
“Response capacity should be available for responding to a 1,000- 5,000 tonnes 
(depending on the likely accident in the area) oil spill at sea in favourable weather 
within 3 days. Local geographical and other specifics (e.g. archipelago area, 
shallow water, etc.) should be taken into account.” 
 
However, this target does not explicitly specify whether the Baltic Sea countries 
should have this capacity together or per country, but it is implied that this relates to 
the Baltic Sea sub-regions discussed in the adjacent sections of the BSAP. These 
sub-regions (see Figure 60) are defined as: 
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1. Gulf of Bothnia 
2. Gulf of Finland 
3. Central Baltic Sea 
4. Southeast Baltic Sea 
5. Southwest Baltic Sea 
6. Kattegat and the Belt Straits 
 
 
Figure 60: HELCOM and BRISK sub-regions of the Baltic Sea (COWI, 2012b). 
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The BRISK project developed a detailed Baltic Sea risk assessment and 
recommended specific response targets for the Baltic Sea based on the BSAP 
(COWI, 2012b). In these recommendations, the 5,000 tonnes were interpreted to 
apply to each country in each sub-region (see Figure 60). The BRISK project 
interpretation was made after consulting the HELCOM experts, as the project 
worked closely with the secretariat. It is also notable that the target values are not 
scaled to the length of the coastlines or the size of sea areas of the different countries. 
Return periods, meaning the estimated time before an oil spill occurs, were also 
calculated based on the risk assessment for both recommended values and existing 
values (see Table 29). 
 
Table 29: BRISK sub-regional spill capacity and estimated return period for oil spills (COWI, 2012b). 
Sub-
regi
on 
Sub-region countries Recommended 
capacity (tonnes) 
Existing capacity 
(tonnes) 
Recommended 
return period 
(years) 
Existing 
return period 
(years) 
1 Sweden, Finland 10,000 5,000 800 270 
2 Finland, Russia, Estonia 15,000 45,000 380 850 
3 Sweden, Estonia, Latvia 15,000 5,000 250 105 
4 Latvia, Russia, Poland 15,000 12,000 1,800 1,400 
5 Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany, Poland 
20,000 34,000 165 250 
6 Denmark, Sweden 10,000 20,000 75 120 
Total  85,000 121,000   
 
BRISK then consulted the existing response capacity and the planned investments of 
the Baltic Sea states and found that the overall existing spill capacity is 42.3% higher 
than the recommendations. However, this conclusion has a few limitations. It 
assumes that the recommended 5,000 tonnes set in the BSAP is a suitable target 
value and does not reflect the onshore capacity. 
 
Comparing to the other areas of this risk assessment (see Table 27), the Swedish 
target of 10,000 tonnes, which has been in place since 2006 (Kustbevakningen, 
2007), seems realistic. However, response capacity is extremely dependent on 
weather conditions. In light of the risk assessments published in recent years (COWI, 
2012c; J. Johansson & Molitor, 2011; Rådberg & Gyllenhammar, 2012), a re-
evaluation of this goal is needed. As mentioned before, the previous onshore target 
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value of 10,000 tonnes has disappeared from the Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill 
Preparedness (NSO, 2014b). This frees the response from focusing on an assumed 
and perhaps unrealistic target value, but also makes it harder to plan for an oil spill 
that could be interpreted as being 100 tonnes or 100,000 tonnes. Many countries deal 
with the scale issue through the use of the Tiered Preparedness and Response 
concept. This calls for a debate in Sweden on whether the response should be 
planned according to a realistic scenario or a worst-case scenario. 
9.4.3	 Management	system	
The results of the development of a country-specific National Contingency Plan 
(NCP), shows that 110 countries have a NCP and a further 19 have a draft plan of the 
144 countries with available information. However, the results need to be interpreted 
with caution. Three assumptions should be clarified. 
 
• The data do not show the quality of the NCP for any specific country, which 
likely varies significantly between countries. 
• The data do not exclude the existence of a functional contingency planning 
system with an absence of a NCP, or that regional or local oil spill response 
plans are in place. 
• The data does not reveal if the NCP covers the onshore response or not, as in 
the Swedish example. 
 
The analysis of the global management systems shows that a NCP is considered a 
standard practice. There is no correlation between being party to the OPRC 
Convention and having a NCP (see Figure 54). This reinforces the critique by 
Knudsen and Hassler (2011) of the limited effect of the IMO Conventions in 
regulating oil spill preparedness in the individual nations, as the OPRC Conventions 
was meant to encourage developing countries to increase their oil spill preparedness, 
in part by establishing NCPs (Holt, 1993). This partially opposes the view of Knapp 
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and Franses (2009), who argued that the IMO Conventions in general have had a 
positive effect on decreasing pollution from ships. 
 
The usage of the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept shows that 58 countries 
of the 143 with available information have adopted this concept to varying degrees. 
However, the boundaries of the different Tiers vary (see Table 27) and it is argued 
that they indeed should not have specific values (IPIECA, 2007), but be designated 
by the responsible authority for each spill. 
 
The statistical correlation shows that most countries that have a NCP also adopt the 
Tiered Preparedness and Response concept (see Figure 57). This is reasonable, as the 
two measures are strongly associated in the planning community (IPIECA, 2007; 
ITOPF, 2011b; Jamieson, 2005). As discussed in the introduction, Tiered 
Preparedness and Response is more widespread in the industry (IPIECA, 2007). This 
means that most of the response authorities at sea, such as coast guards, navy etc., 
are familiar with the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept. However, this 
familiarity likely does not exist among the response authorities onshore. This likely 
leads to communication issues when collaborating internationally between 
organisations using the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept and those who do 
not. 
 
Sweden has a national response system in place, which can and has been interpreted 
as having a NCP (ITOPF, 2012a). Chapter 6 discussed why Sweden should not be 
considered to have a NCP, since no such document has ever existed. Having a NCP 
only covering the response at sea and not on land, may be the case with other 
reported countries. Thus, a NCP that covers both jurisdictions at sea and on land 
might be less common than is suggested in Figure 54. The Swedish organisation of 
not having a NCP, but instead having an established system with separate 
responsible agencies at sea and on land for the local, regional, and national levels 
might not be uncommon in practice. But the Swedish case discussed in this 
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dissertation shows that a well functioning system could be in place without the need 
for the standard practice of having a NCP and using the Tiered Preparedness and 
Response concept. This suggests that the NCP and Tiered Preparedness and 
Response concept are not critical and indirectly questions their usefulness. 
9.4.4	 International	readiness	
The evaluation results from the RETOS™ Programme show a large variation 
between the evaluated countries (see Figure 59). It is reasonable that the United 
States has scored high in all categories of the test, as the RETOS™ Programme, to a 
large extent, is modelled after the preparedness system in the United States. This 
model is the most developed system in North and Central America and the United 
States has great influence in the region. All the basic issues listed in the National 
RETOS™ Level A evaluation have been addressed in the United States. It is 
noteable that all of the Baltic Sea countries are more or less developed to the same 
degree, with an evaluation score between 56% and 74%. Sweden received an 
evaluation score of 69%, corresponding to the status “In Development”. Norway and 
Finland have used part of their oil revenue for developing oil spill preparedness and 
are expectedly scoring higher than Sweden. 
 
It cannot be ruled out that the better RETOS™ score of the United States compared 
to Sweden is not because of the Incident Management System (IMS), but because of 
other factors. Regardless, as discussed in Chapter 5, the IMS may not be appropriate 
for Sweden in all circumstances. Indeed, Sweden scores high despite the fact that it 
does not use IMS or the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept, and does not 
have an NCP. 
 
The evaluation results are not approved as the "official" evaluations by all countries, 
as not all of the respective governments have cleared them. However, highly 
qualified individuals, and generally the person responsible for the national 
contingency planning, supplied the data. 
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Results from the NSO interviews (January 2015), show a divided opinion among the 
experts on the statement “Swedish oil spill preparedness is equivalent to 
international standard.”. Two informants disagreed with the statement, two were in 
agreement, and two did not have an opinion (see Figure 61). 
 
 
Figure 61: Expert opinion on the statement “Swedish oil spill preparedness is equivalent to international 
standard.”. 
The informants argue that lessons learned from other countries have been taken into 
account when developing the Swedish oil spill preparedness. As Sweden is active in 
several regional agreements and forums on oil spill preparedness, comparable 
practices to the regional countries have been developed. Informants of both opinions 
have worked with oil spills or exercises abroad, although primarily in the Baltic and 
North Sea context. The results of the RETOS™ evaluation shows that the Swedish 
oil spill preparedness is indeed equivalent to international practice, at least the 
practice around neighbouring countries. 
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9.4.5	 Implications	
It is noteworthy that Sweden scores well using the RETOS™ evaluation, in 
comparison to the neighbouring countries, despite not having a NCP or using Tiered 
Preparedness and Response. This suggests that those measures are not be needed to 
maintain a good preparedness level, although they most likely will help 
communication during international cooperation and operations. 
 
The scores of the analysed variables for oil spill planning in this chapter have been 
summarised in Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Scores for the H5 variables. 
 Preferable Sufficient  Insufficient Score 
Number of 
conventions 
Sweden has ratified a 
number of conventions 
more than one standard 
deviation from the average, 
equal to more than 87.0%. 
Sweden has ratified a 
number of conventions 
within +/- one standard 
deviation from the average, 
equal to between 16.6% 
and 87.0%. 
Sweden has ratified a 
number of conventions less 
than one standard deviation 
from the average, equal to 
less than 16.6%. 
100.0% 
Target value Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets 
higher than 95% or more of 
the neighbouring countries. 
Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets 
higher than 50% up to 95% 
of the neighbouring 
countries. 
Sweden has oil spill 
preparedness targets lower 
than 50% of the 
neighbouring countries. 
50.0 % 
Use of NCP Sweden follows 
international practices by 
having a National 
Contingency Plan, counted 
as 100%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices, but 
has a system equivalent to 
a National Contingency 
Plan, counted as 50%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices by 
having a National 
Contingency Plan, counted 
as 0%. 
50.0 % 
Use of Tiered 
response 
Sweden follows 
international practices by 
using Tiered Preparedness 
and Response, counted as 
100%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices, but 
uses a system equivalent to 
Tiered Preparedness and 
Response, counted as 
50%. 
Sweden does not follow 
international practices by 
using Tiered Preparedness 
and Response, counted as 
0%. 
50.0 % 
Evaluation scores Sweden scores more than 
one standard deviation from 
the average score of the 
compared countries, equal 
to more than 85%. 
Sweden scores within +/- 
one standard deviation from 
the average score of the 
compared countries, equal 
to between 61% and 85%. 
Sweden scores less than 
one standard deviation from 
the average score of the 
compared countries, equal 
to less than 61%. 
69% 
 
As shown by analysis of the variables in Table 30, none of the variables are ranked 
Insufficient. Since the national ratification of the relevant international oil spill 
conventions is perfect, the national targets are in line with the neighbouring 
countries, Sweden is one of few countries that do not have a NCP or use the Tiered 
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Preparedness and Response concept, but score similarly to the other Baltic Sea 
Region states, the hypothesis: 
 
H5 – Preparedness in Sweden is equivalent to international practice 
is accepted and the null hypothesis H50 is rejected. 
9.4.6	 Limitations	
The principal dataset for the NCP and the Tiered Preparedness and Response relies 
on data that is not up to date (ITOPF, 2012a). The oldest record was updated in May 
1996, but the majority were updated between 2005 and 2012. Effort has been made 
to verify this data, but information on the national contingency plans was not 
publicly available in most countries. Additionally, the interpretation of an NCP and 
the Tiered Preparedness and Response might vary between countries as well as the 
actual implementation. Thus, the data should be considered unverified, especially for 
the developing countries. Primary data sources from the neighbouring countries of 
Sweden have been used for verification, so these values should be considered 
reliable. This makes the data from other areas unreliable and a direct comparison 
should not be made, but are useful as a general indication of the use of NCP and the 
Tiered Preparedness and Response. 
9.5	 Conclusion	
This chapter introduces a novel method to statistically compare the results of the 
RETOS™ country evaluations using Friedman’s test. However, the method requires 
some tweaking to make it easier to distinguish between outliers in the material. In 
this analysis, the United States and Norway are two external controls the Baltic Sea 
Region countries were compared to for the RETOS™ evaluation. The nature of a 
rank sum calculation also makes the method more powerful if the number of 
compared units, the countries, increase. However, most of the RETOS™ evaluation 
indicators are focusing on the sea response and does not reflect the onshore 
preparedness and response as well. 
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The convention ratification, existence of a National Contingency Plan and use of the 
Tiered Preparedness and Response concept, are considered crude indicators. There 
are insufficient data available to analyse the National Contingency Plan and Tiered 
Preparedness and Response concept properly, and a deeper analysis would yield a 
better result. Thus, the result can only be used as an indication of the global practice 
of these concepts. However, it is still evident that most countries indeed have a 
National Contingency Plan, and to some extent use the Tiered Preparedness and 
Response concept. 
 
However, despite not having a National Contingency Plan or using the Tiered 
Preparedness and Response concept, Sweden appears to be at a similar oil spill 
preparedness level to its neighbouring countries. This suggests that a National 
Contingency Plan and the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept are not critical 
and indirectly questions their usefulness. This is especially true if other 
corresponding measures exist, as they do in the Swedish case. The main use for 
Sweden to develop a National Contingency Plan would be to harmonise the various 
regional and municipal plans into a national system and use terminology in line with 
the global practice. This would utilise the best practices from abroad and simplify 
cooperation and understanding during international operations. 
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Chapter	10	-	Conclusion	
The final chapter summarises the dissertation findings and explains the implications 
to Swedish oil spill preparedness. Recommendations, limitations, and future research 
topics are also presented.  
10.1	 Introduction	
This dissertation set out to analyse the Swedish oil spill preparedness to manage a 
large oil spill by analysing its management, and prevention, planning, and response 
measures. Oil spills refer to oil pollution from ships, pipelines, fixed installations, 
ports etc. and concerns any oil spills affecting the Swedish territorial sea or EEZ. 
 
Sweden has never experienced any oil spills over 1,200 tonnes and most spills have 
been below 700 tonnes. This means that responders do not have much real field 
experience. To majority of the local and regional authorities, the most recent oil spill 
happened a long time ago, and some areas have never experienced any spill at all. 
This situation has helped to create a false sense of security, and oil spill preparedness 
is not generally prioritised in Sweden. Consequently, organisational resources are 
allocated to other more pressing tasks. However, poor preparedness will presumably 
lead to a costly response once an oil spill occurs, as the spill will be managed 
ineffectively and result in an insufficient response (IPIECAOGP, 2015; ITOPF, 
2011b; NRT, 1989; Twigg, 2002). Experts agree that a longer time to respond will 
doubtless result in an increased environmental impact and subsequently an higher 
cost for clean-up, damage compensation, and environmental restoration, while a 
well-functioning oil spill preparedness management will lead to a faster and more 
effective response with significantly less damage and lower cost (Elmgren et al., 
1983; Etkin, 2000; Kirby & Law, 2010; Lindén et al., 1979; Smith, 1968; Taylor, 
Steen, Meza, Couzigou, Hodges, Miranda, Ramos, & Moyano, 2008a; Tegeback & 
Hasselström, 2012). However, it should be stressed that the amount of oil is not 
correlated with the amount of damage. Even a small spill can cause significant 
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damage, if occurring for example during bird migration, seal birthing, or fish 
spawning. 
 
The need for pre-emptive prevention measures, effective contingency planning, and 
well-trained response measures in order to have sufficient oil spill preparedness in 
Sweden is put forward in this dissertation. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to better understand the state of oil spill preparedness 
in Sweden today and use the findings to recommend improvements. The study 
sought to answer the overall research question: 
 
Is Sweden prepared to handle a large oil spill? 
 
This question was divided into five sub-questions about Swedish oil spill 
preparedness: 
 
1. Is the oil spill preparedness regime effectively managed? 
2. Is the political commitment for oil spill prevention sufficient? 
3. Are the existing contingency planning measures sufficient? 
4. Are the existing response measures sufficient? 
5. Is the oil spill preparedness regime equivalent to international practice? 
10.2	 Findings	
The main empirical findings on the state of oil spill preparedness in Sweden have 
been divided into Chapter 5 - Management, Chapter 6 - Prevention, Chapter 7 - 
Planning, Chapter 8 - Response, and Chapter 9 - International practice, each based on 
the different research questions.  
 
This section summarises these findings to answer the research questions: 
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10.2.1	 Is	the	oil	spill	preparedness	regime	effectively	managed?	
In order to be effectively managed, the organisational structure should be logically 
tied to the organisational responsibilities and the organisations involved should know 
their place and responsibilities. It was found that: 
 
• The national oil spill preparedness system does not have a hierarchical 
structure, and only 70% of the organisations have a mandate for oil spill 
preparedness. This leads to uncertainties regarding division of responsibilities 
and priorities among the authorities, and potential delays in complex 
situations where quick decisions are essential for an effective response. 
• There is an established network both for contingency planning and for 
response, covering 83% and 88% of the maximum theoretical connections. 
The Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Oil 
Spill Depots, the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine Management, and 
the Oil Spill Advisory Service are central organisations. However, the Oil 
Spill Advisory Service contract was discontinued during 2014 and this 
service faces an uncertain future, which will likely impact the network. 
• The respondents generally understand the structure of the management. The 
role of the Swedish Coast Guard is particularly clear. However, the roles and 
responsibilities for oil spills of the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine 
Management and the Environmental Protection Agency are unclear to the 
respondents. Despite that the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine 
Management has no direct mandate for oil spill preparedness and its role is 
viewed as unclear, it occupies a surprisingly central role in the oil spill 
management network. 
• The few connections between the counties, and in some cases between 
neighbouring municipalities, in the management network suggests a need to 
implement the Function-based system for larger cross-organisational 
operations, for example for oil spills.  
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• In contrast to the situation in most other countries, the oil industry is only 
peripherally involved in the oil spill planning and response network. 
 
In conclusion, the preparedness regime is effectively managed, as the Swedish oil 
spill preparedness management structure is generally understood by the involved 
organisations, it follows a logical division of responsibilities, and has an established 
network. 
10.2.2	 Is	the	political	commitment	for	oil	spill	prevention	sufficient?	
In order to have sufficient political commitment, the relevant international 
conventions should be ratified and international agreements should be signed and 
have been implemented and budgeted for. It was found that: 
 
• Sweden follows its political commitment for safety and environmental 
protection by having all international conventions related to oil spill 
preparedness ratified and all international agreements signed, as well as 
taking an active part in implementation and enforcement. 
• Sweden does not fulfil the requirements of the OPRC Convention, by not 
having a National Contingency Plan. The Swedish Coast Guard Emergency 
Response Plan appears to have been interpreted internationally to be the 
National Contingency Plan, but neither this nor the document developed by 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency fulfils the criteria defined in the 
OPRC Convention. However, the Swedish preparedness system is functional 
despite not having a National Contingency Plan, and such a plan is therefore 
not necessary, unless it regulates other issues, for example training and 
exercises. 
• The funding for preparedness measures and agencies has increased by 24% 
between 2010 and 2015 and seem sufficient to accomplish the mandates. 
However, there is still a need to redistribute the organisations’ internal 
budgets to prioritise oil spill preparedness. 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
267 
In conclusion, the political commitment is sufficient, as all international conventions 
related to oil spill preparedness are ratified and all relevant international agreements 
are signed and implemented (with the exception of having a National Contingency 
Plan), and as sufficient budget to maintain oil spill preparedness for the relevant 
government agencies and municipalities has been found. 
10.2.3	 Are	the	existing	contingency	planning	measures	sufficient?	
In order to have sufficient oil spill contingency planning measures and since Sweden 
does not have a National Contingency Plan, the planning responsibility lies with the 
municipalities. The municipalities supported by the County Administrative Boards 
should have updated oil spill contingency plans, taking into account risk assessment 
and sensitive areas. It was found that: 
 
• Only 27% of the municipalities and 33% of the County Administrative 
Boards have a risk assessment for oil spills. 
• Sensitivity mapping tools are used by 78% of the coastal municipalities, but 
most of the data are based on digitised maps from the 1960s.  
• Although there has been an increase in the development of plans between 
2011 and 2015, only 79% of the coastal municipalities have an oil spill 
contingency plan. 
• In contrast to the governmental agencies, the resources for oil spill planning 
among the municipalities appear to be sufficient for the current level of 
activity as there is no difference in contingency planning and exercise activity 
between municipalities with increased or decreased resources for oil spill 
preparedness during the last five years. This suggests that other factors than 
resources determine the oil spill preparedness development within the 
municipalities. 
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In conclusion, contingency planning measures are not sufficient, as only a few of the 
municipalities and County Administrative Boards have performed risk assessments, 
have an updated oil spill contingency plan, or use environmental sensitivity maps. 
10.2.4	 Are	the	existing	response	measures	sufficient?	
In order to have sufficient response measures, all municipalities would have to be 
properly trained and frequently conduct oil spill exercises. Available equipment 
should be located close to the risk areas in sufficient quantities. A systematic 
training, exercise, and evaluation regime and engagement in external projects should 
be evident. It was found that: 
 
• The level of formal oil spill training among the coastal municipalities is only 
70% for the basic course on Environmental impacts and up to 23% for the 
advanced course as a Staff specialist. Given the recent move from a no cost to 
a fee-based system for training courses, participation in the courses will likely 
decrease. 
• Regional equipment centres exists in the Oil Spill Depots and equipment have 
not been reported to be a limitation during any of the recent real oil spill 
responses.  
• Only 60% of the municipalities have exercised their contingency plans within 
the last 5 years and many have never exercised their plans at all. 
Requirements for regular tabletop and deployment exercises should be 
enforced by the authorities, in order for the training to have a lasting effect on 
the organisations and in order to build needed inter-organisational 
relationships. 
• Results show that exercises are closely associated with the EU oil spill 
projects examined, suggesting that a main driving factor is involvement in 
external oil spill projects. 
• The recent nine exercises and two real oil spill evaluations that have been 
analysed showed that only 45% use an established evaluation methodology, 
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and although 73% give recommendations, only 18% of them required any 
follow-up. 
 
In conclusion, response measures are not sufficient, as municipal training is low, not 
all Swedish municipalities have conducted an oil spill exercise, no common 
evaluation method for exercise is used, recommendations are not followed up, and 
conducted exercises are to a great extent driven by external projects. 
10.2.5	 Is	the	oil	spill	preparedness	regime	equivalent	to	international	
practice?	
In order to have a level of oil spill preparedness equivalent to international practice, 
the relevant international conventions should be ratified, a National Contingency 
Plan and Tiered Preparedness and Response concept should be used, and the oil spill 
preparedness target value and RETOS™ evaluation score should be in line with 
those of the neighbouring countries. It was found that: 
 
• Sweden is one of the countries that have ratified all of the relevant oil spill 
preparedness conventions, although the implementation of the OPRC 
Convention 1b § 6 is lacking. 
• The Swedish oil spill response capacity target of 10,000 tonnes at sea is 
similar to those of the Baltic Sea Region countries. However, this number 
should be reviewed in light of the changed oil spill risk in the Baltic Sea. 
• Despite not using the common international practices of having a National 
Contingency Plan or using the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept, 
Sweden has a RETOS™ evaluation score close to the Baltic Sea Region 
countries, but significantly lower than the United States and Norway. 
 
In conclusion, Sweden has an oil spill preparedness level equivalent to international 
practice, as ratification of the relevant international oil spill conventions is perfect, 
systems similar to a National Contingency Plan and Tiered Preparedness and 
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Response concept are used, and national oil spill preparedness targets and RETOS™ 
evaluation scores are comparable to those of neighbouring countries. 
10.2.6	 Conclusion	
Considering the variables ranked Insufficient among the results, the main hypothesis 
 
Hmain – Sweden is prepared for an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes 
 
is rejected. Following the rationale in Chapter 4, all of the embedded hypotheses 
must be ranked sufficient for the main hypothesis to also be ranked sufficient. If any 
of the variables are insufficient, important links in the Swedish oil spill preparedness 
is missing. 
 
But a rejection of the main hypothesis does not mean that Sweden is unprepared for a 
large oil spill in all aspects. This dissertation has shown that the country is on the 
whole well prepared. However, Sweden is shown to be insufficient in some 
important aspects of preparedness, for example management, training, and exercises, 
which leads to the rejection of the main hypothesis. 
 
It is concluded that the current level of preparedness is not structured to handle an oil 
spill as large as 10,000 tonnes. An oil spill of that magnitude would likely take 
several years to clean up. However, each spill is unique and favourable conditions 
(e.g. calm weather, proximity to infrastructure, and qualified personnel) for a large 
spill could mean that it could be handled, while unfavourable conditions (e.g. stormy 
weather, remote locations, and limited qualified personnel accessible) for a small 
spill, could mean that it cannot be handled (Etkin, 2000; IPIECA, 1994a; ITOPF, 
2011b; Singsaas & Lewis, 2011). 
10.3	 Implications	
This dissertation has increased the knowledge concerning oil spill preparedness in 
Sweden by analysing the relationships in the oil spill preparedness management 
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network, and measures affecting oil spill prevention, planning, and response. The 
understanding of the Swedish oil spill preparedness has enabled comparative 
analyses to neighbouring countries and international practices. The theoretical 
implications of this study are discussed below. 
10.3.1	 Management	theory	
The non-hierarchical team-based structure of the Swedish management of oil spill 
preparedness has been described in detail in Chapter 5. The theoretical advantages of 
a Function-based structure (Buck et al., 2006; IPIECAOGP, 2014a; Lindell et al., 
2005) over a traditional Team-based organisational (ITOPF, 2012b) structure has 
also been discussed, using the Swedish example. 
 
This dissertation shows that it is possible to build a working oil spill response 
management system without a Function-based structure, as has been done in 
Sweden. This supports Waugh and Streib’s (Waugh & Streib, 2006) arguments that 
centralisation is unrelated to response effectiveness. However, it is suggested that the 
Swedish Team-based structure will work up to a certain scale, above which this 
structure will lose effectiveness. This concerns complex operations and has been 
suggested after the large forest fire in Sweden during 2014 (Sjökvist, 2015). This 
critique specifically targeted the lack of responsible parties at a national level and the 
prioritisation between different counties. 
 
Although the RETOS™ evaluation gives the Function-based countries like the 
United States and Norway higher scores than Sweden, it is difficult to interpret the 
effect of the management structure using the evaluation scores. This study does not 
go as far as Waugh and Streib who suggest that centralisation is destructive for 
preparedness. Waugh and Streib (2006) argue that authority by itself, without 
trusting relationships already established between the involved actors, offers an 
inadequate basis for coordination. Compared to the United States, Sweden is a much 
smaller country, which makes it easier to develop and maintain the personal 
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connections emphasised separately by Ödlund (2010), Moynihan (2009), and Buck 
(Buck et al., 2006). 
 
However, if the organisations are not coordinated and are too autonomous, there will 
be a lack of centralised direction and the possibility of parallel work (Moynihan, 
2009), exemplified by the Tjörn oil spill (MSBHaV, 2014). This suggests that a size 
span exists, where the Team-based structure works best in smaller countries with a 
limited number of organisation and personnel in an operation (like the Swedish 
case), and the Function-based structure works best in larger countries with several 
organisation and a multitude of personnel (such as the state-wide disasters in the 
United States). Considering the low number of connections between the counties in 
Sweden, and between some of the neighbouring municipalities, it can be argued that 
there is indeed a need for the Function-based system. If such a system would be 
universally used in Sweden among the responding agencies, it would be easier for 
the agencies to find their place. Time may otherwise be lost when agencies and 
organisations unfamiliar to each other have to start to cooperate during a stressful 
response. 
 
The uncertainty regarding the roles of the Swedish Agency for Water and Marine 
Management and the Environmental Protection Agency implies that there is little 
knowledge about the mandates of these organisations. The results of this dissertation 
generally reinforces Moynihan (2009), in that untrusted organisations are only 
peripherally included in the management structure, and may require more effort to 
find their place and make a positive impact. However, the central role of the Swedish 
Agency for Water and Marine Management revealed in this study does not agree 
with Moynihan’s research, implying that other factors likely play an important part 
here. Speculatively, this could be linked to the expected functions of an unknown 
agency, even when no prior trust has been established, as explained by Meyerson et 
al.’s (1996) concept of “swift trust”. Swift trust is the process where members in 
temporary groups relate to each other according to their roles rather than as persons. 
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Consequently, swift trust is built on professionalism and not on character and could 
be especially influential when strangers cooperate. 
Quarantelli’s (1982) principle: 
 
“Planning should be based on what is likely to happen. While catastrophic and 
worst-case disasters do occur, preparedness efforts should focus first on disaster 
scenarios that are typical and probable. Plans should be based on empirically 
grounded assumptions about how members of the public will respond in emergency 
situations, rather than on “common sense" ideas or myths about disaster behavior. 
There is considerable continuity between how people behave during non-disaster 
times and how they behave in disasters. Rather than developing plans that require 
people to do things differently, planners should take this continuity into account.” 
 
is not applicable to an oil spill context. The Baltic Sea risk assessment (COWI, 
2012c) showed that “no oil spill” is the most likely event. On the contrary, oil spill 
preparedness should be planned around a worst-case, or at least a “realistic” worst-
case scenario. This is the philosophy used in the United States National Preparedness 
For Response Exercise Program system, when choosing exercise scenarios (Reiter et 
al., 2005). However, as was noted in Chapter 3, Quarantelli’s principles are primarily 
based on research on natural disasters, and need some interpretation for application 
on oil spill disasters. 
10.3.2	 Network	theory	
The network graphing is a novel way to visualise the organisations involved in oil 
spill planning and response, and has never been used before in the Swedish context. 
Kupucu (2005) used this approach to map out the connections and organisational 
influence when analysing the 9/11 World Trade Centre response, although this was 
based on the degree centrality and closeness. The analysis in this dissertation instead 
used the eigenvector centrality measure, which contains more information as it 
includes the influence of each node’s neighbours (Newman, 2008). 
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The Swedish network structure shows a few nodes with a high number of 
connections and a majority of nodes with few connections. This shows that the 
Swedish oil spill preparedness network is similar to the common pattern described by 
Newman (2003). 
10.3.3	 Evaluation	theory	
The RETOS™ Programme evaluation is another novel way to evaluate the 
preparedness in the Baltic Sea Region. It has been used before in the Caribbean, but 
there are few evaluations publically available (Taylor et al., 2014). Thus, this study 
includes some of the first tests with this model outside of Central America and the 
Caribbean. This dissertation has shown that it is possible to apply the model 
successfully to the Baltic Sea Region. However, there are issues with some of the 
questions, as they refer specifically to details that concern the Incident Command 
System primarily used in the United States. 
 
The findings suggest that the structure of the RETOS™ Programme may not be as 
meaningful to apply in an international context not using a National Contingency 
Plan and Tiered Preparedness and Response, and further refinement may well be 
needed in order to make the programme less focused on the system of the United 
States. 
10.3.4	 Policy	implication	
The particular policy programme this dissertation is meant to impact is the Swedish 
oil spill preparedness policy, which is currently being updated by the National 
Cooperation Group for Oil Combating (NSO, 2014a). Furthermore, the Swedish 
Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness (NSO, 2014b) has recently been revised from the 
previous strategy (Kulander et al., 2004), and harmonised with the new governance 
structure and responsibilities that the creation of SwAM produced. This strategy is 
being followed up with a draft national Action Plan that has been sent for review 
during 2015 to all the affected organisations, and additionally followed up by 
multiple regional hearings during mid-2015 (NSO, 2015). 
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This dissertation argues that there is a need to maintain the momentum that has been 
built around several EU projects on oil spill preparedness during the last five years. 
This study has used empirical evidence to show that the Oil Spill Depots and the Oil 
Spill Advisory Service (OSAS) have been an essential part of the oil spill 
preparedness, and that complete removal of these services will severely impact the 
Swedish oil spill preparedness regime. The new locations and resource pool for staff 
for the Oil Spill Depots have not been tested yet, and it is too early to evaluate this 
new arrangement. As some Depots have been moved closer to risk areas and some 
further away, the net effect is difficult to analyse. 
 
It has been shown that the use of a National Contingency Plan for oil spills and the 
Tiered Preparedness and Response concept is not required for an adequate level of 
preparedness, as Sweden has evaluation scores similar to neighbouring countries that 
have these measures. However, the widespread use of National Contingency Plans 
and the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept abroad and especially in the oil 
industry is a good argument for familiarising responders with the terminology, 
especially for international operations. 
10.4	 Recommendations	
The research findings clearly argue for several measures that should be undertaken 
by Sweden in order to secure a sustainable and somewhat increased oil spill 
preparedness. The six most important measures are presented below in order of 
importance. 
10.4.1	 Establishment	of	a	national	oil	spill	fund	
Sweden should establish a national oil spill fund, in line with the systems in the 
United States or Finland. These funds were established to serve as a national system 
for damage compensation and response costs, covering cases where no polluter can 
be identified or where costs cannot be recovered, and also for research and 
development (NPFC, 2006; Syke, 2014; USCG, 2013). The United States Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund is based on a tax of 8 cents per barrel (raised from 5 cents in 
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2009, ~67 cents per tonne) of oil imported and has accumulated around 1 billion 
USD. The Finnish fund collects 2–3 million EUR in annual revenue from an oil 
pollution protection fee on oil imported to, or transported via, Finland (Syke, 2014). 
If Sweden would establish a similar fund, the corresponding revenue could be used 
to support risk assessments, sensitivity mapping, training, exercises, equipment, 
research, and monitoring. Primarily, it should be used as a buffer to compensate the 
municipalities in situations where the IOPC Fund cannot be used, similar to the 
Finnish model. This would serve the polluter-pays principle and could help Sweden 
maintain a higher level of preparedness. Such a fund was suggested already in 1979 
(Norrby et al., 1979). However, this fund was never established, but would have been 
useful to cover extra costs, for example during the Tjörn oil spill, as the clean-up 
ended partially because there was no more money from the insurance company. 
Additionally, the municipality had to take expensive loans during the clean-up phase, 
while waiting for reimbursement from the insurance company. This situation could 
have been mitigated if a national oil spill fund had existed. Finally, such a fund could 
be used to send appropriate staff abroad as participants or observers during 
international oil spills or exercises. 
10.4.2	 Introduction	of	mandatory	exercises	
A mandatory exercise system should be established in regulations, to require the 
County Administrative Boards and municipalities to exercise their disaster 
contingency plans frequently. In these exercises, oil spills should be a recurring 
theme. The frequency of the oil spill exercises should follow the suggestions in 
Chapter 5, which suggests holding international tabletop exercises once every 4 to 5 
years and national, county, and municipal tabletop exercises once every 2 to 3 years. 
Further suggestions include conducting international, national, and county 
deployment exercises once every 4 to 5 years and municipal deployment exercises 
every 2 to 3 years. These could potentially be the same exercise, which is added to a 
topic at a time, as suggested by Reiter (2005). These exercises should be externally 
evaluated, in order to systematically measure preparedness development, and be 
properly followed-up by the organisations themselves. A step in this direction has 
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been taken in the draft action plan of the Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill 
Preparedness, which designates the County Administrative Boards to coordinate 
exercise needs in their respective county (NSO, 2015). 
10.4.3	 Establishment	of	a	national	task	force	
There is an obvious need for a qualified unit that can provide expert advice for 
planning and on-site guidance during real oil spills. This function has previously 
been performed by the Oil Spill Advisory Service under contract with the Swedish 
Agency for Marine and Water Management. Funding to maintain the Oil Spill 
Advisory Service has not been found, and no agency is willing to take responsibility, 
even if all agencies acknowledge the importance of this service (NSO, 2015). 
 
As an alternative to the Oil Spill Advisory Service, a national task force of oil spill 
experts from different agencies could be formed on demand. The Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency already has such a system in place for disaster response with 
a pool of qualified personnel that can be deployed on short notice when needed. The 
rescue service staff that previously manned the Oil Spill Depots until April 2015 was 
included in this staff pool when the Depots themselves were physically moved to the 
Swedish Coast Guard stations. This staff pool could be expanded to include expertise 
on management, environmental impacts, and oiled wildlife response, creating a 
national task force for all oil spill issues that can be called upon when needed. 
However, such a task force opposes the reasoning that trust is an important factor for 
a successful response (Buck et al., 2006; Ödlund, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006). This 
is because a specialised unit for rare events will have few, if any, personal 
connections to the local municipalities. Consequently, a task force would likely work 
best if it was integrated into regular exercises or permanently attached to an 
organisation, as the Oil Spill Depots or the Oil Spill Advisory Service were 
previously organised. 
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10.4.4	 Involvement	of	research	institutes	
It is interesting to note that hardly any research has been done on the latest larger oil 
spills in Sweden. For example, the Söderhamn spill of pine oil was the first spill of 
its kind and the oil behaved differently than the producers had predicted. In addition, 
regular marine monitoring programmes have not been used to assess oil spill 
pollution effects in the affected areas. This is related to the very limited scope of 
funding available for such studies, with multi-year studies requiring time to prepare 
and process. However, a recent disaster management review called for further 
research in Sweden on the effects and management of large and complex response 
operations (Danielsson et al., 2012). 
 
There are few research groups on oil spill effects and management in Sweden outside 
of the Maritime Environmental Research Group at the World Maritime University, 
notably the Department of Shipping and Marine Technology at Chalmers University, 
the Environmental Studies Research Group at Södertörn University College, and the 
Maritime Science Research Group at the Kalmar Maritime University. There are also 
research groups focused on natural disaster management, for example the Risk and 
Crisis Research Centre at the Mid Sweden University, the Centre for Natural 
Disaster Science, and the Swedish Defence University. These research institutes 
would benefit from being more involved in oil spill and response management and 
could help to evaluate and shape it according to the research findings. 
10.4.5	 Establishment	of	a	management	system	for	national	disasters	
Evidence suggests that due to limited connections between the counties, and 
sometimes between neighbouring municipalities, communication and cooperation 
between them will be hampered by differences in organisational training, design, 
procedures, and titles (Lindell et al., 2005). The degrees to which municipalities and 
County Administrative Boards cooperate with agencies on oil spill preparedness also 
vary. Consequently, there is a need for a different management structure when 
cooperating on large and complex operations on a national level, such as responding 
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to large oil spills. This dissertation suggests a system similar to the Incident 
Command System used in the United States (Lindell et al., 2005), or the state 
response organisation used in Norway (Kystverket, 2015). In the current Swedish 
planar structure, all agencies are at the same hierarchical level. Discussing and 
agreeing response actions taken and how to priorities may delay urgent decisions, 
especially as it involves multiple agencies, County Administrative Boards, and 
municipalities with potentially conflicting interests and priorities. The Incident 
Management System has two important advantages: 1) a hierarchical structure would 
be helpful to assign a responsible organisation or individual (with the intention that 
unresolved issues will not ignored, not to assign any blame), and 2) the different 
organisations would be familiar with the organisational structure, tasks, and 
mandates. However, such an Incident Management System would still require 
training and frequent exercises to familiarise the involved organisations with their 
roles, as the inter-organisational relationships are more important for building trust. 
Additionally, an Incident Management System could be used to engage different 
volunteer organisations and formally assign them a place in the preparedness system. 
 
Although evidence suggests that a National Contingency Plan is not needed for the 
Swedish oil spill preparedness to function, an Incident Management System for use 
during national emergencies could be developed through a National Contingency 
Plan. This plan could also be used to clarify the issues with the division of 
responsibilities, and regulate training and exercise requirements and preparedness 
levels. 
10.5	 Limitations	
This study has assessed the effectiveness of the important national development of 
Swedish oil spill preparedness. The research was conducted between 2009 and 2015 
and is based on publicly available data, interviews with experts from the national oil 
spill authorities, and surveys administered to the coastal County Administrative 
Boards and municipalities. As a direct consequence of this methodology, the study 
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has a number of limitations that have been considered during its formation and 
discussed in the methodology chapter. Additional minor limitations have been 
encountered during the course of the study. 
 
The major additional limitation is time and access. There was insufficient time and 
language access to go into detail regarding the countries that were compared to 
Sweden. An optimal approach would be to select all the Baltic Sea Region countries 
and perform a more elaborated in-depth analysis on each one, in order to compare 
the countries. Such a meta-analysis would identify crosscutting issues and give input 
to the work of the Helsinki Commission response and onshore working groups. 
Another approach would be examining oil spill preparedness in other regions, such 
as the Atlantic, Mediterranean, or Southeast Asia regions. 
10.6	 Future	research	
The scale of the oil spill preparedness discussion is extensive and many issues are 
inconclusive. Several questions suitable for further research have been discovered 
during the course of this study. Exploring them will provide greater insights into the 
topic and increase the level of national and local preparedness. 
10.6.1	 Alternative	fuels	
In striving towards lower emissions and becoming more environmentally friendly, 
many alternative fuels have been developed in recent years, for example different 
kinds of biofuels. These fuels have generally not been spilled, but their behaviour if 
spilled may not be as expected. For example, the pine oil spill in Söderhamn 2011 is 
an example of an alternative oil (although not used as fuel) that did not behave 
according to expectations (Holmström et al., 2014). There is a need to review and 
test existing response measures for such alternative fuels. 
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10.6.2	 Communication	 strategies	 between	 national	 and	 local	
authorities	
Communication between national and local authorities in Sweden needs to be 
improved during an emergency response. With several different agencies involved, 
the national authorities need to maintain good communication without getting the 
message confused. An analysis on the adequacy of existing communication channels 
and their use is needed, as well as an analysis of how social media impacts this 
communication. 
10.6.3	 Environmental	sensitivity	mapping	
Environmental sensitivity mapping is currently not harmonised on any level in 
Sweden. There is a need to develop Swedish criteria for prioritisation of marine areas 
that are sensitive or important for oil spills. These prioritisations need to be practical 
enough to be useful during oil spill response, while still being simple to understand. 
An analysis of different sector uses and how they should be weighed in comparison 
to each other is needed and would additionally be relevant to Marine Spatial 
Planning. It would also be interesting to analyse how calculations of ecosystem 
services can contribute to mapping and prioritisation. 
10.6.4	 Evaluation	models	
There is a need to test the RETOS™ programme evaluation model against another 
evaluation processes to study its strengths and weaknesses. As has been shown in 
this dissertation, it does not work as well when evaluating countries that do not use 
an Incident Command System. Comparative analyses to other frameworks are 
needed to validate RETOS™ and other evaluation models. Additionally, statistical 
models for comparison are needed to analyse the results of the evaluation. 
10.6.5	 Improved	transition	
One of the identified bottlenecks in Sweden concerns the transition from the 
emergency phase to the clean-up phase of an oil spill response. An analysis of the 
definitions of the transition and the transition process itself is needed. Additionally 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
282 
the end phase of the clean-up is in need of analysis, as this decision is also 
subjective. In the Tjörn oil spill, clean-up was essentially stopped when there was no 
money left to spend, which may not be the preferred end point (MSBHaV, 2014). 
10.6.6	 Initiative	among	municipalities	
There is an organisational interest to study what processes and mechanisms are 
required to engage municipalities in rare events such as oil spills. This dissertation 
has shown that some municipalities have maintained the momentum after 
participating in external oil spill projects (for example by implementing a schedule of 
contingency plan exercises and revisions), while others have not. It also showed that 
funding is not an issue, suggesting that important driving forces may instead be 
dedicated individuals, policies, or specific events. An analysis of processes and 
mechanisms that helps the municipalities to implement and maintain project results 
is needed to improve governance.  
10.6.7	 Management	structure	change	
This dissertation has shown that there is a need for a management structure designed 
for large national disasters. An analysis of how such a management structure should 
be organised and when it would be relevant to use is needed. Furthermore, a 
comparison between the bottom-up approach, by structuring the response according 
to the needs of the local responders, the top-down approach, where the national 
legislation is changed and the local responders are trained accordingly, or a mix of 
these approaches, is needed. Clarifications on the use of such a system for different 
types of disasters would also be necessary, for example for oil spills, forest fires, 
refugee crises, tsunami evacuations, and floods. 
10.6.8	 Monitoring	
Only levels of PAHs in blue mussels and sediment concentrations are currently 
applied for environmental monitoring after oil spills in Sweden, primarily based on 
historic oil spills. An analysis of whether these existing indicators are still valid 
today, or if other measurements and indicators have been developed is desired. A 
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comparative analysis of the use of these indicators on the Swedish west coast and in 
the Baltic Sea is also vital, as these environments are quite different and blue mussels 
do not exist in most of the Baltic Sea. 
10.7	 Concluding	remarks	
It has been 12 years since Fu Shan Hai sparked the most recent wave of development 
for Swedish oil spill preparedness in 2003. This period has likely seen the most 
influential development of oil spill preparedness since that which followed the Tsesis 
oil spill in 1977. Oil spill preparedness and response management have been 
tremendously improved. The last of the relevant international conventions have now 
been signed, most of the coastal municipalities have developed or updated their oil 
spill contingency plans, and several response exercises including onshore activities 
have been carried out. However, this momentum needs to be maintained and not 
abate. After increased attention and activities following oil spills, such as Fu Shan 
Hai, diverted priorities will weaken national oil spill preparedness as time goes by. 
After all, oil spills are rare occurrences and follow the saying “Out of sight, out of 
mind”. 
 
The draft action plan that is being circulated for comments during 2015 reveals new 
developments for the Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness. The plan does not 
have any proper actions listed, but rather lists priorities and assigns responsible 
organisations to develop these. Most importantly, the responsibility for oil spill 
contingency planning, training, and exercises are firmly lifted to the regional level, 
giving the County Administrative Boards more responsibilities for oil spill 
preparedness. This is a welcomed development, as a regional approach to planning is 
more realistic considering the few oil spill accidents that occur. However, there is a 
danger that municipalities will assume that all responsibilities for oil spill 
preparedness now belong to the County Administrative Boards. Careful 
communication and balancing is needed to disseminate the proper responsibilities.  
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There are still no agencies willing to accept responsibilities and costs for the oil spill 
support resources: the Oil Spill Advisory Service, the Digital Environmental Atlas, 
and the oil spill drift model SeaTrack Web, despite being declared to be of national 
importance in the Swedish Strategy for Oil Spill Preparedness. The lack of 
responsibility for these resources is unfortunate and has a negative effect on the 
national oil spill preparedness, as these support resources struggle in limbo without 
development and with an uncertain future. The draft action plan acknowledges the 
lack of training and exercises and assigns the National Cooperation Group for Oil 
Combating to develop a national training and exercise strategy, which is in line with 
the results of this dissertation. An essential issue not covered in the draft action plan 
is funding. This dissertation strongly suggests that an oil spill fund should be 
developed in Sweden, already suggested in the wake of the Tsesis accident 35 years 
ago. Such a fund would greatly help to improve Swedish oil spill preparedness, by 
funding maintenance and development the oil spill support resources, as well as 
training and exercises for municipalities, County Administrative Boards, and other 
relevant organisations. 
 
This dissertation establishes the strengths and weaknesses in the Swedish oil spill 
preparedness regime in 2015 and calls for further development. The benefits of 
maintaining and improving the current level of preparedness far outweigh the effort, 
but will only be evident when a large oil spill occurs. 
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Appendix	A	-	Questionnaire	
Questionnaire distributed to all 126 municipalities and 18 County Administrative 
Boards with a coast to the ocean or the three largest Swedish lakes, Vänern, Vättern, 
and Mälaren during winter 2014. 
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Oil spill preparedness in Sweden 
 
Introduction 
 
Page exit logic: AgreementIF: Question "Do you agree these terms and would like to 
participate in this survey?" #1 is one of the following answers ("No") THEN: 
Disqualify and display: "Thank you for your time."  
 
 
 
3/12-2014 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Jonas Pålsson and I am a PhD student at the World 
Maritime University. For my PhD thesis, I am examining the state of oil 
spill preparedness in Sweden, for oil spills at sea. The data collected will 
provide useful information regarding oil spill planning, response, 
organisation and management in Sweden.  
Because you are involved in oil spill contingency preparedness in your 
organisation, I am inviting you to participate in this research study by 
completing an electronic survey. It will take around thirty minutes of 
your time. Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to 
participate at any time. Your participation is much appreciated. There 
is no compensation for responding, but I hope that my findings will 
benefit oil spill preparedness in Sweden in general, by increasing the 
understanding and suggesting improvements. 
 
I will keep all non-public information confidential and only the 
combined results of several interviews will be disclosed, not individual 
answers. The findings will be made available publicly. 
 
The survey has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
World Maritime University. If you are not satisfied with the manner in 
which this study is being conducted, you may report (anonymously if 
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you so choose) any complaints to my supervisor, Professor Olof Lindén.  
 
If you require additional information or have questions, please contact 
me. 
 
Sincerely, 
Jonas Pålsson 
 
+46 709 45 51 32 
jp@wmu.se 
 
Professor 
Olof Lindén 
+46 40-35 63 30 
ol@wmu.se 
 
1) Do you agree these terms and would like to participate in this survey?* 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
 
Participant information 
This section asks basic questions about the participant. 
 
2) Name* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
3) Organisation* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
4) Position* 
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_________________________________________________ 
 
5) Telephone* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
6) Email* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
7) What percent of your work time is dedicated to oil spill preparedness 
issues? 
_________________________________________________ 
 
8) In what capacity do you work with oil spill preparedness issues? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
Thank you for providing valuable information about yourself! Let's 
begin with questions on planning, before moving on to response, 
management and concluding questions. 
 
 
Definitions 
 
These questions are limited to oil spills originating from spills 
originating from vessels at sea and end up on land. The time ranges 
from the planning phase to the initial response phase, but does not 
include the long term clean-up phase. 
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Oil spill preparedness 
This includes all oil spill related issues, relating to risk assessments, 
sensitivity mapping, contingency planning, response, equipment, 
exercises, monitoring, environmental impact and claims. 
 
Oil spill contingency planning 
Only includes issues related to risk assessments, sensitivity mapping 
and contingency planning. 
Excludes issues related to response, equipment, exercises, monitoring, 
environmental impact and claims. 
 
Oil spill response 
Only includes issues related to response, equipment, exercises, 
monitoring, environmental impact and claims. 
Excludes issues related to risk assessments, sensitivity mapping and 
contingency planning. 
 
 
Planning questions 
This section asks questions about the contingency planning part of the 
oil spill preparedness in Sweden. It includes issues related to risk 
assessments, sensitivity mapping and contingency planning and 
excludes issues related to response, equipment, exercises, monitoring, 
environmental impact and claims. 
 
 
 
9) Does your organisation have a formal responsibility for oil spill contingency 
planning? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
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Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have a formal 
responsibility for oil spill contingency planning?" #9 is one of the following 
answers ("Yes") 
10) What is your organisation's responsibility for oil spill contingency 
planning? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
11) Which of the following organisations does your organisation work with on oil 
spill contingency planning? 
[ ] Swedish Coast Guard 
[ ] Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
[ ] Swedish Oil Spill Equipment Depot:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
[ ] Swedish Oil Spill On-call Service 
[ ] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
[ ] Swedish Maritime Administration 
[ ] Swedish Transport Agency 
[ ] Swedish Armed Forces 
[ ] County Administrative Boards:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Municipalities:: _________________________________________________ 
[ ] Volunteer organisations:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Industries:: _________________________________________________ 
[ ] Others:: _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
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12) Does your organisation have an oil spill contingency plan? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have an oil spill 
contingency plan?" #12 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
13) What year was this oil spill contingency plan written? 
_________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have an oil spill 
contingency plan?" #12 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
14) What years were this oil spill contingency plan last revised? 
 Year 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have an oil spill 
contingency plan?" #12 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
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15) Is this oil spill contingency plan shared with other organisations? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Is this oil spill contingency plan shared with 
other organisations?" #15 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
16) With which organisations is this oil spill contingency plan shared, why is it 
shared and how? 
 Name 
Organisation _________________________________________________ 
Organisation _________________________________________________ 
Organisation _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
17) Does your organisation have a risk assessment for oil spills? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have a risk assessment 
for oil spills?" #17 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
18) In what year was the risk assessment written? 
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_________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have a risk assessment 
for oil spills?" #17 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
19) In what years were the risk assessment last revised? 
 Year 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Revision _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
20)  
Several organisations are involved with oil spill planning in various ways and 
their impact to your organisation in oil spill contingency planning may differ. 
 
Please identify how valuable you consider these organisations to be in assisting 
with your oil spill contingency planning (NOT for oil spill response)? 
 
Not 
valuable 
Limited 
value 
Average 
value Valuable 
Very 
valuable 
No 
opinion 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
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21) Some organisations have different responsibilities and priorities for oil spill 
contingency planning. This responsibility may not correspond to the expectations 
of the other organisations involved. 
 
What level of responsibility do you think these organisations should have in oil 
spill contingency planning, compared to today? 
 
No 
responsibility 
Greatly 
decreased 
Slightly 
decreased 
Same 
as 
now 
Slightly 
increased 
Greatly 
increased 
No 
opinion 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
22) Do you think there is a risk for an oil spill (1,000 tonnes or more) in your 
geographic area of jurisdiction between 2015 and 2025? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Do you think there is a risk for an oil spill 
(1,000 tonnes or more) in your geographic area of jurisdiction between 2015 and 
2025?" #22 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
23) Why do you think there is a risk for an oil spill between 2015 and 
2025? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Do you think there is a risk for an oil spill 
(1,000 tonnes or more) in your geographic area of jurisdiction between 2015 and 
2025?" #22 is one of the following answers ("No") 
24) Why do you think there is no risk for an oil spill between 2015 and 
2025? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
Thank you for providing valuable information about planning! 
 
Let's continue with questions on response, before moving on to 
management and concluding questions. 
 
 
Response questions 
This section asks questions about the response part of the oil spill 
preparedness in Sweden. It includes issues related to response, 
equipment, exercises, monitoring, environmental impact and claims and 
excludes issues related to risk assessments, sensitivity mapping and 
contingency planning. 
 
 
 
25) Does your organisation have a formal responsibility for oil spill response? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
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Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Does your organisation have a formal 
responsibility for oil spill response?" #25 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
26) What is your organisation's responsibility for oil spill response? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
27) Which organisations does your organisation work with on oil spill response? 
[ ] Swedish Coast Guard 
[ ] Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
[ ] Swedish Oil Spill Equipment Depot:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
[ ] Swedish Oil Spill On-call Service 
[ ] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
[ ] Swedish Maritime Administration 
[ ] Swedish Transport Agency 
[ ] Swedish Armed Forces 
[ ] County Administrative Boards:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Municipalities:: _________________________________________________ 
[ ] Volunteer organisations:: 
_________________________________________________ 
[ ] Industries:: _________________________________________________ 
[ ] Others:: _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
28) Has your organisation participated in any oil spill exercises? 
( ) Yes 
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( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Has your organisation participated in any oil 
spill exercises?" #28 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
29) What were the names, which years and what were the locations of the last 
exercises your organisation participated in? 
 Name Year Location 
Exercise _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
Exercise _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
Exercise _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Has your organisation participated in any oil 
spill exercises?" #28 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
30) In what way were the exercises helpful to your organisation? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
31) Several organisations are involved with oil spill response in various ways and 
their impact to your organisation in oil spill response may differ. 
 
Please identify how valuable you consider these organisations to be in assisting 
with your oil spill response (NOT for oil spill contingency planning)? 
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Not 
valuable 
Limited 
value 
Average 
value Valuable 
Very 
valuable 
No 
opinion 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
32) Some organisations have different responsibilities and priorities for oil spill 
response. This responsibility may not correspond to the expectations of the other 
organisations involved. 
 
What level of responsibility do you think these organisations should have in oil 
spill response, compared to today? 
 
No 
responsibility 
Greatly 
decreased 
Slightly 
decreased 
Same 
as 
now 
Slightly 
increased 
Greatly 
increased 
No 
opinion 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
33) Exercises are considered an important part of oil spill preparedness. They 
can range from simple tabletop exercises to full deployment exercises. Tabletop 
exercises tests the communication channels and decision making of the oil spill 
response personnel. 
 
How often do you think Sweden needs to conduct tabletop exercises for oil spills 
at different levels? 
 Never 
Less 
than 
once 
Once 
every 
4-5 
Once 
every 
2-3 
Once 
per 
year 
More 
than 
once 
No 
opinion 
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every 
5th 
year 
years years per 
year 
International 
tabletop 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
National 
tabletop 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
tabletop 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipal 
tabletop 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
34) A full deployment exercise tests the equipment to be used in a real spill and 
how well the personnel can handle the equipment, in addition to communication 
and decision making. 
 
How often do you think Sweden needs to conduct full deployment exercises for oil 
spills at different levels? 
 Never 
Less 
than 
once 
every 
5th 
year 
Once 
every 
4-5 
years 
Once 
every 
2-3 
years 
Once 
per 
year 
More 
than 
once 
per 
year 
No 
opinion 
International 
deployment 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
National 
deployment 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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exercises 
County 
deployment 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipal 
deployment 
exercises 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
Thank you for providing valuable information about response!  
 
Let's continue with questions on management, before moving on to 
concluding questions. 
 
 
Management questions 
This section asks questions about the organisation, management and 
communication part of the oil spill preparedness in Sweden. Oil spill 
preparedness includes all oil spill related issues, relating to risk 
assessments, sensitivity mapping, contingency planning, response, 
equipment, exercises, monitoring, environmental impact and claims. 
 
 
 
35) Has any strategy or policy documents made your organisation prioritise oil 
spill preparedness more between 2010 and 2015, compared to before? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
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Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Has any strategy or policy documents made 
your organisation prioritise oil spill preparedness more between 2010 and 2015, 
compared to before?" #35 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
36) What are the names of the strategy or policy documents? 
 Name 
Document _________________________________________________ 
Document _________________________________________________ 
Document _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
37) How has the work load for oil spill preparedness changed in your 
organisation between 2010 and 2015? 
( ) Decreased greatly 
( ) Decreased slightly 
( ) Remains the same 
( ) Increased slightly 
( ) Increased greatly 
Comments:  
 
 
38) How has the budget for oil spill preparedness changed in your organisation 
between 2010 and 2015? 
( ) Decreased greatly 
( ) Decreased slightly 
( ) Remains the same 
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( ) Increased slightly 
( ) Increased greatly 
Comments:  
 
 
39) How has the allocated staff for oil spill preparedness changed in your 
organisation between 2010 and 2015? 
( ) Decreased greatly 
( ) Decreased slightly 
( ) Remains the same 
( ) Increased slightly 
( ) Increased greatly 
Comments:  
 
 
40) Has your organisation been part of any external oil spill project? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Has your organisation been part of any 
external oil spill project?" #40 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
41) Which external oil spill projects has your organisation been part of, when 
were the projects and how were they funded? 
 Name Years Funding source 
Project _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
Project _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
Project _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 
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Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Has your organisation been part of any 
external oil spill project?" #40 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
42) In what way was the projects helpful to your organisation? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
43) This statement addresses the formal roles and division of responsibilities 
between different organisations in the organisational structure of oil spill 
preparedness in Sweden. The roles could be widely known or they could be 
virtually unknown to other organisations. 
 
How do you agree with the statement "The role of this organisation in oil spill 
preparedness is well understood by the others."? 
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
No 
opinion Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
44) Good communication can be a very limiting factor in oil spill preparedness. 
This question addresses the flow of information between different organisations. 
Directions means orders that you are obliged to follow and recommendations 
means advice that would be beneficial to heed, but you are not required to do so. 
 
How do you communicate with these organisations about oil spill preparedness? 
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We don't 
communicate 
They give 
us 
directions 
They give us 
recommendations 
We 
discuss 
We give them 
recommendations 
We give 
them 
directions 
Swedish Coast 
Guard 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill 
Equipment 
Depots 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Agency for 
Marine and 
Water 
Management 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish Oil 
Spill On-call 
Service 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administration 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Transport 
Agency 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Swedish 
Armed Forces 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Municipalities ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Volunteer 
organisations 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Industry ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Others ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comments:  
 
 
Thank you for providing valuable information about management!  
 
Let's finish with some concluding questions. 
 
 
Concluding questions 
This section asks questions about the Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil 
Spill Forum and general issues of the oil spill preparedness in Sweden. 
 
45) Have you heard about the Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil Spill Forum? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you heard about the Baltic Maritime 
Science Park Oil Spill Forum?" #45 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
46) How did you first hear about the Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil Spill 
Forum? 
( ) Colleague 
( ) Project 
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( ) Course 
( ) Internet 
( ) Other: _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you heard about the Baltic Maritime 
Science Park Oil Spill Forum?" #45 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
47) Have you visited the Baltic Maritime Science Park Oil Spill Forum? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you heard about the Baltic Maritime 
Science Park Oil Spill Forum?" #45 is one of the following answers ("No") 
The Baltic Maritime Science Park oil spill forum is a webpage that 
collects information from oil spill preparedness projects in the Baltic 
Sea and displays oil spill news at www.bmsp.se. 
 
48) Please list topics that you believe to be essential to have easy access to for oil 
spill preparedness? 
Topic: _________________________________________________ 
Topic: _________________________________________________ 
Topic: _________________________________________________ 
Topic: _________________________________________________ 
Topic: _________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
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49) Two of the latest oil spills from ships has been the Fu Shan Hai outside Ystad 
in 2003 and the Golden Trader that impacted Tjörn 2011. These vessels spilled 
roughly 1,000 tonnes of oil. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 1,000 tonnes? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Two of the latest oil spills from ships has been 
the Fu Shan Hai outside Ystad in 2003 and the Golden Trader that impacted 
Tjörn 2011. These vessels spilled roughly 1,000 tonnes of oil. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 1,000 tonnes?" #49 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
50) Why do you think your organisation's area is prepared to handle an 
oil spill of 1,000 tonnes? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Two of the latest oil spills from ships has been 
the Fu Shan Hai outside Ystad in 2003 and the Golden Trader that impacted 
Tjörn 2011. These vessels spilled roughly 1,000 tonnes of oil. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 1,000 tonnes?" #49 is one of the following answers ("No") 
51) Why do you think your organisation's area is not prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 1,000 tonnes? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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52) In a strategic document about Swedish oil spill preparedness for 2010 written 
by the Swedish Rescue Agency, the goal that Sweden will be prepared to handle 
an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes by the year 2010 is outlined. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "In a strategic document about Swedish oil spill 
preparedness for 2010 written by the Swedish Rescue Agency, the goal that 
Sweden will be prepared to handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes by the year 2010 
is outlined. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes?" #52 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
53) Why do you think your organisation's area is prepared to handle an 
oil spill of 10,000 tonnes? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "In a strategic document about Swedish oil spill 
preparedness for 2010 written by the Swedish Rescue Agency, the goal that 
Sweden will be prepared to handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes by the year 2010 
is outlined. 
 
Do you think your organisation's geographic area of jurisdiction is prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes?" #52 is one of the following answers ("No") 
54) Why do you think your organisation's area is not prepared to 
handle an oil spill of 10,000 tonnes? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
 
55) What do you think are the most limiting factors in Swedish oil spill 
preparedness? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
56) What do you think are the least limiting factors in Swedish oil spill 
preparedness? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you for providing valuable 
information about oil spill preparedness in Sweden! 
 
 
Thank You! 
 
 
 
My sincerest thank you for taking my survey! The data collected will provide useful 
information about oil spill planning, response, organisation and management in 
Sweden and lead to advances in Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
 
Best regards, 
Jonas Pålsson 
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Interview questions used on the oil spill experts interviewed during January 2015. 
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Oil spill preparedness in Sweden - 
Interview 
 
Introduction 
 
3/12-2014 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Jonas Pålsson and I am a PhD student at the World 
Maritime University. For my PhD thesis, I am examining the state of oil 
spill preparedness in Sweden. The data collected will provide useful 
information regarding oil spill planning, response, organisation and 
management in Sweden. 
 
Because you are a member of the Swedish National Coordination 
Group for Oil Spill Preparedness, I am inviting you to participate in 
this research study by allowing me to interview you on this topic. The 
interview will take around one hour of your time and preferably be 
conducted in person or over Skype or telephone. Participation is strictly 
voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time. Your 
participation is much appreciated. 
 
There is no compensation for responding, but I hope that my findings 
will benefit oil spill preparedness in Sweden in general, by increasing 
the understanding and suggesting improvements. 
 
I will keep all non-public information confidential and only the 
combined results of several interviews will be disclosed, not individual 
answers. The findings will be made available publicly. 
 
The survey has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
World Maritime University. If you are not satisfied with the manner in 
which this study is being conducted, you may report (anonymously if 
you so choose) any complaints to my supervisor, Professor Olof Lindén. 
 
If you require additional information or have questions, please contact 
me. 
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Sincerely, 
Jonas Pålsson 
 
+46 709 45 51 32 
jp@wmu.se 
 
Professor 
Olof Lindén 
+46 40-35 63 30 
ol@wmu.se 
 
 
Participant information 
 
1) Name* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
2) Organisation 
_________________________________________________ 
 
3) Email* 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
Definitions 
 
These questions are limited to oil spills originating from spills originating from 
vessels at sea and end up on land. The time ranges from the planning phase to the 
initial response phase, but does not include the long term clean-up phase. 
 
Oil spill preparedness 
This includes all oil spill related issues, relating to risk assessments, sensitivity 
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mapping, contingency planning, response, equipment, exercises, monitoring, 
environmental impact and claims. 
 
Oil spill contingency planning 
Only includes issues related to risk assessments, sensitivity mapping and 
contingency planning. 
Excludes issues related to response, equipment, exercises, monitoring, 
environmental impact and claims. 
 
Oil spill response 
Only includes issues related to response, equipment, exercises, monitoring, 
environmental impact and claims. 
Excludes issues related to risk assessments, sensitivity mapping and contingency 
planning. 
 
 
Planning questions 
 
4) How do you agree with the statement "The existing system for contingency 
planning in Sweden is sufficient for the national preparedness." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
5) How do you agree with the statement "Sweden needs of a national oil spill 
contingency plan." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
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Comments:  
 
 
6) How do you agree with the statement "Sweden needs a coastal environmental 
sensitivity map." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
Response question 
 
7) How do you agree with the statement "Sweden sufficiently addresses the 
problems identified in the oil spill response exercise evaluations." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
Management questions 
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8) How do you agree with the statement "Swedish oil spill preparedness is 
effectively organised." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
9) How do you agree with the statement "Swedish oil spill contingency planning 
is effectively managed." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
10) How do you agree with the statement "Swedish oil spill response is effectively 
managed." and why? 
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinion 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
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11) What role would you prefer your organisation to have in oil spill 
preparedness and why? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
International questions 
 
12) Have you worked with (including as observer) oil spills outside of Sweden? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you worked with (including as observer) 
oil spills outside of Sweden?" #12 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
13) How many oil spills have you worked with (including as observer) 
outside of Sweden and in what capacity? 
_________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you worked with (including as observer) 
oil spills outside of Sweden?" #12 is one of the following answers ("Yes") 
14) In which countries outside of Sweden did you work with oil spills 
(including as observer)? 
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
15) Have you participated in oil spill exercises (including as observer) outside of 
Sweden? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you participated in oil spill exercises 
(including as observer) outside of Sweden?" #15 is one of the following answers 
("Yes") 
16) How many oil spill exercises have you participated in (including as 
observer) outside of Sweden and in what capacity? 
_________________________________________________ 
Comments:  
 
 
Logic: Hidden unless: Question "Have you participated in oil spill exercises 
(including as observer) outside of Sweden?" #15 is one of the following answers 
("Yes") 
17) In which countries outside of Sweden did you participate in oil spill 
exercises (including as observer)? 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
18) How do you agree with the statement "Swedish oil spill preparedness is 
equivalent to international standard." and why? 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
349 
 
 
  
( ) Strongly disagree 
( ) Disagree 
( ) No opinon 
( ) Agree 
( ) Strongly agree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
Thank You! 
 
My sincerest thank you for taking part in this interview! The data collected will 
provide useful information about oil spill planning, response, organisation and 
management in Sweden and lead to advances in Swedish oil spill preparedness. 
 
Best regards, 
Jonas Pålsson 
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Appendix	C	-	Sendlist	
List of emails addresses the questionnaire was sent to during 2014 and 2015. 
County	Administrative	Boards	
County Name Email 
Blekinge Jonas Hallbom jonas.hallbom@lansstyrelsen.se 
Gotland Mats Lagerqvist mats.lagerqvist@lansstyrelsen.se  
Gävleborg Torleif Michel  torleif.michel@lansstyrelsen.se 
Halland Catrin Käldman catrin.kaldman@lansstyrelsen.se 
Jönköping Börje Karlsson borje.n.karlsson@lansstyrelsen.se 
Kalmar Sigge Sundström sigge.sundstrom@lansstyrelsen.se 
Norrbotten Micael Bredefeldt micael.bredefeldt@lansstyrelsen.se 
Skåne Lars Persson lars.persson@lansstyrelsen.se 
Stockholm Göran Dalin goran.dalin@lansstyrelsen.se  
Södermanland Tomas Birgegård tomas.birgegard@lansstyrelsen.se 
Uppsala Anders Leijon anders.leijon@lansstyrelsen.se 
Värmland Johan Olsson johan.olsson@lansstyrelsen.se 
Västerbotten Patrik Nilsson patrik.u.nilsson@lansstyrelsen.se 
Västernorrland Martin Neldén martin.nelden@lansstyrelsen.se  
Västmanland Ingela Regnell Ingela.Regnell@lansstyrelsen.se 
Västra Götaland Markus Green markus.green@lansstyrelsen.se  
Örebro Marcus Sjöholm marcus.sjoholm@lansstyrelsen.se  
Östergötland Carl Granström carl.granstrom@lansstyrelsen.se 
Municipalities	
Municipality County Name Organisation Email 
Ale Västra 
Götaland 
Fredrik 
Johansson 
Bohus 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
fredrik.johansson@borf.se 
Askersund Örebro Anders 
Larsson 
Nerikes Brandkår anders.larsson@nerikesbrandkar.se  
Borgholm Kalmar Bengt 
Andersson 
Räddningstjänsten Öland bengt.andersson@morbylanga.se  
Botkyrka Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Bromölla Skåne Sanja 
Vojnikovic 
Bromölla kommun sanja.vojnikovic@bromolla.se 
Burlöv Skåne Torbjörn 
Krokström 
Räddningstjänsten Syd torbjorn.krokstrom@rsyd.se 
Båstad Skåne Rolf 
Andreasson 
Räddningstjänsten 
Båstad 
rolf.andreasson@bastad.se  
Danderyd Stockholm Lars 
Winberg 
Danderyds kommun lars.winberg@danderyd.se 
Ekerö Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Enköping Uppsala Maria Kanka Enköpings kommun maria.kanka@enkoping.se  
Eskilstuna Södermanland Katarina 
Reigo 
Eskilstuna kommun katarina.reigo@eskilstuna.se 
Falkenberg Halland Therese 
Jouper 
Räddningstjänsten Väst therese.jouper@rvast.se 
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Gotland Gotland Robert 
Hjalmarsson 
Räddningstjänsten 
Gotland 
robert.hjalmarsson@gotland.se  
Grums Värmland Nils Weslien Räddningstjänsten 
Karlstadsregionen 
nils.weslien@karlstad.se 
Grästorp Västra 
Götaland 
Anders 
Ydergren 
Räddningstjänsten Västra 
Skaraborg 
anders.ydergren@lidkoping.se  
Gullspång Västra 
Götaland 
Daniele 
Coen 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Skaraborg 
daniele.coen@rtos.se  
Gävle Gävleborg Tommy 
Törling 
Gästrike Räddningstjänst tommy.torling@gavle.se 
Göteborg Västra 
Götaland 
Per Nyqvist Räddningstjänsten 
Storgöteborg 
per.nyqvist@rsgbg.se  
Götene Västra 
Götaland 
Tommy 
Emriksson 
Räddningstjänsten Skara-
Götene 
tommy.emriksson@skara.se  
Habo Jönköping Kent 
Granberg 
Habo kommun kent.granberg@habokommun.se 
Hallstahammar Västmanland Erik 
Mattsson 
Mälardalens Brand- och 
Räddningsförbund 
erik.mattsson@mbrf.se  
Halmstad Halland Lars Fredin Räddningstjänsten 
Halmstad 
lars.fredin@halmstad.se 
Hammarö Värmland Nils Weslien Räddningstjänsten 
Karlstadsregionen 
nils.weslien@karlstad.se 
Haninge Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Haparanda Norrbotten Anders 
Lindahl 
 anders.lindahl@haparanda.se 
Helsingborg Skåne Jonas Nylén Räddningstjänsten Skåne 
Nordväst 
jonas.nylen@helsingborg.se 
Hjo Västra 
Götaland 
Daniele 
Coen 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Skaraborg 
daniele.coen@rtos.se  
Huddinge Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Hudiksvall Gävleborg Lennart 
Juhlin 
Norrhälsinge 
Räddningstjänst 
lennart.juhlin@hudiksvall.se 
Håbo Uppsala Louise 
Lightowler 
Håbo kommun louise.lightowler@habo.se 
Härnösand Västernorrland Mats Granat Räddningstjänsten Höga 
Kusten-Ådalen 
mats.granat@hka.se 
Höganäs Skåne Marcus 
Nilsson 
Höganäs kommun marcus.nilsson@hoganas.se  
Järfälla Stockholm Bengt 
Engkvist 
Järfälla kommun bengt.engkvist@jarfalla.se  
Jönköping Jönköping Göran Melin Jönköpings 
räddningstjänst  
goran.melin@jonkoping.se  
Kalix Norrbotten Agneta 
Lipkin 
 agneta.Lipkin@kalix.se  
Kalmar Kalmar Kalle Daleen Kalmar kommun karl-johan.daleen@kalmar.se 
Karlsborg Västra Daniele Räddningstjänsten Östra daniele.coen@rtos.se  
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Götaland Coen Skaraborg 
Karlshamn Blekinge Ulf Melander  ulf.melander@karlshamn.se  
Karlskrona Blekinge Per Drysén  per.Drysen@olofstrom.se  
Karlstad Värmland Nils Weslien Räddningstjänsten 
Karlstadsregionen 
nils.weslien@karlstad.se 
Kramfors Västernorrland Mats Granat Räddningstjänsten Höga 
Kusten-Ådalen 
mats.granat@hka.se 
Kristianstad Skåne Peter Zerpe Räddningstjänsten 
Kristianstad 
peter.zerpe@kristianstad.se  
Kristinehamn Värmland Per Modin Bergslagens 
Räddningstjänst 
per.modin@brt.se  
Kungsbacka Halland Per Nyqvist Räddningstjänsten 
Storgöteborg 
per.nyqvist@rsgbg.se  
Kungsör Västmanland Lena 
Mäenpää 
Västra Mälardalens 
Räddningstjänst 
lena.maenpaa@vmkfb.se 
Kungälv Västra 
Götaland 
Fredrik 
Johansson 
Bohus 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
fredrik.johansson@borf.se 
Kävlinge Skåne Torbjörn 
Krokström 
Räddningstjänsten Syd torbjorn.krokstrom@rsyd.se 
Köping Västmanland Lena 
Mäenpää 
Västra Mälardalens 
Räddningstjänst 
lena.maenpaa@vmkfb.se 
Laholm Halland Elin Tallqvist Räddningstjänsten 
Laholm 
elin.tallqvist@laholm.se  
Landskrona Skåne Hanna 
Johansson 
Räddningstjänsten 
Landskrona 
hanna.i.johansson@landskrona.se  
Lidingö Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Lidköping Västra 
Götaland 
Anders 
Ydergren 
Räddningstjänsten Västra 
Skaraborg 
anders.ydergren@lidkoping.se  
Lomma Skåne Anders 
Åkesson 
Lomma kommun anders.akesson@lomma.se  
Luleå Norrbotten Urban 
Rönnbäck 
Luleå kommun urban.ronnback@rtj.lulea.se  
Lysekil Västra 
Götaland 
Mikael Gard  mikael.gard@uddevalla.se  
Malmö Skåne Torbjörn 
Krokström 
Räddningstjänsten Syd torbjorn.krokstrom@rsyd.se 
Mariestad Västra 
Götaland 
Daniele 
Coen 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Skaraborg 
daniele.coen@rtos.se  
Mellerud Västra 
Götaland 
Tomas 
Sunnerdahl 
Norra Älvsborgs 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
tomas.sunnerdahl@brand112.se 
Motala Östergötland Henrik 
Josefsson 
Räddningstjänsten 
Motala-Vadstena 
henrik.josefsson@motala.se  
Munkedal Västra 
Götaland 
Mikael Gard  mikael.gard@uddevalla.se  
Mönsterås Kalmar Ingemar Idh Mönsterås kommun ingemar.idh@monsteras.se 
Mörbylånga Kalmar Bengt 
Andersson 
Räddningstjänsten Öland bengt.andersson@morbylanga.se  
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Nacka Stockholm Per Höglund  per.hoglund@nacka.se  
Nordanstig Gävleborg Lennart 
Juhlin 
Norrhälsinge 
Räddningstjänst 
lennart.juhlin@hudiksvall.se 
Nordmaling Västerbotten Jörgen 
Forslund 
 jorgen.forslund@nordmaling.se 
Norrköping Östergötland Samuel 
Andersson 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Götaland 
samuel.andersson@rtog.se 
Norrtälje Stockholm Ola 
Andersson 
 ola.andersson@norrtalje.se 
Nykvarn Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Nyköping Södermanland Benny 
Svensson 
Sörmlandskustens 
Räddningstjänst 
benny.svensson@nykoping.se  
Nynäshamn Stockholm Kenneth 
Kollberg 
Nynäshamns kommun kenneth.kollberg@nynashamn.se 
Orust Västra 
Götaland 
Marcus 
Larsson 
Räddningstjänsten Orust marcus.larsson2@orust.se  
Oskarshamn Kalmar Lars 
Blomberg 
Räddningstjänsten 
Oskarshamn 
lars.blomberg@oskarshamn.se 
Oxelösund Södermanland Benny 
Svensson 
Sörmlandskustens 
Räddningstjänst 
benny.svensson@nykoping.se  
Piteå Norrbotten Linda 
Sjölund 
Räddningstjänsten Piteå linda.sjolund@pitea.se 
Robertsfors Västerbotten Lars Tapani Umeå kommun lars.tapani@umea.se 
Ronneby Blekinge Per Drysén  per.Drysen@olofstrom.se  
Salem Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Sigtuna Stockholm Bengt 
Engkvist 
Järfälla kommun bengt.engkvist@jarfalla.se  
Simrishamn Skåne Mats 
Svensson 
Sydöstra Skånes 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
mats.svensson@sorf.se  
Skellefteå Västerbotten Mattias 
Hagelin 
Räddningstjänsten i 
Skellefteå kommun 
mattias.hagelin@skelleftea.se  
Skurup Skåne Mats 
Svensson 
Sydöstra Skånes 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
mats.svensson@sorf.se  
Sollentuna Stockholm Bengt 
Engkvist 
Järfälla kommun bengt.engkvist@jarfalla.se  
Solna Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Sotenäs Västra 
Götaland 
Sandra 
Ylinenpää 
 sandra.ylinenpaa@sotenas.se 
Stenungsund Västra 
Götaland 
Göran 
Andtbacka 
 goran.andtbacka@stenungsund.se  
Stockholm Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Strängnäs Västmanland Annica 
Strandberg 
Strängnäs kommun annica.strandberg@strangnas.se  
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Strömstad Västra 
Götaland 
Peter 
Birgersson 
Dafteryd 
Strömstad kommun peter.birgersson.dafteryd@stromstad.se  
Sundbyberg Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Sundsvall Västernorrland Tomas Öhrn Räddningstjänsten 
Medelpad 
tomas.ohrn@sundsvall.se 
Säffle Värmland Mattias 
Larsson 
Räddningsledning Säffle, 
Arvika, Eda 
mattias.larsson@arvika.se  
Söderhamn Gävleborg Michael 
Lindberg 
Räddningstjänsten Södra 
Hälsingland 
michael.lindberg@kfsh.se  
Söderköping Östergötland Samuel 
Andersson 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Götaland 
samuel.andersson@rtog.se 
Södertälje Stockholm Bo Björklund Södertörns 
Brandförsvarsförbund 
bo.bjorklund@sbff.se  
Sölvesborg Blekinge Per Drysén  per.Drysen@olofstrom.se  
Tanum Västra 
Götaland 
Göran 
Gustavsson 
 goeran.gustavsson@tanum.se  
Tierp Uppsala Lars-Erik 
Falk 
Östhammars kommun lars-erik.falk@osthammar.se  
Timrå Västernorrland Tomas Öhrn Räddningstjänsten 
Medelpad 
tomas.ohrn@sundsvall.se 
Tjörn Västra 
Götaland 
Patrick 
Sällinen 
Tjörns kommun patrick.sallinen@tjorn.se  
Torsås Kalmar Hans 
Erlandsson 
Räddningstjänstförbundet 
Emmaboda-Torsås 
hans.erlandsson@rfet.se 
Trelleborg Skåne Måns Krook  mans.krook@trelleborg.se  
Trosa Södermanland Benny 
Svensson 
Sörmlandskustens 
Räddningstjänst 
benny.svensson@nykoping.se  
Tyresö Stockholm Kenneth 
Kollberg 
Nynäshamns kommun kenneth.kollberg@nynashamn.se 
Täby Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Uddevalla Västra 
Götaland 
Mikael Gard  mikael.gard@uddevalla.se  
Umeå Västerbotten Lars Tapani Umeå kommun lars.tapani@umea.se 
Upplands 
Väsby 
Stockholm Bengt 
Engkvist 
Järfälla kommun bengt.engkvist@jarfalla.se  
Upplands-Bro Stockholm Tomas 
Wrådhe 
Brandkåren Attunda tomas.wradhe@brandkaren-attunda.se  
Vadstena Östergötland Henrik 
Josefsson 
Räddningstjänsten 
Motala-Vadstena 
henrik.josefsson@motala.se  
Valdemarsvik Östergötland Samuel 
Andersson 
Räddningstjänsten Östra 
Götaland 
samuel.andersson@rtog.se 
Varberg Halland Therese 
Jouper 
Räddningstjänsten Väst therese.jouper@rvast.se 
Vaxholm Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
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Vellinge Skåne Måns Krook  mans.krook@trelleborg.se  
Vänersborg Västra 
Götaland 
Tomas 
Sunnerdahl 
Norra Älvsborgs 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
tomas.sunnerdahl@brand112.se 
Värmdö Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Västervik Kalmar Peter Helge Västerviks kommun peter.helge@vastervik.se  
Västerås Västmanland Erik 
Mattsson 
Mälardalens Brand- och 
Räddningsförbund 
erik.mattsson@mbrf.se  
Ystad Skåne Mats 
Svensson 
Sydöstra Skånes 
Räddningstjänstförbund 
mats.svensson@sorf.se  
Åmål Västra 
Götaland 
Tommy 
Kihlberg 
Räddningstjänsten Åmål tommy.kihlberg@amal.se 
Älvkarleby Uppsala Martin 
Nilsson 
 martin.nilsson@alvkarleby.se  
Ängelholm Skåne Jonas Nylén Räddningstjänsten Skåne 
Nordväst 
jonas.nylen@helsingborg.se 
Öckerö Västra 
Götaland 
Jan-Eric 
Bäck 
Öckerö kommun jan-eric.back@ockero.se  
Ödeshög Östergötland Jörgen 
Nielsen 
Räddningstjänsten 
Ödeshög 
jorgen.nielsen@odeshog.se 
Örnsköldsvik Västernorrland Mats 
Renning 
Räddningstjänsten 
Örnsköldsvik 
mats.renning@ornskoldsvik.se  
Österåker Stockholm Fredrik 
Letzler 
Storstockholms 
brandförsvar 
fredrik.letzler@ssbf.brand.se 
Östhammar Uppsala Lars-Erik 
Falk 
Östhammars kommun lars-erik.falk@osthammar.se  
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Appendix	D	-	Letters	of	Consent	
Letters of consent from the oil spill experts interviewed during January 2015.	
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WM WORLDMARITIMEUNIVERSITY
Established under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization
a specialized agency of the United Nations
Oljeskadeskyddsberedskap i Sverige
16/12-20 14
Kara deltagare,
Mitt namn ãr Jonas Pálsson och jag doktorerar pa World Maritime University i Malmö. Till mill
avhandling undersOker jag oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen I Sverige for oljeolyckor till hays som drabbar
kusten. Informationen som samlas in kommer att ge användbar information om planering, insats,
organisation och ledning av oljeskadeskyddet I Sverige. Eftersom du är involverad i
oljeskadeskyddsberedskap, bjuder jag in dig till att delta i denna undersokning genom att svara pa denna
enkãt. Enkãten tar ungefär en lialvtimme att fylla I. Deltagande r naturligtvis friviliigt och du kan dra
dig ur nar som heist, men ditt deltagande är hUgst uppskattat.
Ingen kompensation utgar fOr att deltaga, men jag hoppas att mina resultat kommer till nytta fOr
oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige, genom att Oka fOrstelsen och rekommendera fUrãndringar.
Insamlad information som inte ar offentlig kommer att htIlas konfidentiell och enbart resultatet i helhet
kommer att goras tillgOngligt, inte enstaka svar. Resultaten kommer att anvandas i win
doktorsavhandling ocli gUras tiliganglig genom vetenskapliga artiklar, konferenser och
populärvetenskapliga artiklar.
Undersokningen har godkänts av den Vetenskapliga Etikkommittén pa World Maritime University. Har
du n6gra problem eller frágor rörande undersOkningen, kontakta dá mig eller mm handledare, professor
Olof Linden. Onskas ytterligare information, tveka dä inte att kontakta mig.
Vinliga hiilsningar,
Jonas Pálsson
0709-45 51 32
jpJ/wmu.se
Professor
Olof Linden
040-35 63 30
ol@wmu.se
Godkäniier dii dessti villkor ocli skulle dii vdja delta i undersOkiiuigeu?
()Nej
Datum och underskrift
Visiting Address: Citadellsvhgen 20,.MalmS Pastel Addmss: P0 Boa 500, SE 201 24 MaImS, Sweden Tel: +4640356300 Fax: +4640 128442 Org No: 8460(J2-4832
www.wmu.se
I INTERNATIONALMARITIME‘ ORGANIZATION
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WM 1 WORLDMARITIME“i1 UNIVERSITY
Established under the auspices of I he International Maritime Organization
e specialized agency of the United Nabons
Oljeskadeskyddsberedskap i Sverige
16/12-20 14
Kära deltagare,
Mitt namn är Jonas Pilsson och jag doktorerar pa World Maritime University i Malmö. Till mm
avhandling undersöker jag oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige for oljeoiyckor till hays som drabbar
kusten. Informationen som samias in kommer att ge anvàndbar information om pianering, insats,
organisation och ledning av oljeskadeskyddet i Sverige. Eftersom du är involverad i
oljeskadeskyddsberedskap, bjuder jag in dig till att delta i denna undersökning genom att svara p6 denna
enkät. Enkäten tar ungefar en halvtimme att fylla I. Deltagande ãr naturligtvis frivilligt och du kan dra
dig ur nür som heist, men ditt deltagande àr högst uppskattat.
Ingen kompensation utg6r for att deltaga, men jag hoppas att mina resuitat kommer till nytta for
oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen I Sverige, genom att öka förstelsen och rekommendera fOrandringar.
Insamlad information som inte är offentlig kommer att hàllas konfidentiell och enbart resultatet i helhet
kommer att gOras tillgOngligt, inte enstaka svar. Resultaten kommer att anvindas i mm
doktorsavhandllng och gUras tillgänglig genom vetenskapliga artikiar, konferenser och
populärvetenskapliga artikiar.
Undersokningen har godkants av den Vetenskapliga Etikkommittén pa World Maritime University. Har
du n6gra problem eller frágor rOrande undersOkningen, kontakta d6 mig eller mm handledare, professor
Olof Linden. Onskas ytterligare information, tveka dà inte att kontakta wig.
Vänhiga hälsningar,
Jonas Pálsson
0709-45 51 32
jp@wmu.se
Professor
Olof Linden
040-35 63 30
ol@wmu.se
Godkänner dii dessa i’illkor och skulle dii vilja delta i uiidersokningeii?
Ja
()Nej
Datunoch un erskrift
Z92OLJ
Visiting Address: Citadellsvagen 29, Malmo Postal Address: P0 Box 500. SE 201 24 MaimS. Sweden Tel *4640 356 300 Fax *4640 128442 Org No 846002.4832
www wmti.se
I - n-sr 5505
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WM WORLDMARITIME‘I1 UNIVERSITY
Established tinder the auspices of the International Maritime Organizahon
a specialized agency of the United Nations
Oljeskadeskyddsberedskap I Sverige
16/12-2014
Kara deltagare,
Mitt namn ür Jonas P6lsson och jag doktorerar p6 World Maritime University i Malmö. Till mill
avhandling undersöker jag oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige for oljeolyckor till hays som drabbar
kusten. Informationen som samlas in kommer att ge anvandbar information om planering, insats,
organisation och ledning av oljeskadeskyddet i Sverige. Eftersom du Or involverad I
oljeskadeskyddsberedskap, bjuder jag in dig till att delta i denna undersökning genom att svara pa denna
enkOt. EnkOten tar ungef’ar en halvtimme att fylla i. Deltagande Or naturligtvis frivilligt och du kan dra
dig ur nOr som heist, men ditt deltagande Or hogst uppskattat.
Ingen kompensation utg5r for att deltaga, men jag hoppas att mina resuitat kommer till nytta fOr
oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige, genom att öka fOrstelsen och rekommendera forOndringar.
Insamlad information som inte or offentlig kommer att h6IIas konfidentiell och enbart resultatet I heihet
kommer att gOras tillgOngligt, inte enstaka svar. Resuitaten kommer att anvandas I mm
doktorsavhandling och gOras tillgOnglig genom vetenskapliga artiklar, konferenser och
popuiarvetenskapiiga artiklar.
Undersokningen har godkants av den Vetenskapliga Etikkommittén pa World Maritime University. Har
du nágra problem eiler frOgor rörande undersokningen, kontakta dá mig eller mm handledare, professor
Olof Linden. Onskas ytterligare information, tveka dà inte att kontakta mig.
Vanliga haisningar,
Jonas P6lsson
0709-45 51 32
jpwmu.se
Professor
Oiof Linden
040-35 63 30
ol@wmu.se
Godkiinner du dessa vilikor odi skulie dii vilja delta i undersökningeu?
()Nej
Datum och underskrift
//-2
Visiting Address. Citadellsvagan 29. MalarO Postal Address: P0 Box 500. SE 201 24 Matmo. Sweden Tel: 46 40 356 300 Fax 4640 128442 Org No 846002-4832
WWW.wmu.Seiivic
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WM WORLDMARITIMEUNIVERSITY
E,tahIKhed under the auspices of the tnternatioriat Maritime Organization
a speciatized agency of the United Nations
Oljeskadeskyddsbereclskap I Sverige
16/12-2014
Kãra deitagare,
Mitt namn ar Jonas Plsson och jag doktorerar p6 World Maritime University i Malmö. Till mm
avhandling undersöker jag oijeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige for oijeolyckor till hays som drabbar
kusten. Informationen som samlas in kommer att ge anviindbar information om pianering, insats,
organisation och ledning av oljeskadeskyddet i Sverige. Eftersom du iir invoiverad i
oljeskadeskyddsberedskap, bjuder jag in dig till att delta i denna undersOkning genom att svara pa denna
enkät. Enkaten tar ungefar en halvtimme att fylla i. Deltagande ar naturligtvis frivilligt och du kan dra
dig ur när som heist, men ditt deltagande iir högst uppskattat.
ingen kompensation utg6r for att deltaga, men jag hoppas att mina resultat kommer till nytta fOr
oijeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige, genom att Oka fOrstelsen och rekommendera fOrandringar.
Insamlad information som inte är offentlig kommer att h6llas konfidentiell och enbart resuLtatet i helhet
kommer att gOras tillgOngiigt, inte enstaka svar. Resultaten kommer att anvOndas i mm
doktorsavhandling och göras tillgängiig genom vetenskapiiga artiklar, konferenser och
populàrvetenskapliga artiklar.
UndersOkningen har godkOnts av den Vetenskapliga Etikkommittén p6 World Maritime University. Har
du nágra problem eller frágor rörande undersökningen, kontakta dà mig eller mm handledare, professor
OlofLindén. Onskas ytterligare information, tveka dá inte att kontakta mig.
Vaniiga hillsningar,
Jonas Pàlsson
0709-45 51 32
jp@wmu.se
Professor
Olof Linden
040-35 63 30
ol@wmLl.se
Godkünner dii dessa i’illkor och skulle dii Wlja delta i undersokniiigeu?
Ja
()Nej
Datum och underskrift
/-Lc
Visiting Address Citadettsvagen 29, MalmO Postat Address P0 Boa 500. SE 201 24 MatmO. Sweden Tet: .46 40356300 Fax +4640 128442 Org No. 846002-4832
www.wmu seaivii
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FtabIishei under he auspices of he International Maritime Organization
a specialized agency of the United Nations
Oljeskadeskyddsberedskap I Sverige
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Kara deitagare,
Mitt namn är Jonas Pálsson och jag doktorerar p6 World Maritime University i Maimö. Till mill
avhandling undersüker jag oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige for oljeoiyckor till hays som drabbar
kusten. Informationen som samias in kommer att ge användbar information om planering, insats,
organisation och ledning av oljeskadeskyddet i Sverige. Eftersom du ar involverad i
oijeskadeskyddsberedskap, bjuder jag in dig till att delta i denna undersokning genom att svara p6 denna
enkat. Enkäten tar ungefär en halvtimme att fylla i. Deltagande ar naturligtvis frivilligt och du kan dra
dig ur när som heist, men ditt deitagande är högst uppskattat.
Ingen kompensation utg6r für att deltaga, men jag hoppas att mina resultat kommer till nytta für
oljeskadeskyddsberedskapen i Sverige, genom att öka förstelsen och rekommendera förandringar.
Insamlad information som inte ar offentlig kommer att háIlas konfidentiell och enbart resilltatet i helhet
kommer att göras tiilgängligt, inte enstaka svar. Resultaten kommer att användas i mm
doktorsavhandling och göras tiiigänglig genom vetenskapliga artikiar, konferenser och
populärvetenskapliga artiklar.
Undersokningen har godkänts a’ den Vetenskapliga Etikkommittén p6 World Maritime University. Har
du nágra problem elier fr5gor rörande undersokningen, kontakta dà mig eller mm handledare, professor
OlofLindén. Onskas ytterligare information, tveka d6 inte att kontakta mig.
Vanliga hälsningar,
Jonas Pálsson
0709-45 51 32
jpwmu.se
Professor
Olof Linden
040-35 63 30
ol@wmu.se
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()Nej
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Appendix	E	–	Management	Results	
Node	table	
List of all organisations mentioned in the survey responses. 
 
Id Label English name Swedish 
abbreviation 
Swedish name Type 
A1 SCG Swedish Coast 
Guard 
KBV Kustbevakningen Agency 
A2 MSB Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency 
MSB Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och 
Beredskap 
Agency 
A3 Depots Oil Spill Equipment 
Depots 
Oljeförråden MSBs oljeskyddsdepåer Agency 
A4 SwAM Swedish Agency 
for Marine and 
Water 
Management 
HaV Havs- och vattenmyndigheten Agency 
A5 OSAS Oil Spill Advisory 
Service  
Oljejouren Agency 
A6 EPA Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
NVV Naturvårdsverket Agency 
A7 SMA Swedish Maritime 
Administration 
SFV Sjöfartsverket Agency 
A8 STA Swedish Transport 
Agency 
TS Transportstyrelsen Agency 
A9 SAF Swedish Armed 
Forces 
FM Försvarsmakten Agency 
A10 Police Swedish Police Polisen Polismyndigheten Agency 
B1 CAB Blekinge County 
Administrative 
Board of Blekinge 
 Länsstyrelsen Blekinge län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B2 CAB Gotland County 
Administrative 
Board of Gotland 
 Länsstyrelsen Gotlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B3 CAB 
Gävleborg 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Gävleborg 
 Länsstyrelsen Gävleborgs län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B4 CAB Halland County 
Administrative 
Board of Halland 
 Länsstyrelsen Hallands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B5 CAB 
Jönköping 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Jönköping 
 Länsstyrelsen Jönköpings län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B6 CAB Kalmar County 
Administrative 
Board of Kalmar 
 Länsstyrelsen Kalmar län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B7 CAB 
Norrbotten 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Norrbotten 
 Länsstyrelsen Norrbottens län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B8 CAB Skåne County 
Administrative 
Board of Skåne 
 Länsstyrelsen Skånes län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B9 CAB County  Länsstyrelsen Stockholms län County 
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Stockholm Administrative 
Board of 
Stockholm 
Administrative 
Board 
B10 CAB 
Södermanland 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Södermanland 
 Länsstyrelsen Södermanlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B11 CAB Uppsala County 
Administrative 
Board of Uppsala 
 Länsstyrelen Uppsala län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B12 CAB Värmland County 
Administrative 
Board of Värmland 
 Länsstyrelsen Värmlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B13 CAB 
Västerbotten 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Västerbotten 
 Länsstyrelsen Västerbottens län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B14 CAB 
Västernorrland 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Västernorrland 
 Länsstyrelsen Västernorrlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B15 CAB 
Västmanland 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Västmanland 
 Länsstyrelsen Västmanlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B16 CAB Västra 
Götaland 
County 
Administrative 
Board of Västra 
Götaland 
 Länsstyrelsen Västra Götalands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B17 CAB Örebro County 
Administrative 
Board of Örebro 
 Länsstyrelsen Örebros län County 
Administrative 
Board 
B18 CAB 
Östergötland 
County 
Administrative 
Board of 
Östergötland 
 Länsstyrelsen Östergötlands län County 
Administrative 
Board 
C1 Attunda Attunda Fire 
Brigade 
 Brandkåren Attunda (Knivsta, Järfälla, 
Sigtuna, Sollentuna, Upplands-Bro och 
Upplands Väsby) 
Municipality 
C2 Bohuslän Mitt Bohuslän 
Rescue Service 
Association 
 Räddningstjänstförbundet Mitt 
Bohuslän (Lysekil, Munkedal och 
Uddevalla) 
Municipality 
C3 BORF Bohus Fire & 
Rescue Union 
BORF Bohus Räddningstjänstförbund (Ale 
och Kungälv) 
Municipality 
C4 Bromölla Bromölla Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Bromölla Municipality 
C5 BRT Bergslagen 
Rescue Service 
BRT Bergslagens räddningstjänst 
(Kristinehamn, Karlskoga, Filipstad, 
Degerfors, Hällefors och Storfors) 
Municipality 
C6 Båstad Båstad 
municipality  
Båstads kommun Municipality 
C7 Enköping-
Håbo 
Enköping-Håbo 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Enköping-Håbo 
(Enköping och Håbo) 
Municipality 
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C8 Eskilstuna Eskilstuna Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Eskilstuna Municipality 
C9 Gotland Region Gotland  Region Gotland Municipality 
C10 Gästrike Gästrike Rescue 
Service 
 Gästrike Räddningstjänst (Gävle, 
Sandviken, Ockelbo, Hofors och 
Älvkarleby) 
Municipality 
C11 Habo Habo Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Habo kommun Municipality 
C12 Halmstad Halmstad Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Halmstad Municipality 
C13 Haparanda Haparanda 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Haparanda Municipality 
C14 Höga Kusten Höga Kusten-
Ådalen Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Höga Kusten - 
Ådalen (Härnösand, Kramfors och 
Sollefteå) 
Municipality 
C15 Höganäs Höganäs Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Höganäs Municipality 
C16 Jönköping Jönköping Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Jönköping Municipality 
C17 Kalix Kalix Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Kalix Municipality 
C18 Kalmar Kalmar Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Kalmar Municipality 
C19 Karlstad Karlstad Region 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Karlstadsregionen 
(Forshaga, Grums, Hammarö, 
Karlstad, Kil och Munkfors) 
Municipality 
C20 Kristianstad Kristianstad 
municipality 
 Kristianstads kommun Municipality 
C21 Laholm Laholm 
municipality 
 Laholms kommun Municipality 
C22 Landskrona Landskrona 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Landskrona Municipality 
C23 Lomma Lomma 
municipality 
 Lommas kommun Municipality 
C24 Luleå Luleå Rescue 
Service 
 Luleå kommun, räddningstjänsten Municipality 
C25 MBR Mälardalen Fire 
and Rescue 
Association 
MBR Mälardalens Brand- och 
Räddningsförbund (Västerås, 
Hallstahammar och Surahammar) 
Municipality 
C26 Medelpad Medelpad Rescue 
Service 
 Medelpads Räddningstjänstförbund 
(Timrå, Sundsvall och Ånge) 
Municipality 
C27 Motala Motala-Vadstena 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Motala-Vadstena Municipality 
C28 Mönsterås Mönsterås 
municipality 
 Mönsterås kommun Municipality 
C29 Nerike Nerike Fire 
Brigade 
 Nerikes Brandkår (Örebro, Kumla, 
Hallsberg, Lekeberg, Laxå, Askersund, 
Municipality 
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Lindesberg och Nora) 
C30 Nordmaling Nordmaling 
municipality 
 Nordmalings kommun Municipality 
C31 Norrhälsinge Norrhälsinge 
Rescue Service 
 Norrhälsinge Räddningstjänst 
(Hudiksvall och Nordanstig) 
Municipality 
C32 Norrtälje Norrtälje 
municipality 
 Norrtäljes kommun Municipality 
C33 NÄRF Northern Älvsborg 
Rescue Service 
Association 
NÄRF Norra Älvsborgs 
Räddningstjänstförbund (Färgelanda, 
Mellerud, Trollhättan och Vänersborg) 
Municipality 
C34 Orust Orust Rescue 
Service 
 Orust Räddningstjänst Municipality 
C35 Oskarshamn Oskarshamn 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Oskarshamns 
kommun 
Municipality 
C36 Piteå Piteå municipality  Piteås kommun Municipality 
C37 RFET Emmaboda-Torsås 
Rescue Service 
Association 
RFET Räddningstjänstförbundet Emmaboda-
Torsås (Emmaboda och Torsås) 
Municipality 
C38 RSG Greater 
Gothenburg 
Rescue Service 
RSG Räddningstjänsten Storgöteborg 
(Göteborg, Mölndal, Kungsbacka, 
Härryda, Partille och Lerum) 
Municipality 
C39 RSNV Northwestern 
Skåne Rescue 
Service 
RSNV Räddningstjänsten Skåne Nordväst 
(Helsingborg, Ängelholm och 
Örkelljunga) 
Municipality 
C40 RSYD Rescue Service 
South 
RSYD Räddningstjänsten Syd (Burlöv, Eslöv, 
Kävlinge, Lund och Malmö) 
Municipality 
C41 RTÖG Eastern Götaland 
Rescue Service 
RTÖG Räddningstjänsten Östra Götaland 
(Linköping, Norrköping, Söderköping, 
Valdemarsvik och Åtvidaberg) 
Municipality 
C42 RVS Rescue Service 
Western 
Skaraborg 
RVS Räddningstjänsten Västra Skaraborg 
(Lidköping, Vara, Grästorp och 
Essunga) 
Municipality 
C43 RVÄST Rescue Service 
West 
RVÄST Räddningstjänsten Väst (Varberg och 
Falkenberg) 
Municipality 
C44 RÖS Rescue Service 
Eastern Skaraborg 
RÖS Räddningstjänsten Östra Skaraborg 
(Mariestad, Töreboda, Karlsborg, 
Skövde, Gullspång, Hjo och Tibro) 
Municipality 
C45 SBFF Södertörn Fire 
Prevention 
Association 
SBFF Södertörns brandförsvarsförbund 
(Botkyrka, Ekerö, Haninge, Huddinge, 
Nacka, Nykvarn, Nynäshamn, Salem, 
Södertälje och Tyresö) 
Municipality 
C46 Skara-Götene Skara-Götene 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Skara-Götene 
(Skara och Götene) 
Municipality 
C47 Skellefteå Skellefteå 
municipality 
 Skellefteås kommun Municipality 
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C48 Sotenäs Sotenäs 
municipality 
 Sotenäs kommun Municipality 
C49 SSBF Greater Stockholm 
Fire Brigade 
SSBF Storstockholms brandförsvar 
(Danderyd, Lidingö, Solna, Stockholm, 
Sundbyberg, Täby, Vallentuna, 
Vaxholm, Värmdö och Österåker) 
Municipality 
C50 Stenungsund Stenungsund 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Stenungsunds 
kommun 
Municipality 
C51 Strängnäs Strängnäs Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Strängnäs kommun Municipality 
C52 Strömstad Strömstad 
municipality 
 Strömstads kommun Municipality 
C53 Säffle Säffle Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Säffle Municipality 
C54 Söderhamn Söderhamn 
municipality 
 Söderhamns kommun Municipality 
C55 SÖRF Southeast Skåne’s 
Fire and Rescue 
Service 
SÖRF Sydöstra Skånes 
Räddningstjänstförbund (Simrishamn, 
Skurup, Tomelilla och Ystad) 
Municipality 
C56 Sörmland Sörmland Coast 
Rescue Service 
 Sörmlandskustens Räddningstjänst 
(Nyköping, Oxelösund, Trosa och 
Gnesta) 
Municipality 
C57 Tanum Tanum Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Tanumskommun Municipality 
C58 Tjörn Tjörn municipality  Tjörns kommun Municipality 
C59 Trelleborg Trelleborg Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Trelleborg 
(Trelleborg och Vellinge) 
Municipality 
C60 Umeå Umeå Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Umeå (Robertsfors 
och Umeå) 
Municipality 
C61 Uppsala Uppsala Rescue 
Service 
 Uppsala brandförsvar (Tierp, Uppsala 
och Östhammar) 
Municipality 
C62 VMKFB Western 
Mälardalen 
Municipal 
Association 
VMKFB Västra Mälardalens Kommunalförbund 
(Arboga, Kungsör och Köping) 
Municipality 
C63 Västervik Västervik Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Västervik Municipality 
C64 Västra 
Blekinge 
Western Blekinge 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Västra Blekinge 
(Karlshamn, Olofström, Sölvesborg) 
Municipality 
C65 Åmål Åmål Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Åmål Municipality 
C66 Öckerö Öckerö 
municipality 
 Öckerö kommun Municipality 
C67 Ödeshög Ödeshög Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Ödeshög Municipality 
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
369 
C68 Öland Öland Rescue 
Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Öland (Mörbylånga 
och Borgholm) 
Municipality 
C69 Örnsköldsvik Örnsköldsvik 
municipality 
 Örnsköldsviks kommun Municipality 
C70 Östra Blekinge Eastern Blekinge 
Rescue Service 
 Räddningstjänsten Östra Blekinge 
(Karlskrona och Ronneby) 
Municipality 
D1 FRG Voluntary 
Resource Group 
FRG Frivilliga Resursgruppen Volunteer 
D2 Hv Home Guard – 
National Security 
Forces 
Hv Hemvärnet – Nationella 
skyddsstyrkorna 
Volunteer 
D3 KFV Swedish Wildlife 
Rehabilitators 
Association 
KFV Katastrofhjälp Fåglar och Vilt Volunteer 
D4 SBS Swedish Blue Star 
Voluntary Club 
 Blå Stjärnan Volunteer 
D5 SCF Swedish Civil 
Defence League 
CFF Civilförsvarsförbundet Volunteer 
D6 SSRS Swedish Sea 
Rescue Society 
SSRS Sjöräddningssällskapet Volunteer 
D7 SVK National 
Association of 
Naval Volunteer 
Corps 
SVK Sjövärnskåren Volunteer 
E1 Almer Oil Almer Oil & 
Chemical Storage  
Almer Oil & Chemical Storage Industry 
E2 Arizona 
Chemicals 
Arizona Chemicals  Arizona Chemicals Industry 
E3 Billeröd Billeröd Gruvön 
Factory  
Billeröd Gruvöns Bruk Grums Industry 
E4 Clean-up 
companies 
Clean-up 
companies 
 Saneringsföretag Industry 
E5 Energy 
companies 
Energy companies  Energibolag Industry 
E6 Entropi Entropi  Entropi Sanerings Industry 
E7 Freight 
companies 
Freight companies  Transportörer Industry 
E8 Holmen Holmen  Holmen Industry 
E9 Innovators Innovators  Innovatörer Industry 
E10 NBA NBA Energy and 
Environmental 
Development 
NBA NBA Energi & Miljöutveckling Industry 
E11 Nynas Nynas AB  Nynas AB Industry 
E12 Oil companies Oil companies 
Norrköping 
 Oljehamnsbolagen i Norrköping Industry 
E13 Paper mills Paper mills  Pappersbruk längs länets kust Industry 
E14 Port of 
Gothenburg 
Port of Gothenburg  Göteborgs hamn Industry 
E15 Port of Luleå Port of Luleå  Luleå hamn Industry 
E16 Port of 
Oxelösund 
Port of Oxelösund  Oxelösunds hamn Industry 
E17 Port of 
Uddevalla 
Port of Uddevalla  Uddevalla Hamnterminal Industry 
E18 Ports Ports  Hamnar Industry 
E19 Preem Preemraff Lysekil  Preemraff Lysekil Industry 
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E20 Reception 
facilities 
Reception facilities  Mottagningsanläggningar Industry 
E21 Recycling 
companies 
Recycling 
companies 
 Återvinningsföretag Industry 
E22 Refineries Refineries  Raffinaderier och petrokemisk industri Industry 
E23 Ringhals Ringhals nuclear 
power plant 
 Ringhals kärnkraftverk Industry 
E24 SCA SCA SCA Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget Industry 
E25 Shipping 
companies 
Shipping 
companies 
 Redererier Industry 
E26 Smurfit Kappa Smurfit Kappa  Smurfit Kappa Industry 
E27 SRF Swedish 
Shipowners’ 
Association 
SRF Sveriges Redareförening Industry 
E28 SSAB SSAB (formerly 
Swedish Steel AB) 
SSAB SSAB (fd Svenskt Stål AB) Industry 
E29 Stora Enso Stora Enso  Stora Enso Skutskär Industry 
E30 SunPine SunPine  SunPine Industry 
E31 Suppliers Suppliers  Leverantörer Industry 
E32 Sweboat Sweboat - the 
Swedish Marine 
Industries 
Federation 
 SweBoat - Båtbranschens Riksförbund Industry 
E33 Wibax Wibax  Wibax Industry 
F1 Finland Finnish authorities  Finska myndigheter med ansvar för 
oljeskadeskydd 
Other 
F2 IUA Østfold IUA Østfold IUA Østfold Østfold Interkommunale Utvalg mot 
Akutt forurensning 
Other 
F3 Norway Norwegian 
authorities 
 Norska myndigheter Other 
F4 SOS Alarm SOS Alarm SOS Alarm SOS Alarm Göteborg Other 
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Edge	tables	
Connections between organisations in a theoretical maximum scenario and the 
planning and response networks based on survey responses. 
 
Theoretical maximum Planning Response 
Source Target Source Target Source Target 
A1 A2 A1 A2 A1 A10 
A1 A3 A1 A3 A1 A2 
A1 A4 A1 A4 A1 A3 
A1 A5 A1 A5 A1 A4 
A1 A6 A1 A6 A1 A5 
A1 A7 A1 A7 A1 A6 
A1 A8 A1 A9 A1 A7 
A1 A9 A1 B1 A1 A8 
A1 A10 A1 B10 A1 B1 
A1 B1 A1 B11 A1 B10 
A1 B2 A1 B12 A1 B11 
A1 B3 A1 B13 A1 B12 
A1 B4 A1 B14 A1 B13 
A1 B5 A1 B15 A1 B14 
A1 B6 A1 B16 A1 B15 
A1 B7 A1 B17 A1 B16 
A1 B8 A1 B18 A1 B17 
A1 B9 A1 B2 A1 B18 
A1 B10 A1 B3 A1 B2 
A1 B11 A1 B4 A1 B3 
A1 B12 A1 B5 A1 B4 
A1 B13 A1 B6 A1 B5 
A1 B14 A1 B7 A1 B6 
A1 B15 A1 B8 A1 B7 
A1 B16 A1 B9 A1 B8 
A1 B17 A1 C1 A1 B9 
A1 B18 A1 C10 A1 C1 
A1 C1 A1 C11 A1 C10 
A1 C2 A1 C12 A1 C11 
A1 C3 A1 C13 A1 C12 
A1 C4 A1 C14 A1 C13 
A1 C5 A1 C15 A1 C14 
A1 C6 A1 C16 A1 C15 
A1 C7 A1 C17 A1 C16 
A1 C8 A1 C18 A1 C17 
A1 C9 A1 C19 A1 C18 
A1 C10 A1 C2 A1 C19 
A1 C11 A1 C20 A1 C2 
A1 C12 A1 C21 A1 C20 
A1 C13 A1 C22 A1 C21 
A1 C14 A1 C23 A1 C22 
A1 C15 A1 C24 A1 C23 
A1 C16 A1 C25 A1 C24 
A1 C17 A1 C26 A1 C25 
A1 C18 A1 C27 A1 C26 
A1 C19 A1 C28 A1 C27 
A1 C20 A1 C29 A1 C28 
A1 C21 A1 C3 A1 C29 
A1 C22 A1 C30 A1 C3 
A1 C23 A1 C31 A1 C30 
A1 C24 A1 C32 A1 C31 
A1 C25 A1 C33 A1 C32 
A1 C26 A1 C34 A1 C33 
A1 C27 A1 C35 A1 C34 
A1 C28 A1 C36 A1 C35 
A1 C29 A1 C37 A1 C36 
A1 C30 A1 C38 A1 C37 
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A1 C31 A1 C39 A1 C38 
A1 C32 A1 C4 A1 C39 
A1 C33 A1 C40 A1 C4 
A1 C34 A1 C41 A1 C40 
A1 C35 A1 C42 A1 C41 
A1 C36 A1 C43 A1 C42 
A1 C37 A1 C44 A1 C43 
A1 C38 A1 C45 A1 C44 
A1 C39 A1 C46 A1 C45 
A1 C40 A1 C47 A1 C46 
A1 C41 A1 C48 A1 C47 
A1 C42 A1 C49 A1 C48 
A1 C43 A1 C5 A1 C49 
A1 C44 A1 C50 A1 C5 
A1 C45 A1 C51 A1 C50 
A1 C46 A1 C52 A1 C51 
A1 C47 A1 C53 A1 C52 
A1 C48 A1 C54 A1 C53 
A1 C49 A1 C55 A1 C54 
A1 C50 A1 C56 A1 C55 
A1 C51 A1 C57 A1 C56 
A1 C52 A1 C58 A1 C57 
A1 C53 A1 C59 A1 C58 
A1 C54 A1 C6 A1 C59 
A1 C55 A1 C60 A1 C6 
A1 C56 A1 C61 A1 C60 
A1 C57 A1 C62 A1 C61 
A1 C58 A1 C63 A1 C62 
A1 C59 A1 C64 A1 C63 
A1 C60 A1 C65 A1 C64 
A1 C61 A1 C66 A1 C65 
A1 C62 A1 C67 A1 C66 
A1 C63 A1 C68 A1 C67 
A1 C64 A1 C69 A1 C68 
A1 C65 A1 C7 A1 C69 
A1 C66 A1 C70 A1 C7 
A1 C67 A1 C8 A1 C70 
A1 C68 A1 C9 A1 C8 
A1 C69 A1 D6 A1 C9 
A1 C70 A1 E20 A1 D6 
A2 A1 A1 E31 A2 A1 
A2 A3 A1 E7 A2 A10 
A2 A4 A2 A1 A2 A3 
A2 A5 A2 A10 A2 A4 
A2 A6 A2 A3 A2 A5 
A2 A7 A2 A4 A2 A9 
A2 A8 A2 A5 A2 B1 
A2 A9 A2 A6 A2 B10 
A2 A10 A2 A7 A2 B11 
A2 B1 A2 A8 A2 B12 
A2 B2 A2 A9 A2 B13 
A2 B3 A2 B1 A2 B14 
A2 B4 A2 B10 A2 B15 
A2 B5 A2 B11 A2 B16 
A2 B6 A2 B12 A2 B17 
A2 B7 A2 B13 A2 B18 
A2 B8 A2 B14 A2 B2 
A2 B9 A2 B15 A2 B3 
A2 B10 A2 B16 A2 B4 
A2 B11 A2 B17 A2 B5 
A2 B12 A2 B18 A2 B6 
A2 B13 A2 B2 A2 B7 
A2 B14 A2 B3 A2 B8 
A2 B15 A2 B4 A2 B9 
A2 B16 A2 B5 A2 C1 
A2 B17 A2 B6 A2 C10 
A2 B18 A2 B7 A2 C11 
A2 C1 A2 B8 A2 C12 
A2 C2 A2 B9 A2 C13 
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A2 C3 A2 C1 A2 C14 
A2 C4 A2 C10 A2 C15 
A2 C5 A2 C11 A2 C16 
A2 C6 A2 C12 A2 C17 
A2 C7 A2 C13 A2 C18 
A2 C8 A2 C14 A2 C19 
A2 C9 A2 C15 A2 C2 
A2 C10 A2 C16 A2 C20 
A2 C11 A2 C17 A2 C21 
A2 C12 A2 C18 A2 C22 
A2 C13 A2 C19 A2 C23 
A2 C14 A2 C2 A2 C24 
A2 C15 A2 C20 A2 C25 
A2 C16 A2 C21 A2 C26 
A2 C17 A2 C22 A2 C27 
A2 C18 A2 C23 A2 C28 
A2 C19 A2 C24 A2 C29 
A2 C20 A2 C25 A2 C3 
A2 C21 A2 C26 A2 C30 
A2 C22 A2 C27 A2 C31 
A2 C23 A2 C28 A2 C32 
A2 C24 A2 C29 A2 C33 
A2 C25 A2 C3 A2 C34 
A2 C26 A2 C30 A2 C35 
A2 C27 A2 C31 A2 C36 
A2 C28 A2 C32 A2 C37 
A2 C29 A2 C33 A2 C38 
A2 C30 A2 C34 A2 C39 
A2 C31 A2 C35 A2 C4 
A2 C32 A2 C36 A2 C40 
A2 C33 A2 C37 A2 C41 
A2 C34 A2 C38 A2 C42 
A2 C35 A2 C39 A2 C43 
A2 C36 A2 C4 A2 C44 
A2 C37 A2 C40 A2 C45 
A2 C38 A2 C41 A2 C46 
A2 C39 A2 C42 A2 C47 
A2 C40 A2 C43 A2 C48 
A2 C41 A2 C44 A2 C49 
A2 C42 A2 C45 A2 C5 
A2 C43 A2 C46 A2 C50 
A2 C44 A2 C47 A2 C51 
A2 C45 A2 C48 A2 C52 
A2 C46 A2 C49 A2 C53 
A2 C47 A2 C5 A2 C54 
A2 C48 A2 C50 A2 C55 
A2 C49 A2 C51 A2 C56 
A2 C50 A2 C52 A2 C57 
A2 C51 A2 C53 A2 C58 
A2 C52 A2 C54 A2 C59 
A2 C53 A2 C55 A2 C6 
A2 C54 A2 C56 A2 C60 
A2 C55 A2 C57 A2 C61 
A2 C56 A2 C58 A2 C62 
A2 C57 A2 C59 A2 C63 
A2 C58 A2 C6 A2 C64 
A2 C59 A2 C60 A2 C65 
A2 C60 A2 C61 A2 C66 
A2 C61 A2 C62 A2 C67 
A2 C62 A2 C63 A2 C68 
A2 C63 A2 C64 A2 C69 
A2 C64 A2 C65 A2 C7 
A2 C65 A2 C66 A2 C70 
A2 C66 A2 C67 A2 C8 
A2 C67 A2 C68 A2 C9 
A2 C68 A2 C69 A2 D3 
A2 C69 A2 C7 A2 D4 
A2 C70 A2 C70 A2 D6 
A3 A1 A2 C8 A2 D7 
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A3 A2 A2 C9 A2 E18 
A3 A4 A2 D3 A2 E25 
A3 A5 A2 D4 A4 A1 
A3 A6 A2 D6 A4 A10 
A3 A7 A2 D7 A4 A2 
A3 A8 A2 E18 A4 A3 
A3 A9 A2 E25 A4 A5 
A3 A10 A4 A1 A4 A6 
A3 B1 A4 A10 A4 A7 
A3 B2 A4 A2 A4 A8 
A3 B3 A4 A3 A4 A9 
A3 B4 A4 A5 A4 B1 
A3 B5 A4 A6 A4 B10 
A3 B6 A4 A7 A4 B11 
A3 B7 A4 A8 A4 B12 
A3 B8 A4 A9 A4 B13 
A3 B9 A4 B1 A4 B14 
A3 B10 A4 B10 A4 B15 
A3 B11 A4 B11 A4 B16 
A3 B12 A4 B12 A4 B17 
A3 B13 A4 B13 A4 B18 
A3 B14 A4 B14 A4 B2 
A3 B15 A4 B15 A4 B3 
A3 B16 A4 B16 A4 B4 
A3 B17 A4 B17 A4 B5 
A3 B18 A4 B18 A4 B6 
A3 C1 A4 B2 A4 B7 
A3 C2 A4 B3 A4 B8 
A3 C3 A4 B4 A4 B9 
A3 C4 A4 B5 A4 C1 
A3 C5 A4 B6 A4 C10 
A3 C6 A4 B7 A4 C11 
A3 C7 A4 B8 A4 C12 
A3 C8 A4 B9 A4 C13 
A3 C9 A4 C1 A4 C14 
A3 C10 A4 C10 A4 C15 
A3 C11 A4 C11 A4 C16 
A3 C12 A4 C12 A4 C17 
A3 C13 A4 C13 A4 C18 
A3 C14 A4 C14 A4 C19 
A3 C15 A4 C15 A4 C2 
A3 C16 A4 C16 A4 C20 
A3 C17 A4 C17 A4 C21 
A3 C18 A4 C18 A4 C22 
A3 C19 A4 C19 A4 C23 
A3 C20 A4 C2 A4 C24 
A3 C21 A4 C20 A4 C25 
A3 C22 A4 C21 A4 C26 
A3 C23 A4 C22 A4 C27 
A3 C24 A4 C23 A4 C28 
A3 C25 A4 C24 A4 C29 
A3 C26 A4 C25 A4 C3 
A3 C27 A4 C26 A4 C30 
A3 C28 A4 C27 A4 C31 
A3 C29 A4 C28 A4 C32 
A3 C30 A4 C29 A4 C33 
A3 C31 A4 C3 A4 C34 
A3 C32 A4 C30 A4 C35 
A3 C33 A4 C31 A4 C36 
A3 C34 A4 C32 A4 C37 
A3 C35 A4 C33 A4 C38 
A3 C36 A4 C34 A4 C39 
A3 C37 A4 C35 A4 C4 
A3 C38 A4 C36 A4 C40 
A3 C39 A4 C37 A4 C41 
A3 C40 A4 C38 A4 C42 
A3 C41 A4 C39 A4 C43 
A3 C42 A4 C4 A4 C44 
A3 C43 A4 C40 A4 C45 
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A3 C44 A4 C41 A4 C46 
A3 C45 A4 C42 A4 C47 
A3 C46 A4 C43 A4 C48 
A3 C47 A4 C44 A4 C49 
A3 C48 A4 C45 A4 C5 
A3 C49 A4 C46 A4 C50 
A3 C50 A4 C47 A4 C51 
A3 C51 A4 C48 A4 C52 
A3 C52 A4 C49 A4 C53 
A3 C53 A4 C5 A4 C54 
A3 C54 A4 C50 A4 C55 
A3 C55 A4 C51 A4 C56 
A3 C56 A4 C52 A4 C57 
A3 C57 A4 C53 A4 C58 
A3 C58 A4 C54 A4 C59 
A3 C59 A4 C55 A4 C6 
A3 C60 A4 C56 A4 C60 
A3 C61 A4 C57 A4 C61 
A3 C62 A4 C58 A4 C62 
A3 C63 A4 C59 A4 C63 
A3 C64 A4 C6 A4 C64 
A3 C65 A4 C60 A4 C65 
A3 C66 A4 C61 A4 C66 
A3 C67 A4 C62 A4 C67 
A3 C68 A4 C63 A4 C68 
A3 C69 A4 C64 A4 C69 
A3 C70 A4 C65 A4 C7 
A4 A1 A4 C66 A4 C70 
A4 A2 A4 C67 A4 C8 
A4 A3 A4 C68 A4 C9 
A4 A5 A4 C69 A4 D6 
A4 A6 A4 C7 A4 E22 
A4 A7 A4 C70 A4 E32 
A4 A8 A4 C8 A4 E9 
A4 A9 A4 C9 A5 A1 
A4 A10 A4 D6 A5 A2 
A4 B1 A4 E22 A5 A3 
A4 B2 A4 E32 A5 A4 
A4 B3 A4 E9 A5 A6 
A4 B4 A5 A1 A5 A7 
A4 B5 A5 A10 A5 A8 
A4 B6 A5 A2 A5 B1 
A4 B7 A5 A3 A5 B10 
A4 B8 A5 A4 A5 B11 
A4 B9 A5 A6 A5 B12 
A4 B10 A5 A7 A5 B13 
A4 B11 A5 A8 A5 B14 
A4 B12 A5 B1 A5 B15 
A4 B13 A5 B10 A5 B16 
A4 B14 A5 B11 A5 B17 
A4 B15 A5 B12 A5 B18 
A4 B16 A5 B13 A5 B2 
A4 B17 A5 B14 A5 B3 
A4 B18 A5 B15 A5 B4 
A4 C1 A5 B16 A5 B5 
A4 C2 A5 B17 A5 B6 
A4 C3 A5 B18 A5 B7 
A4 C4 A5 B2 A5 B8 
A4 C5 A5 B3 A5 B9 
A4 C6 A5 B4 A5 C1 
A4 C7 A5 B5 A5 C10 
A4 C8 A5 B6 A5 C11 
A4 C9 A5 B7 A5 C12 
A4 C10 A5 B8 A5 C13 
A4 C11 A5 B9 A5 C14 
A4 C12 A5 C1 A5 C15 
A4 C13 A5 C10 A5 C16 
A4 C14 A5 C11 A5 C17 
A4 C15 A5 C12 A5 C18 
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A4 C16 A5 C13 A5 C19 
A4 C17 A5 C14 A5 C2 
A4 C18 A5 C15 A5 C20 
A4 C19 A5 C16 A5 C21 
A4 C20 A5 C17 A5 C22 
A4 C21 A5 C18 A5 C23 
A4 C22 A5 C19 A5 C24 
A4 C23 A5 C2 A5 C25 
A4 C24 A5 C20 A5 C26 
A4 C25 A5 C21 A5 C27 
A4 C26 A5 C22 A5 C28 
A4 C27 A5 C23 A5 C29 
A4 C28 A5 C24 A5 C3 
A4 C29 A5 C25 A5 C30 
A4 C30 A5 C26 A5 C31 
A4 C31 A5 C27 A5 C32 
A4 C32 A5 C28 A5 C33 
A4 C33 A5 C29 A5 C34 
A4 C34 A5 C3 A5 C35 
A4 C35 A5 C30 A5 C36 
A4 C36 A5 C31 A5 C37 
A4 C37 A5 C32 A5 C38 
A4 C38 A5 C33 A5 C39 
A4 C39 A5 C34 A5 C4 
A4 C40 A5 C35 A5 C40 
A4 C41 A5 C36 A5 C41 
A4 C42 A5 C37 A5 C42 
A4 C43 A5 C38 A5 C43 
A4 C44 A5 C39 A5 C44 
A4 C45 A5 C4 A5 C45 
A4 C46 A5 C40 A5 C46 
A4 C47 A5 C41 A5 C47 
A4 C48 A5 C42 A5 C48 
A4 C49 A5 C43 A5 C49 
A4 C50 A5 C44 A5 C5 
A4 C51 A5 C45 A5 C50 
A4 C52 A5 C46 A5 C51 
A4 C53 A5 C47 A5 C52 
A4 C54 A5 C48 A5 C53 
A4 C55 A5 C49 A5 C54 
A4 C56 A5 C5 A5 C55 
A4 C57 A5 C50 A5 C56 
A4 C58 A5 C51 A5 C57 
A4 C59 A5 C52 A5 C58 
A4 C60 A5 C53 A5 C59 
A4 C61 A5 C54 A5 C6 
A4 C62 A5 C55 A5 C60 
A4 C63 A5 C56 A5 C61 
A4 C64 A5 C57 A5 C62 
A4 C65 A5 C58 A5 C63 
A4 C66 A5 C59 A5 C64 
A4 C67 A5 C6 A5 C65 
A4 C68 A5 C60 A5 C66 
A4 C69 A5 C61 A5 C67 
A4 C70 A5 C62 A5 C68 
A5 A1 A5 C63 A5 C69 
A5 A2 A5 C64 A5 C7 
A5 A3 A5 C65 A5 C70 
A5 A4 A5 C66 A5 C8 
A5 A6 A5 C67 A5 C9 
A5 A7 A5 C68 A5 D1 
A5 A8 A5 C69 A5 D6 
A5 A9 A5 C7 A5 E2 
A5 A10 A5 C70 A5 E4 
A5 B1 A5 C8 A5 E5 
A5 B2 A5 C9 A7 A1 
A5 B3 A5 D1 A8 A1 
A5 B4 A5 D6 B13 A1 
A5 B5 A5 E2 B13 A10 
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A5 B6 A5 E4 B13 A2 
A5 B7 A5 E5 B13 A3 
A5 B8 A7 A1 B13 A5 
A5 B9 A7 A2 B13 A7 
A5 B10 A7 A4 B13 A9 
A5 B11 A7 A8 B13 C30 
A5 B12 A7 A9 B13 C47 
A5 B13 A8 A1 B13 C60 
A5 B14 A8 A2 B14 A1 
A5 B15 A8 A4 B14 A10 
A5 B16 A8 A5 B14 A2 
A5 B17 A8 A6 B14 A9 
A5 B18 A8 A7 B14 B13 
A5 C1 A8 E27 B14 B3 
A5 C2 B12 C19 B14 C14 
A5 C3 B13 A1 B14 C26 
A5 C4 B13 A2 B14 C69 
A5 C5 B13 A3 B17 A10 
A5 C6 B13 A9 B17 A2 
A5 C7 B13 C30 B17 A3 
A5 C8 B13 C47 B17 A6 
A5 C9 B13 C60 B17 A8 
A5 C10 B14 A1 B17 A9 
A5 C11 B14 A10 B17 C29 
A5 C12 B14 A2 B2 A1 
A5 C13 B14 A4 B2 A10 
A5 C14 B14 A5 B2 A2 
A5 C15 B14 A6 B2 A3 
A5 C16 B14 A7 B2 A6 
A5 C17 B14 A8 B2 A9 
A5 C18 B14 A9 B2 C9 
A5 C19 B14 B13 B3 A1 
A5 C20 B14 B3 B3 A10 
A5 C21 B14 C14 B3 A9 
A5 C22 B14 C26 B3 C10 
A5 C23 B14 C69 B3 C31 
A5 C24 B2 A1 B3 C54 
A5 C25 B2 A2 B4 A1 
A5 C26 B2 A6 B4 A2 
A5 C27 B2 A9 B4 B1 
A5 C28 B2 C9 B4 B16 
A5 C29 B3 A1 B4 B5 
A5 C30 B3 A2 B4 B6 
A5 C31 B3 B1 B4 B8 
A5 C32 B3 B10 B4 C12 
A5 C33 B3 B11 B4 C21 
A5 C34 B3 B13 B4 C38 
A5 C35 B3 B14 B4 C43 
A5 C36 B3 B16 B4 D1 
A5 C37 B3 B18 B4 E23 
A5 C38 B3 B3 B5 A1 
A5 C39 B3 B4 B5 A3 
A5 C40 B3 B6 B5 A5 
A5 C41 B3 B7 B5 A7 
A5 C42 B3 B8 B5 C11 
A5 C43 B3 B9 B5 C16 
A5 C44 B3 C10 B5 D6 
A5 C45 B3 C31 B7 A1 
A5 C46 B3 C54 B7 A2 
A5 C47 B3 E13 B7 A3 
A5 C48 B4 A1 B7 A5 
A5 C49 B4 A2 B7 A7 
A5 C50 B4 C12 B7 C13 
A5 C51 B4 C21 B7 C17 
A5 C52 B4 C38 B7 C24 
A5 C53 B4 C43 B7 C36 
A5 C54 B4 D1 B7 F1 
A5 C55 B5 A1 B8 A1 
A5 C56 B5 A7 B8 A10 
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A5 C57 B5 C11 B8 A2 
A5 C58 B5 C16 B8 A3 
A5 C59 B6 A1 B8 A4 
A5 C60 B6 A2 B8 A5 
A5 C61 B6 A3 B8 A6 
A5 C62 B6 A5 B8 A8 
A5 C63 B6 C18 B8 A9 
A5 C64 B6 C28 B8 C15 
A5 C65 B6 C35 B8 C20 
A5 C66 B6 C37 B8 C22 
A5 C67 B6 C63 B8 C23 
A5 C68 B6 C68 B8 C39 
A5 C69 B6 D1 B8 C4 
A5 C70 B7 A1 B8 C40 
A6 A1 B7 A2 B8 C55 
A6 A2 B7 B1 B8 C59 
A6 A3 B7 B10 B8 C6 
A6 A4 B7 B11 C1 A1 
A6 A5 B7 B12 C1 B9 
A6 A7 B7 B13 C1 C45 
A6 A8 B7 B14 C11 A1 
A6 A9 B7 B15 C11 A10 
A6 A10 B7 B16 C11 A2 
A6 B1 B7 B17 C11 A3 
A6 B2 B7 B18 C11 A5 
A6 B3 B7 B2 C11 A9 
A6 B4 B7 B3 C11 B5 
A6 B5 B7 B4 C12 A1 
A6 B6 B7 B5 C12 A10 
A6 B7 B7 B6 C12 A2 
A6 B8 B7 B8 C12 A3 
A6 B9 B7 B9 C12 A9 
A6 B10 B7 C13 C12 B4 
A6 B11 B7 C17 C13 A1 
A6 B12 B7 C24 C13 A2 
A6 B13 B7 C36 C13 A3 
A6 B14 B8 A1 C13 A7 
A6 B15 B8 A10 C13 B7 
A6 B16 B8 A2 C14 A1 
A6 B17 B8 A3 C14 A2 
A6 B18 B8 A4 C14 A3 
A6 C1 B8 A5 C14 A5 
A6 C2 B8 A6 C14 B14 
A6 C3 B8 A8 C15 A1 
A6 C4 B8 A9 C15 A2 
A6 C5 B8 C15 C15 A3 
A6 C6 B8 C20 C15 B8 
A6 C7 B8 C22 C15 D3 
A6 C8 B8 C23 C18 A1 
A6 C9 B8 C39 C18 A10 
A6 C10 B8 C4 C18 A2 
A6 C11 B8 C40 C18 A3 
A6 C12 B8 C55 C18 A4 
A6 C13 B8 C59 C18 A5 
A6 C14 B8 C6 C18 A6 
A6 C15 C1 A1 C18 A7 
A6 C16 C1 A2 C18 A9 
A6 C17 C1 B9 C18 B6 
A6 C18 C1 C45 C18 D3 
A6 C19 C1 D1 C19 A1 
A6 C20 C11 A1 C19 A10 
A6 C21 C11 A2 C19 A2 
A6 C22 C11 B5 C19 A3 
A6 C23 C12 A1 C19 A4 
A6 C24 C12 A2 C19 A5 
A6 C25 C12 A3 C19 A6 
A6 C26 C12 A4 C19 A7 
A6 C27 C12 A5 C19 A8 
A6 C28 C12 A6 C19 A9 
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A6 C29 C12 A9 C19 B12 
A6 C30 C12 B4 C19 D1 
A6 C31 C13 A1 C19 E29 
A6 C32 C13 A2 C19 E3 
A6 C33 C13 A3 C2 A1 
A6 C34 C13 A7 C2 A2 
A6 C35 C13 B7 C2 A3 
A6 C36 C14 A1 C2 A4 
A6 C37 C14 A2 C2 A5 
A6 C38 C14 A3 C2 A6 
A6 C39 C14 A5 C2 A7 
A6 C40 C14 A7 C2 A8 
A6 C41 C14 B14 C2 A9 
A6 C42 C15 A1 C2 B16 
A6 C43 C15 A2 C2 C48 
A6 C44 C15 B8 C2 C52 
A6 C45 C15 D3 C2 C57 
A6 C46 C18 A1 C2 E17 
A6 C47 C18 A10 C2 E19 
A6 C48 C18 A2 C2 E6 
A6 C49 C18 A3 C20 A1 
A6 C50 C18 A4 C20 A3 
A6 C51 C18 A5 C20 A9 
A6 C52 C18 A6 C20 B8 
A6 C53 C18 A7 C21 A1 
A6 C54 C18 A8 C21 A10 
A6 C55 C18 A9 C21 A2 
A6 C56 C18 B6 C21 A3 
A6 C57 C19 A1 C21 A4 
A6 C58 C19 A10 C21 A5 
A6 C59 C19 A2 C21 A9 
A6 C60 C19 A3 C21 B4 
A6 C61 C19 A5 C22 A1 
A6 C62 C19 A6 C22 A10 
A6 C63 C19 A7 C22 A2 
A6 C64 C19 A8 C22 A3 
A6 C65 C19 A9 C22 A4 
A6 C66 C19 B12 C22 A5 
A6 C67 C19 D1 C22 A6 
A6 C68 C19 E29 C22 A7 
A6 C69 C19 E3 C22 A8 
A6 C70 C2 A1 C22 A9 
A7 A1 C2 A2 C22 B8 
A7 A2 C2 A3 C22 C39 
A7 A3 C2 A4 C22 C40 
A7 A4 C2 A5 C23 A1 
A7 A5 C2 A6 C23 A2 
A7 A6 C2 A7 C23 A3 
A7 A8 C2 A8 C23 A5 
A7 A9 C2 A9 C24 A1 
A7 A10 C2 B16 C24 A5 
A7 B1 C2 E6 C24 A7 
A7 B2 C2 F2 C24 D1 
A7 B3 C2 F4 C24 E4 
A7 B4 C20 B8 C26 A1 
A7 B5 C20 D1 C26 A10 
A7 B6 C21 A1 C26 A2 
A7 B7 C21 A10 C26 A3 
A7 B8 C21 A2 C26 A4 
A7 B9 C21 A3 C26 A5 
A7 B10 C21 A4 C26 A7 
A7 B11 C21 A5 C26 A8 
A7 B12 C21 A9 C26 A9 
A7 B13 C21 B4 C26 B14 
A7 B14 C22 A1 C27 A1 
A7 B15 C22 A10 C27 A2 
A7 B16 C22 A2 C27 A3 
A7 B17 C22 A3 C27 D6 
A7 B18 C22 A6 C29 A1 
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A7 C1 C22 A8 C29 A2 
A7 C2 C22 A9 C29 A3 
A7 C3 C22 B8 C29 A7 
A7 C4 C22 C39 C29 B17 
A7 C5 C22 D3 C3 A1 
A7 C6 C23 A1 C3 A10 
A7 C7 C23 A2 C3 A2 
A7 C8 C23 A5 C3 A3 
A7 C9 C25 A1 C3 A4 
A7 C10 C25 B7 C3 A5 
A7 C11 C25 D1 C3 A9 
A7 C12 C25 E15 C3 B16 
A7 C13 C25 E4 C3 E6 
A7 C14 C26 A1 C30 A3 
A7 C15 C26 A2 C30 B13 
A7 C16 C26 A3 C31 A1 
A7 C17 C26 A5 C31 A10 
A7 C18 C26 B14 C31 A2 
A7 C19 C27 A1 C31 A3 
A7 C20 C27 D6 C31 A4 
A7 C21 C29 A1 C31 A5 
A7 C22 C29 A7 C31 A7 
A7 C23 C29 B17 C31 A9 
A7 C24 C3 B16 C31 B3 
A7 C25 C3 E6 C31 C26 
A7 C26 C30 B13 C31 C54 
A7 C27 C31 A1 C31 E8 
A7 C28 C31 A2 C32 A1 
A7 C29 C31 A3 C32 A2 
A7 C30 C31 A5 C32 A3 
A7 C31 C31 A7 C32 A4 
A7 C32 C31 B3 C32 A5 
A7 C33 C31 C26 C32 A9 
A7 C34 C31 C54 C32 B9 
A7 C35 C31 E8 C32 D1 
A7 C36 C32 A1 C32 D6 
A7 C37 C32 A2 C33 A1 
A7 C38 C32 A4 C33 A2 
A7 C39 C32 A5 C33 A3 
A7 C40 C32 A7 C33 A5 
A7 C41 C32 A9 C33 A7 
A7 C42 C32 B9 C33 A8 
A7 C43 C32 D1 C33 B16 
A7 C44 C32 D6 C36 A1 
A7 C45 C33 A1 C36 A3 
A7 C46 C33 A2 C36 A4 
A7 C47 C33 A3 C36 A5 
A7 C48 C33 A7 C36 A6 
A7 C49 C33 B16 C36 A7 
A7 C50 C36 A1 C36 A8 
A7 C51 C36 A10 C36 B7 
A7 C52 C36 A3 C36 C24 
A7 C53 C36 A4 C36 C47 
A7 C54 C36 A5 C36 E10 
A7 C55 C36 A6 C36 E24 
A7 C56 C36 A7 C36 E26 
A7 C57 C36 A8 C36 E30 
A7 C58 C36 A9 C37 A1 
A7 C59 C36 B7 C37 A10 
A7 C60 C36 C24 C37 A2 
A7 C61 C36 C47 C37 A3 
A7 C62 C36 D1 C37 A7 
A7 C63 C36 E10 C37 A8 
A7 C64 C36 E24 C37 A9 
A7 C65 C36 E26 C37 B6 
A7 C66 C36 E30 C38 A1 
A7 C67 C37 A1 C38 A10 
A7 C68 C37 A10 C38 A2 
A7 C69 C37 A2 C38 A3 
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A7 C70 C37 A3 C38 A5 
A8 A1 C37 A6 C38 A7 
A8 A2 C37 A7 C38 A8 
A8 A3 C37 A8 C38 A9 
A8 A4 C37 A9 C38 B16 
A8 A5 C37 B6 C38 B4 
A8 A6 C37 D1 C38 E14 
A8 A7 C38 A1 C39 A1 
A8 A9 C38 A2 C39 A10 
A8 A10 C38 A3 C39 A2 
A8 B1 C38 A4 C39 A3 
A8 B2 C38 A5 C39 A5 
A8 B3 C38 A7 C39 A9 
A8 B4 C38 A9 C39 B8 
A8 B5 C38 B16 C41 A1 
A8 B6 C38 B4 C41 A10 
A8 B7 C38 E14 C41 A3 
A8 B8 C39 A1 C41 A5 
A8 B9 C39 A2 C41 A7 
A8 B10 C39 A3 C41 A9 
A8 B11 C39 A5 C41 B18 
A8 B12 C39 A7 C41 D1 
A8 B13 C39 A9 C41 D2 
A8 B14 C39 B8 C41 D3 
A8 B15 C39 C15 C41 D6 
A8 B16 C39 C22 C41 E12 
A8 B17 C39 C6 C43 A1 
A8 B18 C40 A1 C43 A10 
A8 C1 C40 A2 C43 A2 
A8 C2 C40 A3 C43 A3 
A8 C3 C41 A1 C43 A4 
A8 C4 C41 A2 C43 A5 
A8 C5 C41 A4 C43 A6 
A8 C6 C41 A5 C43 A7 
A8 C7 C41 A7 C43 A8 
A8 C8 C41 A9 C43 A9 
A8 C9 C41 B18 C43 B4 
A8 C10 C41 D4 C45 A1 
A8 C11 C41 D6 C45 A2 
A8 C12 C41 E12 C45 A3 
A8 C13 C43 A1 C45 A4 
A8 C14 C43 A10 C45 A5 
A8 C15 C43 A2 C45 A6 
A8 C16 C43 A3 C45 B9 
A8 C17 C43 A4 C45 C49 
A8 C18 C43 A5 C45 D1 
A8 C19 C43 A6 C45 E11 
A8 C20 C43 A7 C46 A1 
A8 C21 C43 A8 C46 A2 
A8 C22 C43 A9 C46 A3 
A8 C23 C43 B16 C46 B16 
A8 C24 C43 B4 C46 E6 
A8 C25 C43 B8 C50 A3 
A8 C26 C43 C12 C50 A7 
A8 C27 C43 C21 C52 A1 
A8 C28 C43 C38 C52 A10 
A8 C29 C43 E21 C52 A2 
A8 C30 C45 A1 C52 A3 
A8 C31 C45 A2 C52 A5 
A8 C32 C45 A3 C52 A7 
A8 C33 C45 A4 C52 A9 
A8 C34 C45 A5 C52 B16 
A8 C35 C45 A6 C52 C57 
A8 C36 C45 A7 C52 D1 
A8 C37 C45 B9 C52 F3 
A8 C38 C45 D1 C53 A1 
A8 C39 C46 A1 C53 A2 
A8 C40 C46 A2 C53 A3 
A8 C41 C46 A3 C53 A5 
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A8 C42 C46 A6 C53 A7 
A8 C43 C46 B16 C53 A9 
A8 C44 C46 E6 C53 B12 
A8 C45 C47 A1 C53 C19 
A8 C46 C47 A2 C53 C65 
A8 C47 C47 A3 C53 D5 
A8 C48 C47 A7 C55 A1 
A8 C49 C47 A9 C55 A3 
A8 C50 C47 B13 C55 B8 
A8 C51 C47 E1 C56 A1 
A8 C52 C47 E33 C56 A2 
A8 C53 C49 A1 C56 A3 
A8 C54 C49 A2 C56 A4 
A8 C55 C49 A3 C56 A5 
A8 C56 C49 A4 C56 A6 
A8 C57 C49 A5 C56 B10 
A8 C58 C49 B9 C57 A1 
A8 C59 C50 A2 C57 A2 
A8 C60 C50 E18 C57 A3 
A8 C61 C50 E22 C57 A4 
A8 C62 C52 A1 C57 A5 
A8 C63 C52 A10 C57 A6 
A8 C64 C52 A2 C57 B16 
A8 C65 C52 A3 C57 C48 
A8 C66 C52 A4 C57 C52 
A8 C67 C52 A5 C6 A1 
A8 C68 C52 A7 C6 A2 
A8 C69 C52 A9 C6 A3 
A8 C70 C52 B16 C6 A9 
A9 A1 C52 C57 C6 C15 
A9 A2 C52 D1 C6 C22 
A9 A3 C52 F2 C6 C39 
A9 A4 C52 F3 C60 A1 
A9 A5 C53 A1 C60 A2 
A9 A6 C53 A5 C60 A3 
A9 A7 C53 A7 C60 A7 
A9 A8 C53 B12 C61 A1 
A9 A10 C53 C19 C61 A10 
A9 B1 C53 C65 C61 A2 
A9 B2 C53 D5 C61 A3 
A9 B3 C55 A1 C61 A4 
A9 B4 C55 A10 C61 A5 
A9 B5 C55 A3 C61 A6 
A9 B6 C55 A5 C61 B11 
A9 B7 C55 A9 C61 C32 
A9 B8 C55 B8 C62 A1 
A9 B9 C56 A1 C62 A2 
A9 B10 C56 A2 C62 A3 
A9 B11 C56 A3 C62 A5 
A9 B12 C56 B10 C62 A7 
A9 B13 C56 E16 C62 B15 
A9 B14 C56 E28 C63 A1 
A9 B15 C57 A2 C63 A2 
A9 B16 C57 A3 C63 A3 
A9 B17 C57 A4 C63 B18 
A9 B18 C57 A5 C63 B6 
A9 C1 C57 A6 C64 A1 
A9 C2 C57 B16 C64 A10 
A9 C3 C57 C48 C64 A3 
A9 C4 C57 C52 C64 A4 
A9 C5 C58 C34 C64 A5 
A9 C6 C58 C50 C64 A9 
A9 C7 C59 A1 C64 B1 
A9 C8 C59 A2 C64 C71 
A9 C9 C59 A3 C65 A1 
A9 C10 C59 A4 C65 A2 
A9 C11 C59 A5 C65 A3 
A9 C12 C59 A6 C65 A4 
A9 C13 C59 A7 C65 A5 
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A9 C14 C59 A9 C65 A7 
A9 C15 C59 B8 C65 B16 
A9 C16 C6 B8 C10 A1 
A9 C17 C6 C39 C10 A2 
A9 C18 C60 A1 C10 A3 
A9 C19 C60 A10 C10 A4 
A9 C20 C60 A2 C10 A5 
A9 C21 C60 A3 C10 B11 
A9 C22 C60 A4 C10 E29 
A9 C23 C60 A6 C68 A1 
A9 C24 C60 A7 C68 A2 
A9 C25 C60 A8 C68 A3 
A9 C26 C60 A9 C68 A4 
A9 C27 C60 B13 C68 A5 
A9 C28 C61 A1 C68 A6 
A9 C29 C61 A3 C68 B6 
A9 C30 C61 A5   
A9 C31 C61 A6   
A9 C32 C61 A7   
A9 C33 C61 B11   
A9 C34 C61 C32   
A9 C35 C62 A1   
A9 C36 C62 A2   
A9 C37 C62 B15   
A9 C38 C62 C1   
A9 C39 C62 C25   
A9 C40 C62 C45   
A9 C41 C62 C49   
A9 C42 C62 C51   
A9 C43 C62 C7   
A9 C44 C62 C8   
A9 C45 C63 A1   
A9 C46 C63 A2   
A9 C47 C63 A3   
A9 C48 C63 A4   
A9 C49 C63 B18   
A9 C50 C63 B6   
A9 C51 C64 A1   
A9 C52 C64 A10   
A9 C53 C64 A2   
A9 C54 C64 A3   
A9 C55 C64 A4   
A9 C56 C64 A5   
A9 C57 C64 A9   
A9 C58 C64 B1   
A9 C59 C64 C71   
A9 C60 C64 D1   
A9 C61 C64 D3   
A9 C62 C65 A1   
A9 C63 C65 A2   
A9 C64 C65 A3   
A9 C65 C65 A4   
A9 C66 C65 A5   
A9 C67 C65 A6   
A9 C68 C65 A7   
A9 C69 C65 A8   
A9 C70 C65 B16   
A10 A1 C10 A1   
A10 A2 C10 A2   
A10 A3 C10 A3   
A10 A4 C10 A4   
A10 A5 C10 A5   
A10 A6 C10 B11   
A10 A7 C10 E29   
A10 A8 C68 A1   
A10 A9 C68 A2   
A10 B1 C68 A3   
A10 B2 C68 A4   
A10 B3 C68 A5   
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A10 B4 C68 A6   
A10 B5 C68 B6   
A10 B6 C69 A1   
A10 B7 C69 A3   
A10 B8 C69 A7   
A10 B9 C69 B14   
A10 B10 C69 C14   
A10 B11 C69 C30   
A10 B12 C69 D1   
A10 B13     
A10 B14     
A10 B15     
A10 B16     
A10 B17     
A10 B18     
A10 C1     
A10 C2     
A10 C3     
A10 C4     
A10 C5     
A10 C6     
A10 C7     
A10 C8     
A10 C9     
A10 C10     
A10 C11     
A10 C12     
A10 C13     
A10 C14     
A10 C15     
A10 C16     
A10 C17     
A10 C18     
A10 C19     
A10 C20     
A10 C21     
A10 C22     
A10 C23     
A10 C24     
A10 C25     
A10 C26     
A10 C27     
A10 C28     
A10 C29     
A10 C30     
A10 C31     
A10 C32     
A10 C33     
A10 C34     
A10 C35     
A10 C36     
A10 C37     
A10 C38     
A10 C39     
A10 C40     
A10 C41     
A10 C42     
A10 C43     
A10 C44     
A10 C45     
A10 C46     
A10 C47     
A10 C48     
A10 C49     
A10 C50     
A10 C51     
A10 C52     
A10 C53     
A10 C54     
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A10 C55     
A10 C56     
A10 C57     
A10 C58     
A10 C59     
A10 C60     
A10 C61     
A10 C62     
A10 C63     
A10 C64     
A10 C65     
A10 C66     
A10 C67     
A10 C68     
A10 C69     
A10 C70     
B1 B8     
B1 B6     
B1 C64     
B1 C70     
B2 B6     
B2 B9     
B2 C9     
B3 B11     
B3 B14     
B3 C10     
B3 C31     
B3 C54     
B4 B8     
B4 B16     
B4 C12     
B4 C21     
B4 C38     
B4 C43     
B5 B16     
B5 B18     
B5 C11     
B5 C16     
B6 B1     
B6 B2     
B6 B18     
B6 C18     
B6 C28     
B6 C35     
B6 C37     
B6 C63     
B6 C68     
B7 B13     
B7 C13     
B7 C17     
B7 C24     
B7 C36     
B8 B1     
B8 B4     
B8 C4     
B8 C6     
B8 C15     
B8 C20     
B8 C22     
B8 C23     
B8 C39     
B8 C40     
B8 C55     
B8 C59     
B9 B2     
B9 B10     
B9 B11     
B9 C1     
B9 C32     
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B9 C45     
B9 C49     
B10 B9     
B10 B11     
B10 B15     
B10 B17     
B10 B18     
B10 C8     
B10 C51     
B10 C56     
B11 B3     
B11 B9     
B11 B10     
B11 B15     
B11 C7     
B11 C61     
B11 C10     
B12 B16     
B12 C5     
B12 C19     
B12 C53     
B13 B7     
B13 B14     
B13 C30     
B13 C47     
B13 C60     
B14 B3     
B14 B13     
B14 C14     
B14 C26     
B14 C69     
B15 B10     
B15 B11     
B15 C25     
B15 C62     
B16 B4     
B16 B5     
B16 B12     
B16 B17     
B16 B18     
B16 C2     
B16 C3     
B16 C33     
B16 C34     
B16 C38     
B16 C42     
B16 C44     
B16 C46     
B16 C48     
B16 C50     
B16 C52     
B16 C57     
B16 C58     
B16 C65     
B16 C66     
B17 B16     
B17 B18     
B17 C29     
B18 B5     
B18 B6     
B18 B10     
B18 B16     
B18 B17     
B18 C27     
B18 C41     
B18 C67     
C1 B9     
C1 C7     
C1 C32     
Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
387 
C1 C45     
C1 C49     
C1 C51     
C2 B16     
C2 C34     
C2 C48     
C2 C50     
C3 B16     
C3 C38     
C3 C50     
C3 C58     
C4 B8     
C4 C20     
C4 C64     
C5 B12     
C5 C19     
C5 C44     
C5 C53     
C6 B8     
C6 C15     
C6 C21     
C6 C39     
C7 B11     
C7 C1     
C7 C25     
C7 C45     
C7 C51     
C8 B10     
C8 C25     
C8 C51     
C8 C62     
C9 B2     
C9 C45     
C9 C68     
C10 B3     
C10 B11     
C10 C54     
C10 C61     
C11 B5     
C11 C16     
C11 C44     
C11 C67     
C12 B4     
C12 C21     
C12 C43     
C13 B7     
C13 C17     
C14 B14     
C14 C26     
C14 C69     
C15 B8     
C15 C6     
C15 C39     
C16 B5     
C16 C11     
C16 C44     
C16 C67     
C17 B7     
C17 C13     
C17 C24     
C18 B6     
C18 C28     
C18 C37     
C18 C68     
C19 B12     
C19 C5     
C19 C44     
C19 C53     
C20 B8     
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C20 C4     
C20 C55     
C21 B4     
C21 C6     
C21 C12     
C22 B8     
C22 C39     
C22 C40     
C23 B8     
C23 C40     
C24 B7     
C24 C17     
C24 C36     
C25 B15     
C25 C7     
C25 C8     
C25 C51     
C25 C62     
C26 B14     
C26 C14     
C26 C31     
C27 B18     
C27 C29     
C27 C44     
C27 C67     
C28 B6     
C28 C18     
C28 C35     
C28 C68     
C29 B17     
C29 C27     
C29 C44     
C30 B13     
C30 C60     
C30 C69     
C31 B3     
C31 C26     
C31 C54     
C32 B9     
C32 C49     
C32 C61     
C33 B16     
C33 C42     
C33 C53     
C33 C65     
C34 B16     
C34 C2     
C34 C50     
C34 C58     
C35 B6     
C35 C28     
C35 C63     
C35 C68     
C36 B7     
C36 C24     
C36 C47     
C37 B6     
C37 C18     
C37 C68     
C37 C70     
C38 B16     
C38 C3     
C38 C43     
C39 B8     
C39 C6     
C39 C15     
C39 C22     
C40 B8     
C40 C22     
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C40 C23     
C40 C59     
C41 B18     
C41 C56     
C41 C63     
C42 B16     
C42 C33     
C42 C46     
C42 C53     
C43 B4     
C43 C12     
C43 C38     
C44 B16     
C44 C5     
C44 C11     
C44 C16     
C44 C19     
C44 C27     
C44 C29     
C44 C46     
C44 C53     
C44 C67     
C45 B9     
C45 C1     
C45 C7     
C45 C49     
C45 C51     
C45 C56     
C46 B16     
C46 C42     
C46 C44     
C46 C53     
C47 B13     
C47 C36     
C47 C60     
C48 B16     
C48 C2     
C48 C57     
C49 B9     
C49 C1     
C49 C32     
C49 C45     
C50 B16     
C50 C2     
C50 C3     
C50 C34     
C50 C58     
C51 B10     
C51 C1     
C51 C7     
C51 C8     
C51 C25     
C51 C45     
C52 B16     
C52 C57     
C53 B12     
C53 C19     
C53 C42     
C53 C44     
C53 C46     
C53 C65     
C54 B3     
C54 C10     
C54 C31     
C55 B8     
C55 C20     
C55 C59     
C56 B10     
C56 C41     
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C56 C45     
C57 B16     
C57 C48     
C57 C52     
C58 B16     
C58 C3     
C58 C34     
C58 C50     
C59 B8     
C59 C40     
C59 C55     
C60 B13     
C60 C30     
C60 C47     
C61 B11     
C61 C32     
C61 C10     
C62 B15     
C62 C8     
C62 C25     
C63 B6     
C63 C35     
C63 C41     
C64 B1     
C64 C4     
C64 C70     
C65 B16     
C65 C33     
C65 C42     
C65 C53     
C66 B16     
C66 C38     
C67 B18     
C67 C11     
C67 C16     
C67 C27     
C67 C44     
C68 B6     
C68 C9     
C68 C18     
C68 C28     
C68 C35     
C68 C37     
C69 B14     
C69 C14     
C69 C30     
C70 B1     
C70 C37     
C70 C64     
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Understanding	
Opinions of the survey respondents on understanding the roles of the oil spill 
preparedness organisations. 
 
Type SC
G 
MS
B 
De
pot
s 
Sw
AM 
OS
AS 
EP
A 
SM
A 
ST
A 
SA
F 
Poli
ce 
CA
B 
Mu
nici
pali
ties 
Vol
unt
eer
s 
Ind
ustr
y 
Oth
ers 
 
Agency 1 1 1 1 1 −2 1 1 −2 −1 1 1 −1 −2   
Agency 2 −1 2 −2 −1 −2 −1 −1 −1 −2 1 1 −2 −2 2  
Agency −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 0 1 −1 −1 −1 0 −1  
Agency 2 −1 0 −1 0 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1   
Agency 2 1 0 0 1 −1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 −1 0  
Agency 1 1 −1 −1 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 1 0 0   
Agency 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −2 −1 −1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0   
CAB 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 1   
CAB 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 0  
CAB 0 0 0         0   0  
CAB −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 1 1 0 0  
CAB 2 1 2 −1 1 −2 0 −1 2 2 2 2 1 −1   
CAB 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2    
CAB 2 −1 2 −2 −2 −2 −2 −1 1 −1 −1 1 0 −1 0  
CAB 2 1 2 −2 −2 −2 −1 −2 −1 −1 −1 1   −1  
CAB 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 1 1 0 0  
CAB 1 2 0 0 1 −1 0 0 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 0 1 −1 0 −1 0 0 −1 1 −1 −1 −1  
Municip
ality 
2 1 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 −1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0  
Municip
ality 
−1 −1 −1 −2 −1 0 0 0 1 0 −1 −1 0 1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −2 −2 −2 −2 1 2 1 −1 2  
Municip
ality 
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   
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Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1  1  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 −2 2 2 −2 −2 −2  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 0 1 1 1 1 −1   
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
−1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0  2 1 −1   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −2 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0   
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 −1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 −1 −1 −2 1 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1 −1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 −1 −1 −1 1 −2 −2 −2 1 1 1 1 −1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 −1 2 −1 1 −2 −1 −2 1 1 −1 2 2 0   
Municip
ality 
2 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1   
Municip
ality 
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1  
Municip
ality 
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 0   
Municip
ality 
2 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 1 0 −1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 −1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 −1 −1 −2 −2 −2 1 −2 1 1 −1 2 0 1 0  
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Municip
ality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 −1 2 −1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0  
Municip
ality 
2 −1 2 −2 1 −2 0 0 1 2 0 1 −2 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 1   
Municip
ality 
2 −1 1 0 −1 0 0 −2 0 −1 1 2 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 −1 1 2 −1 −1 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 0 0  0 1 1    1 2 0    
Municip
ality 
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 2 2  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 −1 −1 0 −1 −1 1 0 1 1 0 −1 −1  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 0  
Averag
e 
1.1
7 
0.5
2 
0.8
2 
−0.
30 
0.3
1 
−0.
31 
−0.
05 
−0.
39 
0.1
9 
0.0
6 
0.5
6 
0.9
7 
0.1
7 
−0.
10 
0.0
0 
0.2
4 
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Planning	value	
Opinions of the survey respondents on the value for the oil spill preparedness 
organisations for oil spill contingency planning. 
 
Type SC
G 
MS
B 
De
pot
s 
Sw
AM 
OS
AS 
EP
A 
SM
A 
ST
A 
SA
F 
Poli
ce 
CA
B 
Mu
nici
pali
ties 
Vol
unt
eer
s 
Ind
ustr
y 
Oth
ers 
 
Agency 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 0   
Agency  2 −1 1 1 0 0 1 −1 −1 2 0 1 0   
Agency 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 −1 1 2 2 2 1 2  
Agency 2 1  2   2 2 1 0 1 1 −1 0   
Agency 2 2 −1 1 1 0 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 0 −1  
Agency 1 1 −2 1 0  1 2   1 1 1 1   
Agency 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 2   
CAB 2 2 1  0 0   0 0  2 1 −1   
CAB 2 0 1  1 1 1 0 −1 −1 2 2 −1 1   
CAB 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 −1 −1  
CAB 2 2 2  2    −1 −2 2 2 2    
CAB 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 1   
CAB 2 2 0 1 −1 −1 0 1 −1 0 2 2 −2 −2 0  
CAB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1     
CAB 2 2         2 2     
CAB 2 0 2   0   0 0  2 0    
CAB 1 −1 1 −2 −2 −1 1 −1 −2 −2 0 2 −1 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 −1 −2 0 1 −2 −2 −2  
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 2 0 −1  1 1 1 2 2 −1   
Munici
pality 
2 1 2 1 1    1 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 0 1 −1 2 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 0 2 1 1 1  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 −1 1 −1 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 1 −1 1  
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 2   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1   
Munici
pality 
1 2 1 1 0   0 0 0 2 2     
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Munici
pality 
 2 2 2 2 0     2 2     
Munici
pality 
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 2 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 −1 2 2 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1  0 1 1 0 0 −1 −1  1 1 −1 −1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 0 −1 −1 −1 2 2 0 2   
Munici
pality 
1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 2   
Munici
pality 
2 1 2 2 2  0  2 −1 2 2 2    
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2  2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1  
Munici
pality 
2 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 −1 2 2 2 −2   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2    2 2     
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 2 −1 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
−1 1 2      −1 −2 2 2     
Munici
pality 
1 1    1  1 1 1 1 1     
Munici
pality 
−1 0 1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 2 −1 0 2  
Munici
pality 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 2 −1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1  
Munici
pality 
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 −1 −1 2 2 −1 1 2  
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 2 0 −1 −1  
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Munici
pality 
2 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 −1 0 2 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 −2 2 −2 −2 −2 −2 −2 0 0 2 0 2   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2      2 −1 2 2 1 1 1  
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
−1 2 2 0 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 1 −1 0   
Munici
pality 
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 2  1 1 1  
Munici
pality 
2 1 2 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 2 −2 −2 −2  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2  −1 −1 2 2 1 −1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 −1 −1 1 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 2  −1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 0 −1 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 −1 1  
Munici
pality 
1 2 2 −1 0 0  −1 −1 −1 2 2 0 −1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2        2 2     
Munici
pality 
2 0 2 1 1 0 0 −1 −1 0 1 2 1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 0 −2 −2 −2 0 −2 −2 −2 1 1 −2 −2 −2  
Munici
pality 
2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 −1 1 2 −1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1     2      
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2  1 2   
Munici
pality 
0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1  
Munici
pality 
2 0 2 −1 1 −1 2 −1 1 2 2 2 0 −1 −1  
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Averag
e 
1.5
1 
1.3
8 
1.3
0 
0.6
3 
0.8
8 
0.3
7 
0.5
3 
0.1
9 
0.0
5 
−0.
29 
1.4
6 
1.6
9 
0.2
5 
0.0
7 
−0.
06 
0.6
6 
 
Response	value	
Opinions of the survey respondents on the value for the oil spill preparedness 
organisations for oil spill response. 
 
Type SC
G 
MS
B 
De
pot
s 
Sw
AM 
OS
AS 
EP
A 
SM
A 
ST
A 
SA
F 
Poli
ce 
CA
B 
Mu
nici
pali
ties 
Vol
unt
eer
s 
Ind
ustr
y 
Oth
ers 
 
Agency 1 2 2 0 2 2 −1 −1 2 0 2 2 2 0   
Agency 2 2 1 1 2 −1 0 1 0 −1 2 2 0 1 2  
Agency 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0  2 2 2 2 0 2  
Agency 2 1     2 2 0 0 2 2 1    
Agency 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Agency 1 1  1 1  0 2   0 0  1   
Agency 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2   
CAB 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 2 2 −1 0   
CAB 2 2 2 2 2 2   1 1  2 1 1   
CAB 2 2 2  2  2     2   2  
CAB 2 2 2  2  2  2 2 2 2  1   
CAB 2 2 −2 −2 1 −2 −1 0 1 1 2 2 −2 −2 1  
CAB 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −2 1 −2 −2 −1 −1 2 1 −1 0  
CAB 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 0   
CAB 2 2 2   0   0 0 1 2 0    
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 1   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 −1 0 2 2 1   
Municip
ality 
2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 2  1  1  
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 1 0 −1 1 −1 2 2 0 1   
Municip
ality 
2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 2   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2   
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Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2      2 2     
Municip
ality 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 −1 −1 −1 1 1 2 2 1 0   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2        1 2     
Municip
ality 
2 2 2  2      2 2 2    
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1  
Municip
ality 
0 0 2 0 1 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 2 1 0 2  
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 0 2 0 0 −1 −1 0 1 2 1 1 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2  2    2 −1 2 2     
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0   
Municip
ality 
0 1 2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 2 −1 −1 1  
Municip
ality 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 2 1    
Municip
ality 
2 2    2  2 2 2 2 2     
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 −1 −1 2 2 −2 1 0  
Municip
ality 
2 −1 2 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 2 −1 0   
Municip
ality 
2 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 2 −1 −1  
Municip
ality 
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 0  
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Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2      2 2 −1 2   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2    1  1  2 2 1 1 1  
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0   
Municip
ality 
          2 2 2    
Municip
ality 
2 0 2 1 2    2  2 2 1 −1   
Municip
ality 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1  
Municip
ality 
2 1 2  1 1   2 0 2 2 2    
Municip
ality 
2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0  
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 1     2      
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0   
Municip
ality 
2 0 1   −1 0 0 1 0 −1 2 0 −1   
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 1  
Municip
ality 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0    1 1     
Municip
ality 
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 −1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1  
Municip
ality 
2 1 2 0 2  1   0 2 1  0   
Municip
ality 
2  2  2  2 2 2 2 2 2     
Averag
e 
1.7
9 
1.3
5 
1.6
4 
0.8
8 
1.4
5 
0.4
6 
0.6
0 
0.2
8 
0.7
1 
0.2
2 
1.4
7 
1.7
8 
0.7
3 
0.4
7 
0.6
5 
0.9
6 
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Planning	expectations	
Expectations of the survey respondents on the oil spill preparedness organisations for 
oil spill contingency planning. 
 
Type SC
G 
MS
B 
De
pot
s 
Sw
AM 
OS
AS 
EP
A 
SM
A 
ST
A 
SA
F 
Poli
ce 
CA
B 
Mu
nici
pali
ties 
Vol
unt
eer
s 
Ind
ustr
y 
Oth
ers 
 
Agency 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1   
Agency 0 0  2 2 0 0 0 1  1 1 0 0   
Agency 1 2 0 2 1 2 0 0  0 1 1 0 1 1  
Agency 0 2  1   0 0 1  0 0 0 0   
Agency 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0  
Agency 0 0 0 0 0  0 0   0 0 0 1   
Agency 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1   
CAB 1 2 1 2 0 2   0 0 1 0 0 0   
CAB 1 0     1 0 0 0 1 1  0   
CAB 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0  
CAB 0 0 0  0    0  1 0 0    
CAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
CAB 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
CAB 0 0 0         0     
CAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 1   
Munici
pality 
 0 0              
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0    
Munici
pality 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 1 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 2 −2 0 2   
Munici
pality 
1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1   
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 2 0 1 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
2 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2  0 0 2 2   
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Munici
pality 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1    2 1  1   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0   
Munici
pality 
0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 −2 2   
Munici
pality 
0 1  0 0      1 0  1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 2  1     2 2     
Munici
pality 
0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
1 0 0         2     
Munici
pality 
0 0    0  0 0 0 0 0     
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 −2 −2 −2 2 2 0 1 1  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  
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Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
1 2 1    2 2 0  2 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 2 0 0 0 0    1 2 0    
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1   
Munici
pality 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 0   0     0 0     
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
0 1 0        0 0     
Munici
pality 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 0 0    0    1 0 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
2 −2 2 1 2 1 1 0 −2 −2 2 2 0 2 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0      
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 −2 1   
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1  1    1 1 1 1 0    
Averag
e 
0.7
4 
0.7
5 
0.6
9 
0.5
5 
0.4
9 
0.5
0 
0.4
1 
0.3
1 
0.1
6 
0.0
0 
0.9
1 
0.5
5 
0.0
2 
0.5
5 
0.1
0 
0.4
5 
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Response	expectations	
Expectations of the survey respondents on the oil spill preparedness organisations for 
oil spill response. 
 
Type SC
G 
MS
B 
De
pot
s 
Sw
AM 
OS
AS 
EP
A 
SM
A 
ST
A 
SA
F 
Poli
ce 
CA
B 
Mu
nici
pali
ties 
Vol
unt
eer
s 
Ind
ustr
y 
Oth
ers 
 
Agency 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1   
Agency 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Agency 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0  0 1 1 0 0 1  
Agency 0 1  1   0 0 1  0 0 0    
Agency 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  
Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   
Agency 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
CAB 1 1 1    1  1 0 1 1  0   
CAB 1 1 1 1 1 1   0 0 1 1 0 0   
CAB 0 0 0 0 0    0 0  0 0    
CAB 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1   
CAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −2  0  
CAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
CAB 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
CAB 0 0 0   0 0   0 0 0 1 0   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 0  1  2 0 1 2 0 1   
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 1   
Munici
pality 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0   
Munici
pality 
2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2   
Munici
pality 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 2   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0   
Munici 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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pality 
Munici
pality 
0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1     
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
0 1 0        0 0     
Munici
pality 
2 2 2  1 1 1    2 2     
Munici
pality 
1 1 0   0     0 0     
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1  
Munici
pality 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0  0    0  0 0     
Munici
pality 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Munici
pality 
0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 −1 −1 2 1 0 1 1  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0    0  0 0 0 0 0     
Munici
pality 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2  0   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0  0   0 0 0  0   
Munici
pality 
0 1 1    0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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pality 
Munici
pality 
1 2 1    2 2 0  2 1 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 2 −1 0 2   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2 2 0 2 2    2 2 0    
Munici
pality 
0 1 0 0 0      1 0  2   
Munici
pality 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0  0 0   0  0 0     
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0  
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 0 0 0     0      
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 0 1   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0       0 0 0  0   
Munici
pality 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 2 0  
Munici
pality 
2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1  2   
Munici
pality 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0    2 0     
Munici
pality 
2 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 2 0  
Munici
pality 
1 0 1 0 0  0   0 0 0  0   
Munici
pality 
2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2     
Averag
e 
0.6
6 
0.8
0 
0.7
6 
0.5
0 
0.4
2 
0.4
8 
0.4
1 
0.3
2 
0.2
7 
0.0
8 
0.8
4 
0.4
8 
0.1
7 
0.5
2 
0.1
9 
0.4
6 
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Appendix	F	–	Prevention	Results	
Financial statements of oil spill preparedness related posts from the Swedish national 
budgets 2000-2015 in million SEK. 
 
Translation Swedish name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Environment Allmän miljö- och naturvård  1,461 2,201 3,125 3,363 3,771 3,995 4,596 
Marine Havsmiljö/Åtgärder för havs- och 
vattenmiljö 
       
SEPA Naturvårdsverket 278 303 311 314 323 327 334 
SwAM Havs- och vattenmyndigheten         
SCG Kustbevakningen  440 474 507 548 622 642 692 
MSB Myndigheten för samhällsskydd 
och beredskap  
       
Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency 
Statens räddningsverk: 
samhällets skydd mot olyckor  
526 555 596 612 621 735 686 
Crisis 
Preparedness 
Agency 
Krisberedskapsmyndigheten    140 143 145 147 
Crisis 
preparedness 
Krisberedskap      1,747 1,779 
Municipalities Generellt statsbidrag till 
kommuner och 
landsting/Kommunalekonomisk 
utjämning  
78,00
4 
78,10
6 
76,30
0 
43,12
9 
44,14
2 
57,46
9 
58,12
9 
 
Translation 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Prop 
2015 
Bill 
2015 
Environment 4,615 4,722 5,338 5,245 5,129 5,025 4,893 5,156 6,881 5,348 
Marine    370 579 738 503 673 742 667 
SEPA 339 339 337 349 375 368 370 377 414 378 
SwAM     102 193 202 207 228 208 
SCG 778 857 923 990 999 999 1,007 1,047 1,040 1,040 
MSB   907 961 988 1,045 1,025 1,060 1,044 1,044 
Swedish 
Rescue 
Services 
Agency 
669 669         
Crisis 
Preparedness 
Agency 
166 165         
Crisis 
preparedness 
1,712 1,637 1,531 1,171 1,154 1,111 1,172 1,113 1,014 1,014 
Municipalities 70,818 62,498 64,772 72,749 85,003 81,975 85,603 90,128 90,773 90,773 
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Appendix	G	–	Planning	Results	
Sensitivity	index	development	
The number of municipalities using different kinds of environmental sensitivity 
mapping systems in the 2011 and 2013 surveys is shown. 
 
Question Answer 2011 2013 2015 Combined 
Is a sensitivity 
index used? 
Environmental Atlas 40 49  58 
Own system 25 13  21 
No system 27 11  23 
No reply 34 53  24 
 Total 126 126  126 
 
Plan	development	
The number of municipalities having written or revised their oil spill contingency 
plan during various times in the 2011, 2013, and 2015 surveys, as well as the 
combined score using all three datasets. 
 
Question Answer 2011 2013 2015 Combined 
When was the 
plan revised? 
0-5 years ago 32 46 65 83 
>5 years ago 16 16 6 12 
No plan 46 16 25 25 
No reply 32 48 30 6 
 Total 126 126 126 126 
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Organisational	resources	
Changes in budget and staff resources compared to if the organisation has an oil spill 
contingency plan or not. 
 
 Budget Staff resources 
Municipalities CABs Municipalities CABs 
Plan No plan Plan No plan Plan No plan Plan No plan 
Decreased 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 
No 
change 
26 12 5 2 27 12 4 3 
Increased 8 2 1 2 6 2 1 1 
Total 35 15 6 4 35 15 6 4 
 
External	projects	
Participation in external projects from municipality and CAB questionnaire 
responses and municipalities listed as partners in EU projects. 
 
 Responses Listed CABs 
Plan No plan Plan No plan Plan No plan 
Project 11 2 31 8 3 1 
No project 24 13 52 29 3 3 
Total 35 15 83 37 6 4 
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Appendix	H	–	Response	Results	
Courses	
Oil spill preparedness course participation between 2004 and 2015. 
 
Course name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Oil spill preparedness 
environmental 
impacts 
      33 27 47 11 32 150 
Oil spill preparedness 
limitation and clean-
up 
      20 19 27 12 21 99 
Oil spill preparedness 
clean-up manager        
10 24 28  62 
Oil spill preparedness 
staff specialist 
       9  13  22 
Oil spill preparedness 
land spills          
52 21 73 
Marine oil spill 
preparedness basics 
8 14 15  14       51 
Marine oil spill 
preparedness 
advanced 
9 7  13 9       38 
Marine oil spill 
preparedness 
command and 
cooperation 
   10 6       16 
Total 17 21 15 23 29 0 53 65 98 116 74 511 
 
Exercise	development	
The number of municipalities having exercised during various times in the 2011, 
2013, and 2015 surveys, as well as the combined score using all three datasets. 
 
Question Answer 2011 2013 2015 Combined 
When was the 
plan exercised? 
0-5 years ago 29 37 56 72 
>5 years ago 9 3 0 3 
No exercise 56 41 35 45 
No reply 32 45 35 6 
 Total 126 126 126 126 
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Evaluation	framework	
The evaluation model used to categorise the analysed evaluations. 
 
Question Response options 
What was the name of the 
event? 
Name/s       
What year did the event take 
place? 
Number       
What was the name of the 
organising organisation? 
Name/s       
What were the names of the 
other participant 
organisations? 
Name/s       
What kind of event was it? Exercise 
seminar 
Exercise 
worksho
p 
Tabletop 
exercise 
Drill 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Full-
scale 
exercise 
Real spill 
Did the event have concrete 
aims? 
Yes Partially No     
How often is this exercise 
performed? 
Unique Annual Biannual Recurrin
g 
   
Which organisations did the 
evaluators represent? 
Name/s       
What type of evaluation is 
this? 
Internal External Both     
What year was the evaluation 
written? 
Number       
Did the evaluation have 
specific target groups? 
Yes Partially No     
Which method did the 
evaluation use? 
Name       
Did the evaluation have 
specific evaluation criteria? 
Yes Partially No     
Did the evaluation have 
specific performance 
objectives? 
Yes Partially No     
Where did the evaluation 
data come from? 
(Multiple answers possible) 
Evaluator 
notes 
Documen
tation 
Interview
s 
Question
naire    
Does the evaluation refer to 
the contingency plan? 
Yes Partially No     
Does the evaluation refer to 
earlier spills? 
Yes Partially No     
Does the evaluation refer to 
earlier evaluations? 
Yes Partially No     
Does the evaluation refer to 
response priorities? 
Yes Partially No     
How many pages did the 
evaluation have? 
Number       
How was the evaluation 
distributed? 
(Multiple answers possible) 
Email Report Seminar Other    
To whom was the evaluation 
distributed? 
Names Unknown      
Did the evaluation have 
recommendations? 
Yes Partially No     
Did the recommendations 
require a follow-up? 
Yes Partially No     
Are there any previous oil 
spills? 
Text       
Are there any previous oil 
spill exercises? 
Text       
Comments Text       
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Evaluation	database	
The evaluations analysed according to the evaluation framework, divided between 
real spills and exercises. 
 
Question Real spills 
What was the name of the event? Fu Shan Hai Tjörn (Golden Trader) 
What year did the event take place? 2003 2011 
What was the name of the organising 
organisation? 
Southeast Skåne’s Fire and Rescue 
Service 
Municipality of Tjörn 
What were the names of the other 
participant organisations? 
Municipalities of Ystad, Trelleborg and 
Simrishamn, Swedish Armed Forces, 
County Administrative Board of 
Skåne, Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency (SRSA, now the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency, MSB), 
Swedish Coast Guard, Police, IVL, 
Swedish Wildlife Rehabilitators (KFV), 
KBM 
County Administrative Board of Västra 
Götaland, MSB, SwAM, Swedish 
Coast Guard, Sweco, Swedish Armed 
Forces, Swedish Sea Rescue Society, 
Entropi, Greater Gothenburg Rescue 
Service and Stenungsund Rescue 
Service 
What kind of event was it? Real spill Real spill 
Did the event have concrete aims? Yes Yes 
How often is this exercise 
performed? 
Unique Unique 
Which organisations did the 
evaluators represent? 
Southeast Skåne’s Fire and Rescue 
Service 
MSB, SwAM 
What type of evaluation is this? Internal External 
What year was the evaluation 
written? 
2003 2014 
Did the evaluation have specific 
target groups? 
No Yes 
Which method did the evaluation 
use? 
No specific method MSB model 
Did the evaluation have specific 
evaluation criteria? 
Yes Yes 
Did the evaluation have specific 
performance objectives? 
No Yes 
Where did the evaluation data come 
from? (Multiple answers possible) 
Evaluator notes, documentation Documentation, interviews 
Does the evaluation refer to the 
contingency plan? 
No Yes 
Does the evaluation refer to earlier 
spills? 
No Yes 
Does the evaluation refer to earlier 
evaluations? 
No Yes 
Does the evaluation refer to 
response priorities? 
Yes Yes 
How many pages did the evaluation 
have? 
77 131 
How was the evaluation distributed? 
(Multiple answers possible) 
Report Report, seminars 
Did the evaluation have a 
dissemination plan? 
No Yes 
Did the evaluation have 
recommendations? 
Yes Yes 
Did the recommendations require a 
follow-up? 
No No 
Are there any previous oil spills? Jawachta, Trelleborg 1974, 1,000 
tonnes spilled. 
Tolmiros, Västra Götaland north of 
Gothenburg 1987, 200 tonnes spilled. 
Are there any previous oil spill 
exercises? 
No previous exercises found. No previous exercises found. 
Comments No contingency plan existed. 
 
Report available online from MSB (w/o 
appendices). 
Performance objectives are related to 
the organisations’ responsibilities. 
 
Report available online from MSB. 
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Reference Ljungkvist, E. (2003). Oljesanering på 
Österlenkusten efter “Fu Shan Hai:s” 
haveri 2003 (1st ed., pp. 1–40). Ystad: 
Sydöstra Skånes 
Räddningstjänstförbund. 
MSB, Hav. (2014). Oljepåslaget på 
Tjörn 2011 (No. MSB687) (pp. 1–
131). MSB. 
 
Question Exercises 
What was 
the name 
of the 
event? 
Matteus Skåne 
Nordväs
t 
Bleking
e 
Gotland Olivia BOILEX FSHex1
3 
Hedvig Barbro 
What year 
did the 
event 
take 
place? 
2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2013 2014 2014 
What was 
the name 
of the 
organisin
g 
organisati
on? 
Greater 
Gothenb
urg 
Rescue 
Service, 
Öckerö 
Rescue 
Service, 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG) 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
Municipa
lities of 
Ronneby 
and 
Karlskro
na, 
Southea
st 
Skåne’s 
Fire and 
Rescue 
Service, 
Western 
Blekinge 
Rescue 
Service 
Region 
Gotland, 
Southea
st 
Skåne’s 
Fire and 
Rescue 
Service, 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB) 
Greater 
Stockhol
m Fire 
Brigade 
(SSBF) 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB) 
and 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG) 
Southea
st 
Skåne’s 
Fire and 
Rescue 
Service 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Halland 
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What 
were the 
names of 
the other 
participan
t 
organisati
ons? 
Municipa
lity of 
Gothenb
urg and 
Öckerö, 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Västra 
Götalan
d, 
Europea
n 
Maritime 
Safety 
Agency 
(EMSA), 
Norwegi
an 
Coastal 
Administ
ration 
(NCA), 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB), 
Southea
st 
Skåne’s 
Fire and 
Rescue 
Service, 
Sweco, 
Swedish 
Wildlife 
Rehabilit
ators 
(KFV), 
Swedish 
Sea 
Rescue 
Society 
(SSRS), 
Defence 
Comma
nd 
Denmar
k (SOK) 
Municipa
lities of 
Ängelhol
m, 
Höganäs
, and 
Helsingb
org, 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG), 
IVL, 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Skåne, 
Port of 
Helsingb
org, 
Police, 
Southea
st 
Skåne’s 
Fire and 
Rescue 
Service. 
Swedish 
Sea 
Rescue 
Society 
(SSRS), 
Swedish 
Wildlife 
Rehabilit
ators 
(KFV), 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG), 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Blekinge
, 
municipa
lities of 
Karlsha
mn and 
Sölvesb
org, port 
of 
Karlsha
mn, 
Eastern 
Blekinge 
Rescue 
Service, 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB), 
Miljöförb
undet 
Blekinge 
Väst 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG), 
Greater 
Stockhol
m Fire 
Brigade 
(SSBF), 
Gotland 
Rescue 
Service, 
Swedish 
Wildlife 
Rehabilit
ators 
(KFV) 
Municipa
lities of 
Tyresö, 
Värmdö, 
Nynäsha
mn and 
Haninge, 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB), 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Stockhol
m, IVL, 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG), 
Södertör
n Fire 
Preventi
on 
covenan
t 
(SBFF), 
SOS 
Alarm, 
SL, 
Stockhol
m 
County 
Council, 
Swedish 
Police, 
TV, 
Traffic 
Stockhol
m, 
Swedish 
Wildlife 
Rehabilit
ators 
(KFV), 
Swedish 
Civil 
Defence 
League 
(FRG) 
Centre 
for 
Economi
c 
Develop
ment, 
Transpor
t and the 
Environ
ment in 
Southea
st 
Finland, 
Committ
ee for 
nature 
use, 
Environ
mental 
Protectio
n and 
Ecologic
al 
Safety, 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Stockhol
m, 
Europea
n 
Maritime 
Safety 
Agency 
(EMSA), 
Estonian 
Academ
y of 
Security 
Science
s, 
Estonian 
Environ
mental 
Inspecto
rate, 
Estonian 
Fund for 
Nature 
(ELF), 
Estonian 
Maritime 
Academ
y, 
Estonian 
Rescue 
Board, 
Finnish 
Environ
ment 
Institute 
(SYKE), 
Finnish 
ministry 
of the 
Environ
ment, 
Greater 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG), 
Swedish 
Maritime 
Administ
ration 
(SMA), 
Danish 
Emerge
ncy 
Manage
ment 
Agency 
(DEMA), 
Defence 
Comma
nd 
Denmar
k (SOK), 
Danish 
Police 
Municipa
lities of 
Båstad, 
Ängelhol
m, 
Höganäs
, 
Helsingb
org, 
Klippan/
Åstorp, 
and 
Landskr
ona 
 
Municipa
lities of 
Kungsba
cka, 
Varberg, 
Falkenb
erg, 
Halmsta
d, 
Laholm, 
and 
Hylte, 
Region 
Halland, 
Police 
Swedish 
Armed 
Forces, 
Regional 
Resourc
e Group 
(RRG), 
Sweco, 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG) 
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Stockhol
m Fire 
Brigade 
(SSBF), 
HAAGA-
HELIA 
Universit
y of 
Applied 
Science
s, 
Haninge 
municipa
lity, Itä-
Uusimaa 
regional 
rescue 
services, 
Jõeläht
me 
municipa
lity, 
Swedish 
Wildlife 
Rehabilit
ators 
(KFV), 
Kotka 
Maritime 
Researc
h 
Centre, 
Ministry 
of the 
Environ
ment of 
Estonia, 
Nacka 
municipa
lity, 
Nacka 
Värmdö 
räddning
ssällska
p, 
Nynäsha
mn 
municipa
lity, Port 
of 
Stockhol
m, 
Swedish 
Meteorol
ogical 
and 
Hydrolog
ical 
Institute 
(SMHI), 
Southwe
st 
Finland 
emergen
cy 
services, 
State 
Unitary 
Enterpris
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e, St 
Petersbu
rg 
emergen
cy 
service 
(SUE 
”PILARN
”), 
Sweco, 
Swedish 
Civil 
Defence 
League 
(FRG),  
Sweden, 
Swedish 
Sea 
Rescue 
Society 
(SSRS), 
Swedish 
Blue 
Star,  
Södertör
n Fire 
and 
Rescue 
Service 
(SBFF), 
Swedish 
Environ
ment 
and 
Health 
Protectio
n Union, 
Tyresö 
municipa
lity, 
Estonian 
Voluntee
r 
Reserve 
Rescue 
Team, 
West-
Estonia 
Voluntar
y 
Reserve 
Rescue 
Team, 
WWF 
Finland, 
Västra 
Nylands 
rescue 
service, 
Åland 
rescue 
service 
What kind 
of event 
was it? 
Full-
scale 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Full-
scale 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Function
al 
exercise 
Did the 
event 
have 
concrete 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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aims? 
How 
often is 
this 
exercise 
performe
d? 
Annually Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Biannual
ly 
Unique 
Which 
organisati
ons did 
the 
evaluator
s 
represent
? 
Swedish 
Coast 
Guard 
(SCG) 
and 
Greater 
Gothenb
urg 
Rescue 
Service, 
municipa
lity of 
Skien, 
Södra 
Älvsborg 
Fire & 
Rescue 
Services 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
Municipa
lity of 
Sölvesb
org, 
Eastern 
Blekinge 
Rescue 
Service, 
Helsingb
org 
Rescue 
Service, 
US 
Coast 
Guard 
Region 
Gotland 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Stockhol
m 
MSB, 
Committ
ee for 
nature 
use, 
environ
mental 
protectio
n and 
ecologic
al safety, 
St 
Petersbu
rg, SUE 
“Pilarn”, 
Estonian 
Rescue 
Board, 
Itä-
Uusimaa 
regional 
rescue 
services, 
SCG, 
KFV, 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Stockhol
m, US 
Coast 
Guard 
(USCG), 
IVL 
SMA, 
SCG, 
BRIDGE
, Crisis 
Training, 
SAAB 
Technol
ogy, 
Stockhol
m 
Universit
y, 
Danish 
Police, 
NJ 
Resourc
es 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
County 
Administ
rative 
Board of 
Halland, 
municipa
lities of 
Kungsba
cka, 
Varberg, 
Falkenb
erg, 
Halmsta
d, 
Laholm, 
and 
Hylte, 
Swedish 
Civil 
Continge
ncies 
Agency 
(MSB) 
What type 
of 
evaluatio
n is this? 
Both Internal Both Internal Internal Both Both Internal Both 
What year 
was the 
evaluatio
n written? 
2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Did the 
evaluatio
n have 
specific 
target 
groups? 
No No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Which 
method 
did the 
evaluatio
n use? 
MTO No 
specific 
method 
No 
specific 
method 
No 
specific 
method 
No 
specific 
method 
Accimap
, 
Deviatio
n 
investiga
tion, 
MTO, 
HSEEP 
EEG 
OSHBIP 
and 
AKKA 
No 
specific 
method 
Target 
based 
Did the 
evaluatio
n have 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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specific 
evaluatio
n 
criteria? 
Did the 
evaluatio
n have 
specific 
performa
nce 
objective
s? 
No No No No No No Yes No No 
Where 
did the 
evaluatio
n data 
come 
from? 
(Multiple 
answers 
possible) 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation, 
question
naires 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation, 
question
naires 
Evaluato
r notes 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation, 
question
naires 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation 
Evaluato
r notes, 
docume
ntation, 
question
naires 
Does the 
evaluatio
n refer to 
the 
contingen
cy plan? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does the 
evaluatio
n refer to 
earlier 
spills? 
No No No No No No Yes No No 
Does the 
evaluatio
n refer to 
earlier 
evaluatio
ns? 
No No No No No No Yes Yes No 
Does the 
evaluatio
n refer to 
response 
priorities
? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
How 
many 
pages did 
the 
evaluatio
n have? 
28 19 19 2 14 44 28 43 35 
How was 
the 
evaluatio
n 
distribute
d? 
(Multiple 
answers 
possible) 
Report, 
seminar 
Report Report Report Report Report, 
seminar
s 
Report, 
seminar
s 
Report Report, 
seminar 
Did the 
evaluatio
n have a 
dissemin
ation 
plan? 
No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Did the 
evaluatio
n have 
recomme
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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ndations? 
Did the 
recomme
ndations 
require a 
follow-
up? 
No No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Are there 
any 
previous 
oil spills? 
Unknow
n, 
Halland 
and 
Västra 
Götalan
d 
counties 
1992, 
200 
tonnes 
oil 
spilled. 
 
Eva 
Oden, 
Gothenb
urg 
1980, 
250 
tonnes 
spilled. 
Hual 
Trooper, 
the 
Sound 
1995, 
180 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Unknow
n, 
Torekov 
1988, 
200 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Sivona, 
the 
Sound 
1982, 
800 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Furenäs, 
the 
Sound 
1980, 
200 
tonnes 
spilled 
 
Rio 
Iquazu, 
the 
Sound 
1975, 
230 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Tärnsjö, 
the 
Sound 
1973, 
300 
tonnes 
spilled. 
Volgonef
t 263, 
Karlskro
na 1990, 
1,000 
tonnes 
oil 
spilled. 
Sefir, 
Öland 
1981, 
500 
tonnes 
spilled. 
José 
Martin, 
Dalarö 
1981, 
1,000 
tonnes 
spilled.  
 
Irini, 
Nynäsha
mn 
1970, 
1,000 
tonnes 
oil 
spilled. 
José 
Martin, 
Dalarö 
1981, 
1,000 
tonnes 
spilled.  
 
Irini, 
Nynäsha
mn 
1970, 
1,000 
tonnes 
oil 
spilled. 
Fu Shan 
Hai, 
Ystad 
2003, 
1,200 
tonnes 
spilled. 
Hual 
Trooper, 
the 
Sound 
1995, 
180 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Unknow
n, 
Torekov 
1988, 
200 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Sivona, 
the 
Sound 
1982, 
800 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Furenäs, 
the 
Sound 
1980, 
200 
tonnes 
spilled 
 
Rio 
Iquazu, 
the 
Sound 
1975, 
230 
tonnes 
spilled. 
 
Tärnsjö, 
the 
Sound 
1973, 
300 
tonnes 
spilled. 
Unknow
n, 
Halland 
and 
Västra 
Götalan
d 
counties 
1992, 
200 
tonnes 
oil 
spilled. 
Are there 
any 
previous 
oil spill 
exercises
? 
Copenh
agen 
Agreem
ent 
annual 
exercise
s, last in 
Karlsha
mn 
2009. 
does not 
usually 
No 
previous 
exercise
s found. 
No 
previous 
exercise
s found. 
At least 
one 
previous 
Copenh
agen 
agreeme
nt 
exercise. 
No 
previous 
exercise
s found. 
Previous 
Olivia 
exercise 
in 2011. 
No 
previous 
exercise
s found. 
Previous 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
exercise 
in 2010. 
No 
previous 
exercise
s found. 
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include 
shorelin
e 
respons
e. 
Comment
s 
Professi
onal 
evaluato
rs 
involved. 
 
The 
exercise 
develop
ment 
referred 
to the 
previous 
exercise. 
Short 
evaluatio
n 
focused 
on the 
lessons 
learned 
and not 
on 
methods
. 
Not a full 
evaluatio
n done. 
Due to 
miscom
municati
on, the 
evaluatio
n is 
instead 
a 
summar
y of 
commen
ts. 
Short 
evaluatio
n 
focused 
on the 
lessons 
learned 
and not 
on 
methods
. 
Preparat
ion 
exercise 
for the 
larger 
BOILEX. 
Many 
professi
onal 
evaluato
rs 
involved. 
 
Report 
available 
online 
from 
EnSaCo 
and 
MSB. 
Many 
professi
onal 
evaluato
rs 
involved. 
 
Report 
available 
online 
from 
Oceanus
. 
Short 
evaluatio
n 
focused 
on the 
lessons 
learned 
and not 
on 
methods
. 
 
Referenc
e 
Ljungkvi
st, E. 
(2011). 
Utvärder
ing 
Oljeskyd
dsövning 
Matteus 
21-22 
septemb
er 2010 
Götebor
g (pp. 1–
28). 
Götebor
g: MSB, 
Kustbev
akninge
n, 
Räddnin
gstjänste
n 
Storgöte
borg. 
Jönsson, 
C., & 
Svenbro, 
M. 
(2011). 
Oljeskyd
dsövning 
Skåne 
Nordväst 
26 
oktober 
2010 
(pp. 1–
19). 
Ängelhol
m: 
Helsingb
org & 
Ängelhol
m. 
Haglund, 
U. 
(2011). 
Oljeskyd
dsövning 
Blekinge 
för 
Övningsl
edning 
och 
utvärder
are (pp. 
1–19). 
Karlskro
na: 
Baltic 
Master 
II. 
Region 
Gotland. 
(2011). 
Minutes 
Övning 
Baltic 
Master II 
(pp. 1–
2). 
Visby: 
Region 
Gotland. 
Sjödin, 
T. 
(2011). 
Övning 
Olivia 
(pp. 1–
14). 
Länsstyr
elsen i 
Stockhol
ms län. 
MSB. 
(2012). 
BOILEX 
2011 
Final 
exercise 
report 
(No. 
2011-
2836) (7 
ed., pp. 
1–44). 
Stockhol
m: MSB. 
Ljungkvi
st, E., 
Munk, 
C., 
Mårtens
son, J., 
Rasmus
sen, F. 
K., 
Bloch, 
J., & 
Bergma
n, P. 
(2013). 
Utvärder
ing av 
FSHex1
3 (pp. 1–
28). 
Ystad: 
Oceanus
. 
Skåne 
Nordväst
. (2014). 
Övning 
Hedvig - 
Övnings
planerin
g i 
samverk
an (pp. 
1–12). 
Ängelhol
m: 
Skåne 
Nordväst
. 
Länsstyr
elsen 
Hallands 
Län. 
(2015). 
Övning 
Barbro – 
Utvärder
ingsrapp
ort - 
underlag 
vid 
utvärderi
ngssemi
narium 
(pp. 1–
35). 
Halmsta
d: 
Länsstyr
elsen 
Hallands 
Län. 
 
External	projects	
Participation in external projects from municipality and CAB questionnaire 
responses and municipalities listed as partners in EU projects. 
 
 Responses Listed CABs 
Exercise No exercise Exercise No exercise Exercise No exercise 
Project 12 1 33 6 4 0 
No project 23 13 39 42 5 1 
Total 35 14 72 48 9 1 
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Appendix	I	–	International	Practice	
Results	
RETOS™ Global Performance Analysis Results Level A evaluation scores of the 
examined countries. A yellow field means that a critical indicator is missing or only 
partially completed. 
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Denmark	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 100% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 81% 
Response Coordination 70% 
Health, Safety & Security 83% 
Operational Response 50% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 67% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 100% 
Training & Exercises 44% 
Sustainability & Improvements 90% 
Total 73% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  40/ 66 
Level A Overall Assessment: 73% (In Development ) 
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80%	100%	
Legislation, 
Regulations, 
Agreements 
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Planning 
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Coordination 
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Management 
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Training & Exercises 
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Improvements 
Denmark	
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Finland	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 100% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 80% 
Response Coordination 85% 
Health, Safety & Security 75% 
Operational Response 94% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 83% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 100% 
Training & Exercises 56% 
Sustainability & Improvements 83% 
Total 83% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  45/ 65 
Level A Overall Assessment: 83% (In Development ) 
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Germany	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 88% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 47% 
Response Coordination 65% 
Health, Safety & Security 50% 
Operational Response 56% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 50% 
Logistics 67% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 17% 
Training & Exercises 50% 
Sustainability & Improvements 70% 
Total 56% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  18/ 57 
Level A Overall Assessment: 56% (In Development ) 
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Germany	
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Latvia	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 88% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 59% 
Response Coordination 100% 
Health, Safety & Security 83% 
Operational Response 69% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 83% 
Logistics 42% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 33% 
Training & Exercises 50% 
Sustainability & Improvements 58% 
Total 66% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  33/ 68 
Level A Overall Assessment: 66% (In Development ) 
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Lithuania	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 100% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 62% 
Response Coordination 75% 
Health, Safety & Security 50% 
Operational Response 63% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 75% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 67% 
Training & Exercises 50% 
Sustainability & Improvements 42% 
Total 65% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  29/ 68 
Level A Overall Assessment: 65% (In Development ) 
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Norway	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 100% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 100% 
Response Coordination 100% 
Health, Safety & Security 100% 
Operational Response 100% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 92% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 100% 
Training & Exercises 100% 
Sustainability & Improvements 92% 
Total 98% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  61/ 63 
Level A Overall Assessment: 98% (Completed ) 
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Poland	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 75% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 66% 
Response Coordination 80% 
Health, Safety & Security 83% 
Operational Response 75% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 50% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 100% 
Training & Exercises 81% 
Sustainability & Improvements 67% 
Total 74% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  36/ 67 
Level A Overall Assessment: 74% (In Development ) 
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Russia	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 75% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 80% 
Response Coordination 100% 
Health, Safety & Security 50% 
Operational Response 79% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 67% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 50% 
Training & Exercises 64% 
Sustainability & Improvements 42% 
Total 74% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  32/ 63 
Level A Overall Assessment: 74% (In Development ) 
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Oil Spill Preparedness in Sweden   
429 
Sweden	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 63% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 73% 
Response Coordination 83% 
Health, Safety & Security 100% 
Operational Response 69% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 50% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 67% 
Training & Exercises 44% 
Sustainability & Improvements 67% 
Total 69% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  35/ 63 
Level A Overall Assessment: 69% (In Development ) 
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USA	RETOS™	evaluation	scores	
 
Category Value 
Legislation, Regulations, Agreements 100% 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 100% 
Response Coordination 100% 
Health, Safety & Security 100% 
Operational Response 100% 
Tracking, Assessment & Information Management 100% 
Logistics 92% 
Financial & Administrative Considerations 100% 
Training & Exercises 100% 
Sustainability & Improvements 100% 
Total 99% 
Institution Specific Criteria N/A 
#Completed / Number of questions:  67/ 68 
Level A Overall Assessment: 99% (Completed ) 
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